Add support for just integrity protecting. Implement and use

`gss_krb5_getsomekey'. Fix bug in checking of pad.


git-svn-id: svn://svn.h5l.se/heimdal/trunk/heimdal@4655 ec53bebd-3082-4978-b11e-865c3cabbd6b
This commit is contained in:
Johan Danielsson
1998-03-23 22:50:41 +00:00
parent c309115820
commit aab481a09a
2 changed files with 110 additions and 68 deletions

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska H<>gskolan
* Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska H<>gskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -40,6 +40,30 @@
RCSID("$Id$");
OM_uint32
gss_krb5_getsomekey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
des_cblock *key)
{
/* XXX this is ugly, and probably incorrect... */
krb5_keyblock *skey;
krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&skey);
if(skey == NULL)
krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&skey);
if(skey == NULL)
krb5_auth_con_getkey(gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&skey);
if(skey == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
memcpy(key, skey->keyvalue.data, sizeof(*key));
krb5_free_keyblock(gssapi_krb5_context, skey);
return 0;
}
OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
@@ -60,6 +84,7 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
int32_t seq_number;
size_t padlength;
OM_uint32 ret;
int cstate;
p = input_message_buffer->value;
ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p,
@@ -71,9 +96,15 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
p += 2;
if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) == 0) {
cstate = 1;
} else if (memcmp (p, "\xFF\xFF", 2) == 0) {
cstate = 0;
} else
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
p += 2;
if(conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = cstate;
if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
p += 2;
@@ -81,34 +112,29 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
len = p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value;
/* decrypt data */
memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero));
#if 0
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->key.keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
#endif
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->remote_subkey->keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
key[i] ^= 0xf0;
des_set_key (&key, schedule);
des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p,
(des_cblock *)p,
input_message_buffer->length - len,
schedule,
&zero,
DES_DECRYPT);
memset (key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule));
if(cstate) {
/* decrypt data */
gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
key[i] ^= 0xf0;
des_set_key (&key, schedule);
memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero));
des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p,
(des_cblock *)p,
input_message_buffer->length - len,
schedule,
&zero,
DES_DECRYPT);
memset (key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule));
}
/* check pad */
pad = (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value + input_message_buffer->length - 1;
padlength = *pad;
for (i = padlength; i >= 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--)
for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--)
;
if (i != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
@@ -119,12 +145,7 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
md5_finito (&md5, hash);
memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero));
#if 0
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->key.keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
#endif
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->remote_subkey->keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key);
des_set_key (&key, schedule);
des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)hash,
(des_cblock *)hash, sizeof(hash), schedule, &zero);
@@ -165,8 +186,8 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length
- len - 8 - padlength;
output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length);
if(output_message_buffer->value == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if(output_message_buffer->length != 0 && output_message_buffer->value == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
memcpy (output_message_buffer->value,
p + 24,
output_message_buffer->length);

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska H<>gskolan
* Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska H<>gskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -40,6 +40,30 @@
RCSID("$Id$");
OM_uint32
gss_krb5_getsomekey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
des_cblock *key)
{
/* XXX this is ugly, and probably incorrect... */
krb5_keyblock *skey;
krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&skey);
if(skey == NULL)
krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&skey);
if(skey == NULL)
krb5_auth_con_getkey(gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&skey);
if(skey == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
memcpy(key, skey->keyvalue.data, sizeof(*key));
krb5_free_keyblock(gssapi_krb5_context, skey);
return 0;
}
OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
@@ -60,6 +84,7 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
int32_t seq_number;
size_t padlength;
OM_uint32 ret;
int cstate;
p = input_message_buffer->value;
ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p,
@@ -71,9 +96,15 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
p += 2;
if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) == 0) {
cstate = 1;
} else if (memcmp (p, "\xFF\xFF", 2) == 0) {
cstate = 0;
} else
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
p += 2;
if(conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = cstate;
if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
p += 2;
@@ -81,34 +112,29 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
len = p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value;
/* decrypt data */
memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero));
#if 0
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->key.keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
#endif
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->remote_subkey->keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
key[i] ^= 0xf0;
des_set_key (&key, schedule);
des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p,
(des_cblock *)p,
input_message_buffer->length - len,
schedule,
&zero,
DES_DECRYPT);
memset (key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule));
if(cstate) {
/* decrypt data */
gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
key[i] ^= 0xf0;
des_set_key (&key, schedule);
memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero));
des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p,
(des_cblock *)p,
input_message_buffer->length - len,
schedule,
&zero,
DES_DECRYPT);
memset (key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule));
}
/* check pad */
pad = (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value + input_message_buffer->length - 1;
padlength = *pad;
for (i = padlength; i >= 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--)
for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--)
;
if (i != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
@@ -119,12 +145,7 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
md5_finito (&md5, hash);
memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero));
#if 0
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->key.keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
#endif
memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->remote_subkey->keyvalue.data,
sizeof(key));
gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key);
des_set_key (&key, schedule);
des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)hash,
(des_cblock *)hash, sizeof(hash), schedule, &zero);
@@ -165,8 +186,8 @@ OM_uint32 gss_unwrap
output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length
- len - 8 - padlength;
output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length);
if(output_message_buffer->value == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if(output_message_buffer->length != 0 && output_message_buffer->value == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
memcpy (output_message_buffer->value,
p + 24,
output_message_buffer->length);