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heimdal/lib/asn1/krb5.asn1
Nicolas Williams db7763ca7b asn1: X.681/682/683 magic handling of open types 
Status:

 - And it works!

 - We have an extensive test based on decoding a rich EK certficate.

   This test exercises all of:

    - decoding
    - encoding with and without decoded open types
    - copying of decoded values with decoded open types
    - freeing of decoded values with decoded open types

   Valgrind finds no memory errors.

 - Added a manual page for the compiler.

 - rfc2459.asn1 now has all three primary PKIX types that we care about
   defined as in RFC5912, with IOS constraints and parameterization:

    - `Extension`       (embeds open type in an `OCTET STRING`)
    - `OtherName`       (embeds open type in an        `ANY`-like type)
    - `SingleAttribute` (embeds open type in an        `ANY`-like type)
    - `AttributeSet`    (embeds open type in a  `SET OF ANY`-like type)

   All of these use OIDs as the open type type ID field, but integer
   open type type ID fields are also supported (and needed, for
   Kerberos).

   That will cover every typed hole pattern in all our ASN.1 modules.

   With this we'll be able to automatically and recursively decode
   through all subject DN attributes even when the subject DN is a
   directoryName SAN, and subjectDirectoryAttributes, and all
   extensions, and all SANs, and all authorization-data elements, and
   PA-data, and...

   We're not really using `SingleAttribute` and `AttributeSet` yet
   because various changes are needed in `lib/hx509` for that.

 - `asn1_compile` builds and recognizes the subset of X.681/682/683 that
   we need for, and now use in, rfc2459.asn1.  It builds the necessary
   AST, generates the correct C types, and generates templating for
   object sets and open types!

 - See READMEs for details.

 - Codegen backend not tested; I won't make it implement automatic open
   type handling, but it should at least not crash by substituting
   `heim_any` for open types not embedded in `OCTET STRING`.

 - We're _really_ starting to have problems with the ITU-T ASN.1
   grammar and our version of it...

   Type names have to start with upper-case, value names with
   lower-case, but it's not enough to disambiguate.

   The fact the we've allowed value and type names to violate their
   respective start-with case rules is causing us trouble now that we're
   adding grammar from X.681/682/683, and we're going to have to undo
   that.

   In preparation for that I'm capitalizing the `heim_any` and
   `heim_any_set` types, and doing some additional cleanup, which
   requires changes to other parts of Heimdal (all in this same commit
   for now).

   Problems we have because of this:

    - We cannot IMPORT values into modules because we have no idea if a
      symbol being imported refers to a value or a type because the only
      clue we would have is the symbol's name, so we assume IMPORTed
      symbols are for types.

      This means we can't import OIDs, for example, which is super
      annoying.

      One thing we might be able to do here is mark imported symbols as
      being of an undetermined-but-not-undefined type, then coerce the
      symbol's type the first time it's used in a context where its type
      is inferred as type, value, object, object set, or class.  (Though
      since we don't generate C symbols for objects or classes, we won't
      be able to import them, especially since we need to know them at
      compile time and cannot defer their handling to link- or
      run-time.)

    - The `NULL` type name, and the `NULL` value name now cause two
      reduce/reduce conflicts via the `FieldSetting` production.

    - Various shift/reduce conflicts involving `NULL` values in
      non-top-level contexts (in constraints, for example).

 - Currently I have a bug where to disambiguate the grammar I have a
   CLASS_IDENTIFIER token that is all caps, while TYPE_IDENTIFIER must
   start with a capital but not be all caps, but this breaks Kerberos
   since all its types are all capitalized -- oof!

   To fix this I made it so class names have to be all caps and
   start with an underscore (ick).

TBD:

 - Check all the XXX comments and address them
 - Apply this treatment to Kerberos!  Automatic handling of authz-data
   sounds useful :)
 - Apply this treatment to PKCS#10 (CSRs) and other ASN.1 modules too.
 - Replace various bits of code in `lib/hx509/` with uses of this
   feature.
 - Add JER.
 - Enhance `hxtool` and `asn1_print`.

