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Network Working Group L. Zhu
Request for Comments: 4557 K. Jaganathan
Category: Standards Track Microsoft Corporation
N. Williams
Sun Microsystems
June 2006
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Support for
Public Key Cryptography for
Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document defines a mechanism to enable in-band transmission of
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses in the Kerberos
network authentication protocol. These responses are used to verify
the validity of the certificates used in Public Key Cryptography for
Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT), which is the Kerberos
Version 5 extension that provides for the use of public key
cryptography.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................2
3. Message Definition ..............................................2
4. Security Considerations .........................................3
5. Acknowledgements ................................................4
6. References ......................................................4
6.1. Normative References .......................................4
6.2. Informative References .....................................4
Zhu, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 4557 OCSP Support for PKINIT June 2006
1. Introduction
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560] enables
applications to obtain timely information regarding the revocation
status of a certificate. Because OCSP responses are well bounded and
small in size, constrained clients may wish to use OCSP to check the
validity of the certificates for Kerberos Key Distribution Center
(KDC) in order to avoid transmission of large Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs) and therefore save bandwidth on constrained networks
[OCSP-PROFILE].
This document defines a pre-authentication type [RFC4120], where the
client and the KDC MAY piggyback OCSP responses for certificates used
in authentication exchanges, as defined in [RFC4556].
By using this OPTIONAL extension, PKINIT clients and the KDC can
maximize the reuse of cached OCSP responses.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Message Definition
A pre-authentication type identifier is defined for this mechanism:
PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE 18
The corresponding padata-value field [RFC4120] contains the DER [X60]
encoding of the following ASN.1 type:
PKOcspData ::= SEQUENCE OF OcspResponse
-- If more than one OcspResponse is
-- included, the first OcspResponse
-- MUST contain the OCSP response
-- for the signer's certificate.
-- The signer refers to the client for
-- AS-REQ, and the KDC for the AS-REP,
-- respectively.
OcspResponse ::= OCTET STRING
-- Contains a complete OCSP response,
-- as defined in [RFC2560].
The client MAY send OCSP responses for certificates used in PA-PK-
AS-REQ [RFC4556] via a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE.
Zhu, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 4557 OCSP Support for PKINIT June 2006
The KDC that receives a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE SHOULD send a PA-PK-
OCSP-RESPONSE containing OCSP responses for certificates used in the
KDC's PA-PK-AS-REP. The client can request a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE by
using a PKOcspData containing an empty sequence.
The KDC MAY send a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE when it does not receive a
PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE from the client.
The PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE sent by the KDC contains OCSP responses for
certificates used in PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556].
Note the lack of integrity protection for the empty or missing OCSP
response; lack of an expected OCSP response from the KDC for the
KDC's certificates SHOULD be treated as an error by the client,
unless it is configured otherwise.
When using OCSP, the response is signed by the OCSP server, which is
trusted by the receiver. Depending on local policy, further
verification of the validity of the OCSP servers may be needed
The client and the KDC SHOULD ignore invalid OCSP responses received
via this mechanism, and they MAY implement CRL processing logic as a
fall-back position, if the OCSP responses received via this mechanism
alone are not sufficient for the verification of certificate
validity. The client and/or the KDC MAY ignore a valid OCSP response
and perform its own revocation status verification independently.
4. Security Considerations
The pre-authentication data in this document do not actually
authenticate any principals, but are designed to be used in
conjunction with PKINIT.
There is no binding between PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE pre-authentication
data and PKINIT pre-authentication data other than a given OCSP
response corresponding to a certificate used in a PKINIT pre-
authentication data element. Attacks involving removal or
replacement of PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE pre-authentication data elements
are, at worst, downgrade attacks, where a PKINIT client or KDC would
proceed without use of CRLs or OCSP for certificate validation, or
denial-of-service attacks, where a PKINIT client or KDC that cannot
validate the other's certificate without an accompanying OCSP
response might reject the AS exchange or might have to download very
large CRLs in order to continue. Kerberos V does not protect against
denial-of-service attacks; therefore, the denial-of-service aspect of
these attacks is acceptable.
Zhu, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 4557 OCSP Support for PKINIT June 2006
If a PKINIT client or KDC cannot validate certificates without the
aid of a valid PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE, then it SHOULD fail the AS
exchange, possibly according to local configuration.
5. Acknowledgements
This document was based on conversations among the authors, Jeffrey
Altman, Sam Hartman, Martin Rex, and other members of the Kerberos
working group.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and
C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
June 1999.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC
4120, July 2005.
[RFC4556] Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for
Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC
4556, June 2006.
[X690] ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), ITU-T
Recommendation X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC International
Standard 8825-1:1998.
