895 lines
26 KiB
C
895 lines
26 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1997 - 2005 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
|
|
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
|
|
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
|
|
* without specific prior written permission.
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "kadmin_locl.h"
|
|
#include <krb5-private.h>
|
|
|
|
static kadm5_ret_t check_aliases(kadm5_server_context *,
|
|
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *,
|
|
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *);
|
|
|
|
static kadm5_ret_t
|
|
kadmind_dispatch(void *kadm_handlep, krb5_boolean initial,
|
|
krb5_data *in, krb5_data *out)
|
|
{
|
|
kadm5_ret_t ret;
|
|
int32_t cmd, mask, kvno, tmp;
|
|
kadm5_server_context *contextp = kadm_handlep;
|
|
char client[128], name[128], name2[128];
|
|
const char *op = "";
|
|
krb5_principal princ = NULL, princ2 = NULL;
|
|
kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, ent_prev;
|
|
char *password = NULL, *expression;
|
|
krb5_keyblock *new_keys;
|
|
krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple = NULL;
|
|
int keepold = FALSE;
|
|
int n_ks_tuple = 0;
|
|
int n_keys;
|
|
char **princs;
|
|
int n_princs;
|
|
int keys_ok = 0;
|
|
krb5_storage *sp;
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, contextp->caller,
|
|
client, sizeof(client));
|
|
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_from_data(in);
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
krb5_ret_int32(sp, &cmd);
|
|
switch(cmd){
|
|
case kadm_get:{
|
|
op = "GET";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL;
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
|
|
/* If the caller doesn't have KADM5_PRIV_GET, we're done. */
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_GET, princ);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
/* Then check to see if it is ok to return keys */
|
|
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) != 0) {
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_GET_KEYS,
|
|
princ);
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
keys_ok = 1;
|
|
} else if ((mask == (KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KEY_DATA)) ||
|
|
(mask == (KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KVNO|KADM5_KEY_DATA))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Requests for keys will get bogus keys, which is useful if
|
|
* the client just wants to see what (kvno, enctype)s the
|
|
* principal has keys for, but terrible if the client wants to
|
|
* write the keys into a keytab or modify the principal and
|
|
* write the bogus keys back to the server.
|
|
*
|
|
* We use a heuristic to detect which case we're handling here.
|
|
* If the client only asks for the flags in the above
|
|
* condition, then it's very likely a kadmin ext_keytab,
|
|
* add_enctype, or other request that should not see bogus
|
|
* keys. We deny them.
|
|
*
|
|
* The kadmin get command can be coaxed into making a request
|
|
* with the same mask. But the default long and terse output
|
|
* modes request other things too, so in all likelihood this
|
|
* heuristic will not hurt any kadmin get uses.
|
|
*/
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, &ent, mask);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
if (ret == 0){
|
|
if (keys_ok)
|
|
kadm5_store_principal_ent(sp, &ent);
|
|
else
|
|
kadm5_store_principal_ent_nokeys(sp, &ent);
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_delete:{
|
|
op = "DELETE";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_DELETE, princ);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* There's no need to check that the caller has permission to
|
|
* delete the victim principal's aliases.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handlep, princ);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_create:{
|
|
op = "CREATE";
|
|
ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask);
|
|
if(ret){
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password);
|
|
if(ret){
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, ent.principal,
|
|
name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_ADD,
|
|
ent.principal);
|
|
if(ret){
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((mask & KADM5_TL_DATA)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Also check that the caller can create the aliases, if the
|
|
* new principal has any.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = check_aliases(contextp, &ent, NULL);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handlep, &ent,
|
|
mask, password);
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_modify:{
|
|
op = "MODIFY";
|
|
ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask);
|
|
if(ret){
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, ent.principal,
|
|
name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY,
|
|
ent.principal);
|
|
if(ret){
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((mask & KADM5_TL_DATA)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Also check that the caller can create aliases that are in
|
|
* the new entry but not the old one. There's no need to
|
|
* check that the caller can delete aliases it wants to
|
|
* drop. See also handling of rename.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handlep, ent.principal, &ent_prev, mask);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = check_aliases(contextp, &ent, &ent_prev);
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent_prev);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handlep, &ent, mask);
|
|
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_prune:{
|
|
op = "PRUNE";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &kvno);
|
|
if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) {
|
|
kvno = 0;
|
|
} else if (ret) {
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
ret = kadm5_prune_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, kvno);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_rename:{
|
|
op = "RENAME";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ2);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ2,
|
|
name2, sizeof(name2));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s -> %s",
|
|
client, op, name, name2);
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp,
|
|
KADM5_PRIV_ADD,
|
|
princ2);
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Also require modify for the principal. For backwards
|
|
* compatibility, allow delete permission on the old name to
|
|
* cure lack of modify permission on the old name.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp,
|
|
KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY,
|
|
princ);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp,
|
|
KADM5_PRIV_DELETE,
|
|
princ);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
ret = kadm5_rename_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, princ2);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_chpass:{
|
|
krb5_boolean is_self_cpw, allow_self_cpw;
|
|
|
|
op = "CHPASS";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold);
|
|
if (ret && ret != HEIM_ERR_EOF)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change password requests are subject to ACLs unless the principal is
|
|
* changing their own password and the initial ticket flag is set, and
|
|
* the allow_self_change_password configuration option is TRUE.
