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INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-18.txt Clifford Neuman
Updates: RFC 1510bis USC/ISI
expires August 20, 2004 Matthew Hur
Ari Medvinsky
Microsoft Corporation
Sasha Medvinsky
Motorola, Inc.
John Wray
Iris Associates, Inc.
Jonathan Trostle
Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
0. Status Of This Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provision of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are
working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-18.txt and expires August 20, 2004.
Please send comments to the authors.
1. Abstract
This draft describes protocol extensions (hereafter called PKINIT)
to the Kerberos protocol specification (RFC 1510bis [1]). These
extensions provide a method for integrating public key cryptography
into the initial authentication exchange, by passing cryptographic
certificates and associated authenticators in preauthentication data
fields.
2. Introduction
A client typically authenticates itself to a service in Kerberos
using three distinct though related exchanges. First, the client
requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos
authentication server (AS). Then, it uses the TGT to request a
service ticket from the Kerberos ticket-granting server (TGS).
Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device known as
a Kerberos Key Distribution Center, or KDC. (In this draft, we will
refer to both the AS and the TGS as the KDC.) Finally, the client
uses the service ticket to authenticate itself to the service.
The advantage afforded by the TGT is that the user need only
explicitly request a ticket and expose his credentials once. The
TGT and its associated session key can then be used for any
subsequent requests. One implication of this is that all further
authentication is independent of the method by which the initial
authentication was performed. Consequently, initial authentication
provides a convenient place to integrate public-key cryptography
into Kerberos authentication.
As defined, Kerberos authentication exchanges use symmetric-key
cryptography, in part for performance. (Symmetric-key cryptography
is typically 10-100 times faster than public-key cryptography,
depending on the public-key operations. [cite]) One cost of using
symmetric-key cryptography is that the keys must be shared, so that
before a user can authentication himself, he must already be
registered with the KDC.
Conversely, public-key cryptography--in conjunction with an
established certification infrastructure--permits authentication
without prior registration. Adding it to Kerberos allows the
widespread use of Kerberized applications by users without requiring
them to register first--a requirement that has no inherent security
benefit.
As noted above, a convenient and efficient place to introduce
public-key cryptography into Kerberos is in the initial
authentication exchange. This document describes the methods and
data formats for integrating public-key cryptography into Kerberos
initial authentication. Another document (PKCROSS) describes a
similar protocol for Kerberos cross-realm authentication.
3. Extensions
This section describes extensions to RFC 1510bis for supporting the
use of public-key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket
granting ticket (TGT).
Briefly, the following changes to RFC 1510bis are proposed:
1. If public-key authentication is indicated, the client sends
the user's public-key data and an authenticator in a
preauthentication field accompanying the usual request.
This authenticator is signed by the user's private
signature key.
2. The KDC verifies the client's request against its own
policy and certification authorities.
3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC
replies as usual, but the reply is encrypted using either:
a. a randomly generated key, signed using the KDC's
signature key and encrypted using the user's encryption
key; or
b. a key generated through a Diffie-Hellman exchange with
the client, signed using the KDC's signature key.
Any key data required by the client to obtain the encryption
key is returned in a preauthentication field accompanying
the usual reply.
4. The client obtains the encryption key, decrypts the reply,
and then proceeds as usual.
Section 3.1 of this document defines the necessary message formats.
Section 3.2 describes their syntax and use in greater detail.
Implementation of all specified formats and uses in these sections
is REQUIRED for compliance with PKINIT.
3.1. Definitions
3.1.1. Required Algorithms
At minimum, PKINIT must be able to use the following algorithms:
Reply key (or DH-derived key): AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 etype
(as required by clarifications).
Signature algorithm: SHA-1 digest and RSA.
Reply key delivery method: ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
with a non-zero nonce.
Unkeyed checksum type for the paChecksum member of
PKAuthenticator: SHA1 (unkeyed).
3.1.2. Defined Message and Encryption Types
PKINIT makes use of the following new preauthentication types:
PA-PK-AS-REQ TBD
PA-PK-AS-REP TBD
PA-PK-OCSP-REQ TBD
PA-PK-OCSP-REP TBD
PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:
AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS TBD
PKINIT introduces the following new error types:
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62
KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63
KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG 64
KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65
KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66
KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70
KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71
KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72
KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75
PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:
TD-DH-PARAMETERS 102
TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104
TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105
PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the AS-REQ
message (to indicate acceptance of the corresponding encryption OIDs
in PKINIT):
dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9
md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10
sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11
rc2CBC-EnvOID 12
rsaEncryption-EnvOID (PKCS1 v1.5) 13
rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID (PKCS1 v2.0) 14
des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15
The above encryption types are used (in PKINIT) only within CMS [8]
structures within the PKINIT preauthentication fields. Their use
within Kerberos EncryptedData structures is unspecified.
