Files
heimdal/lib/asn1/krb5.asn1
Nicolas Williams 9c9dac2b16 asn1: CVE-2022-44640 invalid free in ASN.1 codec
Heimdal's ASN.1 compiler generates code that allows specially
crafted DER encodings of CHOICEs to invoke the wrong free function
on the decoded structure upon decode error.  This is known to impact
the Heimdal KDC, leading to an invalid free() of an address partly
or wholly under the control of the attacker, in turn leading to a
potential remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.

This error affects the DER codec for all CHOICE types used in
Heimdal, though not all cases will be exploitable.  We have not
completed a thorough analysis of all the Heimdal components
affected, thus the Kerberos client, the X.509 library, and other
parts, may be affected as well.

This bug has been in Heimdal since 2005.  It was first reported by
Douglas Bagnall, though it had been found independently by the
Heimdal maintainers via fuzzing a few weeks earlier.
2022-11-15 17:51:45 -06:00

1053 lines
28 KiB
Groff

-- $Id$
KERBEROS5 DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS
AD-AND-OR,
AD-IF-RELEVANT,
AD-KDCIssued,
AD-LoginAlias,
AP-REP,
AP-REQ,
AS-REP,
AS-REQ,
AUTHDATA-TYPE,
Authenticator,
AuthorizationData,
AuthorizationDataElement,
CKSUMTYPE,
ChangePasswdDataMS,
Checksum,
CompositePrincipal,
ENCTYPE,
ETYPE-INFO,
ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY,
ETYPE-INFO2,
ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY,
EncAPRepPart,
EncASRepPart,
EncKDCRepPart,
EncKrbCredPart,
EncKrbPrivPart,
EncTGSRepPart,
EncTicketPart,
EncryptedData,
EncryptionKey,
EtypeList,
HostAddress,
HostAddresses,
KDC-REQ-BODY,
KDCOptions,
KDC-REP,
KRB-CRED,
KRB-ERROR,
KRB-PRIV,
KRB-SAFE,
KRB-SAFE-BODY,
KerberosString,
KerberosTime,
KrbCredInfo,
LR-TYPE,
LastReq,
METHOD-DATA,
NAME-TYPE,
PA-ClientCanonicalized,
PA-ClientCanonicalizedNames,
PA-DATA,
PA-ENC-TS-ENC,
PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP,
PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ,
PA-PAC-OPTIONS,
PA-PAC-REQUEST,
PA-S4U2Self,
PA-S4U-X509-USER,
PA-SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA,
PA-ServerReferralData,
PA-SvrReferralData,
PADATA-TYPE,
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST,
PA-FX-FAST-REPLY,
Principal,
PrincipalName,
Principals,
Realm,
TGS-REP,
TGS-REQ,
Ticket,
TicketFlags,
TransitedEncoding,
TypedData,
KrbFastResponse,
KrbFastFinished,
KrbFastReq,
KrbFastArmor,
KrbFastArmoredReq,
KDCFastState,
KDCFastCookie,
KDC-PROXY-MESSAGE,
KERB-AD-RESTRICTION-ENTRY,
KERB-TIMES,
KERB-CRED,
KERB-TGS-REQ-IN,
KERB-TGS-REQ-OUT,
KERB-ARMOR-SERVICE-REPLY
;
NAME-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN(0), -- Name type not known
KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL(1), -- Just the name of the principal as in
KRB5_NT_SRV_INST(2), -- Service and other unique instance (krbtgt)
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST(3), -- Service with host name as instance
KRB5_NT_SRV_XHST(4), -- Service with host as remaining components
KRB5_NT_UID(5), -- Unique ID
KRB5_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL(6), -- PKINIT
KRB5_NT_SMTP_NAME(7), -- Name in form of SMTP email name
KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL(10), -- Windows 2000 UPN
KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN(11), -- Wellknown
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST_DOMAIN(12), -- Domain based service with host name as instance (RFC5179)
KRB5_NT_ENT_PRINCIPAL_AND_ID(-130), -- Windows 2000 UPN and SID
KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL(-128), -- NT 4 style name
KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL_AND_ID(-129), -- NT style name and SID
KRB5_NT_NTLM(-1200), -- NTLM name, realm is domain
KRB5_NT_X509_GENERAL_NAME(-1201), -- x509 general name (base64 encoded)
KRB5_NT_GSS_HOSTBASED_SERVICE(-1202), -- not used; remove
KRB5_NT_CACHE_UUID(-1203), -- name is actually a uuid pointing to ccache, use client name in cache
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST_NEEDS_CANON (-195894762) -- Internal: indicates that name canonicalization is needed
}
-- message types
MESSAGE-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
krb-as-req(10), -- Request for initial authentication
krb-as-rep(11), -- Response to KRB_AS_REQ request
krb-tgs-req(12), -- Request for authentication based on TGT
krb-tgs-rep(13), -- Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request
krb-ap-req(14), -- application request to server
krb-ap-rep(15), -- Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL
krb-safe(20), -- Safe (checksummed) application message
krb-priv(21), -- Private (encrypted) application message
krb-cred(22), -- Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials
krb-error(30) -- Error response
}
