This fixes the following problems from #210:
- hdb_ldap doesn't load even when installed correctly
- loadable hdb backends not listed by kdc --builtin-hdb
Not fixed:
- hdb_ldap.so not installed in plugin dir
In hdb_ldap_common() the test
if (search_base == NULL && search_base[0] == '\0')
error handling ...
must be
if (search_base == NULL || search_base[0] == '\0')
error handling ...
Change-Id: I8d876a9c56833431b3c4b582fbb0a8cc7353893d
This adds a new backend for libhcrypto: the OpenSSL backend.
Now libhcrypto has these backends:
- hcrypto itself (i.e., the algorithms coded in lib/hcrypto)
- Common Crypto (OS X)
- PKCS#11 (specifically for Solaris, but not Solaris-specific)
- Windows CNG (Windows)
- OpenSSL (generic)
The ./configure --with-openssl=... option no longer disables the use of
hcrypto. Instead it enables the use of OpenSSL as a (and the default)
backend in libhcrypto. The libhcrypto framework is now always used.
OpenSSL should no longer be used directly within Heimdal, except in the
OpenSSL hcrypto backend itself, and files where elliptic curve (EC)
crypto is needed.
Because libhcrypto's EC support is incomplete, we can only use OpenSSL
for EC. Currently that means separating all EC-using code so that it
does not use hcrypto, thus the libhx509/hxtool and PKINIT EC code has
been moved out of the files it used to be in.
The hdb_method functions cannot be KRB5_LIB_CALL as lib/hdb is not
lib/krb5. KRB5_LIB_CALL will be inconsistently defined.
This inconsistency resulted in crashes of test_hdbplugin on 32-bit
Windows.
Change-Id: I4cf8d3ef76f31a3cae923df234a19610d956e7ee
When new keys are added (typically via kadm5_setkey_principal_3),
truncate the key history to remove old keys, that is keys older than
the newest key which was in effect prior longer ago than the principal's
maximum ticket lifetime. This feature is controlled via the "[kadmin]"
section's "prune-key-history" boolean parameter, which defaults to false.
Currently this happens only when kadm5_setkey_principal_3()
is called directly on the server, the client API simulates
kadm5_setkey_principal_3() via a get, update, modify sequence that does
not prune the key history. The plan is to add a new kadm5 protocol RPC
and convert clients to call that instead.
In setkey_principal_3 seal keys after entry key update
Also, for now, don't check the return value of kadm5_log_modify() in
the new kadm5_s_setkey_principal_3(). This has to be addressed more
globally.
Censor stale keys in kadm5_s_get_principal
We used to update the iprop log and HDB in different orders depending on
the kadm5 operation, which then led to various race conditions.
The iprop log now functions as a two-phase commit (with roll forward)
log for HDB changes. The log is auto-truncated, keeping the latest
entries that fit in a configurable maximum number of bytes (defaults to
50MB). See the log-max-size parameter description in krb5.conf(5).
The iprop log format and the protocol remain backwards-compatible with
earlier versions of Heimdal. This is NOT a flag-day; there is NO need
to update all the slaves at once with the master, though it is advisable
in general. Rolling upgrades and downgrades should work.
The sequence of updates is now (with HDB and log open and locked):
a) check that the HDB operation will succeed if attempted,
b) append to iprop log and fsync() it,
c) write to HDB (which should fsync()),
d) mark last log record committed (no fsync in this case).
Every kadm5 write operation recover transactions not yet confirmed as
committed, thus there can be at most one unconfirmed commit on a master
KDC.
Reads via kadm5_get_principal() also attempt to lock the log, and if
successful, recover unconfirmed transactions; readers must have write
access and must win any race to lock the iprop log.
The ipropd-master daemon also attempts to recover unconfirmed
transactions when idle.
The log now starts with a nop record whose payload records the offset of
the logical end of the log: the end of the last confirmed committed
transaction. This is kown as the "uber record". Its purpose is
two-fold: act as the confirmation of committed transactions, and provide
an O(1) method of finding the end of the log (i.e., without having to
traverse the entire log front to back).
Two-phase commit makes all kadm5 writes single-operation atomic
transactions (though some kadm5 operations, such as renames of
principals, and changes to principals' aliases, use multiple low-level
HDB write operations, but still all in one transaction). One can still
hold a lock on the HDB across many operations (e.g., by using the lock
command in a kadmin -l or calling kadm5_lock()) in order to push
multiple transactions in sequence, but this sequence will not be atomic
if the process or host crashes in the middle.
As before, HDB writes which do not go through the kadm5 API are excluded
from all of this, but there should be no such writes.
Lastly, the iprop-log(1) command is enhanced as follows:
- The dump, last-version, truncate, and replay sub-commands now have an
option to not lock the log. This is useful for inspecting a running
system's log file, especially on slave KDCs.
- The dump, last-version, truncate, and replay sub-commands now take an
optional iprop log file positional argument, so that they may be used
to inspect log files other than the running system's
configured/default log file.
Extensive code review and some re-writing for clarity by Viktor Dukhovni.
A careful code review was undertaken, and it was determined
that the best way to store the extended attributes was in a
native ASN1 encoded field. LDAP does not understand the
SEQUENCE of SEQUENCE structures used extensively throughout
the extended attributes structure, and there was already a
precedent set for storing the krb5Key data in a native ASN1
encoded field.
A backend can return this if asked with HDB_F_GET_CLIENT|HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
for a KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL record or for HDB_F_GET_SERVER | HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ.
entry_ex->entry.principal->realm needs to return the real realm of the principal
(or at least a the realm of the next cross-realm trust hop).
This is needed to route enterprise principals between AD domain trusts.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Modify the NTMakefile rules for tests so that a failed test does
not prevent subsequent tests from being executed.
Change-Id: I9595ad4a1527feae7c402241bf06ab21a0b76d4a
Prior to this change hdb_unseal_keys_kvno() could return successfully (0)
if the choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys extension was found but the
hist_keys list was empty. As a side effect callers would believe that the
provide hdb_entry keys were unsealed when they weren't. This could cause
the KDC or kadmin to report invalid key size errors.
If the extension is present and the history list is empty attempt to
unseal the provided hdb_entry using hdb_unseal_keys_mkey().
Change-Id: I9218b02bccdbcf22133a9464a677374db53ade85
The hdb_ldap_create and hdb_ldapi_create prototypes use the "static"
keyword, but the functions themselves are not implemented as static.
Heimdal's buildsystem dynamically adds function declarations to
hdb-protos.h based on the actual function implementations. Those
declarations in hdb-protos.h are not declared as static.
Since the build system generates the declarations dynamically, just
remove them from hdb-ldap.c.
The use of the wrong value for the length of ":mkey=" was identified
by Brian May and reported via github:
https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues/40
Change-Id: I0aed86a5bb0359b7a266369076fde5e62f23b5fe