3.1.3. Algorithm Identifiers
PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following
algorithm identifiers.
PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifier for Diffie-Hellman
key agreement [11]:
dhpublicnumber
PKINIT uses the following signature algorithm identifiers [8, 12]:
sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1)
md5WithRSAEncryption (RSA with MD5)
id-dsa-with-sha1 (DSA with SHA1)
PKINIT uses the following encryption algorithm identifiers [12] for
encrypting the temporary key with a public key:
rsaEncryption (PKCS1 v1.5)
id-RSAES-OAEP (PKCS1 v2.0)
These OIDs are not to be confused with the encryption types listed
above.
PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [8] for encrypting
the reply key with the temporary key:
des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode)
rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode)
Again, these OIDs are not to be confused with the encryption types
listed above.
3.2. PKINIT Preauthentication Syntax and Use
In this section, we describe the syntax and use of the various
preauthentication fields employed to implement PKINIT.
3.2.1. Client Request
The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per RFC
1510bis, except that a preauthentication field containing data
signed by the user's private signature key accompanies the request,
as follows:
PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
-- PAType TBD
signedAuthPack [0] ContentInfo,
-- Defined in CMS.
-- Type is SignedData.
-- Content is AuthPack
-- (defined below).
trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCAs OPTIONAL,
-- A list of CAs, trusted by
-- the client, used to certify
-- KDCs.
kdcCert [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
-- Defined in CMS.
-- Identifies a particular KDC
-- certificate, if the client
-- already has it.
encryptionCert [3] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
-- May identify the user's
-- Diffie-Hellman certificate,
-- or an RSA encryption key
-- certificate.
...
}
TrustedCAs ::= CHOICE {
caName [0] Name,
-- Fully qualified X.500 name
-- as defined in X.509 [11].
issuerAndSerial [1] IssuerAndSerialNumber,
-- Identifies a specific CA
-- certificate, if the client
-- only trusts one.
...
}
AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL
-- Defined in X.509,
-- reproduced below.
-- Present only if the client
-- is using ephemeral-ephemeral
-- Diffie-Hellman.
}
PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
cusec [0] INTEGER,
ctime [1] KerberosTime,
-- cusec and ctime are used as
-- in RFC 1510bis, for replay
-- prevention.
nonce [2] INTEGER,
-- Binds reply to request,
-- except is zero when client
-- will accept cached
-- Diffie-Hellman parameters
-- from KDC and MUST NOT be
-- zero otherwise.
-- MUST be < 2^32.
paChecksum [3] Checksum,
-- Defined in [15].
-- Performed over KDC-REQ-BODY,
-- must be unkeyed.
...
}
IMPORTS
-- from X.509
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, AlgorithmIdentifier, DomainParameters,
ValidationParms
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso (1) identified-organization (3)
dod (6) internet (1) security (5) mechanisms (5)
pkix (7) id-mod (0) id-pkix1-explicit-88 (1) }
The ContentInfo in the signedAuthPack is filled out as follows:
1. The eContent field contains data of type AuthPack. It MUST
contain the pkAuthenticator, and MAY also contain the
user's Diffie-Hellman public value (clientPublicValue).
2. The eContentType field MUST contain the OID value for
pkauthdata: { iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1)
security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkauthdata (1)}
3. The signerInfos field MUST contain the signature of the
AuthPack.
4. The certificates field MUST contain at least a signature
verification certificate chain that the KDC can use to
verify the signature on the AuthPack. Additionally, the
client may also insert an encryption certificate chain, if
(for example) the client is not using ephemeral-ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman.
5. If a Diffie-Hellman key is being used, the parameters SHOULD
be chosen from the First or Second defined Oakley Groups.
(See RFC 2409 [c].)
6. The KDC may wish to use cached Diffie-Hellman parameters.
To indicate acceptance of caching, the client sends zero in
the nonce field of the pkAuthenticator. Zero is not a valid
value for this field under any other circumstances. Since
zero is used to indicate acceptance of cached parameters,
message binding in this case is performed instead using the
nonce in the main request.