Getting there!
2021-02-28 18:13:08 -06:00

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-- $Id$
KERBEROS5 DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS
AD-AND-OR,
AD-IF-RELEVANT,
AD-KDCIssued,
AD-LoginAlias,
AP-REP,
AP-REQ,
AS-REP,
AS-REQ,
AUTHDATA-TYPE,
Authenticator,
AuthorizationData,
AuthorizationDataElement,
CKSUMTYPE,
ChangePasswdDataMS,
Checksum,
ENCTYPE,
ETYPE-INFO,
ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY,
ETYPE-INFO2,
ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY,
EncAPRepPart,
EncASRepPart,
EncKDCRepPart,
EncKrbCredPart,
EncKrbPrivPart,
EncTGSRepPart,
EncTicketPart,
EncryptedData,
EncryptionKey,
EtypeList,
HostAddress,
HostAddresses,
KDC-REQ-BODY,
KDCOptions,
KDC-REP,
KRB-CRED,
KRB-ERROR,
KRB-PRIV,
KRB-SAFE,
KRB-SAFE-BODY,
KRB5SignedPath,
KRB5SignedPathData,
KRB5SignedPathPrincipals,
KerberosString,
KerberosTime,
KrbCredInfo,
LR-TYPE,
LastReq,
METHOD-DATA,
NAME-TYPE,
PA-ClientCanonicalized,
PA-ClientCanonicalizedNames,
PA-DATA,
PA-ENC-TS-ENC,
PA-PAC-REQUEST,
PA-S4U2Self,
PA-SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA,
PA-ServerReferralData,
PA-SvrReferralData,
PADATA-TYPE,
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST,
PA-FX-FAST-REPLY,
Principal,
PrincipalName,
Principals,
Realm,
TGS-REP,
TGS-REQ,
Ticket,
TicketFlags,
TransitedEncoding,
TypedData,
KrbFastResponse,
KrbFastFinished,
KrbFastReq,
KrbFastArmor,
KDCFastState,
KDCFastCookie,
KDC-PROXY-MESSAGE,
KERB-TIMES,
KERB-CRED,
KERB-TGS-REQ-IN,
KERB-TGS-REQ-OUT,
KERB-ARMOR-SERVICE-REPLY
;
NAME-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN(0), -- Name type not known
KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL(1), -- Just the name of the principal as in
KRB5_NT_SRV_INST(2), -- Service and other unique instance (krbtgt)
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST(3), -- Service with host name as instance
KRB5_NT_SRV_XHST(4), -- Service with host as remaining components
KRB5_NT_UID(5), -- Unique ID
KRB5_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL(6), -- PKINIT
KRB5_NT_SMTP_NAME(7), -- Name in form of SMTP email name
KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL(10), -- Windows 2000 UPN
KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN(11), -- Wellknown
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST_DOMAIN(12), -- Domain based service with host name as instance (RFC5179)
KRB5_NT_ENT_PRINCIPAL_AND_ID(-130), -- Windows 2000 UPN and SID
KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL(-128), -- NT 4 style name
KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL_AND_ID(-129), -- NT style name and SID
KRB5_NT_NTLM(-1200), -- NTLM name, realm is domain
KRB5_NT_X509_GENERAL_NAME(-1201), -- x509 general name (base64 encoded)
KRB5_NT_GSS_HOSTBASED_SERVICE(-1202), -- not used; remove
KRB5_NT_CACHE_UUID(-1203), -- name is actually a uuid pointing to ccache, use client name in cache
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST_NEEDS_CANON (-195894762) -- Internal: indicates that name canonicalization is needed
}
-- message types
MESSAGE-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
krb-as-req(10), -- Request for initial authentication
krb-as-rep(11), -- Response to KRB_AS_REQ request
krb-tgs-req(12), -- Request for authentication based on TGT
krb-tgs-rep(13), -- Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request
krb-ap-req(14), -- application request to server
krb-ap-rep(15), -- Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL
krb-safe(20), -- Safe (checksummed) application message
krb-priv(21), -- Private (encrypted) application message
krb-cred(22), -- Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials
krb-error(30) -- Error response
}
-- pa-data types
PADATA-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5-PADATA-NONE(0),
KRB5-PADATA-TGS-REQ(1),
KRB5-PADATA-AP-REQ(1),
KRB5-PADATA-ENC-TIMESTAMP(2),
KRB5-PADATA-PW-SALT(3),
KRB5-PADATA-ENC-UNIX-TIME(5),
KRB5-PADATA-SANDIA-SECUREID(6),
KRB5-PADATA-SESAME(7),
KRB5-PADATA-OSF-DCE(8),
KRB5-PADATA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID(9),
KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT(10),
KRB5-PADATA-ETYPE-INFO(11),
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-CHALLENGE(12), -- (sam/otp)
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-RESPONSE(13), -- (sam/otp)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REQ-19(14), -- (PKINIT-19)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REP-19(15), -- (PKINIT-19)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REQ-WIN(15), -- (PKINIT - old number)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REQ(16), -- (PKINIT-25)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REP(17), -- (PKINIT-25)
KRB5-PADATA-PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE(18),
KRB5-PADATA-ETYPE-INFO2(19),
KRB5-PADATA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO(20),
KRB5-PADATA-SVR-REFERRAL-INFO(20), --- old ms referral number
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-REDIRECT(21), -- (sam/otp)
KRB5-PADATA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA(22),
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO(23),
KRB5-PADATA-SERVER-REFERRAL(25),
KRB5-PADATA-ALT-PRINC(24), -- (crawdad@fnal.gov)
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-CHALLENGE2(30), -- (kenh@pobox.com)
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-RESPONSE2(31), -- (kenh@pobox.com)
KRB5-PA-EXTRA-TGT(41), -- Reserved extra TGT
KRB5-PADATA-FX-FAST-ARMOR(71), -- fast armor
