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INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-22.txt Clifford Neuman
expires May 15, 2005 USC/ISI
Sasha Medvinsky
Motorola, Inc.
Larry Zhu
Microsoft
Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
0. Status Of This Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-22.txt and expires May 15, 2005.
Please send comments to the authors.
1. Abstract
This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called
PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol specification [1]. These
extensions provide a method for integrating public key cryptography
into the initial authentication exchange, by passing digital
certificates and associated authenticators in preauthentication data
fields.
2. Introduction
A client typically authenticates itself to a service in Kerberos
using three distinct though related exchanges. First, the client
requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos
authentication server (AS). Then, it uses the TGT to request a
service ticket from the Kerberos ticket-granting server (TGS).
Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device known as
a Kerberos Key Distribution Center, or KDC. (In this document, we
will refer to both the AS and the TGS as the KDC.) Finally, the
client uses the service ticket to authenticate itself to the
service.
The advantage afforded by the TGT is that the client need explicitly
request a ticket and expose his credentials only once. The TGT and
its associated session key can then be used for any subsequent
requests. One result of this is that all further authentication is
independent of the method by which the initial authentication was
performed. Consequently, initial authentication provides a
convenient place to integrate public-key cryptography into Kerberos
authentication.
As defined, Kerberos authentication exchanges use symmetric-key
cryptography, in part for performance. One cost of using
symmetric-key cryptography is that the keys must be shared, so that
before a client can authenticate itself, he must already be
registered with the KDC.
Conversely, public-key cryptography (in conjunction with an
established Public Key Infrastructure) permits authentication
without prior registration with a KDC. Adding it to Kerberos allows
the widespread use of Kerberized applications by clients without
requiring them to register first with a KDC--a requirement that has
no inherent security benefit.
As noted above, a convenient and efficient place to introduce
public-key cryptography into Kerberos is in the initial
authentication exchange. This document describes the methods and
data formats for integrating public-key cryptography into Kerberos
initial authentication.
3. Extensions
This section describes extensions to [1] for supporting the use of
public-key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket.
Briefly, this document defines the following extensions to [1]:
1. The client indicates the use of public-key authentication by
including a special preauthenticator in the initial request.
This preauthenticator contains the client's public-key data
and a signature.
2. The KDC tests the client's request against its policy and
trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).
3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC
replies as usual, but the reply is encrypted using either:
a. a symmetric encryption key, signed using the KDC's
signature key and encrypted using the client's encryption
key; or
b. a key generated through a Diffie-Hellman exchange with
the client, signed using the KDC's signature key.
Any keying material required by the client to obtain the
Encryption key is returned in a preauthentication field
accompanying the usual reply.
4. The client obtains the encryption key, decrypts the reply,
and then proceeds as usual.
Section 3.1 of this document defines the necessary message formats.
Section 3.2 describes their syntax and use in greater detail.
3.1. Definitions, Requirements, and Constants
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [12].
3.1.1. Required Algorithms
All PKINIT implementations MUST support the following algorithms:
- Reply key (or DH-derived key): AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 etype.
- Signature algorithm: SHA-1 digest and RSA.
- Reply key delivery method: ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
with a non-zero nonce.
- Unkeyed checksum type for the paChecksum member of
PKAuthenticator: SHA1 (unkeyed), Kerberos checksum type 14
[11].
3.1.2. Defined Message and Encryption Types
PKINIT makes use of the following new preauthentication types:
PA-PK-AS-REQ TBD
PA-PK-AS-REP TBD
PA-PK-AS-ERR TBD
PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:
AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS TBD
PKINIT introduces the following new error codes:
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62
KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63
KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG 64
KDC_ERR_KEY_SIZE 65
KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66
KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70
KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71
KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72
KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75
PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:
TD-DH-PARAMETERS TBD
TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104
TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105
TD-UNKEYED-CHECKSUM-INFO 109
PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the AS-REQ
message (to indicate acceptance of the corresponding encryption OIDs
in PKINIT):
dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9
md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10
sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11
rc2CBC-EnvOID 12
rsaEncryption-EnvOID (PKCS1 v1.5) 13
rsaES-OAEP-EnvOID (PKCS1 v2.0) 14
des-ede3-cbc-EnvOID 15
The above encryption types are used by the client only within the
KDC-REQ-BODY to indicate which CMS [14] algorithms it supports. Their
use within Kerberos EncryptedData structures is not specified by this
document.