6.2. Informative References
[OCSP-PROFILE] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "Lightweight OCSP Profile for
High Volume Environments", Work in Progress, May 2006.
Zhu, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 4557 OCSP Support for PKINIT June 2006
Authors' Addresses
Larry Zhu
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
EMail: lzhu@microsoft.com
Karthik Jaganathan
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
EMail: karthikj@microsoft.com
Nicolas Williams
Sun Microsystems
5300 Riata Trace Ct
Austin, TX 78727
US
EMail: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
Zhu, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 4557 OCSP Support for PKINIT June 2006
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
Zhu, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]

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Network Working Group K. Jaganathan
Request for Comments: 4559 L. Zhu
Category: Informational J. Brezak
Microsoft Corporation
June 2006
SPNEGO-based Kerberos and NTLM HTTP Authentication
in Microsoft Windows
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document describes how the Microsoft Internet Explorer (MSIE)
and Internet Information Services (IIS) incorporated in Microsoft
Windows 2000 use Kerberos for security enhancements of web
transactions. The Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) auth-scheme of
"negotiate" is defined here; when the negotiation results in the
selection of Kerberos, the security services of authentication and,
optionally, impersonation (the IIS server assumes the windows
identity of the principal that has been authenticated) are performed.
This document explains how HTTP authentication utilizes the Simple
and Protected GSS-API Negotiation mechanism. Details of Simple And
Protected Negotiate (SPNEGO) implementation are not provided in this
document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................2
3. Access Authentication ...........................................2
3.1. Reliance on the HTTP/1.1 Specification .....................2
4. HTTP Negotiate Authentication Scheme ............................2
4.1. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header .......................2
5. Negotiate Operation Example .....................................4
6. Security Considerations .........................................5
7. Normative References ............................................6
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 4559 HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows June 2006
1. Introduction
Microsoft has provided support for Kerberos authentication in
Microsoft Internet Explorer (MSIE) and Internet Information Services
(IIS), in addition to other mechanisms. This provides the benefits
of the Kerberos v5 protocol for Web applications.
Support for Kerberos authentication is based on other previously
defined mechanisms, such as SPNEGO Simple And Protected Negotiate
(SPNEGO) [RFC4178] and the Generic Security Services Application
Program Interface(GSSAPI).
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Access Authentication
3.1. Reliance on the HTTP/1.1 Specification
This specification is a companion to the HTTP/1.1 specification
[RFC2616], and it builds on the authentication mechanisms defined in
[RFC2617]. It uses the augmented BNF section of that document (2.1),
and it relies on both the non-terminals defined in that document and
other aspects of the HTTP/1.1 specification.
4. HTTP Negotiate Authentication Scheme
Use of Kerberos is wrapped in an HTTP auth-scheme of "Negotiate".
The auth-params exchanged use data formats defined for use with the
GSS-API [RFC2743]. In particular, they follow the formats set for
the SPNEGO [RFC4178] and Kerberos [RFC4121] mechanisms for GSSAPI.
The "Negotiate" auth-scheme calls for the use of SPNEGO GSSAPI tokens
that the specific mechanism type specifies.
The current implementation of this protocol is limited to the use of
SPNEGO with the Kerberos and Microsoft(NT Lan Manager) NTLM
protocols.
4.1. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header
If the server receives a request for an access-protected object, and
if an acceptable Authorization header has not been sent, the server
responds with a "401 Unauthorized" status code, and a "WWW-
Authenticate:" header as per the framework described in [RFC2616].
The initial WWW-Authenticate header will not carry any gssapi-data.
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 4559 HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows June 2006
The negotiate scheme will operate as follows:
challenge = "Negotiate" auth-data
auth-data = 1#( [gssapi-data] )
The meanings of the values of the directives used above are as
follows:
gssapi-data
If the gss_accept_security_context returns a token for the client,
this directive contains the base64 encoding of an
initialContextToken, as defined in [RFC2743]. This is not present in
the initial response from the server.
A status code 200 status response can also carry a "WWW-Authenticate"
response header containing the final leg of an authentication. In
this case, the gssapi-data will be present. Before using the
contents of the response, the gssapi-data should be processed by
gss_init_security_context to determine the state of the security
context. If this function indicates success, the response can be
used by the application. Otherwise, an appropriate action, based on
the authentication status, should be taken.
For example, the authentication could have failed on the final leg if
mutual authentication was requested and the server was not able to
prove its identity. In this case, the returned results are suspect.
It is not always possible to mutually authenticate the server before
the HTTP operation. POST methods are in this category.
When the Kerberos Version 5 GSSAPI mechanism [RFC4121] is being used,
the HTTP server will be using a principal name of the form of
"HTTP/hostname".
