
When new keys are added (typically via kadm5_setkey_principal_3), truncate the key history to remove old keys, that is keys older than the newest key which was in effect prior longer ago than the principal's maximum ticket lifetime. This feature is controlled via the "[kadmin]" section's "prune-key-history" boolean parameter, which defaults to false. Currently this happens only when kadm5_setkey_principal_3() is called directly on the server, the client API simulates kadm5_setkey_principal_3() via a get, update, modify sequence that does not prune the key history. The plan is to add a new kadm5 protocol RPC and convert clients to call that instead. In setkey_principal_3 seal keys after entry key update Also, for now, don't check the return value of kadm5_log_modify() in the new kadm5_s_setkey_principal_3(). This has to be addressed more globally. Censor stale keys in kadm5_s_get_principal
394 lines
12 KiB
C
394 lines
12 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1997 - 2006 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
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* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "kadm5_locl.h"
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#include <assert.h>
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RCSID("$Id$");
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static kadm5_ret_t
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add_tl_data(kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, int16_t type,
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const void *data, size_t size)
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{
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krb5_tl_data *tl;
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tl = calloc(1, sizeof(*tl));
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if (tl == NULL)
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return _kadm5_error_code(ENOMEM);
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tl->tl_data_type = type;
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tl->tl_data_length = size;
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tl->tl_data_contents = malloc(size);
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if (tl->tl_data_contents == NULL && size != 0) {
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free(tl);
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return _kadm5_error_code(ENOMEM);
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}
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memcpy(tl->tl_data_contents, data, size);
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tl->tl_data_next = ent->tl_data;
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ent->tl_data = tl;
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ent->n_tl_data++;
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return 0;
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}
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_ssize_t KRB5_LIB_CALL
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_krb5_put_int(void *buffer, unsigned long value, size_t size); /* XXX */
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static
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krb5_error_code
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copy_keyset_to_kadm5(kadm5_server_context *context, krb5_kvno kvno,
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size_t n_keys, Key *keys, krb5_salt *salt,
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kadm5_principal_ent_t out)
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{
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size_t i;
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Key *key;
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krb5_key_data *kd;
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krb5_data *sp;
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krb5_error_code ret = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) {
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key = &keys[i];
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kd = &out->key_data[out->n_key_data];
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kd->key_data_ver = 2;
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kd->key_data_kvno = kvno;
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kd->key_data_type[0] = key->key.keytype;
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if(key->salt)
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kd->key_data_type[1] = key->salt->type;
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else
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kd->key_data_type[1] = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT;
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/* setup key */
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kd->key_data_length[0] = key->key.keyvalue.length;
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kd->key_data_contents[0] = malloc(kd->key_data_length[0]);
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if(kd->key_data_contents[0] == NULL && kd->key_data_length[0] != 0){
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ret = ENOMEM;
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break;
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}
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memcpy(kd->key_data_contents[0], key->key.keyvalue.data,
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kd->key_data_length[0]);
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/* setup salt */
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if(key->salt)
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sp = &key->salt->salt;
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else
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sp = &salt->saltvalue;
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kd->key_data_length[1] = sp->length;
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kd->key_data_contents[1] = malloc(kd->key_data_length[1]);
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if(kd->key_data_length[1] != 0
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&& kd->key_data_contents[1] == NULL) {
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memset(kd->key_data_contents[0], 0, kd->key_data_length[0]);
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ret = ENOMEM;
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break;
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}
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memcpy(kd->key_data_contents[1], sp->data, kd->key_data_length[1]);
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out->n_key_data++;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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kadm5_ret_t
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kadm5_s_get_principal(void *server_handle,
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krb5_principal princ,
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kadm5_principal_ent_t out,
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uint32_t mask)
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{
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kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle;
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kadm5_ret_t ret;
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hdb_entry_ex ent;
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int hdb_is_rw = 1;
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memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent));
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if (!context->keep_open) {
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ret = context->db->hdb_open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0);
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if (ret == EPERM || ret == EACCES) {
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ret = context->db->hdb_open(context->context, context->db, O_RDONLY, 0);
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hdb_is_rw = 0;
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}
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if(ret)
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Attempt to recover the log. This will generally fail on slaves,
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* and we can't tell if we're on a slave here.
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*
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* Perhaps we could set a flag in the kadm5_server_context to
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* indicate whether a read has been done without recovering the log,
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* in which case we could fail any subsequent writes.