KRB5-PADATA-TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL(102), -- PrincipalName
KRB5-PADATA-PK-TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS(104), -- PKINIT
KRB5-PADATA-PK-TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX(105), -- PKINIT
KRB5-PADATA-TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR(106), -- application specific
KRB5-PADATA-TD-REQ-NONCE(107), -- INTEGER
KRB5-PADATA-TD-REQ-SEQ(108), -- INTEGER
KRB5-PADATA-PA-PAC-REQUEST(128), -- jbrezak@exchange.microsoft.com
KRB5-PADATA-FOR-USER(129), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-FOR-X509-USER(130), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-FOR-CHECK-DUPS(131), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-AS-CHECKSUM(132), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-09-BINDING(132), -- client send this to
-- tell KDC that is supports
-- the asCheckSum in the
-- PK-AS-REP
KRB5-PADATA-FX-COOKIE(133), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-AUTHENTICATION-SET(134), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED(135), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-FX-FAST(136), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-FX-ERROR(137), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE(138), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-OTP-CHALLENGE(141), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KRB5-PADATA-OTP-REQUEST(142), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KBB5-PADATA-OTP-CONFIRM(143), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KRB5-PADATA-OTP-PIN-CHANGE(144), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KRB5-PADATA-EPAK-AS-REQ(145),
KRB5-PADATA-EPAK-AS-REP(146),
KRB5-PADATA-PKINIT-KX(147), -- krb-wg-anon
KRB5-PADATA-PKU2U-NAME(148), -- zhu-pku2u
KRB5-PADATA-REQ-ENC-PA-REP(149), --
KRB5-PADATA-SUPPORTED-ETYPES(165) -- MS-KILE
}
AUTHDATA-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5-AUTHDATA-IF-RELEVANT(1),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-INTENDED-FOR_SERVER(2),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS(3),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-KDC-ISSUED(4),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-AND-OR(5),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS(6),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS(7),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC(8),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS(9),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-OSF-DCE(64),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SESAME(65),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-OSF-DCE-PKI-CERTID(66),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-WIN2K-PAC(128),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-GSS-API-ETYPE-NEGOTIATION(129), -- Authenticator only
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SIGNTICKET-OLDER(-17),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SIGNTICKET-OLD(142),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SIGNTICKET(512),
-- N.B. these assignments have not been confirmed yet.
--
-- DO NOT USE in production yet!
KRB5-AUTHDATA-ON-BEHALF-OF(580), -- UTF8String princ name
KRB5-AUTHDATA-BEARER-TOKEN-JWT(581), -- JWT token
KRB5-AUTHDATA-BEARER-TOKEN-SAML(582), -- SAML token
KRB5-AUTHDATA-BEARER-TOKEN-OIDC(583), -- OIDC token
KRB5-AUTHDATA-CSR-AUTHORIZED(584) -- Proxy has authorized client
-- to requested exts in CSR
}
-- checksumtypes
CKSUMTYPE ::= INTEGER {
CKSUMTYPE_NONE(0),
CKSUMTYPE_CRC32(1),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4(2),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES(3),
CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC(4),
CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC_K(5),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES_K(6),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5(7),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES(8),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES3(9),
CKSUMTYPE_SHA1_OTHER(10),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3(12),
CKSUMTYPE_SHA1(14),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_128(15),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_256(16),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA256_128_AES128(19),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA384_192_AES256(20),
CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI(0x8003),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5(-138), -- unofficial microsoft number
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ENC(-1138) -- even more unofficial
}
--enctypes
ENCTYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5_ENCTYPE_NULL(0),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC(1),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4(2),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5(3),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5(5),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1(7),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE(8),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV(9),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB(10),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1(16), -- with key derivation
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96(17),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96(18),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128(19),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192(20),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5(23),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56(24),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS(48),
