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INTERNET-DRAFT Tom Yu
draft-yu-krb-wg-kerberos-extensions-00.txt MIT
Expires: 09 August 2004 09 February 2004
The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (Version 5)
Status of This Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes version 5 of the Kerberos network
authentication protocol. It describes changes to the protocol which
allow for extensions to be made to the protocol without creating
interoperability problems.
[ This document is a VERY rough draft. Many sections are not yet
fully filled out. The main purpose is to illustrate the beginnings
of a new document structure as a starting point. ]
Key Words for Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document are
to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
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Table of Contents
Status of This Memo ....................................... 1
Copyright Notice .......................................... 1
Abstract .................................................. 1
Key Words for Requirements ................................ 1
Table of Contents ......................................... 2
1. Introduction .......................................... 4
1.1. Kerberos Protocol Overview .......................... 4
1.2. Overview of Document ................................ 5
2. Extensibility ......................................... 5
3. Criticality ........................................... 6
4. Use of ASN.1 .......................................... 6
4.1. Module Header ....................................... 6
4.2. Top-Level Type ...................................... 7
4.3. Parameterized Types ................................. 7
4.4. Constraints ......................................... 8
4.5. New Types ........................................... 8
5. Basic Types ........................................... 8
5.1. Constrained Integer Types ........................... 8
5.2. KerberosTime ........................................ 9
5.3. KerberosString ...................................... 9
6. Principals ............................................ 10
6.1. Name Types .......................................... 10
6.2. Principal Name Reuse ................................ 11
7. Types Relating to Encryption .......................... 11
7.1. EncryptedData ....................................... 11
7.2. EncryptionKey ....................................... 13
7.3. Checksums ........................................... 13
7.3.1. ChecksumOf ........................................ 14
7.3.2. Signed ............................................ 15
8. Tickets ............................................... 15
8.1. Timestamps .......................................... 16
8.2. Ticket Flags ........................................ 16
8.2.1. Flags Relating to Initial Ticket Acquisition ...... 17
8.2.2. Invalid Tickets ................................... 17
8.2.3. OK as Delegate .................................... 18
8.3. Renewable Tickets ................................... 18
8.4. Postdated Tickets ................................... 19
8.5. Proxiable and Proxy Tickets ......................... 20
8.6. Forwardable Tickets ................................. 21
8.7. Transited Realms .................................... 21
8.8. Authorization Data .................................. 21
8.9. Encrypted Part of Ticket ............................ 21
8.10. Cleartext Part of Ticket ........................... 22
9. Credential Acquisition ................................ 23
9.1. KDC-REQ ............................................. 24
9.2. PA-DATA ............................................. 26
9.3. KDC-REQ Processing .................................. 26
9.3.1. Handling Replays .................................. 26
9.3.2. Request Validation ................................ 26
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9.3.2.1. AS-REQ Authentication ........................... 27
9.3.2.2. TGS-REQ Authentication .......................... 27
9.3.2.3. Principal Validation ............................ 27
9.3.3. Timestamp Handling ................................ 27
9.3.3.1. AS-REQ Timestamp Processing ..................... 28
9.3.3.2. TGS-REQ Timestamp Processing .................... 29
9.3.4. Key Selection ..................................... 29
9.3.5. Checking For Revoked Tickets ...................... 30
9.4. Reply Validation .................................... 30
10. Application Authentication ........................... 30
11. Session Key Use ...................................... 30
11.1. KRB-SAFE ........................................... 30
11.2. KRB-PRIV ........................................... 30
11.3. KRB-CRED ........................................... 30
12. Security Considerations .............................. 30
12.1. Time Synchronization ............................... 30
12.2. Replays ............................................ 30
12.3. Principal Name Reuse ............................... 30
12.4. Password Guessing .................................. 30
12.5. Forward Secrecy .................................... 30
12.6. Authorization ...................................... 31
12.7. Login Authentication ............................... 31
Appendices ................................................ 31
A. ASN.1 Module (Normative) .............................. 31
B. Kerberos and Character Encodings (Informative) ........ 60
C. Kerberos History (Informative) ........................ 62
Normative References ...................................... 62
Informative References .................................... 63
Acknowledgments ........................................... 63
Author's Address .......................................... 63
Full Copyright Statement .................................. 63
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1. Introduction
The Kerberos network authentication protocol is a trusted third-party
protocol utilizing symmetric-key cryptography. It assumes that all
communications between parties in the protocol may be arbitrarily
tampered with or monitored, and that the security of the overall
system depends only on the effectiveness of the cryptographic
techniques and the secrecy of the keys used. The protocol
authenticates an application client's identity to an application
server, and likewise authenticates the application server's identity
to the application client. These assurances are made possible by the
client and the server sharing secrets with the trusted third party:
the Kerberos server, also known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC).
In addition, the protocol establishes an ephemeral shared secret (the
session key) between the client and the server, allowing the
protection of further communications between them.
1.1. Kerberos Protocol Overview
Kerberos comprises three main sub-protocols: credentials acquisition,
application authentication, and session key usage. A client acquires
credentials by asking the for KDC a credential for a service; the KDC
issues the credential, consisting of a ticket and a session key. The
ticket, containing the client's identity, timestamps, expiration
time, and a session key, is a encrypted in a key known to the
application server. The KDC encrypts the credential using a key
known to the client, and transmits the credential to the client.
There are two means of requesting credentials: the Authentication
Service (AS) exchange, and the Ticket-Granting Service (TGS)
exchange. The AS exchange typically involves a client using a
password-derived key to decrypt the response. The TGS exchange
involves the KDC behaving as an application, which the client
authenticates to using a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT). The client
usually obtains the TGT by using the AS exchange.
Application authentication consists of the client establishing the
session key with the application server by transmitting the ticket to
the application server, along with an authenticator. The
authenticator contains a timestamp and additional data encrypted
using the ticket's session key. The application server decrypts the
ticket, extracting the session key. The application server then uses
the session key to decrypt the authenticator. Upon successful
decryption of the authenticator, the application server knows that
the data in the authenticator were sent by the client named in the
associated ticket. Additionally, since authenticators expire more
quickly than tickets, the application server has some assurance that
the transaction is not a replay. The application server may send an
encrypted acknowledgment to the client, verifying its identity to the
client.
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Once application authentication has occurred, the client and server
may use the established session key to protect further traffic. This
protection may consist of protection of integrity only, or of
protection of confidentiality and integrity. Additional measures
exist for a client to forward credentials to a server.
The entire scheme depends on loosely synchronized clocks.
Synchronization of the clock on the KDC with the application server
clock allows the application server to accurately determine whether a
credential is expired. Likewise, synchronization of the clock on the
client with the application server clock prevents replay attacks
utilizing the same credential. Careful design of the application
protocol may allow replay prevention without requiring client-server
clock synchronization.
Following the establishment of a session key between the application
client and the application server, the Kerberos protocol provides
messages that use the session key to protect the integrity or
confidentiality of communications between the client and the server.
Additionally, the client may forward credentials to the application
server.
The credentials acquisition protocol takes place over specific,
defined transports (UDP and TCP). Application protocols define which
transport to use for the session key establishment protocol and for
messages using the session key; the application may choose to perform
its own encapsulation of the Kerberos messages, for example.
1.2. Overview of Document
The remainder of this document begins by describing the general
frameworks for protocol extensibility, including whether to interpret
unknown extensions as critical. It then defines the protocol
messages and exchanges.