-- pa-data types
PADATA-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5-PADATA-NONE(0),
KRB5-PADATA-TGS-REQ(1),
KRB5-PADATA-AP-REQ(1),
KRB5-PADATA-ENC-TIMESTAMP(2),
KRB5-PADATA-PW-SALT(3),
KRB5-PADATA-ENC-UNIX-TIME(5),
KRB5-PADATA-SANDIA-SECUREID(6),
KRB5-PADATA-SESAME(7),
KRB5-PADATA-OSF-DCE(8),
KRB5-PADATA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID(9),
KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT(10),
KRB5-PADATA-ETYPE-INFO(11),
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-CHALLENGE(12), -- (sam/otp)
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-RESPONSE(13), -- (sam/otp)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REQ-19(14), -- (PKINIT-19)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REP-19(15), -- (PKINIT-19)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REQ-WIN(15), -- (PKINIT - old number)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REQ(16), -- (PKINIT-25)
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-REP(17), -- (PKINIT-25)
KRB5-PADATA-PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE(18),
KRB5-PADATA-ETYPE-INFO2(19),
KRB5-PADATA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO(20),
KRB5-PADATA-SVR-REFERRAL-INFO(20), --- old ms referral number
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-REDIRECT(21), -- (sam/otp)
KRB5-PADATA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA(22),
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO(23),
KRB5-PADATA-SERVER-REFERRAL(25),
KRB5-PADATA-ALT-PRINC(24), -- (crawdad@fnal.gov)
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-CHALLENGE2(30), -- (kenh@pobox.com)
KRB5-PADATA-SAM-RESPONSE2(31), -- (kenh@pobox.com)
KRB5-PA-EXTRA-TGT(41), -- Reserved extra TGT
KRB5-PADATA-FX-FAST-ARMOR(71), -- fast armor
KRB5-PADATA-TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL(102), -- PrincipalName
KRB5-PADATA-PK-TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS(104), -- PKINIT
KRB5-PADATA-PK-TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX(105), -- PKINIT
KRB5-PADATA-TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR(106), -- application specific
KRB5-PADATA-TD-REQ-NONCE(107), -- INTEGER
KRB5-PADATA-TD-REQ-SEQ(108), -- INTEGER
KRB5-PADATA-PA-PAC-REQUEST(128), -- jbrezak@exchange.microsoft.com
KRB5-PADATA-FOR-USER(129), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-FOR-X509-USER(130), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-FOR-CHECK-DUPS(131), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-AS-CHECKSUM(132), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-PK-AS-09-BINDING(132), -- client send this to
-- tell KDC that is supports
-- the asCheckSum in the
-- PK-AS-REP
KRB5-PADATA-FX-COOKIE(133), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-AUTHENTICATION-SET(134), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED(135), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-FX-FAST(136), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-FX-ERROR(137), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE(138), -- krb-wg-preauth-framework
KRB5-PADATA-OTP-CHALLENGE(141), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KRB5-PADATA-OTP-REQUEST(142), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KBB5-PADATA-OTP-CONFIRM(143), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KRB5-PADATA-OTP-PIN-CHANGE(144), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
KRB5-PADATA-EPAK-AS-REQ(145),
KRB5-PADATA-EPAK-AS-REP(146),
KRB5-PADATA-PKINIT-KX(147), -- krb-wg-anon
KRB5-PADATA-PKU2U-NAME(148), -- zhu-pku2u
KRB5-PADATA-REQ-ENC-PA-REP(149), --
KER5-PADATA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ(161), -- MS-KILE
KER5-PADATA-KERB-PAKEY-LIST-REP(162), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-SUPPORTED-ETYPES(165), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-PAC-OPTIONS(167), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-PADATA-GSS(655) -- krb-wg-gss-preauth
}
AUTHDATA-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5-AUTHDATA-IF-RELEVANT(1),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-INTENDED-FOR_SERVER(2),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS(3),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-KDC-ISSUED(4),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-AND-OR(5),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS(6),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS(7),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC(8),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS(9),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-OSF-DCE(64),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SESAME(65),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-OSF-DCE-PKI-CERTID(66),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-AUTHENTICATION-STRENGTH(70),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-FX-FAST-ARMOR(71),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-FX-FAST-USED(72),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-WIN2K-PAC(128),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-GSS-API-ETYPE-NEGOTIATION(129), -- Authenticator only