The ASN.1 module for all structures defined in this document (plus
IMPORT statements for all imported structures) are given in Appendix
A. In the event of a discrepancy between Appendix A and the portions
of ASN.1 in the main text, the appendix is normative.
All structures defined in this document MUST be encoded using
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). All imported data structures
must be encoded according to the rules specified in Kerberos [1] or
CMS [2] as appropriate.
Interoperability note: Some implementations may not be able to
decode CMS objects encoded with BER but not DER; specifically, they
may not be able to decode infinite length encodings. To maximize
interoperability, implementers SHOULD encode CMS objects used in
PKINIT with DER.
3.1.3. Algorithm Identifiers
PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following
algorithm identifiers.
PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifier for Diffie-Hellman
key agreement [9]:
dhpublicnumber
PKINIT uses the following signature algorithm identifiers [8, 12]:
sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1)
md5WithRSAEncryption (RSA with MD5)
id-dsa-with-sha1 (DSA with SHA1)
PKINIT uses the following encryption algorithm identifiers [5] for
encrypting the temporary key with a public key:
rsaEncryption (PKCS1 v1.5)
id-RSAES-OAEP (PKCS1 v2.0)
PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [14, 8] for
encrypting the reply key with the temporary key:
des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode)
rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode)
id-aes256-CBC (AES-256, CBC mode)
3.2. PKINIT Preauthentication Syntax and Use
This section defines the syntax and use of the various
preauthentication fields employed by PKINIT.
3.2.1. Client Request
The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per [1]; in
addition, a preauthentication field contains data signed by the
client's private signature key, as follows:
WrapContentInfo ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- Contains a BER encoding of
-- ContentInfo
})
WrapIssuerAndSerial ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- Contains a BER encoding of
-- IssuerAndSerialNumber
})
PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
signedAuthPack [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
-- Type is SignedData.
-- Content is AuthPack
-- (defined below).
trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
-- A list of CAs, trusted by
-- the client, used to certify
-- KDCs.
kdcCert [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial
OPTIONAL,
-- Identifies a particular KDC
-- certificate, if the client
-- already has it.
...
}
TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {
caName [1] Name,
-- Fully qualified X.500 name
-- as defined in RFC 3280 [4].
issuerAndSerial [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial,
-- Identifies a specific CA
-- certificate.
...
}
AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
-- Defined in RFC 3280 [4].
-- Present only if the client
-- is using ephemeral-ephemeral
-- Diffie-Hellman.
supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
OPTIONAL,
-- List of CMS encryption types
-- supported by client in order
-- of (decreasing) preference.
...
}
PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
cusec [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
ctime [1] KerberosTime,
-- cusec and ctime are used as
-- in [1], for replay
-- prevention.
nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
-- Binds reply to request,
-- MUST be zero when client
-- will accept cached
-- Diffie-Hellman parameters
-- from KDC. MUST NOT be
-- zero otherwise.
paChecksum [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- Defined in [1].
-- Performed over KDC-REQ-BODY,
-- MUST be unkeyed.
...
}
The ContentInfo in the signedAuthPack is filled out as follows:
1. The eContent field MUST contain data of type AuthPack.
The supportedCMSTypes field is filled with the algorithm
identifiers that the client supports, in order of
preference, with most preferred first.
2. The eContentType field MUST contain the OID value for
id-pkauthdata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkauthdata(1)}
3. The signerInfos field MUST contain the signature over the
AuthPack.
4. The certificates field MUST contain at least a signature
verification certificate chain that the KDC can use to
verify the signature over the AuthPack. The certificate
chain(s) MUST NOT contain the root CA certificate.
5. If a Diffie-Hellman key is being used, the parameters MUST
be chosen from Oakley Group 2 or 14. Implementations MUST
support Group 2; they are RECOMMENDED to support Group 14.
(See RFC 2409 [10] and RFC 3526 [13].)
6. The KDC may wish to use cached Diffie-Hellman parameters.
To indicate acceptance of caching, the client sends zero in
the nonce field of the pkAuthenticator. Zero is not a valid
value for this field under any other circumstances. Since
zero is used to indicate acceptance of cached parameters,
message binding in this case is performed using only the
nonce in the main request.
3.2.2. Validation of Client Request
Upon receiving the client's request, the KDC validates it. This
section describes the steps that the KDC MUST (unless otherwise
noted) take in validating the request.
The KDC must look for a client certificate in the signedAuthPack.