The definition of the Kerberos protocol uses Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1) [X680], which specifies notation for describing the
abstract content of protocol messages. This document defines a
number of base types using ASN.1; these base types subsequently
appear in multiple types which define actual protocol messages.
Definitions of principal names and of tickets, which are central to
the protocol, also appear preceding the protocol message definitions.
2. Extensibility
As originally defined in [RFC1510], the Kerberos protocol does not
readily allow for backwards-compatible extensions to the protocol.
Various proposals to extend the Kerberos protocol have appeared since
RFC 1510, many of them creating problems for backwards compatibility.
This document adopts the technique of creating new extensible types
which encode to messages which are very similar to RFC 1510 messages
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on the wire. This similarity allows implementors to use shared code
paths for encoding and decoding both new and old messages.
The protocol defined in RFC 1510 already contains some elements
allowing for limited backwards-compatible extensions to the protocol.
Most of these elements consist of "typed holes"; these are octet
strings whose contents have types defined by an assigned number.
This document adds a number of typed holes to types which have
previously lacked typed holes. This document also describes
procedures for the IETF to use the extensibility model of ASN.1 make
further backwards-compatible extensions of the Kerberos protocol, if
typed holes prove inadequate for some desired extension.
3. Criticality
In general, implementations SHOULD treat unknown extension, flags,
etc. as non-critical; i.e., they should ignore them when they do not
understand them. Exceptions are clearly marked. An implementation
SHOULD NOT reject a request merely because it does not understand
some element of the request. As a related consequence,
implementations SHOULD handle talking to other implementations which
do not implement some requested options. This may require designers
of extensions or options to provide means detect whether extensions
or options are rejected, or whether such extensions or options are
merely not understood, or (perhaps maliciously) deleted in transit.
4. Use of ASN.1
Kerberos uses the ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690].
Even though ASN.1 theoretically allows the description of protocol
messages to be independent of the encoding rules used to encode the
messages, Kerberos messages MUST be encoded with DER. Subtleties in
the semantics of the notation, such as whether tags carry any
semantic content to the application, may cause the use of other ASN.1
encoding rules to be problematic.
Implementors not using existing ASN.1 compilers or support libraries
are cautioned to thoroughly read and understand the actual ASN.1
specification to ensure correct implementation behavior. There is
more complexity in the notation than is immediately obvious, and some
tutorials and guides to ASN.1 are misleading or erroneous.
4.1. Module Header
The type definitions in this section assume an ASN.1 module
definition of the following form:
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KerberosV5Spec3 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) krb5spec3(4)
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
-- Rest of definitions here
END
This specifies that the tagging context for the module will be
explicit and that automatic tagging is not done.
Some other publications [RFC1510] [RFC1964] erroneously specify an
object identifier (OID) having an incorrect value of "5" for the
"dod" component of the OID. In the case of RFC 1964, use of the
"correct" OID value would result in a change in the wire protocol;
therefore, the RFC 1964 OID remains unchanged for now.
4.2. Top-Level Type
The ASN.1 type "KRB-PDU" is a CHOICE over all the types (Protocol
Data Units or PDUs) which an application may directly reference.
Applications SHOULD NOT transmit any types other than those which are
alternatives of the KRB-PDU CHOICE.
-- top-level type
--
-- Applications should not directly reference any types
-- other than KRB-PDU and its component types.
--
KRB-PDU ::= CHOICE {
ticket Ticket,
as-req AS-REQ,
as-rep AS-REP,
tgs-req TGS-REQ,
tgs-rep TGS-REP,
ap-req AP-REQ,
ap-rep AP-REP,
krb-safe KRB-SAFE,
krb-priv KRB-PRIV,
krb-cred KRB-CRED,
tgt-req TGT-REQ,
krb-error KRB-ERROR,
...
}
4.3. Parameterized Types
This document uses ASN.1 parameterized types [X683] to make
definitions of types more readable. For some types, some or all of
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the parameters are advisory, i.e., they are not encoded in any form
for transmission in a protocol message. These advisory parameters
can describe implementation behavior associated with the type.
4.4. Constraints
This document uses ASN.1 constraints, including the
"UserDefinedConstraint" syntax [X682]. Some constraints can be
handled automatically by tools that can parse them. Uses of the
"UserDefinedConstraint" syntax (the "CONSTRAINED BY" syntax) will
typically need to have behavior manually coded; these uses provide a
formalized way of conveying intended implementation behavior.
4.5. New Types
This document defines a number of new ASN.1 types. The names of
these types will typically have a suffix like "Ext", indicating that
the types are intended to support extensibility. Types original to
RFC 1510 have been renamed to have a suffix like "1510". The "Ext"
and "1510" types often contain a number of common elements; these
common elements have a suffix like "Common". The "1510" types have
various ASN.1 constraints applied to them; the constraints limit the
possible values of the "1510" types to those permitted by RFC 1510 or
by [KCLAR]. The "Ext" types may have different constraints,
typically to force string values to be sent as UTF-8.
5. Basic Types
Certain ASN.1 types in Kerberos appear in numerous other types.
5.1. Constrained Integer Types
In [RFC1510], many types contained references to the unconstrained
INTEGER type. Since an unconstrained INTEGER may contain any
possible abstract integer value, most of the unconstrained references
to INTEGER in [RFC1510] have been constrained to 32 bits or smaller.
-- signed values representable in 32 bits
--
-- These are often used as assigned numbers for various things.
Int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647)
-- unsigned 32 bit values
UInt32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
The "Int32" type often contains an assigned number identifying the
type of a protocol element. Unless otherwise stated, non-negative
values are registered, and negative values are available for local
use.
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-- microseconds
Microseconds ::= INTEGER (0..999999)
-- sequence numbers
--
-- We may want to increase this to 2**64 and define a UInt64
-- type.
SeqNum ::= UInt32
-- nonces
--
-- Likewise, we may want to make this UInt64.
Nonce ::= UInt32
While these types have different abstract types from their
equivalents in [RFC1510], their DER encodings remain identical.
5.2. KerberosTime
-- must not have fractional seconds
KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime
The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. A
KerberosTime value MUST NOT include any fractional portions of the
seconds. As required by the DER, it further MUST NOT include any
separators, and it specifies the UTC time zone (Z). Example: The only
valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm on 6
November 1985 is "19851106210627Z".
5.3. KerberosString
-- used for names and for error messages
KerberosString ::= CHOICE {
ia5 GeneralString (IA5String),
utf8 UTF8String,
... -- no extension may be sent
-- to an rfc1510 implementation --
}
The KerberosString type is used for strings in various places in the
Kerberos protocol. For compatibility with RFC 1510, GeneralString
values constrained to IA5String (US-ASCII) are permitted in messages
exchanged with RFC 1510 implementations. The new protocol messages
contain strings encoded as UTF-8. KerberosString values are present
in principal names and in error messages. Control characters SHOULD
NOT be used in principal names, and used with caution in error
messages.
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For detailed background regarding the history of character string use
in Kerberos, as well as discussion of some compatibility issues, see
Appendix B.
6. Principals
Principals are participants in the Kerberos protocol. A "realm"
consists of principals in one administrative domain, served by one
KDC (or one replicated set of KDCs). Each principal name has an
arbitrary number of components, though typical principal names will
only have one or two components. A principal name is meant to be
readable by and meaningful to humans, especially in a realm lacking a
centrally adminstered authorization infrastructure.