-- some "old" windows types
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4(-128),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD(-133),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP(-135),
-- these are for Heimdal internal use
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE(-0x1000),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE(-0x1001),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE(-0x1002),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE(-0x1003),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DIGEST_MD5_NONE(-0x1004), -- private use, lukeh@padl.com
KRB5_ENCTYPE_CRAM_MD5_NONE(-0x1005) -- private use, lukeh@padl.com
}
-- this is sugar to make something ASN1 does not have: unsigned
Krb5UInt32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
Krb5Int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647)
KerberosString ::= GeneralString
Realm ::= GeneralString
PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
name-type[0] NAME-TYPE,
name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString
}
-- this is not part of RFC1510
Principal ::= SEQUENCE {
name[0] PrincipalName,
realm[1] Realm
}
Principals ::= SEQUENCE OF Principal
HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
addr-type[0] Krb5Int32,
address[1] OCTET STRING
}
-- This is from RFC1510.
--
-- HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
-- addr-type[0] Krb5Int32,
-- address[1] OCTET STRING
-- }
-- This seems much better.
HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress
KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z)
AuthorizationDataElement ::= SEQUENCE {
ad-type[0] Krb5Int32,
ad-data[1] OCTET STRING
}
AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF AuthorizationDataElement
APOptions ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
use-session-key(1),
mutual-required(2)
}
TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
forwardable(1),
forwarded(2),
proxiable(3),
proxy(4),
may-postdate(5),
postdated(6),
invalid(7),
renewable(8),
initial(9),
pre-authent(10),
hw-authent(11),
transited-policy-checked(12),
ok-as-delegate(13),
enc-pa-rep(15),
anonymous(16)
}
KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
forwardable(1),
forwarded(2),
proxiable(3),
proxy(4),
allow-postdate(5),
postdated(6),
renewable(8),
cname-in-addl-tkt(14), -- ms extension
canonicalize(15),
request-anonymous(16),
disable-transited-check(26),
renewable-ok(27),
enc-tkt-in-skey(28),
renew(30),
validate(31)
}
LR-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
LR_NONE(0), -- no information
LR_INITIAL_TGT(1), -- last initial TGT request
LR_INITIAL(2), -- last initial request
LR_ISSUE_USE_TGT(3), -- time of newest TGT used
LR_RENEWAL(4), -- time of last renewal
LR_REQUEST(5), -- time of last request (of any type)
LR_PW_EXPTIME(6), -- expiration time of password
LR_ACCT_EXPTIME(7) -- expiration time of account
}
LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
lr-type[0] LR-TYPE,
lr-value[1] KerberosTime
}
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
etype[0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType
kvno[1] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
}
EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
keytype[0] Krb5Int32,
keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING
}
-- encoded Transited field
TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE {
tr-type[0] Krb5Int32, -- must be registered
contents[1] OCTET STRING
}
Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE {
tkt-vno[0] Krb5Int32,
realm[1] Realm,
sname[2] PrincipalName,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData
}
-- Encrypted part of ticket
EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE {
flags[0] TicketFlags,
key[1] EncryptionKey,
crealm[2] Realm,
cname[3] PrincipalName,
transited[4] TransitedEncoding,
authtime[5] KerberosTime,
starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[7] KerberosTime,
renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
Checksum ::= SEQUENCE {
cksumtype[0] CKSUMTYPE,
checksum[1] OCTET STRING
}
Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE {
authenticator-vno[0] Krb5Int32,
crealm[1] Realm,
cname[2] PrincipalName,
cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL,
cusec[4] Krb5Int32,
ctime[5] KerberosTime,
subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number[7] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL,
authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
-- might be encoded AP-REQ
padata-type[1] PADATA-TYPE,
padata-value[2] OCTET STRING
}
ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
etype[0] ENCTYPE,
salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
salttype[2] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL
}
ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY
ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
etype[0] ENCTYPE,
salt[1] KerberosString OPTIONAL,
s2kparams[2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
ETYPE-INFO2 ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY
METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA
TypedData ::= SEQUENCE {
data-type[0] Krb5Int32,
data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TypedData
KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
kdc-options[0] KDCOptions,
cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, -- Used only in AS-REQ
realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm
-- Also client's in AS-REQ
sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
nonce[7] Krb5Int32,
etype[8] SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType,
-- in preference order
addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
-- Encrypted AuthorizationData encoding
additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL
}
KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[1] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[2] MESSAGE-TYPE,
padata[3] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL,
req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY
}
AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ
TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ
-- padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP
-- padata-value ::= EncryptedData - PA-ENC-TS-ENC
PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time
pausec[1] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL
}
-- draft-brezak-win2k-krb-authz-01
PA-PAC-REQUEST ::= SEQUENCE {
include-pac[0] BOOLEAN -- Indicates whether a PAC
-- should be included or not
}
-- PacketCable provisioning server location, PKT-SP-SEC-I09-030728.pdf
PROV-SRV-LOCATION ::= GeneralString
KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
padata[2] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL,
crealm[3] Realm,
cname[4] PrincipalName,
ticket[5] Ticket,
enc-part[6] EncryptedData
}
AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP
TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP
EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE {
key[0] EncryptionKey,
last-req[1] LastReq,
nonce[2] Krb5Int32,
key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
flags[4] TicketFlags,
authtime[5] KerberosTime,
starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[7] KerberosTime,
renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm[9] Realm,
sname[10] PrincipalName,
caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
encrypted-pa-data[12] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL
}
EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart
EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart
AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
ap-options[2] APOptions,
ticket[3] Ticket,
authenticator[4] EncryptedData
}
AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
enc-part[2] EncryptedData
}
EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE {
ctime[0] KerberosTime,
cusec[1] Krb5Int32,
subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL
}
KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[2] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
}
KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY,
cksum[3] Checksum
}
KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData
}
EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE {
user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[2] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr
}
KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, -- KRB_CRED
tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData
}
KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
key[0] EncryptionKey,
prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL,
authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL,
sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL
}
EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE {
ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo,
nonce[1] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[3] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
}
KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
cusec[3] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
stime[4] KerberosTime,
susec[5] Krb5Int32,
error-code[6] Krb5Int32,
crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL,
cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm
sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name
e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
ChangePasswdDataMS ::= SEQUENCE {
newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING,
targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL
}
EtypeList ::= SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE
-- the client's proposed enctype list in
-- decreasing preference order, favorite choice first
krb5-pvno Krb5Int32 ::= 5 -- current Kerberos protocol version number
-- transited encodings
domain-X500-Compress Krb5Int32 ::= 1
-- authorization data primitives
AD-IF-RELEVANT ::= AuthorizationData
AD-KDCIssued ::= SEQUENCE {
ad-checksum[0] Checksum,
i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
elements[3] AuthorizationData
}
AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE {
condition-count[0] Krb5Int32,
elements[1] AuthorizationData
}
AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC ::= AuthorizationData
-- PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2/PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2
PA-SAM-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
PA_SAM_TYPE_ENIGMA(1), -- Enigma Logic
PA_SAM_TYPE_DIGI_PATH(2), -- Digital Pathways
PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY_K0(3), -- S/key where KDC has key 0
PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY(4), -- Traditional S/Key
PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID(5), -- Security Dynamics
PA_SAM_TYPE_CRYPTOCARD(6) -- CRYPTOCard
}
PA-SAM-REDIRECT ::= HostAddresses
SAMFlags ::= BIT STRING {
use-sad-as-key(0),
send-encrypted-sad(1),
must-pk-encrypt-sad(2)
}
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-type[0] Krb5Int32,
sam-flags[1] SAMFlags,