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SIGNTICKET-OLDER(-17),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SIGNTICKET-OLD(142),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SIGNTICKET(512),
KRB5-AUTHDATA-SYNTHETIC-PRINC-USED(513), -- principal was synthetised
KRB5-AUTHDATA-KERB-LOCAL(141), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-AUTHDATA-TOKEN-RESTRICTIONS(142), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-AUTHDATA-AP-OPTIONS(143), -- MS-KILE
KRB5-AUTHDATA-TARGET-PRINCIPAL(144), -- MS-KILE
-- N.B. these assignments have not been confirmed yet.
--
-- DO NOT USE in production yet!
KRB5-AUTHDATA-ON-BEHALF-OF(580), -- UTF8String princ name
KRB5-AUTHDATA-BEARER-TOKEN-JWT(581), -- JWT token
KRB5-AUTHDATA-BEARER-TOKEN-SAML(582), -- SAML token
KRB5-AUTHDATA-BEARER-TOKEN-OIDC(583), -- OIDC token
KRB5-AUTHDATA-CSR-AUTHORIZED(584), -- Proxy has authorized client
-- to requested exts in CSR
KRB5-AUTHDATA-GSS-COMPOSITE-NAME(655) -- gss_export_name_composite
}
-- checksumtypes
CKSUMTYPE ::= INTEGER {
CKSUMTYPE_NONE(0),
CKSUMTYPE_CRC32(1),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4(2),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES(3),
CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC(4),
CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC_K(5),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES_K(6),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5(7),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES(8),
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES3(9),
CKSUMTYPE_SHA1_OTHER(10),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3(12),
CKSUMTYPE_SHA1(14),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_128(15),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES_256(16),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA256_128_AES128(19),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA384_192_AES256(20),
CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI(0x8003),
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5(-138), -- unofficial microsoft number
CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ENC(-1138), -- even more unofficial
CKSUMTYPE_SHA256(-21),
CKSUMTYPE_SHA384(-22),
CKSUMTYPE_SHA512(-23)
}
--enctypes
ENCTYPE ::= INTEGER {
KRB5_ENCTYPE_NULL(0),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC(1),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4(2),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5(3),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5(5),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1(7),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE(8),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV(9),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB(10),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1(16), -- with key derivation
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96(17),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96(18),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128(19),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192(20),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5(23),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56(24),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS(48),
-- some "old" windows types
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4(-128),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD(-133),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP(-135),
-- these are for Heimdal internal use
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE(-0x1000),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE(-0x1001),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE(-0x1002),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE(-0x1003),
KRB5_ENCTYPE_DIGEST_MD5_NONE(-0x1004), -- private use, lukeh@padl.com
KRB5_ENCTYPE_CRAM_MD5_NONE(-0x1005) -- private use, lukeh@padl.com
}
-- this is sugar to make something ASN1 does not have: unsigned
Krb5UInt32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
Krb5Int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647)
KerberosString ::= GeneralString
Realm ::= GeneralString
PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
name-type[0] NAME-TYPE,
name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString
}
HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
addr-type[0] Krb5Int32,
address[1] OCTET STRING
}
-- This is from RFC1510.