Realm ::= KerberosString
PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
name-type [0] NameType,
-- May have zero elements, or individual elements may be
-- zero-length, but this is not recommended.
name-string [1] SEQUENCE OF KerberosString
}
-- assigned numbers for name types (used in principal names)
NameType ::= Int32
Kerberos realm names are KerberosStrings. Realms MUST NOT contain a
character with the code 0 (the US-ASCII NUL). Most realms will
usually consist of several components separated by periods (.), in
the style of Internet Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in
the style of X.500 names.
name-type
Specifies the type of name that follows. The name-type SHOULD
be treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can
be the same (i.e., at least one of the components, or the realm,
must be different).
name-string
Encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each
component encoded as a KerberosString. Taken together, a
PrincipalName and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most
PrincipalNames will have only a few components (typically one or
two).
6.1. Name Types
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-- Name type not known
nt-unknown NameType ::= 0
-- Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users
nt-principal NameType ::= 1
-- Service and other unique instance (krbtgt)
nt-srv-inst NameType ::= 2
-- Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands)
nt-srv-hst NameType ::= 3
-- Service with host as remaining components
nt-srv-xhst NameType ::= 4
-- Unique ID
nt-uid NameType ::= 5
-- Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253]
nt-x500-principal NameType ::= 6
-- Name in form of SMTP email name (e.g. user@foo.com)
nt-smtp-name NameType ::= 7
-- Enterprise name - may be mapped to principal name
nt-enterprise NameType ::= 10
6.2. Principal Name Reuse
Realm administrators SHOULD use extreme caution when considering
reusing a principal name. A service administrator might explicitly
enter principal names into a local access control list (ACL) for the
service. If such local ACLs exist independently of a centrally
administered authorization infrastructure, realm administrators
SHOULD NOT reuse principal names until confirming that all extant ACL
entries referencing that principal name have been updated. Failure
to perform this check can result in a security vulnerability, as a
new principal can inadvertently inherit unauthorized privileges upon
receiving a reused principal name. An organization whose Kerberos-
authenticated services all use a centrally-adminstered authorization
infrastructure may not need to take these precautions regarding
principal name reuse.
7. Types Relating to Encryption
Many Kerberos protocol messages contain encryptions of various data
types. Kerberos protocol messages also contain checksums
(signatures) of various types.
7.1. EncryptedData
The "EncryptedData" type contains the encryption of another data
type. The recipient uses fields within EncryptedData to determine
which key to use for decryption.
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-- "Type" specifies which ASN.1 type is encrypted to the
-- ciphertext in the EncryptedData. "Keys" specifies a set of
-- keys of which one key may be used to encrypt the data.
-- "KeyUsages" specifies a set of key usages, one of which may
-- be used to encrypt.
--
-- None of the parameters is transmitted over the wire.
EncryptedData { Type, KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::=
SEQUENCE {
etype [0] EType,
kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
cipher [2] OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- must be encryption of --
OCTET STRING (CONTAINING Type),
-- with one of the keys -- KeyToUse:Keys,
-- with key usage being one of --
KeyUsage:KeyUsages
}),
...
}
-- Assigned numbers denoting encryption mechanisms.
EType ::= Int32
-- Assigned numbers denoting key usages.
KeyUsage ::= UInt32
EType
Integer type for assigned numbers for encryption algorithms.
Defined in [KCRYPTO]
KeyUsage
Integer type for assigned numbers for key usages. Key usage
values are inputs to the encryption and decryption functions
described in [KCRYPTO].
Type
Advisory parameter indicating the ASN.1 type whose DER encoding
is the plaintext encrypted into the EncryptedData.
Keys
Advisory parameter indicating which key to use to perform the
encryption. If "Keys" indicate multiple "KeyToUse" values, the
detailed description of the containing message will indicate
which key to use under which conditions.
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-- KeyToUse identifies which key is to be used to encrypt or
-- sign a given value.
--
-- Values of KeyToUse are never actually transmitted over the
-- wire, or even used directly by the implementation in any
-- way, as key usages are; it exists primarily to identify
-- which key gets used for what purpose. Thus, the specific
-- numeric values associated with this type are irrelevant.
KeyToUse ::= ENUMERATED {
-- unspecified
key-unspecified,
-- server long term key
key-server,
-- client long term key
key-client,
-- key selected by KDC for encryption of a KDC-REP
key-kdc-rep,
-- session key from ticket
key-session,
-- subsession key negotiated via AP-REQ/AP-REP
key-subsession,
...
}
KeyUsages
Advisory parameter indicating which "KeyUsage" value is used to
encrypt. If "KeyUsages" indicates multiple "KeyUsage" values,
the detailed description of the containing message will indicate
which key usage to use under which conditions.
7.2. EncryptionKey
The "EncryptionKey" type holds an encryption key.
EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
keytype [0] EType,
keyvalue [1] OCTET STRING
}
keytype
This "EType" identifies the encryption algorithm, described in
[KCRYPTO].
keyvalue
Contains the actual key.
7.3. Checksums
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Several types contain checksums (actually signatures) of data.
CksumType ::= Int32
-- The parameters specify which key to use to produce the
-- signature, as well as which key usage to use. The
-- parameters are not actually sent over the wire.
Checksum { KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::= SEQUENCE {
cksumtype [0] CksumType,
checksum [1] OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- signed using one of the keys --
KeyToUse:Keys,
-- with key usage being one of --
KeyUsage:KeyUsages
})
}
CksumType
Integer type for assigned numbers for signature algorithms.
Defined in [KCRYPTO]
Keys
As in EncryptedData
KeyUsages
As in EncryptedData
cksumtype
Signature algorithm used to produce the signature.
checksum
The actual checksum.
7.3.1. ChecksumOf
ChecksumOf is like "Checksum", but specifies which type is signed.
-- a Checksum that must contain the checksum of a particular type
ChecksumOf { Type, KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::=
Checksum { Keys, KeyUsages }
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
checksum (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- must be checksum of --
OCTET STRING (CONTAINING Type)
})
})
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Type
Indicates the ASN.1 type whose DER encoding is signed.
7.3.2. Signed
Signed is like "ChecksumOf", but contains an actual instance of the
type being signed in addition to the signature.
-- parameterized type for wrapping authenticated plaintext
Signed { InnerType, KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::=
SEQUENCE {
cksum [0] ChecksumOf
{ InnerType, Keys, KeyUsages } OPTIONAL,
inner [1] InnerType,
...
}
8. Tickets
The important fields of a ticket are in the encrypted part. The
components in common between the RFC 1510 and the extensible versions
are
EncTicketPartCommon ::= SEQUENCE {
flags [0] TicketFlags,
key [1] EncryptionKey,
crealm [2] Realm,
cname [3] PrincipalName,
transited [4] TransitedEncoding,
authtime [5] KerberosTime,
starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime [7] KerberosTime,
renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
caddr [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
authorization-data [10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL,
...
}
crealm
This field contains the client's realm.
cname
This field contains the client's name.
caddr
This field lists the network addresses (if absent, all addresses
are permitted) from which the ticket is valid.
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Descriptions of the other fields appear in the following sections.