sam-type-name[2] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-track-id[3] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-challenge-label[4] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-challenge[5] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-response-prompt[6] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-pk-for-sad[7] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
sam-nonce[8] Krb5Int32,
sam-etype[9] Krb5Int32,
...
}
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2 ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-body[0] PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2-BODY,
sam-cksum[1] SEQUENCE OF Checksum, -- (1..MAX)
...
}
PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2 ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-type[0] Krb5Int32,
sam-flags[1] SAMFlags,
sam-track-id[2] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-enc-nonce-or-sad[3] EncryptedData, -- PA-ENC-SAM-RESPONSE-ENC
sam-nonce[4] Krb5Int32,
...
}
PA-ENC-SAM-RESPONSE-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-nonce[0] Krb5Int32,
sam-sad[1] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
...
}
PA-S4U2Self ::= SEQUENCE {
name[0] PrincipalName,
realm[1] Realm,
cksum[2] Checksum,
auth[3] GeneralString
}
-- never encoded on the wire, just used to checksum over
KRB5SignedPathData ::= SEQUENCE {
client[0] Principal OPTIONAL,
authtime[1] KerberosTime,
delegated[2] Principals OPTIONAL,
method_data[3] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL
}
KRB5SignedPath ::= SEQUENCE {
-- DERcoded KRB5SignedPathData
-- krbtgt key (etype), KeyUsage = XXX
etype[0] ENCTYPE,
cksum[1] Checksum,
-- srvs delegated though
delegated[2] Principals OPTIONAL,
method_data[3] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL
}
AD-LoginAlias ::= SEQUENCE { -- ad-type number TBD --
login-alias [0] PrincipalName,
checksum [1] Checksum
}
-- old ms referral
PA-SvrReferralData ::= SEQUENCE {
referred-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
referred-realm [0] Realm
}
PA-SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA ::= EncryptedData
PA-ServerReferralData ::= SEQUENCE {
referred-realm [0] Realm OPTIONAL,
true-principal-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
requested-principal-name [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
referral-valid-until [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
...
}
FastOptions ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
hide-client-names(1),
kdc-follow-referrals(16)
}
KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
fast-options [0] FastOptions,
padata [1] METHOD-DATA,
req-body [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
...
}
KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
armor-type [0] Krb5Int32,
armor-value [1] OCTET STRING,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
req-checksum [1] Checksum,
enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData -- KrbFastReq --
}
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
...
}
KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
timestamp [0] KerberosTime,
usec [1] Krb5Int32,
crealm [2] Realm,
cname [3] PrincipalName,
ticket-checksum [4] Checksum,
...
}
KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
padata [0] METHOD-DATA,
strengthen-key [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
finished [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
nonce [3] Krb5UInt32,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
enc-fast-rep [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
...
}
PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
...
}
KDCFastFlags ::= BIT STRING {
use_reply_key(0),
reply_key_used(1),
reply_key_replaced(2),
kdc_verfied(3)
}
-- KDCFastState is stored in FX_COOKIE
KDCFastState ::= SEQUENCE {
flags [0] KDCFastFlags,
expiration [1] GeneralizedTime,
fast-state [2] METHOD-DATA,
expected-pa-types [3] SEQUENCE OF PADATA-TYPE OPTIONAL
}
KDCFastCookie ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] UTF8String,
cookie [1] EncryptedData
}
KDC-PROXY-MESSAGE ::= SEQUENCE {
kerb-message [0] OCTET STRING,
target-domain [1] Realm OPTIONAL,
dclocator-hint [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
-- these messages are used in the GSSCred communication and is not part of Kerberos propper
KERB-TIMES ::= SEQUENCE {
authtime [0] KerberosTime,
starttime [1] KerberosTime,
endtime [2] KerberosTime,
renew_till [3] KerberosTime
}
KERB-CRED ::= SEQUENCE {
client [0] Principal,
server [1] Principal,
keyblock [2] EncryptionKey,
times [3] KERB-TIMES,
ticket [4] OCTET STRING,
authdata [5] OCTET STRING,
addresses [6] HostAddresses,
flags [7] TicketFlags
}
KERB-TGS-REQ-IN ::= SEQUENCE {
cache [0] OCTET STRING SIZE (16),
addrs [1] HostAddresses,
flags [2] Krb5UInt32,
imp [3] Principal OPTIONAL,
ticket [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
in_cred [5] KERB-CRED,
krbtgt [6] KERB-CRED,
padata [7] METHOD-DATA
}
KERB-TGS-REQ-OUT ::= SEQUENCE {
subkey [0] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
t [1] TGS-REQ
}
KERB-TGS-REP-IN ::= SEQUENCE {
cache [0] OCTET STRING SIZE (16),
subkey [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
in_cred [2] KERB-CRED,
t [3] TGS-REP
}
KERB-TGS-REP-OUT ::= SEQUENCE {
cache [0] OCTET STRING SIZE (16),
cred [1] KERB-CRED,
subkey [2] EncryptionKey
}
KERB-ARMOR-SERVICE-REPLY ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor,
armor-key [1] EncryptionKey
}
END
-- etags -r '/\([A-Za-z][-A-Za-z0-9]*\).*::=/\1/' k5.asn1
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