If it cannot find one signed by a CA it trusts, it sends back an
error of type KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying
e-data for this error is a TYPED-DATA (as defined in [1]). For this
error, the data-type is TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS, and the data-value is
the DER encoding of
KDCTrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name
If, while verifying the certificate chain, the KDC determines that
the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack is
invalid, it returns an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
The accompanying e-data for this error is a TYPED-DATA, whose
data-type is TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX, and whose data-value is the DER
encoding of the index into the CertificateSet field, ordered as sent
by the client:
CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
-- IssuerAndSerialNumber of
-- certificate with invalid signature
If more than one certificate signature is invalid, the KDC MAY send
one TYPED-DATA per invalid signature.
The KDC MAY also check whether any certificates in the client's
chain have been revoked. If any of them have been revoked, the KDC
MUST return an error of type KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if the KDC
attempts to determine the revocation status but is unable to do so,
it SHOULD return an error of type KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN.
The certificate or certificates affected are identified exactly as
for an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE (see above).
In addition to validating the certificate chain, the KDC MUST also
check that the certificate properly maps to the client's principal name
as specified in the AS-REQ as follows:
1. If the KDC has its own mapping from the name in the
certificate to a Kerberos name, it uses that Kerberos
name.
2. Otherwise, if the certificate contains a SubjectAltName
extension with a Kerberos name in the otherName field,
it uses that name. The otherName field (of type AnotherName)
in the SubjectAltName extension MUST contain the following:
The type-id is:
krb5PrincipalName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5)
kerberosv5 (2) 2
}
The value is:
KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
realm [0] Realm,
principalName [1] PrincipalName
}
If the KDC does not have its own mapping and there is no Kerberos
name present in the certificate, or if the name in the request does
not match the name in the certificate (including the realm name), or
if there is no name in the request, the KDC MUST return error code
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data
for this error.
Even if the chain is validated, and the names in the certificate and
the request match, the KDC may decide not to trust the client. For
example, the certificate may include an Extended Key Usage (EKU) OID
in the extensions field. As a matter of local policy, the KDC may
decide to reject requests on the basis of the absence or presence of
specific EKU OIDs. In this case, the KDC MUST return error code
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED. The PKINIT EKU OID is defined as:
{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
pkinit(3) pkekuoid(4) }
If the client's signature on the signedAuthPack fails to verify, or
if there is no paChecksum field, the KDC MUST return error
KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. There is no accompanying e-data for this
error.
The KDC MUST check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not
a replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits.
The recommendations clock skew times in [1] apply here. If the
check fails, the KDC MUSTreturn error code KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT or
KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, respectively.
If the clientPublicValue is filled in, indicating that the client
wishes to use ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, the KDC checks to
see if the parameters satisfy its policy. If they do not, it MUST
return error code KDC_ERR_KEY_SIZE. The accompanying e-data is a
TYPED-DATA, whose data-type is TD-DH-PARAMETERS, and whose
data-value is the DER encoding of a DomainParameters (see [3]),
including appropriate Diffie-Hellman parameters with which to retry
the request.
The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH if the
client included a kdcCert field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ and the KDC does
not have the corresponding certificate.
The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED if the client
did not include a kdcCert field, but did include a trustedCertifiers
field, and the KDC does not possesses a certificate issued by one of
the listed certifiers.
If there is a supportedCMSTypes field in the AuthPack, the KDC must
check to see if it supports any of the listed types. If it supports
more than one of the types, the KDC SHOULD use the one listed first.
If it does not support any of them, it MUST return an error of type
KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
3.2.3. KDC Reply
Assuming that the client's request has been properly validated, the
KDC proceeds as per [1], except as follows.
The KDC MUST set the initial flag and include an authorization data
of type AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS in the issued ticket. The value is
an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of InitialVerifiedCAs:
InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
ca [0] Name,
Validated [1] BOOLEAN,
...
}
The KDC MAY wrap any AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS data in AD-IF-RELEVANT
containers if the list of CAs satisfies the KDC's realm's policy.
(This corresponds to the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED ticket flag.)
Furthermore, any TGS must copy such authorization data from tickets
used in a PA-TGS-REQ of the TGS-REQ to the resulting ticket,
including the AD-IF-RELEVANT container, if present.
Application servers that understand this authorization data type
SHOULD apply local policy to determine whether a given ticket
bearing such a type *not* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT
container is acceptable. (This corresponds to the AP server
checking the transited field when the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag
has not been set.) If such a data type is contained within an
AD-IF-RELEVANT container, AP servers MAY apply local policy to
determine whether the authorization data is acceptable.
The AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from [1]. The KDC encrypts the
reply as usual, but not with the client's long-term key. Instead,
it encrypts it with either a generated encryption key, or a key
derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange. The contents of the
PA-PK-AS-REP indicate the type of encryption key that was used:
PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
dhSignedData [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
-- Type is SignedData.
-- Content is KDCDHKeyInfo
-- (defined below).
encKeyPack [1] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
-- Type is EnvelopedData.
-- Encrypted using client's
-- public key certificate.
-- Content is SignedData over
-- ReplyKeyPack (defined below).
...
}
KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
-- Equals public exponent
-- (g^a mod p).
-- INTEGER encoded as payload
-- of BIT STRING.
nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
-- Binds reply to request.
-- Exception: A value of zero
-- indicates that the KDC is
-- using cached values.
dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
-- Expiration time for KDC's
-- cached values.
...
}
The fields of the ContentInfo for dhSignedData are to be filled in
as follows:
1. The eContent field contains data of type KDCDHKeyInfo.
2. The eContentType field contains the OID value for
id-pkdhkeydata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkdhkeydata(2) }
3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is
the signature of the KDCDHKeyInfo.
4. The certificates field contains a signature verification
certificate chain that the client will use to verify the
KDC's signature over the KDCDHKeyInfo. This field may only
be left empty if the client did include a kdcCert field in
the PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's
certificate. The certificate chain MUST NOT contain the
root CA certificate.
5. If the client and KDC agree to use cached parameters, the
KDC MUST return a zero in the nonce field and include the
expiration time of the cached values in the dhKeyExpiration
field. If this time is exceeded, the client MUST NOT use
the reply. If the time is absent, the client MUST NOT use
the reply and MAY resubmit a request with a non-zero nonce,
thus indicating non-acceptance of the cached parameters.
The KDC reply key is derived as follows:
1. Both the KDC and the client calculate the shared secret
value
DHKey = g^(ab) mod p
where a and b are the client's and KDC's private exponents,
respectively. DHKey, padded first with leading zeros as
needed to make it as long as the modulus p, is represented
as a string of octets in big-endian order (such that the
size of DHKey in octets is the size of the modulus p).
2. Let K be the key-generation seed length [6] of the reply key
whose enctype is selected according to [1].
3. Define the function octetstring2key() as follows:
octetstring2key(x) == random-to-key(K-truncate(
sha1(0x00 | x) |
sha1(0x01 | x) |
sha1(0x02 | x) |
...
))
where x is an octet string; | is the concatenation operator;
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, etc. are each represented as a single
octet; random-to-key() is an operation that generates a
protocolkey from a bitstring of length K; and K-truncate
truncates its input to K bits. Both K and random-to-key()
are defined in the kcrypto profile [6] for the enctype of
the reply key.
4. When cached DH parameters are used, let n_c be the
clientDHNonce, and n_k be the serverDHNonce; otherwise, let
both n_c and n_k be empty octet strings. The reply key k is
k = octetstring2key(DHKey | n_c | n_k)
If the KDC and client are not using Diffie-Hellman, the KDC encrypts
the reply with an encryption key, packed in the encKeyPack, which
contains data of type ReplyKeyPack:
ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,
-- Defined in [1].
-- Used to encrypt main reply.
-- MUST be at least as strong
-- as session key. (Using the
-- same enctype and a strong
-- prng should suffice, if no
-- stronger encryption system
-- is available.)
nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
-- Binds reply to request.
...
}
The fields of the ContentInfo for encKeyPack MUST be filled in as
follows:
1. The content is of type SignedData. The eContent for
the SignedData is of type ReplyKeyPack.
2. The eContentType for the SignedData contains the OID value
for id-pkrkeydata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkrkeydata(3) }
3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is
the signature of the ReplyKeyPack.
4. The certificates field contains a signature verification
certificate chain that the client will use to verify the
KDC's signature over the ReplyKeyPack. This field may only
be left empty if the client included a kdcCert field in the
PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's certificate.
The certificate chain MUST NOT contain the root CA
certificate.
5. The contentType for the EnvelopedData contains the OID value
for id-signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi
(113549) pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }
6. The enveloped data MUST contain one KeyTransRecipientInfo,
which is targeted to the client's certificate (obtained in
the initial request).
7. The unprotectedAttrs or originatorInfo fields MAY be
present.
3.2.4. Validation of KDC Reply
Upon receipt of the KDC's reply, the client proceeds as follows. If
the PA-PK-AS-REP contains a dhSignedData, the client obtains and
verifies the Diffie-Hellman parameters, and obtains the shared key
as described above. Otherwise, the message contains an encKeyPack,
and the client decrypts and verifies the temporary encryption key.