8.1. Timestamps
Three of the ticket timestamps may be requested from the KDC. The
timestamps may differ from those requested, depending on site policy.
authtime
The time at which the client authenticated, as recorded by the
KDC.
starttime
The earliest time when the ticket is valid. If not present, the
ticket is valid starting at the authtime. This is requested as
the "from" field of KDC-REQ-BODY-COMMON.
endtime
This time is requested in the "till" field of KDC-REQ-BODY-
COMMON. Contains the time after which the ticket will not be
honored (its expiration time). Note that individual services
MAY place their own limits on the life of a ticket and MAY
reject tickets which have not yet expired. As such, this is
really an upper bound on the expiration time for the ticket.
renew-till
This time is requested in the "rtime" field of KDC-REQ-BODY-
COMMON. It is only present in tickets that have the "renewable"
flag set in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime
that may be included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the
absolute expiration time for the ticket, including all renewals.
8.2. Ticket Flags
A number of flags may be set in the ticket, further defining some of
its capabilities. Some of these flags map to flags in a KDC request.
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TicketFlags ::= KerberosFlags { TicketFlagsBits }
TicketFlagsBits ::= BIT STRING {
reserved (0),
forwardable (1),
forwarded (2),
proxiable (3),
proxy (4),
may-postdate (5),
postdated (6),
invalid (7),
renewable (8),
initial (9),
pre-authent (10),
hw-authent (11),
transited-policy-checked (12),
ok-as-delegate (13),
anonymous (14),
cksummed-ticket (15)
}
8.2.1. Flags Relating to Initial Ticket Acquisition
[ adapted KCLAR 2.1. ]
Several flags indicate the details of how the initial ticket was
acquired.
initial
The "initial" flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the
AS protocol, rather than issued based on a ticket-granting
ticket. Application servers (e.g., a password-changing program)
requiring a client's definite knowledge of its secret keycan
insist that this flag be set in any tickets they accept, and
thus be assured that the client's key was recently presented to
the application client.
pre-authent
The "pre-authent" flag indicates that some sort of pre-
authentication was used during the AS exchange.
hw-authent
The "hw-authent" flag indicates that some sort of hardware-based
pre-authentication occurred during the AS exchange.
Both the "pre-authent" and the "hw-authent" flags may be present with
or without the "initial" flag; such tickets with the "initial" flag
clear are ones which are derived from initial tickets with the "pre-
authent" or "hw-authent" flags set.
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8.2.2. Invalid Tickets
[ KCLAR 2.2. ]
The "invalid" flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application
servers MUST reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated
ticket will be issued in this form. Invalid tickets MUST be
validated by the KDC before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a
TGS request with the "validate" option specified. The KDC will only
validate tickets after their starttime has passed. The validation is
required so that postdated tickets which have been stolen before
their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid (through a hot-
list mechanism -- see Section 9.3.5).
8.2.3. OK as Delegate
[ KCLAR 2.8. ]
For some applications a client may need to delegate authority to a
server to act on its behalf in contacting other services. This
requires that the client forward credentials to an intermediate
server. The ability for a client to obtain a service ticket to a
server conveys no information to the client about whether the server
should be trusted to accept delegated credentials. The "ok-as-
delegate" flag provides a way for a KDC to communicate local realm
policy to a client regarding whether an intermediate server is
trusted to accept such credentials.
The copy of the ticket flags visible to the client may have the "ok-
as-delegate" flag set to indicate to the client that the server
specified in the ticket has been determined by policy of the realm to
be a suitable recipient of delegation. A client can use the presence
of this flag to help it make a decision whether to delegate
credentials (either grant a proxy or a forwarded ticket-granting
ticket) to this server. It is acceptable to ignore the value of this
flag. When setting this flag, an administrator should consider the
security and placement of the server on which the service will run,
as well as whether the service requires the use of delegated
credentials.
8.3. Renewable Tickets
[ adapted KCLAR 2.3. ]
Renewable tickets can be used to mitigate the consequences of ticket
theft. Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid
for long periods of time. However, this can expose their credentials
to potential theft for equally long periods, and those stolen
credentials would be valid until the expiration time of the
ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and obtaining new ones
periodically would require the client to have long-term access to its
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secret key, an even greater risk.
Renewable tickets have two "expiration times": the first is when the
current instance of the ticket expires, and the second is the latest
permissible value for an individual expiration time. An application
client must periodically (i.e., before it expires) present a
renewable ticket to the KDC, with the "renew" option set in the KDC
request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key and
a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left
unmodified by the renewal process. When the latest permissible
expiration time arrives, the ticket expires permanently. At each
renewal, the KDC MAY consult a hot-list to determine if the ticket
had been reported stolen since its last renewal; it will refuse to
renew such stolen tickets, and thus the usable lifetime of stolen
tickets is reduced.
The "renewable" flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the
ticket-granting service. It can usually be ignored by application
servers. However, some particularly careful application servers MAY
disallow renewable tickets.
If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC
will not renew the ticket. The "renewable" flag is clear by default,
but a client can request it be set by setting the "renewable" option
in the AS-REQ message. If it is set, then the "renew-till" field in
the ticket contains the time after which the ticket may not be
renewed.
8.4. Postdated Tickets
[ KCLAR 2.4. ]
Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much
later, e.g., a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid
at the time the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to
hold valid tickets in a batch queue, since they will be on-line
longer and more prone to theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to
obtain these tickets from the KDC at job submission time, but to
leave them "dormant" until they are activated and validated by a
further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported in the
interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief
would be foiled.
The "may-postdate" flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by
the TGS. It can be ignored by application servers. This flag MUST be
set in a ticket-granting ticket in order for the KDC to issue a
postdated ticket based on the presented ticket. It is reset by
default; it MAY be requested by a client by setting the "allow-
postdate" option in the AS-REQ [?also TGS-REQ?] message. This flag
does not allow a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting ticket;
postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting
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the postdating in the AS-REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime)
of a postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket-
granting ticket at the time of the request, unless the "renewable"
option is also set, in which case it can be the full life (endtime-
starttime) of the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC MAY limit how far
in the future a ticket may be postdated.
The "postdated" flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The
application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see
when the original authentication occurred. Some services MAY choose
to reject postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a
certain period after the original authentication. When the KDC issues
a "postdated" ticket, it will also be marked as "invalid", so that
the application client MUST present the ticket to the KDC for
validation before use.
8.5. Proxiable and Proxy Tickets
[ KCLAR 2.5. ]
At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to
perform an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take
on the identity of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A
principal can allow a service to take on the principal's identity for
a particular purpose by granting it a proxy.
The process of granting a proxy using the "proxy" and "proxiable"
flags is used to provide credentials for use with specific services.
Though conceptually also a proxy, users wishing to delegate their
identity in a form usable for all purposes MUST use the ticket
forwarding mechanism described in the next section to forward a
ticket-granting ticket.
The "proxiable" flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the
ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers.
When set, this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to
issue a new ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a
different network address based on this ticket. This flag is set if
requested by the client on initial authentication. By default, the
client will request that it be set when requesting a ticket-granting
ticket, and reset when requesting any other ticket.
This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a
remote request on its behalf (e.g. a print service client can give
the print server a proxy to access the client's files on a particular
file server in order to satisfy a print request).
In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos
tickets may contain a set of network addresses from which they are
valid. When granting a proxy, the client MUST specify the new network
address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the
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proxy is to be issued for use from any address.
The "proxy" flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy
ticket. Application servers MAY check this flag and at their option
they MAY require additional authentication from the agent presenting
the proxy in order to provide an audit trail.