3.2.2. Validation of Client Request
Upon receiving the client's request, the KDC validates it. This
section describes the steps that the KDC MUST (unless otherwise
noted) take in validating the request.
The KDC must look for a user certificate in the signedAuthPack.
If it cannot find one signed by a CA it trusts, it sends back an
error of type KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying
e-data for this error is a SEQUENCE OF TypedData:
TypedData ::= SEQUENCE {
-- As defined in RFC 1510bis.
data-type [0] INTEGER,
data-value [1] OCTET STRING
}
For this error, the data-type is TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS, and the
data-value is an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of
TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name
If, while verifying the certificate chain, the KDC determines that
the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack is
invalid, it returns an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
The accompanying e-data for this error is a SEQUENCE OF TypedData,
whose data-type is TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX, and whose data-value is an
OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of the index into the
CertificateSet field, ordered as sent by the client:
CertificateIndex ::= INTEGER
-- 0 = first certificate (in
-- order of encoding),
-- 1 = second certificate, etc.
If more than one signature is invalid, the KDC sends one TypedData
per invalid signature.
The KDC MAY also check whether any of the certificates in the user's
chain have been revoked. If any of them have been revoked, the KDC
returns an error of type KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if the KDC
attempts to determine the revocation status but is unable to do so,
it SHOULD return an error of type KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN.
The certificate or certificates affected are identified exactly as
for an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE (see above).
If the certificate chain is successfully validated, but the user's
certificate is not authorized to the client's principal name in the
AS-REQ (when present), the KDC MUST return an error of type
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data for
this error.
Even if the chain is validated, and the names in the certificate and
the request match, the KDC may decide not to trust the client. For
example, the certificate may include (or not include) an Enhanced
Key Usage (EKU) OID in the extensions field. As a matter of local
policy, the KDC may decide to reject requests on the basis of the
absence or presence of specific EKU OIDs. In this case, the KDC
returns an error of type KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED. For the
benefit of implementors, we define a PKINIT EKU OID as follows:
{ iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5) kerberosv5 (2)
pkinit (3) pkekuoid (4) }.
If the certificate chain and usage check out, but the client's
signature on the signedAuthPack fails to verify, the KDC returns an
error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. There is no accompanying e-data
for this error.
The KDC must check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not
a replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits.
The recommendations for ordinary (that is, non-PKINIT) skew times
apply here. If the check fails, the KDC returns an error of type
KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT or KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, respectively.
Finally, if the clientPublicValue is filled in, indicating that the
client wishes to use ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, the KDC
checks to see if the parameters satisfy its policy. If they do not,
it returns an error of type KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK. The accompanying
e-data is a SEQUENCE OF TypedData, whose data-type is
TD-DH-PARAMETERS, and whose data-value is an OCTET STRING containing
the DER encoding of a DomainParameters (see above), including
appropriate Diffie-Hellman parameters with which to retry the
request.
In order to establish authenticity of the reply, the KDC will sign
some key data (either the random key used to encrypt the reply in
the case of a KDCDHKeyInfo, or the Diffie-Hellman parameters used to
generate the reply-encrypting key in the case of a ReplyKeyPack).
The signature certificate to be used is to be selected as follows:
1. If the client included a kdcCert field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ,
use the referred-to certificate, if the KDC has it. If it
does not, the KDC returns an error of type
KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH.
2. Otherwise, if the client did not include a kdcCert field,
but did include a trustedCertifiers field, and the KDC
possesses a certificate issued by one of the listed
certifiers, use that certificate. if it does not possess
one, it returns an error of type KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED.
3. Otherwise, if the client included neither a kdcCert field
nor a trustedCertifiers field, and the KDC has only one
signature certificate, use that certificate. If it has
more than one certificate, it returns an error of type
KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH.
3.2.3. KDC Reply
Assuming that the client's request has been properly validated, the
KDC proceeds as per RFC 1510bis, except as follows.
The user's name as represented in the AS-REP must be derived from
the certificate provided in the client's request. If the KDC has
its own mapping from the name in the certificate to a Kerberos name,
it uses that Kerberos name.
Otherwise, if the certificate contains a SubjectAltName extension
with a KerberosName in the otherName field, it uses that name.