In either case, the client MUST check to see if the included
certificate contains a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName or
iPAddress (if the KDC is specified by IP address instead of name).
If it does, it MUST check to see if that extension matches the KDC
it believes it is communicating with, with matching rules specified
in RFC 2459. Exception: If the client has some external information
as to the identity of the KDC, this check MAY be omitted.
The client also MUST check that the KDC's certificate contains an
extendedKeyUsage OID of id-pkkdcekuoid:
{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
pkinit(3) pkkdcekuoid(5) }
If all applicable checks are satisfied, the client then decrypts the
main reply with the resulting key, and then proceeds as described in
[1].
3.2.5. Indicating PKINIT Support
A KDC that supports PKINIT SHOULD indicate support for PKINIT to
clients that did not include any or acceptable pre-authentication in
their AS requests. As per [1], KDCs respond to such requests with a
KRB-ERROR with KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED as the error code and with a
list of pre-authentication data in the KRB-ERROR's e-data field.
To indicate support for PKINIT, then, a KDC MUST include, in
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED KRB-ERROR messages, a padata element of
type PA-PK-AS-ERR. The padata-value field of this padata element
MUST be set to the zero-length string; clients MUST ignore this and
any other value.
A client that receives a KRB-ERROR message, bearing a PA-PK-AS-ERR
padata element, from a KDC in response to its AS-REQ should take the
message as an indication of support by the KDC for PKINIT. The
client MAY respond by attempting a new AS exchange using its
preferred pre-authentication mechanism for which the KDC has
indicated support in its error message and for which the client has
credentials, possibly including PKINIT.
Future extensions to PKINIT may provide for the use of the value of
PA-PK-AS-ERR padata elements to indicate such details as KDCs' PKI
trust anchors, negotiation preferences, etc.
4. Security Considerations
PKINIT raises certain security considerations beyond those that can
be regulated strictly in protocol definitions. We will address them
in this section.
PKINIT extends the cross-realm model to the public-key
infrastructure. Users of PKINIT must understand security policies
and procedures appropriate to the use of Public Key Infrastructures.
Standard Kerberos allows the possibility of interactions between
cryptosystems of varying strengths; this document adds interactions
with public-key cryptosystems to Kerberos. Some administrative
policies may allow the use of relatively weak public keys. Using
such keys to wrap data encrypted under stronger conventional
cryptosystems may be inappropriate.
PKINIT requires keys for symmetric cryptosystems to be generated.
Some such systems contain "weak" keys. For recommendations regarding
these weak keys, see [1].
PKINIT allows the use of a zero nonce in the PKAuthenticator when
cached Diffie-Hellman keys are used. In this case, message binding
is performed using the nonce in the main request in the same way as
it is done for ordinary AS-REQs (without the PKINIT
pre-authenticator). The nonce field in the KDC request body is
signed through the checksum in the PKAuthenticator, which
cryptographically binds the PKINIT pre-authenticator to the main
body of the AS Request and also provides message integrity for the
full AS Request.
However, when a PKINIT pre-authenticator in the AS-REP has a
zero-nonce, and an attacker has somehow recorded this
pre-authenticator and discovered the corresponding Diffie-Hellman
private key (e.g., with a brute-force attack), the attacker will be
able to fabricate his own AS-REP messages that impersonate the KDC
with this same pre-authenticator. This compromised pre-authenticator
will remain valid as long as its expiration time has not been reached
and it is therefore important for clients to check this expiration
time and for the expiration time to be reasonably short, which
depends on the size of the Diffie-Hellman group.
If a client also caches its Diffie-Hellman keys, then the session key
could remain the same during multiple AS-REQ/AS-REP exchanges and an
attacker which compromised the session key could fabricate his own
AS-REP messages with a pre-recorded pre-authenticator until the
client starts using a new Diffie-Hellman key pair and while the KDC
pre-authenticator has not yet expired. It is therefore not
recommended for KDC clients to also cache their Diffie-Hellman keys.
Care should be taken in how certificates are chosen for the purposes
of authentication using PKINIT. Some local policies may require
that key escrow be used for certain certificate types. Deployers of
PKINIT should be aware of the implications of using certificates that
have escrowed keys for the purposes of authentication.