8.6. Forwardable Tickets
[ KCLAR 2.6. ]
8.7. Transited Realms
[ KCLAR 2.7., plus new stuff ]
8.8. Authorization Data
8.9. Encrypted Part of Ticket
The complete definition of the encrypted part is
-- Encrypted part of ticket
EncTicketPart ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 3] EncTicketPart1510,
ext [APPLICATION 5] EncTicketPartExt
}
EncTicketPart1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF EncTicketPartCommon
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force IA5 in strings
crealm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }),
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }))
})
})
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EncTicketPartExt ::= EncTicketPartCommon
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force UTF-8 in strings
crealm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }),
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
}),
-- explicitly constrain caddr to be non-empty if present
caddr (SIZE (1..MAX)),
-- explicitly constrain authorization-data to be non-empty
-- if present
authorization-data (SIZE (1..MAX))
})
8.10. Cleartext Part of Ticket
Ticket ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 1] Ticket1510,
ext [APPLICATION 4] Signed {
TicketExt, { key-server }, { ku-Ticket-cksum }
}
}
-- takes a parameter specifying which type gets encrypted
TicketCommon { EncPart } ::= SEQUENCE {
tkt-vno [0] INTEGER (5),
realm [1] Realm,
sname [2] PrincipalName,
enc-part [3] EncryptedData {
EncPart, { key-server }, { ku-Ticket }
},
extensions [4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL,
...
}
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Ticket1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- "COMPONENTS OF" drops the extension marker from
-- TicketCommon
COMPONENTS OF TicketCommon { EncTicketPart1510 }
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force IA5 in strings
realm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }),
sname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }))
}),
extensions ABSENT
})
-- APPLICATION tag goes inside Signed{} as well as outside,
-- to prevent possible substitution attacks.
TicketExt ::= [APPLICATION 4] TicketCommon
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force UTF-8 in strings
realm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }),
sname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
})
})
TEType ::= Int32
TICKETEXTENSION ::= TYPEDHOLE { TEType }
-- ticket extensions: for TicketExt only
TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF SEQUENCE {
te-type [0] TICKETEXTENSION.&id
({TicketExtension-Set}),
te-data [1] OCTET STRING (TICKETEXTENSION.&Type)
({TicketExtension-Set}{@te-type})
}
-- no mandatory ticket extensions currently
TicketExtensionSet TICKETEXTENSION ::= { ... }
9. Credential Acquisition
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There are two exchanges that can be used for acquiring credentials:
the AS exchange and the TGS exchange. These exchanges have many
similarities, and this document describes them in parallel, noting
which behaviors are specific to one type of exchange. The AS request
(AS-REQ) and TGS request (TGS-REQ) are both forms of KDC requests
(KDC-REQ). Likewise, the AS reply (AS-REP) and TGS reply (TGS-REP)
are forms of KDC replies (KDC-REP).
9.1. KDC-REQ
The KDC-REQ has a large number of fields in common between the RFC
1510 and the extensible versions.
KDC-REQ-COMMON ::= SEQUENCE {
-- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0]
pvno [1] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [2] INTEGER (10 -- AS-REQ.rfc1510 --
| 12 -- TGS-REQ.rfc1510 --
| 6 -- AS-REQ.ext --
| 8 -- TGS-REQ.ext -- ),
padata [3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL
-- NOTE: not empty
}
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KDC-REQ-BODY-COMMON ::= SEQUENCE {
kdc-options [0] KDCOptions,
cname [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL
-- Used only in AS-REQ --,
realm [2] Realm
-- Server's realm; also client's in AS-REQ --,
sname [3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
from [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
till [5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL
-- was required in rfc1510;
-- still required for compat versions
-- of messages --,
rtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
nonce [7] Nonce,
etype [8] SEQUENCE OF EType
-- in preference order --,
addresses [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
enc-authorization-data [10] EncryptedData {
AuthorizationData, { key-session | key-subsession },
{ ku-TGSReqAuthData-subkey |
ku-TGSReqAuthData-sesskey }
} OPTIONAL,
additional-tickets [11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL
-- NOTE: not empty --,
...
}
Many fields of KDC-REQ-BODY-COMMON correspond directly to fields of
an EncTicketPartCommon. The KDC copies most of them unchanged,
provided that their values meet site policy.
kdc-options
These flags do not correspond directly to "flags" in
EncTicketPartCommon. [ insert mapping table here ]
cname
This field is copied to the "cname" field in
EncTicketPartCommon. The "cname" field is required in an AS-
REQ; the client places its own name here. In a TGS-REQ, the
"cname" in the ticket in the AP-REQ takes precedence.
realm
This field is the server's realm, and also holds the client's
realm in an AS-REQ.
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The "from", "till", and "rtime" fields correspond to the "starttime",
"endtime", and "renew-till" fields of EncTicketPartCommon.
addresses
This field corresponds to the "caddr" field of
EncTicketPartCommon.
enc-authorization-data
For TGS-REQ, this field contains authorization data encrypted
using either the TGT session key or the AP-REQ subsession key;
these may be copied into the "authorization-data" field of
EncTicketPartCommon if policy permits.
9.2. PA-DATA
PA-DATA have multiple uses in the Kerberos protocol. They may pre-
authenticate an AS-REQ; they may also modify several of the
encryption keys used in a KDC-REP. PA-DATA may also provide "hints"
to the client about which long-term key (usually password-derived) to
use. PA-DATA may also include "hints" about which pre-authentication
mechanisms to use, or include data for input into a pre-
authentication mechanism.
9.3. KDC-REQ Processing
Processing of a KDC-REQ proceeds through several steps. An
implementation need not perform these steps exactly as described, as
long as the resulting behavior is as if the steps were performed as
described. The KDC performs replay handling on receipt of the
request; it then validates the request, adjusts timestamps, and
selects the keys used in the reply. It copies data from the request
into the issued ticket, adjusting for policy. The KDC then transmits
the reply to the client.
9.3.1. Handling Replays
Because Kerberos can run over unreliable transports such as UDP, the
KDC MUST be prepared to retransmit responses in case they are lost.
If a KDC receives a request identical to one it has recently
successfully processed, the KDC MUST respond with an KDC-REP message
rather than a replay error. In order to reduce the amount of
ciphertext given to a potential attacker, KDCs MAY send the same
response generated when the request was first handled. KDCs MUST
obey this replay behavior even if the actual transport in use is
reliable. If the AP-REQ which authenticates a TGS-REQ is a replay,
and the entire request is not identical to a recently successfully
processed request, the KDC SHOULD return "krb-ap-err-repeat", as is
appropriate for AP-REQ processing.
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9.3.2. Request Validation
9.3.2.1. AS-REQ Authentication
Site policy determines whether a given client principal is required
to provide some pre-authentication prior to receiving an AS-REP.
Since the default reply key is typically the client's long-term
password-based key, an attacker may easily request known plaintext
(in the form of an AS-REP) upon which to mount a dictionary attack.
Pre-authentication can limit the possibility of such an attack.
If site policy requires pre-authentication for a client principal,
and no pre-authentication is provided, the KDC returns the error
"kdc-err-preauth-required". Accompanying this error are "e-data"
which include hints telling the client which pre-authentication
mechanisms to use, or data for input to pre-authentication mechanisms
(e.g., input to challenge-response systems). If pre-authentication
fails, the KDC returns the error "kdc-err-preauth-failed".