AnotherName ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Defined in [11].
type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id
}
KerberosName ::= SEQUENCE {
realm [0] Realm,
principalName [1] PrincipalName
}
with OID
krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1)
security (5) kerberosv5 (2) }
krb5PrincipalName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { krb5 2 }
In this case, the realm in the ticket is that of the local realm (or
some other realm name chosen by that realm). Otherwise, the KDC
returns an error of type KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH.
In addition, the KDC MUST set the initial flag in the issued TGT
*and* add an authorization data of type AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS to
the TGT. The value is an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding
of InitialVerifiedCAs:
InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
ca [0] Name,
ocspValidated [1] BOOLEAN,
...
}
The KDC MAY wrap any AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS data in AD-IF-RELEVANT
containers if the list of CAs satisfies the KDC's realm's policy.
(This corresponds to the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED ticket flag.)
Furthermore, any TGS must copy such authorization data from tickets
used in a PA-TGS-REQ of the TGS-REQ to the resulting ticket,
including the AD-IF-RELEVANT container, if present.
AP servers that understand this authorization data type SHOULD apply
local policy to determine whether a given ticket bearing such a type
(not contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT container) is acceptable.
(This corresponds to the AP server checking the transited field when
the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag has not been set.) If such a data
type *is* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT container, AP servers
still MAY apply local policy to determine whether the authorization
data is acceptable.
The AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from RFC 1510bis. The KDC then
encrypts the reply as usual, but not with the user's long-term key.
Instead, it encrypts it with either a random encryption key, or a
key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange. Which is the case is
indicated by the contents of the PA-PK-AS-REP (note tags):
PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
-- PAType YY (TBD)
dhSignedData [0] ContentInfo,
-- Type is SignedData.
-- Content is KDCDHKeyInfo
-- (defined below).
encKeyPack [1] ContentInfo,
-- Type is EnvelopedData.
-- Content is ReplyKeyPack
-- (defined below).
...
}
Note that PA-PK-AS-REP is a CHOICE: either a dhSignedData, or an
encKeyPack, but not both. The former contains data of type
KDCDHKeyInfo, and is used only when the reply is encrypted using a
Diffie-Hellman derived key:
KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
-- Equals public exponent
-- (g^a mod p).
-- INTEGER encoded as payload
-- of BIT STRING.
nonce [1] INTEGER,
-- Binds reply to request.
-- Exception: A value of zero
-- indicates that the KDC is
-- using cached values.
dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
-- Expiration time for KDC's
-- cached values.
...
}
The fields of the ContentInfo for dhSignedData are to be filled in
as follows:
1. The eContent field contains data of type KDCDHKeyInfo.
2. The eContentType field contains the OID value for
pkdhkeydata: { iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1)
security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkdhkeydata (2) }
3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is
the signature of the KDCDHKeyInfo.
4. The certificates field contains a signature verification
certificate chain that the client may use to verify the
KDC's signature over the KDCDHKeyInfo.) It may only be left
empty if the client did not include a trustedCertifiers
field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's
certificate.
5. If the client and KDC agree to use cached parameters, the
KDC SHOULD return a zero in the nonce field and include the
expiration time of the cached values in the dhKeyExpiration
field. If this time is exceeded, the client SHOULD NOT use
the reply. If the time is absent, the client SHOULD NOT use
the reply and MAY resubmit a request with a non-zero nonce,
thus indicating non-acceptance of the cached parameters.
The key is derived as follows: Both the KDC and the client calculate
the value g^(ab) mod p, where a and b are the client's and KDC's
private exponents, respectively. They both take the first k bits of
this secret value as a key generation seed, where the parameter k
(the size of the seed) is dependent on the selected key type, as
specified in the Kerberos crypto draft [15]. The seed is then
converted into a protocol key by applying to it a random-to-key
function, which is also dependent on key type.
The protocol key is used to derive the integrity key Ki and the
encryption key Ke according to [15]. Ke and Ki are used to generate
the encrypted part of the AS-REP.
1. For example, if the encryption type is DES with MD4, k = 64
bits and the random-to-key function consists of replacing
some of the bits with parity bits, according to FIPS PUB 74
[cite]. In this case, the key derivation function for Ke is
the identity function, and Ki is not needed because the
checksum in the EncryptedData is not keyed.
