krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT

RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used.  Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.

Introduced by a1ef548600.  First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)

Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
This commit is contained in:
Luke Howard
2019-05-07 13:15:15 +10:00
committed by Jeffrey Altman
parent c6257cc2c8
commit 38c797e1ae
3 changed files with 113 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -2280,6 +2280,26 @@ krb5_init_creds_step(krb5_context context,
&ctx->req_buffer,
NULL,
NULL);
if (ret == 0 && ctx->pk_init_ctx) {
PA_DATA *pa_pkinit_kx;
int idx = 0;
pa_pkinit_kx =
krb5_find_padata(rep.kdc_rep.padata->val,
rep.kdc_rep.padata->len,
KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX,
&idx);
ret = _krb5_pk_kx_confirm(context, ctx->pk_init_ctx,
ctx->fast_state.reply_key,
&ctx->cred.session,
pa_pkinit_kx);
if (ret)
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to confirm PA-PKINIT-KX", ""));
else if (pa_pkinit_kx != NULL)
ctx->ic_flags |= KRB5_INIT_CREDS_PKINIT_KX_VALID;
}
if (ret == 0)
ret = copy_EncKDCRepPart(&rep.enc_part, &ctx->enc_part);

View File

@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ struct _krb5_get_init_creds_opt_private {
#define KRB5_INIT_CREDS_CANONICALIZE 1
#define KRB5_INIT_CREDS_NO_C_CANON_CHECK 2
#define KRB5_INIT_CREDS_NO_C_NO_EKU_CHECK 4
#define KRB5_INIT_CREDS_PKINIT_KX_VALID 32
struct {
krb5_gic_process_last_req func;
void *ctx;

View File

@@ -1220,6 +1220,98 @@ pk_rd_pa_reply_enckey(krb5_context context,
return ret;
}
/*
* RFC 8062 section 7:
*
* The client then decrypts the KDC contribution key and verifies that
* the ticket session key in the returned ticket is the combined key of
* the KDC contribution key and the reply key.
*/
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
_krb5_pk_kx_confirm(krb5_context context,
krb5_pk_init_ctx ctx,
krb5_keyblock *reply_key,
krb5_keyblock *session_key,
PA_DATA *pa_pkinit_kx)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
EncryptedData ed;
krb5_keyblock ck, sk_verify;
krb5_crypto ck_crypto = NULL;
krb5_crypto rk_crypto = NULL;
size_t len;
krb5_data data;
krb5_data p1 = { sizeof("PKINIT") - 1, "PKINIT" };
krb5_data p2 = { sizeof("KEYEXCHANGE") - 1, "KEYEXCHANGE" };
heim_assert(ctx != NULL, "PKINIT context is non-NULL");
heim_assert(reply_key != NULL, "reply key is non-NULL");
heim_assert(session_key != NULL, "session key is non-NULL");
/* PA-PKINIT-KX is optional unless anonymous */
if (pa_pkinit_kx == NULL)
return ctx->anonymous ? KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED : 0;
memset(&ed, 0, sizeof(ed));
krb5_keyblock_zero(&ck);
krb5_keyblock_zero(&sk_verify);
krb5_data_zero(&data);
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa_pkinit_kx->padata_value.data,
pa_pkinit_kx->padata_value.length,
&ed, &len);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (len != pa_pkinit_kx->padata_value.length) {
ret = KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &rk_crypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, rk_crypto,
KRB5_KU_PA_PKINIT_KX,
&ed, &data);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = decode_EncryptionKey(data.data, data.length,
&ck, &len);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &ck, 0, &ck_crypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(context, ck_crypto, rk_crypto,
&p1, &p2, session_key->keytype,
&sk_verify);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (sk_verify.keytype != session_key->keytype ||
krb5_data_ct_cmp(&sk_verify.keyvalue, &session_key->keyvalue) != 0) {
ret = KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED;
goto out;
}
out:
free_EncryptedData(&ed);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &ck);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sk_verify);
if (ck_crypto)
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, ck_crypto);
if (rk_crypto)
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, rk_crypto);
krb5_data_free(&data);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
pk_rd_pa_reply_dh(krb5_context context,
const heim_octet_string *indata,