[ may need additional changes based on Sam's preauth draft ]
9.3.2.2. TGS-REQ Authentication
A TGS-REQ has an accompanying AP-REQ, which is included in the "pa-
tgs-req". The KDC MUST validate the checksum in the Authenticator of
the AP-REQ, which is computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY-1510 or KDC-REQ-
BODY-EXT (for TGS-REQ-1510 or TGS-REQ-EXT, respectively) of the
request. [ padata not signed by authenticator! ] Any error from the
AP-REQ validation process SHOULD be returned in a KRB-ERROR message.
The service principal in the ticket of the AP-REQ may be a ticket-
granting service principal, or a normal application service
principal. An AP-REQ ticket which is not a ticket-granting ticket
MUST NOT be used to issue a ticket for any service other than the one
named in the ticket. In this case, the "renew", "validate", or
"proxy" [?also forwarded?] option must be set in the request.
9.3.2.3. Principal Validation
If the client principal in an AS-REQ is unknown, the KDC returns the
error "kdc-err-c-principal-unknown". If the server principal is
unknown, the KDC returns the error "kdc-err-c-principal-unknown".
9.3.3. Timestamp Handling
[ some aspects of timestamp handling, especially regarding postdating
and renewal, are difficult to read in KCLAR... needs closer
examination here ]
For the AS exchange, the "authtime" of a ticket is set to the local
time at the KDC. For the TGS exchange, the KDC sets the "authtime"
to that of the ticket in the AP-REQ authenticating the TGS-REQ.
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[?application server can spoof the authtime. security issues for
hot-list?] [ MIT implementation may change authtime of renewed
tickets; needs check... ]
Processing of "starttime" (requested in the "from" field) differs
depending on whether the "postdated" option is set in the request.
If the "postdated" option is not set, and the requested "starttime"
is in the future beyond the window of acceptable clock skew, the KDC
returns the error "kdc-err-cannot-postdate". If the "postdated"
option is not set, and the requested "starttime" is absent or does
not indicate a time in the future beyond the acceptable clock skew,
the KDC sets the "starttime" to the KDC's current time. The
"postdated" option MUST NOT be honored if the ticket is being
requested by TGS-REQ and the "may-postdate" is not set in the TGT.
Otherwise, if the "postdated" option is set, and site policy permits,
the KDC sets the "starttime" as requested, and sets the "invalid"
flag in the new ticket.
9.3.3.1. AS-REQ Timestamp Processing
The "endtime" of the ticket will be set to the earlier of the
requested "till" time and a time determined by local policy, possibly
determined using factors specific to the realm or principal. For
example, the expiration time MAY be set to the earliest of the
following:
* The expiration time (till) requested.
* The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime
associated with the client principal from the authentication
server's database.
* The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime
associated with the server principal.
* The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the
policy of the local realm.
If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined
above) is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error
message with code "kdc-err-never-valid" is returned. If the requested
expiration time for the ticket exceeds what was determined as above,
and if the "renewable-ok" option was requested, then the "renewable"
flag is set in the new ticket, and the "renew-till" value is set as
if the "renewable" option were requested.
If the "renewable" option has been requested or if the "renewable-ok"
option has been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the
renew-till field MAY be set to the earliest of:
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* Its requested value.
* The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum
renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database
entries.
* The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime
set by the policy of the local realm.
9.3.3.2. TGS-REQ Timestamp Processing
If the TGS-REQ has the TGT in its AP-REQ, and the TGS-REQ requests an
"endtime" (in the "till" field), then the "endtime" of the new ticket
is set to the minimum of (a) the requested "endtime" value, (b) the
"endtime" in the TGT, and (c) an "endtime" determined by site policy
on ticket lifetimes. If the new ticket is a renewal, the "endtime"
of the new ticket is bounded by (a) the requested "endtime" value,
(b) the value of the "renew-till" value of the old, and (c) the
"starttime" of the new ticket plus the life (endtime - starttime) of
the old ticket. [ the previous sentence is a bit confusing; adapted
from KCLAR 3.3.3. ]
When handling a TGS-REQ, a KDC MUST NOT issue a postdated ticket with
a "starttime", "endtime", or "renew-till" time later than the "renew-
till" time of the TGT.
9.3.4. Key Selection
Three keys are involved in creating a KDC-REP. The reply key is used
to encrypt the encrypted part of the KDC-REP. The session key is
stored in the encrypted part of the ticket, and is also present in
the part of the reply which is visible to the client. The ticket key
is used to encrypt the ticket. These keys all have initial values
for a given exchange; pre-authentication and other extension
mechanisms may change the value used for any of these keys.
[ again, may need changes based on Sam's preauth draft ]
The set of encryption types the client will understand appears in the
"etype" field of KDC-REQ-BODY-COMMON. The KDC limits the set of
possible reply keys and the set of session key encryption types based
on the "etype" field.
For the AS exchange, the reply key is initially a long-term key of
the client, limited to those encryption types specified by the
"etype" field. The KDC SHOULD use the first valid strong "etype" for
which an encryption key is available. For the TGS exchange, the
reply key is initially the subsession key of the Authenticator, or,
if that is not present, the session key of the ticket used to
authenticate the TGS-REQ.
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The ticket key is initially the long-term key of the service. User-
to-user authentication sets the ticket key to be the session key of
the additional ticket in the request.
The session key is initially randomly generated, and has an
encryption type which both the client and the server will understand.
Typically, the KDC has prior knowledge of which encryption types the
server will understand. It selects the first valid strong "etype"
listed the request which the server also will understand.
9.3.5. Checking For Revoked Tickets
9.4. Reply Validation
10. Application Authentication
11. Session Key Use
11.1. KRB-SAFE
11.2. KRB-PRIV
11.3. KRB-CRED
12. Security Considerations
12.1. Time Synchronization
Time synchronization between the KDC and application servers is
necessary to prevent acceptance of expired tickets.
Time synchronization is needed between application servers and
clients to prevent replay attacks if a replay cache is being used.
If negotiated subsession keys are used to encrypt application data,
replay caches may not be necessary.
12.2. Replays
12.3. Principal Name Reuse
See Section 6.2.
12.4. Password Guessing
12.5. Forward Secrecy
[from KCLAR 10.; needs some rewriting]
The Kerberos protocol in its basic form does not provide perfect
forward secrecy for communications. If traffic has been recorded by
an eavesdropper, then messages encrypted using the KRB-PRIV message,
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or messages encrypted using application-specific encryption under
keys exchanged using Kerberos can be decrypted if any of the user's,
application server's, or KDC's key is subsequently discovered. This
is because the session key used to encrypt such messages is
transmitted over the network encrypted in the key of the application
server, and also encrypted under the session key from the user's
ticket-granting ticket when returned to the user in the TGS-REP
message. The session key from the ticket-granting ticket was sent to
the user in the AS-REP message encrypted in the user's secret key,
and embedded in the ticket-granting ticket, which was encrypted in
the key of the KDC. Application requiring perfect forward secrecy
must exchange keys through mechanisms that provide such assurance,
but may use Kerberos for authentication of the encrypted channel
established through such other means.
12.6. Authorization
As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying
the identity of principals on a network. Kerberos does not, by
itself, provide authorization. Applications SHOULD NOT accept the
mere issuance of a service ticket by the Kerberos server as granting
authority to use the service.
12.7. Login Authentication
Some applications, particularly those which provide login access when
provided with a password, SHOULD NOT treat successful acquisition of
credentials as sufficient proof of the user's identity. An attacker
posing as a user could generate an illegitimate KDC-REP message which
decrypts properly. To authenticate a user logging on to a local
system, the credentials obtained SHOULD be used in a TGS exchange to
obtain credentials for a local service. Successful use of those
credentials to authenticate to the local service assures that the
initially obtained credentials are from a valid KDC.