2. If the encryption type is three-key 3DES with HMAC-SHA1,
k = 168 bits and the random-to-key function is
DES3random-to-key as defined in [15]. This function inserts
parity bits to create a 192-bit 3DES protocol key that is
compliant with FIPS PUB 74 [cite]. Ke and Ki are derived
from this protocol key according to [15] with the key usage
number set to 3 (AS-REP encrypted part).
If the KDC and client are not using Diffie-Hellman, the KDC encrypts
the reply with an encryption key, packed in the encKeyPack, which
contains data of type ReplyKeyPack:
ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,
-- Defined in RFC 1510bis.
-- Used to encrypt main reply.
-- MUST be at least as large
-- as session key.
nonce [1] INTEGER,
-- Binds reply to request.
-- MUST be < 2^32.
...
}
The fields of the ContentInfo for encKeyPack MUST be filled in as
follows:
1. The innermost data is of type SignedData. The eContent for
this data is of type ReplyKeyPack.
2. The eContentType for this data contains the OID value for
pkrkeydata: { iso (1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1)
security (5) kerberosv5 (2) pkinit (3) pkrkeydata (3) }
3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is
the signature of the ReplyKeyPack.
4. The certificates field contains a signature verification
certificate chain, which the client may use to verify the
KDC's signature over the ReplyKeyPack.) It may only be left
empty if the client did not include a trustedCertifiers
field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's
certificate.
5. The outer data is of type EnvelopedData. The
encryptedContent for this data is the SignedData described
in items 1 through 4, above.
6. The encryptedContentType for this data contains the OID
value for id-signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840)
rsadsi (113549) pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }
7. The recipientInfos field is a SET which MUST contain exactly
one member of type KeyTransRecipientInfo. The encryptedKey
for this member contains the temporary key which is
encrypted using the client's public key.
8. Neither the unprotectedAttrs field nor the originatorInfo
field is required for PKINIT.
3.2.4. Validation of KDC Reply
Upon receipt of the KDC's reply, the client proceeds as follows. If
the PA-PK-AS-REP contains a dhSignedData, the client obtains and
verifies the Diffie-Hellman parameters, and obtains the shared key
as described above. Otherwise, the message contains an encKeyPack,
and the client decrypts and verifies the temporary encryption key.
In either case, the client then decrypts the main reply with the
resulting key, and then proceeds as described in RFC 1510bis.
3.2.5. Support for OCSP
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) [cite] allows the use of
on-line requests for a client or server to determine the validity of
each other's certificates. It is particularly useful for clients
authenticating each other across a constrained network. These
clients will not have to download the entire CRL to check for the
validity of the KDC's certificate.
In these cases, the KDC generally has better connectivity to the
OCSP server, and it therefore processes the OCSP request and
response and sends the results to the client. The changes proposed
in this section allow a client to request an OCSP response from the
KDC when using PKINIT. This is similar to the way that OCSP is
handled in [cite].
OCSP support is provided in PKINIT through the use of additional
preauthentication data. The following new preauthentication types
are defined:
PA-PK-OCSP-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
-- PAType TBD
responderIDList [0] SEQUENCE of ResponderID OPTIONAL,
-- ResponderID is a DER-encoded
-- ASN.1 type defined in [cite]
requestExtensions [1] Extensions OPTIONAL
-- Extensions is a DER-encoded
-- ASN.1 type defined in [cite]
}
PA-PK-OCSP-REP ::= SEQUENCE of OCSPResponse
-- OCSPResponse is a DER-encoded
-- ASN.1 type defined in [cite]
A KDC that receives a PA-PK-OCSP-REQ MAY send a PA-PK-OCSP-REP.
KDCs MUST NOT send a PA-PK-OCSP-REP if they do not first receive a
PA-PK-OCSP-REQ from the client. The KDC may either send a cached
OCSP response or send an on-line request to the OCSP server.
When using OCSP, the response is signed by the OCSP server, which is
trusted by the client. Depending on local policy, further
verification of the validity of the OCSP server may need to be done.
4. Security Considerations
PKINIT raises certain security considerations beyond those that can
be regulated strictly in protocol definitions. We will address them
in this section.
PKINIT extends the cross-realm model to the public-key
infrastructure. Anyone using PKINIT must be aware of how the
certification infrastructure they are linking to works.
Also, as in standard Kerberos, PKINIT presents the possibility of
interactions between cryptosystems of varying strengths, and this
now includes public-key cryptosystems. Many systems, for example,
allow the use of 512-bit public keys. Using such keys to wrap data
encrypted under strong conventional cryptosystems, such as 3DES, may
be inappropriate.