|
|
*/
|
|
is_self_cpw =
|
|
krb5_principal_compare(contextp->context, contextp->caller, princ);
|
|
allow_self_cpw =
|
|
krb5_config_get_bool_default(contextp->context, NULL, TRUE,
|
|
"kadmin", "allow_self_change_password", NULL);
|
|
if (!(is_self_cpw && initial && allow_self_cpw)) {
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold, 0, NULL,
|
|
password);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_chpass_with_key:{
|
|
int i;
|
|
krb5_key_data *key_data;
|
|
int n_key_data;
|
|
|
|
op = "CHPASS_WITH_KEY";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &n_key_data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold);
|
|
if (ret && ret != HEIM_ERR_EOF)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
/* n_key_data will be squeezed into an int16_t below. */
|
|
if (n_key_data < 0 || n_key_data >= 1 << 16 ||
|
|
(size_t)n_key_data > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*key_data)) {
|
|
ret = ERANGE;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_data = malloc (n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data));
|
|
if (key_data == NULL && n_key_data != 0) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; ++i) {
|
|
ret = kadm5_ret_key_data (sp, &key_data[i]);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
int16_t dummy = i;
|
|
|
|
kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data);
|
|
free (key_data);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The change is only allowed if the user is on the CPW ACL,
|
|
* this it to force password quality check on the user.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
|
|
if(ret) {
|
|
int16_t dummy = n_key_data;
|
|
|
|
kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data);
|
|
free (key_data);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold,
|
|
n_key_data, key_data);
|
|
{
|
|
int16_t dummy = n_key_data;
|
|
kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data);
|
|
}
|
|
free (key_data);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_randkey:{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
op = "RANDKEY";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
|
|
/*
|
|
* The change is allowed if at least one of:
|
|
* a) it's for the principal him/herself and this was an initial ticket
|
|
* b) the user is on the CPW ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (initial
|
|
&& krb5_principal_compare (contextp->context, contextp->caller,
|
|
princ))
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* See comments in kadm5_c_randkey_principal() regarding the
|
|
* protocol.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold);
|
|
if (ret != 0 && ret != HEIM_ERR_EOF)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &n_ks_tuple);
|
|
if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) {
|
|
const char *enctypes;
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
|
|
enctypes = krb5_config_get_string(contextp->context, NULL,
|
|
"realms",
|
|
krb5_principal_get_realm(contextp->context,
|
|
princ),
|
|
"supported_enctypes", NULL);
|
|
if (enctypes == NULL || enctypes[0] == '\0')
|
|
enctypes = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96";
|
|
ret = krb5_string_to_keysalts2(contextp->context, enctypes,
|
|
&n, &ks_tuple);
|
|
n_ks_tuple = n;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret != 0)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
if (n_ks_tuple < 0) {
|
|
ret = EOVERFLOW;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ks_tuple = calloc(n_ks_tuple, sizeof (*ks_tuple))) == NULL) {
|
|
ret = errno;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n_ks_tuple; i++) {
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ks_tuple[i].ks_enctype);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
free(ks_tuple);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ks_tuple[i].ks_salttype);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
free(ks_tuple);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ret = kadm5_randkey_principal_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold,
|
|
n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &new_keys,
|
|
&n_keys);
|
|
free(ks_tuple);
|
|
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
if (ret == 0){
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, n_keys);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++){
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
ret = krb5_store_keyblock(sp, new_keys[i]);
|
|
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(contextp->context, &new_keys[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
free(new_keys);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_get_privs:{
|
|
uint32_t privs;
|
|
ret = kadm5_get_privs(kadm_handlep, &privs);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
if(ret == 0)
|
|
krb5_store_uint32(sp, privs);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case kadm_get_princs:{
|
|
op = "LIST";
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
if(tmp){