PKINIT does not provide for a "return routability" test to prevent
attackers from mounting a denial-of-service attack on the KDC by
causing it to perform unnecessary and expensive public-key
operations. Strictly speaking, this is also true of standard
Kerberos, although the potential cost is not as great, because
standard Kerberos does not make use of public-key cryptography.
The syntax for the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data does
permit empty SEQUENCEs to be encoded. Such empty sequences may only
be used if the KDC itself vouches for the user's certificate. [This
seems to reflect the consensus of the Kerberos working group.]
5. Acknowledgements
The following people have made significant contributions to this
draft: Ari Medvinsky, Matt Hur, John Wray, Jonathan Trostle, Nicolas
Williams, Tom Yu, Sam Hartman, and Jeff Hutzelman.
Some of the ideas on which this document is based arose during
discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF
CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos
and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system.
These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an
attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this
document approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos
perspective. Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas
in DCE have been invaluable.
6. Expiration Date
This draft expires May 15, 2005.
7. Bibliography
[1] RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for
draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications.
[2] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax. August 2002. Request
For Comments 3369.
[3] W. Polk, R. Housley, and L. Bassham. Algorithms and Identifiers
for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, April 2002. Request For
Comments 3279.
[4] R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile, April 2002. Request for Comments 3280.
[5] B. Kaliski, J. Staddon. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications, October 1998. Request for Comments 2437.
[6] RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for
draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto.
[7] S. Blake-Wilson, M. Nystrom, D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen, and
T. Wright. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions, June 2003.
Request for Comments 3546.
[8] J. Schaad. Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). July
2003. Request for Comments 3565.
[9] NIST, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Encryption
Standard, April 1981. FIPS PUB 74.
[10] D. Harkins and D. Carrel. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE),
November 1998. Request for Comments 2409.
[11] K. Raeburn. Unkeyed SHA-1 Checksum Specification for Kerberos
5. Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-krb-wg-sha1-00.txt.
[12] S. Bradner. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels. March 1997. Request for Comments 2119 (BCP 14).
[13] T. Kivinen, M. Kojo. More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-
Hellman Groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). May 2003. Request
for Comments 3526.
[14] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms.
August 2002. Request For Comments 3370.
8. Authors
Brian Tung
Clifford Neuman
USC Information Sciences Institute
4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001
Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695
Phone: +1 310 822 1511
E-mail: {brian,bcn}@isi.edu
Sasha Medvinsky
Motorola, Inc.
6450 Sequence Drive
San Diego, CA 92121
+1 858 404 2367
E-mail: smedvinsky@motorola.com
Appendix A. PKINIT ASN.1 Module
KerberosV5-PK-INIT-SPEC {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(TBD)
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, AlgorithmIdentifier, Name
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso (1) identified-organization (3)
dod (6) internet (1) security (5) mechanisms (5)
pkix (7) id-mod (0) id-pkix1-explicit (18) }
ContentInfo, IssuerAndSerialNumber
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
modules(0) cms(1) }
KerberosTime, Checksum, TYPED-DATA, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey
FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4)
krb5spec2(2) } ;
id-pkinit OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5)
kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) }
id-pkdhkeydata OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 1 }
id-pkdhkeydata OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 2 }
id-pkrkeydata OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 3 }
id-pkekuoid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 4 }
id-pkkdcekuoid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit 5 }
pa-pk-as-req INTEGER ::= TBD
pa-pk-as-rep INTEGER ::= TBD
pa-pk-ocsp-req INTEGER ::= TBD
pa-pk-ocsp-rep INTEGER ::= TBD
ad-initial-verified-cas INTEGER ::= TBD
td-dh-parameters INTEGER ::= TBD
td-trusted-certifiers INTEGER ::= 104
td-certificate-index INTEGER ::= 105
WrapContentInfo ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- Contains a BER encoding of
-- ContentInfo
})
WrapIssuerAndSerial ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- Contains a BER encoding of
-- IssuerAndSerialNumber
})
PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
signedAuthPack [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
kdcCert [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial
OPTIONAL,
...
}
TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {
caName [1] Name,
issuerAndSerial [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial,
...
}
AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
OPTIONAL,
...
}
PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
cusec [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
ctime [1] KerberosTime,
nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
paChecksum [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
...
}
KDCTrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name
CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
realm [0] Realm,
principalName [1] PrincipalName
}
InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
ca [0] Name,
validated [1] BOOLEAN,
...
}
PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
dhSignedData [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
encKeyPack [1] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
...
}
KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
...
}
ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,
nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
...
}
END
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2004. This document is subject
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except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
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