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NETWORK WORKING GROUP N. Williams
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Internet-Draft Sun
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Expires: December 15, 2005 June 13, 2005
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A PRF API extension for the GSS-API
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draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-prf-04.txt
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Status of this Memo
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By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
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Drafts.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
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The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2005.
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Copyright Notice
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
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Abstract
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This document defines a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) extension to the
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Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface (GSS-API)
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for keying application protocols given an established GSS-API
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security context. The primary intended use of this function is to
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key secure session layers that don't or cannot use GSS-API per-
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message MIC (message integrity check) and wrap tokens for session
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protection.
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 1]
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Internet-Draft A PRF Extension for the GSS-API June 2005
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Table of Contents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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1.1 Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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2. GSS_Pseudo_random() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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2.1 C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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2.2 Java Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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5.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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5.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 9
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 2]
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Internet-Draft A PRF Extension for the GSS-API June 2005
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1. Introduction
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A need has arisen for users of the GSS-API to key applications'
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cryptographic protocols using established GSS-API security contexts.
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Such applications can use the GSS-API for authentication, but not for
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transport security (for whatever reasons), and since the GSS-API does
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not provide a method for obtaining keying material from established
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security contexts such applications cannot make effective use of the
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GSS-API.
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To address this need we define a pseudo-random function (PRF)
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extension to the GSS-API.
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1.1 Conventions used in this document
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. GSS_Pseudo_random()
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Inputs:
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o context CONTEXT handle,
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o prf_key INTEGER,
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o prf_in OCTET STRING,
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o desired_output_len INTEGER
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Outputs:
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o major_status INTEGER,
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o minor_status INTEGER,
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o prf_out OCTET STRING
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Return major_status codes:
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o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
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o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that a null context has been provided
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as input.
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 3]
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o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that an expired context has been
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provided as input.
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o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the mechanism lacks support for
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this function or, if the security context is not fully
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established, that the context is not ready to compute the PRF with
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the given prf_key, or that the given prf_key is not available.
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o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates general failure, possibly due to the given
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input data being too large or of zero length, or due to the
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desired_output_len being zero; the minor status code may provide
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additional information.
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This function applies the established context's mechanism's keyed
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pseudo-random function (PRF) to the input data ('prf_in'), keyed with
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key material associated with the given security context and
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identified by 'prf_key', and outputs the resulting octet string
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('prf_out') of desired_output_len length.
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The minimum input data length is one octet.
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Mechanisms MUST be able to consume all the provided prf_in input data
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that is 2^14 or fewer octets.
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If a mechanism cannot consume as much input data as provided by the
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caller, then GSS_Pseudo_random() MUST return GSS_S_FAILURE.
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The minimum desired_output_len is one.
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Mechanisms MUST be able to output at least up to 2^14 octets.
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If the implementation cannot produce the desired output due to lack
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of resources then it MUST output what it can and still return
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GSS_S_COMPLETE.
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The prf_key can take on the following values: GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL,
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GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL or mechanism-specific values, if any. This
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parameter is intended to distinguish between the best cryptographic
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keys that may be available only after full security context
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establishment and keys that may be available prior to full security
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context establishment. For some mechanisms, or contexts, those two
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prf_key values MAY refer to the same cryptographic keys; for
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mechanisms like the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [RFC1964] where one
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peer may assert a key that may be considered better than the others
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they MAY be different keys.
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GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL corresponds to a key that would be have been
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used while the security context was partially established, even if it
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 4]
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is fully established when GSS_Pseudo_random() is actually called.
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Mechanism-specific prf_key values are intended to refer to any other
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keys that may be available.
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The GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL value corresponds to the best key available
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for fully-established security contexts.
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GSS_Pseudo_random() has the following properties:
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o its output string MUST be a pseudo-random function [GGM1] [GGM2]
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of the input keyed with key material from the given security
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context -- the chances of getting the same output given different
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input parameters should be exponentially small.
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o when successfully applied to the same inputs by an initiator and
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acceptor using the same security context, it MUST produce the
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_same results_ for both, the initiator and acceptor, even if
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called multiple times (as long as the security context is not
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expired).