4.2. The Authorization Request Header
Upon receipt of the response containing a "WWW-Authenticate" header
from the server, the client is expected to retry the HTTP request,
passing a HTTP "Authorization" header line. This is defined
according to the framework described in [RFC2616] and is utilized as
follows:
credentials = "Negotiate" auth-data2
auth-data2 = 1#( gssapi-data )
gssapi-data
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 4559 HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows June 2006
This directive contains the base64 encoding of an
InitialContextToken, as defined in [RFC2743].
Any returned code other than a success 2xx code represents an
authentication error. If a 401 containing a "WWW-Authenticate"
header with "Negotiate" and gssapi-data is returned from the server,
it is a continuation of the authentication request.
A client may initiate a connection to the server with an
"Authorization" header containing the initial token for the server.
This form will bypass the initial 401 error from the server when the
client knows that the server will accept the Negotiate HTTP
authentication type.
5. Negotiate Operation Example
The client requests an access-protected document from server via a
GET method request. The URI of the document is
"http://www.nowhere.org/dir/index.html".
C: GET dir/index.html
The first time the client requests the document, no Authorization
header is sent, so the server responds with
S: HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
S: WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate
The client will obtain the user credentials using the SPNEGO GSSAPI
mechanism type to identify generate a GSSAPI message to be sent to
the server with a new request, including the following Authorization
header:
C: GET dir/index.html
C: Authorization: Negotiate a87421000492aa874209af8bc028
The server will decode the gssapi-data and pass this to the SPNEGO
GSSAPI mechanism in the gss_accept_security_context function. If the
context is not complete, the server will respond with a 401 status
code with a WWW-Authenticate header containing the gssapi-data.
S: HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
S: WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate 749efa7b23409c20b92356
The client will decode the gssapi-data, pass this into
Gss_Init_security_context, and return the new gssapi-data to the
server.
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 4559 HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows June 2006
C: GET dir/index.html
C: Authorization: Negotiate 89a8742aa8729a8b028
This cycle can continue until the security context is complete. When
the return value from the gss_accept_security_context function
indicates that the security context is complete, it may supply final
authentication data to be returned to the client. If the server has
more gssapi data to send to the client to complete the context, it is
to be carried in a WWW-Authenticate header with the final response
containing the HTTP body.
S: HTTP/1.1 200 Success
S: WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate ade0234568a4209af8bc0280289eca
The client will decode the gssapi-data and supply it to
gss_init_security_context using the context for this server. If the
status is successful from the final gss_init_security_context, the
response can be used by the application.
6. Security Considerations
The SPNEGO HTTP authentication facility is only used to provide
authentication of a user to a server. It provides no facilities for
protecting the HTTP headers or data including the Authorization and
WWW-Authenticate headers that are used to implement this mechanism.
Alternate mechanisms such as TLS can be used to provide
confidentiality. Hashes of the TLS certificates can be used as
channel bindings to secure the channel. In this case clients would
need to enforce that the channel binding information is valid. Note
that Kerb-TLS [RFC2712] could be used to provide both authentication
and confidentiality, but this requires a change to the TLS provider.
This mechanism is not used for HTTP authentication to HTTP proxies.
If an HTTP proxy is used between the client and server, it must take
care to not share authenticated connections between different
authenticated clients to the same server. If this is not honored,
then the server can easily lose track of security context
associations. A proxy that correctly honors client to server
authentication integrity will supply the "Proxy-support: Session-
Based-Authentication" HTTP header to the client in HTTP responses
from the proxy. The client MUST NOT utilize the SPNEGO HTTP
authentication mechanism through a proxy unless the proxy supplies
this header with the "401 Unauthorized" response from the server.
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 4559 HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows June 2006
When using the SPNEGO HTTP authentication facility with client-
supplied data such as PUT and POST, the authentication should be
complete between the client and server before sending the user data.
The return status from the gss_init_security_context will indicate
that the security context is complete. At this point, the data can
be sent to the server.
7. Normative References
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2", 2, Update 1", 2743, January 2000.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4178] Zhu, L., Leach, P., Jaganathan, K., and W. Ingersoll, "The
Simple and Protected GSS-API Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Negotiation
Mechanism", 4178, October 2005.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2712] Medvinsky, A. and M. Hur, "Addition of Kerberos Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 2712,
October 1999.
[RFC4121] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121, July
2005.
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 4559 HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows June 2006
Authors' Addresses
Karthik Jaganathan
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
EMail: karthikj@microsoft.com
Larry Zhu
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
EMail: lzhu@microsoft.com
John Brezak
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
EMail: jbrezak@microsoft.com
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 4559 HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows June 2006
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78 and at www.rfc-editor.org/copyright.html, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
Jaganathan, et al. Informational [Page 8]