Appendices
A. ASN.1 Module (Normative)
KerberosV5Spec3 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) krb5spec3(4)
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
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-- OID arc for KerberosV5
--
-- This OID may be used to identify Kerberos protocol messages
-- encapsulated in other protocols.
--
-- This OID also designates the OID arc for KerberosV5-related
-- OIDs.
--
-- NOTE: RFC 1510 had an incorrect value (5) for "dod" in its
-- OID.
id-krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosV5(2)
}
-- top-level type
--
-- Applications should not directly reference any types
-- other than KRB-PDU and its component types.
--
KRB-PDU ::= CHOICE {
ticket Ticket,
as-req AS-REQ,
as-rep AS-REP,
tgs-req TGS-REQ,
tgs-rep TGS-REP,
ap-req AP-REQ,
ap-rep AP-REP,
krb-safe KRB-SAFE,
krb-priv KRB-PRIV,
krb-cred KRB-CRED,
tgt-req TGT-REQ,
krb-error KRB-ERROR,
...
}
--
-- *** basic types
--
-- signed values representable in 32 bits
--
-- These are often used as assigned numbers for various things.
Int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647)
-- unsigned 32 bit values
UInt32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
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-- microseconds
Microseconds ::= INTEGER (0..999999)
-- sequence numbers
--
-- We may want to increase this to 2**64 and define a UInt64
-- type.
SeqNum ::= UInt32
-- nonces
--
-- Likewise, we may want to make this UInt64.
Nonce ::= UInt32
-- must not have fractional seconds
KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime
-- used for names and for error messages
KerberosString ::= CHOICE {
ia5 GeneralString (IA5String),
utf8 UTF8String,
... -- no extension may be sent
-- to an rfc1510 implementation --
}
-- used for language tags
LangTag ::= PrintableString (FROM ("A".."Z" | "a".."z" | "0".."9" | "-"))
Realm ::= KerberosString
PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
name-type [0] NameType,
-- May have zero elements, or individual elements may be
-- zero-length, but this is not recommended.
name-string [1] SEQUENCE OF KerberosString
}
-- assigned numbers for name types (used in principal names)
NameType ::= Int32
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-- Name type not known
nt-unknown NameType ::= 0
-- Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users
nt-principal NameType ::= 1
-- Service and other unique instance (krbtgt)
nt-srv-inst NameType ::= 2
-- Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands)
nt-srv-hst NameType ::= 3
-- Service with host as remaining components
nt-srv-xhst NameType ::= 4
-- Unique ID
nt-uid NameType ::= 5
-- Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253]
nt-x500-principal NameType ::= 6
-- Name in form of SMTP email name (e.g. user@foo.com)
nt-smtp-name NameType ::= 7
-- Enterprise name - may be mapped to principal name
nt-enterprise NameType ::= 10
-- Yet another refinement to kludge around historical
-- implementation bugs... we still send at least 32 bits, but
-- this parameterized type allows us to actually use named bit
-- string syntax to define flags, sort of.
KerberosFlags { NamedBits }
::= BIT STRING (SIZE (32..MAX))
(CONSTRAINED BY {
-- must be a valid value of -- NamedBits
-- but if the value to be sent would otherwise be shorter
-- than 32 bits, it must be padded with trailing zero bits
-- to 32 bits. Otherwise, no trailing zero bits may be
-- present.
})
AddrType ::= Int32
HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
addr-type [0] AddrType,
address [1] OCTET STRING
}
-- NOTE: HostAddresses is always used as an OPTIONAL field and
-- should not be a zero-length SEQUENCE OF.
--
-- The extensible messages explicitly constrain this to be
-- non-empty.
HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress
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--
-- *** typed hole support
--
-- Object class for generic typed holes, e.g., padata,
-- authorizationdata.
--
-- Its parameter specifies the name of integer type used as a
-- unique identifier; usually this type is an aliased Int32.
--
-- Usually, the &Type field will be an OctetstringHole, but if
-- there is a need to use a non-ASN.1 encoded type, it may be
-- simply an OCTET STRING, possibly with some comments
-- describing its contents.
TYPEDHOLE { IntType } ::= CLASS {
&id-int IntType UNIQUE,
&id-oid RELATIVE-OID UNIQUE OPTIONAL,
&Type,
&desc ObjectDescriptor OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
SYNTAX &Type
IDENTIFIED BY &id-int
[ OID &id-oid ]
[ DESCRIPTION &desc ]
}
-- An octet string wrapping another ASN.1 type.
OctetstringHole { Type } ::= OCTET STRING (CONTAINING Type)
--
-- *** crypto-related types and assignments
--
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--
-- Actual identifier names are provisional and subject to
-- change.
--
ku-pa-enc-ts KeyUsage ::= 1
ku-Ticket KeyUsage ::= 2
ku-EncASRepPart KeyUsage ::= 3
ku-TGSReqAuthData-sesskey KeyUsage ::= 4
ku-TGSReqAuthData-subkey KeyUsage ::= 5
ku-pa-TGSReq-cksum KeyUsage ::= 6
ku-pa-TGSReq-authenticator KeyUsage ::= 7
ku-EncTGSRepPart-sesskey KeyUsage ::= 8
ku-EncTGSRepPart-subkey KeyUsage ::= 9
ku-Authenticator-cksum KeyUsage ::= 10
ku-APReq-authenticator KeyUsage ::= 11
ku-EncAPRepPart KeyUsage ::= 12
ku-EncKrbPrivPart KeyUsage ::= 13
ku-EncKrbCredPart KeyUsage ::= 14
ku-KrbSafe-cksum KeyUsage ::= 15
ku-ad-KDCIssued-cksum KeyUsage ::= 19
-- The following numbers are provisional... conflicts may exist elsewhere.
ku-Ticket-cksum KeyUsage ::= 25
ku-ASReq-cksum KeyUsage ::= 26
ku-TGSReq-cksum KeyUsage ::= 27
ku-ASRep-cksum KeyUsage ::= 28
ku-TGSRep-cksum KeyUsage ::= 29
ku-APReq-cksum KeyUsage ::= 30
ku-APRep-cksum KeyUsage ::= 31
ku-KrbCred-cksum KeyUsage ::= 32
ku-KrbError-cksum KeyUsage ::= 33
ku-KDCRep-cksum KeyUsage ::= 34
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-- assigned numbers for encryption schemes
et-des-cbc-crc EType ::= 1
et-des-cbc-md4 EType ::= 2
et-des-cbc-md5 EType ::= 3
-- [reserved] 4
et-des3-cbc-md5 EType ::= 5
-- [reserved] 6
et-des3-cbc-sha1 EType ::= 7
et-dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID EType ::= 9
et-md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID EType ::= 10
et-sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID EType ::= 11
et-rc2CBC-EnvOID EType ::= 12
et-rsaEncryption-EnvOID EType ::= 13
et-rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID EType ::= 14
et-des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID EType ::= 15
et-des3-cbc-sha1-kd EType ::= 16
et-aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 EType ::= 17 -- AES
et-aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 EType ::= 18 -- AES
et-rc4-hmac EType ::= 23 -- Microsoft
et-rc4-hmac-exp EType ::= 24 -- Microsoft
et-subkey-keymaterial EType ::= 65 -- opaque; PacketCable
-- "Type" specifies which ASN.1 type is encrypted to the
-- ciphertext in the EncryptedData. "Keys" specifies a set of
-- keys of which one key may be used to encrypt the data.