PKINIT calls for randomly generated keys for conventional
cryptosystems. Many such systems contain systematically "weak"
keys. For recommendations regarding these weak keys, see RFC
1510bis.
PKINIT allows the use of a zero nonce in the PKAuthenticator when
cached Diffie-Hellman parameters are used. In this case, message
binding is performed using the nonce in the main request in the same
way as it is done for ordinary (that is, non-PKINIT) AS-REQs. The
nonce field in the KDC request body is signed through the checksum
in the PKAuthenticator, and it therefore cryptographically binds the
AS-REQ with the AS-REP. If cached parameters are also used on the
client side, the generated session key will be the same, and a
compromised session key could lead to the compromise of future
cached exchanges. It is desirable to limit the use of cached
parameters to just the KDC, in order to eliminate this exposure.
Care should be taken in how certificates are chosen for the purposes
of authentication using PKINIT. Some local policies may require
that key escrow be applied for certain certificate types. People
deploying PKINIT should be aware of the implications of using
certificates that have escrowed keys for the purposes of
authentication.
PKINIT does not provide for a "return routability" test to prevent
attackers from mounting a denial-of-service attack on the KDC by
causing it to perform unnecessary and expensive public-key
operations. Strictly speaking, this is also true of standard
Kerberos, although the potential cost is not as great, because
standard Kerberos does not make use of public-key cryptography.
It might be possible to address this using a preauthentication field
as part of the proposed Kerberos preauthenticatino framework.
5. Acknowledgements
Some of the ideas on which this proposal is based arose during
discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF
CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos
and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system.
These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an
attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this
proposal approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos
perspective. Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas
in DCE have been invaluable.
6. Expiration Date
This draft expires August 20, 2004.
7. Bibliography
[1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication Service
(V5). Request for Comments 1510.
[2] B.C. Neuman, Theodore Ts'o. Kerberos: An Authentication Service
for Computer Networks, IEEE Communications, 32(9):33-38. September
1994.
[3] M. Sirbu, J. Chuang. Distributed Authentication in Kerberos
Using Public Key Cryptography. Symposium On Network and Distributed
System Security, 1997.
[4] B. Cox, J.D. Tygar, M. Sirbu. NetBill Security and Transaction
Protocol. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Electronic
Commerce, July 1995.
[5] T. Dierks, C. Allen. The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0. Request
for Comments 2246, January 1999.
[6] B.C. Neuman, Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for
Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, May 1993.
[7] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information technology - Open Systems
Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework
Recommendation X.509 ISO/IEC 9594-8
[8] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax.
draft-ietf-smime-cms-13.txt, April 1999, approved for publication as
RFC.
[9] PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard. An RSA
Laboratories Technical Note Version 1.5. Revised November 1, 1993
[10] R. Rivest, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and RSA Data
Security, Inc. A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm.
March 1998. Request for Comments 2268.
[11] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile, April 2002.
Request for Comments 3280.
[12] B. Kaliski, J. Staddon. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications, October 1998. Request for Comments 2437.
[13] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) Information Processing Systems - Open
Systems Interconnection - Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1) Rec. X.680 ISO/IEC 8824-1.
[14] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA
Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993.
[15] K. Raeburn. Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5, October 2003. draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-06.txt.
[16] S. Blake-Wilson, M. Nystrom, D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen, and
T. Wright. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions, June 2003.
Request for Comments 3546.
[17] M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, and C. Adams.
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Online Certificate Status
Protocol - OCSP, June 1999. Request for Comments 2560.
8. Authors
Brian Tung
Clifford Neuman
USC Information Sciences Institute
4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001
Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695
Phone: +1 310 822 1511
E-mail: {brian,bcn}@isi.edu
Matthew Hur
Ari Medvinsky
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond WA 98052
Phone: +1 425 707 3336
E-mail: matthur@microsoft.com, arimed@windows.microsoft.com
Sasha Medvinsky
Motorola, Inc.
6450 Sequence Drive
San Diego, CA 92121
+1 858 404 2367
E-mail: smedvinsky@motorola.com
John Wray
Iris Associates, Inc.
5 Technology Park Dr.
Westford, MA 01886
E-mail: John_Wray@iris.com
Jonathan Trostle
E-mail: jtrostle@world.std.com
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