--
-- HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
-- addr-type[0] Krb5Int32,
-- address[1] OCTET STRING
-- }
-- This seems much better.
HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress
KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z)
AuthorizationDataElement ::= SEQUENCE {
ad-type[0] Krb5Int32,
ad-data[1] OCTET STRING
}
AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF AuthorizationDataElement
APOptions ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
use-session-key(1),
mutual-required(2)
}
TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
forwardable(1),
forwarded(2),
proxiable(3),
proxy(4),
may-postdate(5),
postdated(6),
invalid(7),
renewable(8),
initial(9),
pre-authent(10),
hw-authent(11),
transited-policy-checked(12),
ok-as-delegate(13),
enc-pa-rep(15),
anonymous(16)
}
KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
forwardable(1),
forwarded(2),
proxiable(3),
proxy(4),
allow-postdate(5),
postdated(6),
renewable(8),
cname-in-addl-tkt(14), -- ms extension
canonicalize(15),
request-anonymous(16),
disable-transited-check(26),
renewable-ok(27),
enc-tkt-in-skey(28),
renew(30),
validate(31)
}
LR-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
LR_NONE(0), -- no information
LR_INITIAL_TGT(1), -- last initial TGT request
LR_INITIAL(2), -- last initial request
LR_ISSUE_USE_TGT(3), -- time of newest TGT used
LR_RENEWAL(4), -- time of last renewal
LR_REQUEST(5), -- time of last request (of any type)
LR_PW_EXPTIME(6), -- expiration time of password
LR_ACCT_EXPTIME(7) -- expiration time of account
}
LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
lr-type[0] LR-TYPE,
lr-value[1] KerberosTime
}
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
etype[0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType
kvno[1] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
}
EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
keytype[0] Krb5Int32,
keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING
}
-- encoded Transited field
TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE {
tr-type[0] Krb5Int32, -- must be registered
contents[1] OCTET STRING
}
Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE {
tkt-vno[0] Krb5Int32,
realm[1] Realm,
sname[2] PrincipalName,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData
}
-- Encrypted part of ticket
EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE {
flags[0] TicketFlags,
key[1] EncryptionKey,
crealm[2] Realm,
cname[3] PrincipalName,
transited[4] TransitedEncoding,
authtime[5] KerberosTime,
starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[7] KerberosTime,
renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
Checksum ::= SEQUENCE {
cksumtype[0] CKSUMTYPE,
checksum[1] OCTET STRING
}
-- For GSS name attributes [RFC6680] we'll decorate Principal (which is not an
-- RFC4120 type, but which we use a) in HDB, b) in the API as that which
-- krb5_principal points to) with PrincipalNameAttrs.
--
-- Attributes have three possible sources in Heimdal Kerberos at this time:
--
-- - the EncKDCRepPart (for the client's attributes on the client side)
-- - the EncTicketPart (for the client's attributes on the server side)
-- - the Authenticator's AuthorizationData (if any; server-side)
--
-- In principle there can be more:
--
-- - locally-set (asserted) attributes
-- - locally-looked-up attributes (e.g., in LDAP)
-- - locally-transformed attributes (e.g., local groups, filtered SIDs from a
-- PAC, etc.)
--
-- We could also cache "cooked" attributes as reported by the RFC6680 API given
-- the sources we have.
--
-- For now we'll only support authenticated attributes where those come from
-- the KDC, and attributes asserted in Authenticator authz-data.
PrincipalNameAttrSrc ::= CHOICE {
enc-kdc-rep-part [0] EncKDCRepPart, -- minus session key
enc-ticket-part [1] EncTicketPart -- minus session key
}
PrincipalNameAttrs ::= SEQUENCE {
-- True if this name was authenticated via an AP-REQ or a KDC-REP
authenticated [0] BOOLEAN,
-- These are compiled from the Ticket, KDC-REP, and/or Authenticator
source [1] PrincipalNameAttrSrc OPTIONAL,
authenticator-ad [2] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL,
-- For the server on the client side we should keep track of the
-- transit path taken to reach it (if absent -> unknown).