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*/
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if (hdb_is_rw)
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(void) kadm5_log_init_nb(context);
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ret = context->db->hdb_fetch_kvno(context->context, context->db, princ,
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HDB_F_DECRYPT|HDB_F_ALL_KVNOS|
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HDB_F_GET_ANY|HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA, 0, &ent);
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if (hdb_is_rw)
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kadm5_log_end(context);
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if (!context->keep_open)
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context->db->hdb_close(context->context, context->db);
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if(ret)
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return _kadm5_error_code(ret);
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memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
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if(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, ent.entry.principal,
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&out->principal);
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if(ret)
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goto out;
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if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME && ent.entry.valid_end)
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out->princ_expire_time = *ent.entry.valid_end;
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if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION && ent.entry.pw_end)
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out->pw_expiration = *ent.entry.pw_end;
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if(mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE)
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hdb_entry_get_pw_change_time(&ent.entry, &out->last_pwd_change);
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if(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES){
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.postdate ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.forwardable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.initial ? KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.renewable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.proxiable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.invalid ? KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.require_preauth ? KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.require_pwchange ? KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.server ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.change_pw ? KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.ok_as_delegate ? KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation ? KRB5_KDB_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.allow_kerberos4 ? KRB5_KDB_ALLOW_KERBEROS4 : 0;
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out->attributes |= ent.entry.flags.allow_digest ? KRB5_KDB_ALLOW_DIGEST : 0;
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}
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if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) {
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if(ent.entry.max_life)
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out->max_life = *ent.entry.max_life;
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else
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out->max_life = INT_MAX;
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}
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if(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) {
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if(ent.entry.modified_by)
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out->mod_date = ent.entry.modified_by->time;
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else
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out->mod_date = ent.entry.created_by.time;
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}
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if(mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) {
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if(ent.entry.modified_by) {
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if (ent.entry.modified_by->principal != NULL)
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context,
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ent.entry.modified_by->principal,
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&out->mod_name);
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} else if(ent.entry.created_by.principal != NULL)
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context,
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ent.entry.created_by.principal,
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&out->mod_name);
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else
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out->mod_name = NULL;
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}
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if(ret)
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goto out;
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if(mask & KADM5_KVNO)
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out->kvno = ent.entry.kvno;
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if(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) {
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size_t n;
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out->mkvno = 0; /* XXX */
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for(n = 0; n < ent.entry.keys.len; n++)
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if(ent.entry.keys.val[n].mkvno) {
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out->mkvno = *ent.entry.keys.val[n].mkvno; /* XXX this isn't right */
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break;
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}
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}
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#if 0 /* XXX implement */
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if(mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES)
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;
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if(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS)
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;
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if(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED)
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;
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if(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT)
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;
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#endif
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if(mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
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HDB_extension *ext;
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ext = hdb_find_extension(&ent.entry, choice_HDB_extension_data_policy);
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if (ext == NULL) {
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out->policy = strdup("default");
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/* It's OK if we retun NULL instead of "default" */
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} else {
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out->policy = strdup(ext->data.u.policy);
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if (out->policy == NULL) {
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ret = ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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}
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}
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if(mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) {
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if(ent.entry.max_renew)
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out->max_renewable_life = *ent.entry.max_renew;
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else
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out->max_renewable_life = INT_MAX;
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}
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if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA){
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size_t i;
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size_t n_keys = ent.entry.keys.len;
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krb5_salt salt;
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HDB_extension *ext;
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HDB_Ext_KeySet *hist_keys = NULL;
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/* Don't return stale keys to kadm5 clients */
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ret = hdb_prune_keys(context->context, &ent.entry);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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ext = hdb_find_extension(&ent.entry, choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys);
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if (ext != NULL)
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hist_keys = &ext->data.u.hist_keys;
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krb5_get_pw_salt(context->context, ent.entry.principal, &salt);
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for (i = 0; hist_keys != NULL && i < hist_keys->len; i++)
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n_keys += hist_keys->val[i].keys.len;
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out->key_data = malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*out->key_data));
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if (out->key_data == NULL && n_keys != 0) {
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ret = ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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out->n_key_data = 0;
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ret = copy_keyset_to_kadm5(context, ent.entry.kvno, ent.entry.keys.len,
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ent.entry.keys.val, &salt, out);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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for (i = 0; hist_keys != NULL && i < hist_keys->len; i++) {
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ret = copy_keyset_to_kadm5(context, hist_keys->val[i].kvno,
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hist_keys->val[i].keys.len,
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hist_keys->val[i].keys.val,
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&salt, out);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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}
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krb5_free_salt(context->context, salt);
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assert( out->n_key_data == n_keys );
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}
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if(ret){
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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if(mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
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time_t last_pw_expire;
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const HDB_Ext_PKINIT_acl *acl;
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const HDB_Ext_Aliases *aliases;
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ret = hdb_entry_get_pw_change_time(&ent.entry, &last_pw_expire);
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if (ret == 0 && last_pw_expire) {
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unsigned char buf[4];
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_krb5_put_int(buf, last_pw_expire, sizeof(buf));
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ret = add_tl_data(out, KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE, buf, sizeof(buf));
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}
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if(ret){
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* If the client was allowed to get key data, let it have the
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* password too.
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*/
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if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
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heim_utf8_string pw;
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ret = hdb_entry_get_password(context->context,
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context->db, &ent.entry, &pw);
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if (ret == 0) {
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ret = add_tl_data(out, KRB5_TL_PASSWORD, pw, strlen(pw) + 1);
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free(pw);
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}
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krb5_clear_error_message(context->context);
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}
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ret = hdb_entry_get_pkinit_acl(&ent.entry, &acl);
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if (ret == 0 && acl) {
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krb5_data buf;
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size_t len;
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ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(HDB_Ext_PKINIT_acl, buf.data, buf.length,
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acl, &len, ret);
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if (ret) {
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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if (len != buf.length)
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krb5_abortx(context->context,
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"internal ASN.1 encoder error");
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ret = add_tl_data(out, KRB5_TL_PKINIT_ACL, buf.data, buf.length);
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free(buf.data);
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if (ret) {
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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}
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if(ret){
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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ret = hdb_entry_get_aliases(&ent.entry, &aliases);
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if (ret == 0 && aliases) {
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krb5_data buf;
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size_t len;
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ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(HDB_Ext_Aliases, buf.data, buf.length,
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aliases, &len, ret);
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if (ret) {
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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if (len != buf.length)
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krb5_abortx(context->context,
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"internal ASN.1 encoder error");
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ret = add_tl_data(out, KRB5_TL_ALIASES, buf.data, buf.length);
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free(buf.data);
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if (ret) {
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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}
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if(ret){
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kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out);
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goto out;
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}
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}
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out:
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hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent);
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return _kadm5_error_code(ret);
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}
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