|
|
ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &expression);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}else
|
|
expression = NULL;
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op,
|
|
expression ? expression : "*");
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_LIST, NULL);
|
|
if(ret){
|
|
free(expression);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = kadm5_get_principals(kadm_handlep, expression, &princs, &n_princs);
|
|
free(expression);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
if(ret == 0){
|
|
int i;
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, n_princs);
|
|
for(i = 0; i < n_princs; i++)
|
|
krb5_store_string(sp, princs[i]);
|
|
kadm5_free_name_list(kadm_handlep, princs, &n_princs);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: UNKNOWN OP %d", client, cmd);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
|
|
if (sp == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, KADM5_FAILURE);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (password != NULL) {
|
|
len = strlen(password);
|
|
memset_s(password, len, 0, len);
|
|
free(password);
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
if (princ != NULL)
|
|
krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ);
|
|
if (princ2 != NULL)
|
|
krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ2);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
fail:
|
|
if (password != NULL) {
|
|
len = strlen(password);
|
|
memset_s(password, len, 0, len);
|
|
free(password);
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_warn(contextp->context, ret, "%s", op);
|
|
if (sp != NULL) {
|
|
krb5_storage_seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET);
|
|
krb5_store_int32(sp, ret);
|
|
krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out);
|
|
krb5_storage_free(sp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (princ != NULL)
|
|
krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ);
|
|
if (princ2 != NULL)
|
|
krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ2);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct iter_aliases_ctx {
|
|
HDB_Ext_Aliases aliases;
|
|
krb5_tl_data *tl;
|
|
int alias_idx;
|
|
int done;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static kadm5_ret_t
|
|
iter_aliases(kadm5_principal_ent_rec *from,
|
|
struct iter_aliases_ctx *ctx,
|
|
krb5_principal *out)
|
|
{
|
|
HDB_extension ext;
|
|
kadm5_ret_t ret;
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
|
|
*out = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->done > 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->done == 0) {
|
|
if (ctx->alias_idx < ctx->aliases.aliases.len) {
|
|
*out = &ctx->aliases.aliases.val[ctx->alias_idx++];
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Out of aliases in this TL, step to next TL */
|
|
ctx->tl = ctx->tl->tl_data_next;
|
|
} else if (ctx->done < 0) {
|
|
/* Setup iteration context */
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
ctx->done = 0;
|
|
ctx->aliases.aliases.val = NULL;
|
|
ctx->aliases.aliases.len = 0;
|
|
ctx->tl = from->tl_data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&ctx->aliases);
|
|
ctx->alias_idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Find TL with aliases */
|
|
for (; ctx->tl != NULL; ctx->tl = ctx->tl->tl_data_next) {
|
|
if (ctx->tl->tl_data_type != KRB5_TL_EXTENSION)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
ret = decode_HDB_extension(ctx->tl->tl_data_contents,
|
|
ctx->tl->tl_data_length,
|
|
&ext, &size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (ext.data.element == choice_HDB_extension_data_aliases &&
|
|
ext.data.u.aliases.aliases.len > 0) {
|
|
ctx->aliases = ext.data.u.aliases;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
free_HDB_extension(&ext);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->tl != NULL && ctx->aliases.aliases.len > 0) {
|
|
*out = &ctx->aliases.aliases.val[ctx->alias_idx++];
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->done = 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static kadm5_ret_t
|
|
check_aliases(kadm5_server_context *contextp,
|
|
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *add_princ,
|
|
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *del_princ)
|
|
{
|
|
kadm5_ret_t ret;
|
|
struct iter_aliases_ctx iter;
|
|
struct iter_aliases_ctx iter_del;
|
|
krb5_principal new_name, old_name;
|
|
int match;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yeah, this is O(N^2). Gathering and sorting all the aliases
|
|
* would be a bit of a pain; if we ever have principals with enough
|
|
* aliases for this to be a problem, we can fix it then.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (iter.done = -1; iter.done != 1;) {
|
|
match = 0;
|
|
ret = iter_aliases(add_princ, &iter, &new_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (iter.done == 1)
|
|
break;
|
|
for (iter_del.done = -1; iter_del.done != 1;) {
|
|