--
-- We don't learn much more about the server from the KDC.
peer-realm [3] Realm OPTIONAL,
transited [4] TransitedEncoding OPTIONAL,
-- True if the PAC was verified
pac-verified [5] BOOLEAN,
-- True if any AD-KDC-ISSUEDs in the Ticket were validated
kdc-issued-verified [6] BOOLEAN,
-- TODO: Add requested attributes, for gss_set_name_attribute(), which
-- should cause corresponding authz-data elements to be added to
-- any TGS-REQ or to the AP-REQ's Authenticator as appropriate.
want-ad [7] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
-- This is our type for exported composite name tokens for GSS [RFC6680].
-- It's the same as Principal (below) as decorated with (see krb5.opt file and
-- asn1_compile usage), except it's not decorated, so the name attributes are
-- encoded/decoded.
CompositePrincipal ::= [APPLICATION 48] SEQUENCE {
name[0] PrincipalName,
realm[1] Realm,
nameattrs[2] PrincipalNameAttrs OPTIONAL
}
-- This is not part of RFC1510/RFC4120. We use this internally as our
-- krb5_principal (which is a typedef of *Principal), and in HDB entries.
Principal ::= SEQUENCE {
name[0] PrincipalName,
realm[1] Realm
-- This will be decorated with an optional nameattrs field of
-- PrincipalNameAttrs type that doesn't get encoded. Same as
-- CompositePrincipal above, except that CompositePrincipal's
-- nameattrs field does get encoded, while Principal's does not:
--
-- nameattrs[2] PrincipalNameAttrs OPTIONAL
}
Principals ::= SEQUENCE OF Principal
Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE {
authenticator-vno[0] Krb5Int32,
crealm[1] Realm,
cname[2] PrincipalName,
cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL,
cusec[4] Krb5Int32,
ctime[5] KerberosTime,
subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number[7] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL,
authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
-- might be encoded AP-REQ
padata-type[1] PADATA-TYPE,
padata-value[2] OCTET STRING
}
ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
etype[0] ENCTYPE,
salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
salttype[2] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL
}
ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY
ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
etype[0] ENCTYPE,
salt[1] KerberosString OPTIONAL,
s2kparams[2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
ETYPE-INFO2 ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY
METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA
TypedData ::= SEQUENCE {
data-type[0] Krb5Int32,
data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TypedData
KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
kdc-options[0] KDCOptions,
cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, -- Used only in AS-REQ
realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm
-- Also client's in AS-REQ
sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
nonce[7] Krb5Int32,
etype[8] SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType,
-- in preference order
addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
-- Encrypted AuthorizationData encoding
additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL
}
KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[1] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[2] MESSAGE-TYPE,
padata[3] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL,
req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY
}
AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ
TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ
-- padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP
-- padata-value ::= EncryptedData - PA-ENC-TS-ENC
PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time
pausec[1] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL
}
-- draft-brezak-win2k-krb-authz-01
PA-PAC-REQUEST ::= SEQUENCE {
include-pac[0] BOOLEAN -- Indicates whether a PAC
-- should be included or not
}
-- MS-KILE/MS-SFU
PAC-OPTIONS-FLAGS ::= BIT STRING {
claims(0),
branch-aware(1),
forward-to-full-dc(2),
resource-based-constrained-delegation(3)
}
-- MS-KILE
PA-PAC-OPTIONS ::= SEQUENCE {
flags [0] PAC-OPTIONS-FLAGS
}
-- MS-KILE
-- captures show that [UNIVERSAL 16] is required to parse it
KERB-AD-RESTRICTION-ENTRY ::= [UNIVERSAL 16] SEQUENCE {
restriction-type [0] Krb5Int32,
restriction [1] OCTET STRING -- LSAP_TOKEN_INFO_INTEGRITY structure
}
-- MS-KILE Section 2.2.11
PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ ::= SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE
-- MS-KILE Section 2.2.12
PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP ::= SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType,
-- PacketCable provisioning server location, PKT-SP-SEC-I09-030728.pdf
PROV-SRV-LOCATION ::= GeneralString
KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
padata[2] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL,
crealm[3] Realm,
cname[4] PrincipalName,
ticket[5] Ticket,
enc-part[6] EncryptedData
}
AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP
TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP
EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE {
key[0] EncryptionKey,
last-req[1] LastReq,
nonce[2] Krb5Int32,
key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
flags[4] TicketFlags,
authtime[5] KerberosTime,
starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[7] KerberosTime,
renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm[9] Realm,
sname[10] PrincipalName,
caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
encrypted-pa-data[12] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL
}
EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart
EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart
AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
ap-options[2] APOptions,
ticket[3] Ticket,
authenticator[4] EncryptedData
}
AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
enc-part[2] EncryptedData
}
EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE {
ctime[0] KerberosTime,
cusec[1] Krb5Int32,
subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL
}
KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[2] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
}
KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY,
cksum[3] Checksum
}
KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData
}
EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE {
user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[2] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] Krb5UInt32 OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr
}
KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, -- KRB_CRED
tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData
}
KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
key[0] EncryptionKey,
prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL,
authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL,
sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL
}
EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE {
ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo,
nonce[1] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[3] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
}
KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] Krb5Int32,
msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
cusec[3] Krb5Int32 OPTIONAL,
stime[4] KerberosTime,
susec[5] Krb5Int32,
error-code[6] Krb5Int32,
crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL,
cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm
sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name
e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
ChangePasswdDataMS ::= SEQUENCE {
newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING,
targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL
}
EtypeList ::= SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE
-- the client's proposed enctype list in
-- decreasing preference order, favorite choice first
krb5-pvno Krb5Int32 ::= 5 -- current Kerberos protocol version number
-- transited encodings
domain-X500-Compress Krb5Int32 ::= 1
-- authorization data primitives
AD-IF-RELEVANT ::= AuthorizationData
AD-KDCIssued ::= SEQUENCE {
ad-checksum[0] Checksum,
i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
elements[3] AuthorizationData
}
AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE {
condition-count[0] Krb5Int32,
elements[1] AuthorizationData
}
AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC ::= AuthorizationData
-- PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2/PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2
PA-SAM-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
PA_SAM_TYPE_ENIGMA(1), -- Enigma Logic
PA_SAM_TYPE_DIGI_PATH(2), -- Digital Pathways
PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY_K0(3), -- S/key where KDC has key 0
PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY(4), -- Traditional S/Key
PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID(5), -- Security Dynamics
PA_SAM_TYPE_CRYPTOCARD(6) -- CRYPTOCard
}
PA-SAM-REDIRECT ::= HostAddresses
SAMFlags ::= BIT STRING {
use-sad-as-key(0),
send-encrypted-sad(1),
must-pk-encrypt-sad(2)
}
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-type[0] Krb5Int32,
sam-flags[1] SAMFlags,
sam-type-name[2] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-track-id[3] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-challenge-label[4] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-challenge[5] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-response-prompt[6] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-pk-for-sad[7] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
sam-nonce[8] Krb5Int32,
sam-etype[9] Krb5Int32,
...
}
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2 ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-body[0] PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2-BODY,
sam-cksum[1] SEQUENCE OF Checksum, -- (1..MAX)
...
}
PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2 ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-type[0] Krb5Int32,
sam-flags[1] SAMFlags,
sam-track-id[2] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
sam-enc-nonce-or-sad[3] EncryptedData, -- PA-ENC-SAM-RESPONSE-ENC
sam-nonce[4] Krb5Int32,
...
}
PA-ENC-SAM-RESPONSE-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
sam-nonce[0] Krb5Int32,
sam-sad[1] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
...
}
PA-S4U2Self ::= SEQUENCE {
name[0] PrincipalName,
realm[1] Realm,
cksum[2] Checksum,
auth[3] GeneralString
}
PA-S4U-X509-USER::= SEQUENCE {
user-id[0] S4UUserID,
checksum[1] Checksum
}
S4UUserID ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce [0] Krb5UInt32, -- the nonce in KDC-REQ-BODY
cname [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, -- Certificate mapping hints
crealm [2] Realm,
subject-certificate [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
options [4] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
...