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o upon full establishment of a security context all cryptographic
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keys and/or negotiations used for computing the PRF with any
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prf_key MUST be authenticated (mutually, if mutual authentication
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is in effect for the given security context).
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o the outputs of the mechanism's GSS_Pseudo_random() (for different
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inputs) and its per-message tokens for the given security context
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MUST be "cryptographically separate;" in other words, it must not
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be feasible to recover key material for one mechanism operation or
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transform its tokens and PRF outputs from one to the other given
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only said tokens and PRF outputs. [This is a fancy way of saying
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that key derivation and strong cryptographic operations and
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constructions must be used.]
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o as implied by the above requirement, it MUST NOT be possible to
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access any raw keys of a security context through
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GSS_Pseudo_random(), no matter what inputs are given.
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Mechanisms MAY limit the output of the PRF, possibly in ways related
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to the types of cryptographic keys available for the PRF function,
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thus the prf_out output of GSS_Pseudo_random() MAY be smaller than
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requested.
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2.1 C-Bindings
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#define GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL 0
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#define GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL 1
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 5]
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OM_uint32 gss_pseudo_random(
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OM_uint32 *minor_status,
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gss_ctx_id_t context,
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int prf_key,
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const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
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ssize_t desired_output_len,
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gss_buffer_t prf_out
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);
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Additional major status codes for the C-bindings:
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o GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ
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o GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE
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See [RFC2744].
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2.2 Java Bindings
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For Java GSS_Pseudo_random() maps to a GSSContext method, 'prf':
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public static final int GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL = 0
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public static final int GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL = 1
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public byte[] prf(int prf_key, byte inBuf[], int outlen)
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throws GSSException
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See [RFC2853].
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3. IANA Considerations
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This document has no IANA considerations currently. If and when a
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relevant IANA registry of GSS-API symbols is created then the generic
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and language-specific function names, constant names and constant
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values described above should be added to such a registry.
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4. Security Considerations
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Care should be taken in properly designing a mechanism's PRF
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function.
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GSS mechanisms' PRF functions should use a key derived from contexts'
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authenticated session keys and should preserve the forward security
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properties of the mechanisms' key exchanges.
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Some mechanisms may support the GSS PRF function with security
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contexts that are not fully established, but applications MUST assume
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that authentication, mutual or otherwise, has not completed until the
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 6]
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security context is fully established.
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Callers of GSS_Pseudo_random() should avoid accidentally calling it
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with the same inputs. One useful technique is to prepend to the
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prf_in input string, by convention, a string indicating the intended
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purpose of the PRF output in such a way that unique contexts in which
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the function is called yield unique inputs to it.
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Pseudo-random functions are, by their nature, capable of producing
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only limited amounts of cryptographically secure output. The exact
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amount of output that one can safely use, unfortunately, varies from
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one PRF to another (which prevents us from recommending specific
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numbers). Because of this we recommend that unless you really know
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what you are doing (i.e. you are a cryptographer and are qualified to
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pass judgement on cryptographic functions in areas of period,
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presence of short cycles, etc), you limit the amount of the PRF
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output used to the necessary minimum.
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5. References
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5.1 Normative References
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[GGM1] Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., and S. Micali, "How to
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Construct Random Functions", October 1986.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
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Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
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Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
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[RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
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C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000.
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[RFC2853] Kabat, J. and M. Upadhyay, "Generic Security Service API
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Version 2 : Java Bindings", RFC 2853, June 2000.
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5.2 Informative References
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[GGM2] Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., and S. Micali, "On the
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Cryptographic Applications of Random Functions", 1985.
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[RFC1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, "Randomness
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Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
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[RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism",
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RFC 1964, June 1996.
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 7]
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Internet-Draft A PRF Extension for the GSS-API June 2005
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Author's Address
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Nicolas Williams
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Sun Microsystems
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5300 Riata Trace Ct
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Austin, TX 78727
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US
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Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 8]
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Internet-Draft A PRF Extension for the GSS-API June 2005
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Intellectual Property Statement
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The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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Disclaimer of Validity
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This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
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ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
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INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Copyright Statement
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
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to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
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except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
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Acknowledgment
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Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
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Internet Society.
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Williams Expires December 15, 2005 [Page 9]
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