ret = iter_aliases(del_princ, &iter_del, &old_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (iter_del.done == 1)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (!krb5_principal_compare(contextp->context, new_name, old_name))
|
|
continue;
|
|
free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&iter_del.aliases);
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (match)
|
|
continue;
|
|
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_ADD, new_name);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&iter.aliases);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
v5_loop (krb5_context contextp,
|
|
krb5_auth_context ac,
|
|
krb5_boolean initial,
|
|
void *kadm_handlep,
|
|
krb5_socket_t fd)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
krb5_data in, out;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
doing_useful_work = 0;
|
|
if(term_flag)
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
ret = krb5_read_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, &in);
|
|
if(ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF)
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message");
|
|
doing_useful_work = 1;
|
|
ret = kadmind_dispatch(kadm_handlep, initial, &in, &out);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "kadmind_dispatch");
|
|
krb5_data_free(&in);
|
|
ret = krb5_write_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, &out);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_boolean
|
|
match_appl_version(const void *data, const char *appl_version)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned minor;
|
|
if(sscanf(appl_version, "KADM0.%u", &minor) != 1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*XXX*/
|
|
*(unsigned*)(intptr_t)data = minor;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
handle_v5(krb5_context contextp,
|
|
krb5_keytab keytab,
|
|
krb5_socket_t fd)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
krb5_ticket *ticket;
|
|
char *server_name;
|
|
char *client;
|
|
void *kadm_handlep;
|
|
krb5_boolean initial;
|
|
krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned kadm_version = 1;
|
|
kadm5_config_params realm_params;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_recvauth_match_version(contextp, &ac, &fd,
|
|
match_appl_version, &kadm_version,
|
|
NULL, KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION,
|
|
keytab, &ticket);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth");
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_unparse_name (contextp, ticket->server, &server_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
krb5_err (contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp (server_name, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE,
|
|
strlen(KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE)) != 0)
|
|
krb5_errx (contextp, 1, "ticket for strange principal (%s)",
|
|
server_name);
|
|
|
|
free (server_name);
|
|
|
|
memset(&realm_params, 0, sizeof(realm_params));
|
|
|
|
if(kadm_version == 1) {
|
|
krb5_data params;
|
|
ret = krb5_read_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, ¶ms);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message");
|
|
_kadm5_unmarshal_params(contextp, ¶ms, &realm_params);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
initial = ticket->ticket.flags.initial;
|
|
ret = krb5_unparse_name(contextp, ticket->client, &client);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
krb5_err (contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
|
|
krb5_free_ticket (contextp, ticket);
|
|
ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(contextp,
|
|
client,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE,
|
|
&realm_params,
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
&kadm_handlep);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
krb5_err (contextp, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx");
|
|
v5_loop (contextp, ac, initial, kadm_handlep, fd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
krb5_error_code
|
|
kadmind_loop(krb5_context contextp,
|
|
krb5_keytab keytab,
|
|
krb5_socket_t sock)
|
|
{
|
|
u_char buf[sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION) + 4];
|
|
ssize_t n;
|
|
unsigned long len;
|
|
|
|
n = krb5_net_read(contextp, &sock, buf, 4);
|
|
if(n == 0)
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
if(n < 0)
|
|
krb5_err(contextp, 1, errno, "read");
|
|
_krb5_get_int(buf, &len, 4);
|
|
|
|
if (len == sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)) {
|
|
|
|
n = krb5_net_read(contextp, &sock, buf + 4, len);
|
|
if (n < 0)
|
|
krb5_err (contextp, 1, errno, "reading sendauth version");
|
|
if (n == 0)
|
|
krb5_errx (contextp, 1, "EOF reading sendauth version");
|
|
|
|
if(memcmp(buf + 4, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) == 0) {
|
|
handle_v5(contextp, keytab, sock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
len += 4;
|
|
} else
|
|
len = 4;
|
|
|
|
handle_mit(contextp, buf, len, sock);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|