}
AD-LoginAlias ::= SEQUENCE { -- ad-type number TBD --
login-alias [0] PrincipalName,
checksum [1] Checksum
}
-- old ms referral
PA-SvrReferralData ::= SEQUENCE {
referred-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
referred-realm [0] Realm
}
PA-SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA ::= EncryptedData
PA-ServerReferralData ::= SEQUENCE {
referred-realm [0] Realm OPTIONAL,
true-principal-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
requested-principal-name [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
referral-valid-until [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
...
}
FastOptions ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
hide-client-names(1),
critical2(2),
critical3(3),
critical4(4),
critical5(5),
critical6(6),
critical7(7),
critical8(8),
critical9(9),
critical10(10),
critical11(11),
critical12(12),
critical13(13),
critical14(14),
critical15(15),
kdc-follow-referrals(16)
}
KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
fast-options [0] FastOptions,
padata [1] METHOD-DATA,
req-body [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
...
}
KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
armor-type [0] Krb5Int32,
armor-value [1] OCTET STRING,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
req-checksum [1] Checksum,
enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData -- KrbFastReq --
}
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
...
}
KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
timestamp [0] KerberosTime,
usec [1] Krb5Int32,
crealm [2] Realm,
cname [3] PrincipalName,
ticket-checksum [4] Checksum,
...
}
KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
padata [0] METHOD-DATA,
strengthen-key [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
finished [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
nonce [3] Krb5UInt32,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
enc-fast-rep [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
...
}
PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
...
}
KDCFastFlags ::= BIT STRING {
use-reply-key(0),
reply-key-used(1),
reply-key-replaced(2),
kdc-verified(3),
requested-hidden-names(4)
}
-- KDCFastState is stored in FX_COOKIE
KDCFastState ::= SEQUENCE {
flags [0] KDCFastFlags,
expiration [1] GeneralizedTime,
fast-state [2] METHOD-DATA,
expected-pa-types [3] SEQUENCE OF PADATA-TYPE OPTIONAL
}
KDCFastCookie ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] UTF8String,
cookie [1] EncryptedData
}
KDC-PROXY-MESSAGE ::= SEQUENCE {
kerb-message [0] OCTET STRING,
target-domain [1] Realm OPTIONAL,
dclocator-hint [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
-- these messages are used in the GSSCred communication and is not part of Kerberos propper
KERB-TIMES ::= SEQUENCE {
authtime [0] KerberosTime,
starttime [1] KerberosTime,
endtime [2] KerberosTime,
renew_till [3] KerberosTime
}
KERB-CRED ::= SEQUENCE {
client [0] Principal,
server [1] Principal,
keyblock [2] EncryptionKey,
times [3] KERB-TIMES,
ticket [4] OCTET STRING,
authdata [5] OCTET STRING,
addresses [6] HostAddresses,
flags [7] TicketFlags
}
KERB-TGS-REQ-IN ::= SEQUENCE {
cache [0] OCTET STRING SIZE (16),
addrs [1] HostAddresses,
flags [2] Krb5UInt32,
imp [3] Principal OPTIONAL,
ticket [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
in_cred [5] KERB-CRED,
krbtgt [6] KERB-CRED,
padata [7] METHOD-DATA
}
KERB-TGS-REQ-OUT ::= SEQUENCE {
subkey [0] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
t [1] TGS-REQ
}
KERB-TGS-REP-IN ::= SEQUENCE {
cache [0] OCTET STRING SIZE (16),
subkey [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
in_cred [2] KERB-CRED,
t [3] TGS-REP
}
KERB-TGS-REP-OUT ::= SEQUENCE {
cache [0] OCTET STRING SIZE (16),
cred [1] KERB-CRED,
subkey [2] EncryptionKey
}
KERB-ARMOR-SERVICE-REPLY ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor,
armor-key [1] EncryptionKey
}
END
-- etags -r '/\([A-Za-z][-A-Za-z0-9]*\).*::=/\1/' k5.asn1