-- "KeyUsages" specifies a set of key usages, one of which may
-- be used to encrypt.
--
-- None of the parameters is transmitted over the wire.
EncryptedData { Type, KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::=
SEQUENCE {
etype [0] EType,
kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
cipher [2] OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- must be encryption of --
OCTET STRING (CONTAINING Type),
-- with one of the keys -- KeyToUse:Keys,
-- with key usage being one of --
KeyUsage:KeyUsages
}),
...
}
-- Assigned numbers denoting encryption mechanisms.
EType ::= Int32
-- Assigned numbers denoting key usages.
KeyUsage ::= UInt32
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-- KeyToUse identifies which key is to be used to encrypt or
-- sign a given value.
--
-- Values of KeyToUse are never actually transmitted over the
-- wire, or even used directly by the implementation in any
-- way, as key usages are; it exists primarily to identify
-- which key gets used for what purpose. Thus, the specific
-- numeric values associated with this type are irrelevant.
KeyToUse ::= ENUMERATED {
-- unspecified
key-unspecified,
-- server long term key
key-server,
-- client long term key
key-client,
-- key selected by KDC for encryption of a KDC-REP
key-kdc-rep,
-- session key from ticket
key-session,
-- subsession key negotiated via AP-REQ/AP-REP
key-subsession,
...
}
EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
keytype [0] EType,
keyvalue [1] OCTET STRING
}
CksumType ::= Int32
-- The parameters specify which key to use to produce the
-- signature, as well as which key usage to use. The
-- parameters are not actually sent over the wire.
Checksum { KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::= SEQUENCE {
cksumtype [0] CksumType,
checksum [1] OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- signed using one of the keys --
KeyToUse:Keys,
-- with key usage being one of --
KeyUsage:KeyUsages
})
}
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-- a Checksum that must contain the checksum of a particular type
ChecksumOf { Type, KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::=
Checksum { Keys, KeyUsages }
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
checksum (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- must be checksum of --
OCTET STRING (CONTAINING Type)
})
})
-- parameterized type for wrapping authenticated plaintext
Signed { InnerType, KeyToUse:Keys, KeyUsage:KeyUsages } ::=
SEQUENCE {
cksum [0] ChecksumOf
{ InnerType, Keys, KeyUsages } OPTIONAL,
inner [1] InnerType,
...
}
--
-- *** Tickets
--
Ticket ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 1] Ticket1510,
ext [APPLICATION 4] Signed {
TicketExt, { key-server }, { ku-Ticket-cksum }
}
}
-- takes a parameter specifying which type gets encrypted
TicketCommon { EncPart } ::= SEQUENCE {
tkt-vno [0] INTEGER (5),
realm [1] Realm,
sname [2] PrincipalName,
enc-part [3] EncryptedData {
EncPart, { key-server }, { ku-Ticket }
},
extensions [4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL,
...
}
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Ticket1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- "COMPONENTS OF" drops the extension marker from
-- TicketCommon
COMPONENTS OF TicketCommon { EncTicketPart1510 }
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force IA5 in strings
realm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }),
sname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }))
}),
extensions ABSENT
})
-- APPLICATION tag goes inside Signed{} as well as outside,
-- to prevent possible substitution attacks.
TicketExt ::= [APPLICATION 4] TicketCommon
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force UTF-8 in strings
realm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }),
sname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
})
})
-- Encrypted part of ticket
EncTicketPart ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 3] EncTicketPart1510,
ext [APPLICATION 5] EncTicketPartExt
}
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EncTicketPartCommon ::= SEQUENCE {
flags [0] TicketFlags,
key [1] EncryptionKey,
crealm [2] Realm,
cname [3] PrincipalName,
transited [4] TransitedEncoding,
authtime [5] KerberosTime,
starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime [7] KerberosTime,
renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
caddr [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
authorization-data [10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL,
...
}
EncTicketPart1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF EncTicketPartCommon
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force IA5 in strings
crealm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }),
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }))
})
})
EncTicketPartExt ::= EncTicketPartCommon
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
-- explicitly force UTF-8 in strings
crealm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }),
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
}),
-- explicitly constrain caddr to be non-empty if present
caddr (SIZE (1..MAX)),
-- explicitly constrain authorization-data to be non-empty
-- if present
authorization-data (SIZE (1..MAX))
})
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--
-- *** Authorization Data
--
ADType ::= Int32
AUTHDATA ::= TYPEDHOLE { ADType }
-- NOTE: AuthorizationData is always used as an OPTIONAL field and
-- should not be a zero-length SEQUENCE OF.
--
-- The extensible messages explicitly constrain this to be non-empty.
AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
ad-type [0] AUTHDATA.&id-int ({Authdata-Set}),
ad-data [1] OCTET STRING (AUTHDATA.&Type)
({Authdata-Set}{@ad-type})
}
-- Mandatory AuthorizationData
Authdata-Set AUTHDATA ::= {
ad-if-relevant |
ad-kdcissued |
ad-and-or |
ad-mandatory-for-kdc ,
...
}
ad-if-relevant AUTHDATA ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { AuthorizationData }
IDENTIFIED BY 1
DESCRIPTION
"Encapsulates another AuthorizationData.
Intended for application servers; receiving application servers
MAY ignore."
}
ad-kdcissued AUTHDATA ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { AD-KDCIssued }
IDENTIFIED BY 4
DESCRIPTION "KDC-issued privilege attributes"
}
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AD-KDCIssued ::= SEQUENCE {
ad-checksum [0] ChecksumOf {
AuthorizationData, { key-session },
{ ku-ad-KDCIssued-cksum }},
i-realm [1] Realm OPTIONAL,
i-sname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
elements [3] AuthorizationData
}
AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE {
condition-count [0] INTEGER,
elements [1] AuthorizationData
}
AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC ::= AuthorizationData
ad-and-or AUTHDATA ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { AD-AND-OR }
IDENTIFIED BY 5
DESCRIPTION "And/Or"
}
AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE {
condition-count [0] INTEGER,
elements [1] AuthorizationData
}
ad-mandatory-for-kdc AUTHDATA ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { AuthorizationData }
IDENTIFIED BY 8
DESCRIPTION "KDCs MUST interpret any AuthorizationData
wrapped in this."
}
TrType ::= Int32 -- must be registered
-- encoded Transited field
TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE {
tr-type [0] TrType,
contents [1] OCTET STRING
}
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TEType ::= Int32
TICKETEXTENSION ::= TYPEDHOLE { TEType }
-- ticket extensions: for TicketExt only
TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF SEQUENCE {
te-type [0] TICKETEXTENSION.&id
({TicketExtension-Set}),
te-data [1] OCTET STRING (TICKETEXTENSION.&Type)
({TicketExtension-Set}{@te-type})
}
-- no mandatory ticket extensions currently
TicketExtensionSet TICKETEXTENSION ::= { ... }
TicketFlags ::= KerberosFlags { TicketFlagsBits }
TicketFlagsBits ::= BIT STRING {
reserved (0),
forwardable (1),
forwarded (2),
proxiable (3),
proxy (4),
may-postdate (5),
postdated (6),
invalid (7),
renewable (8),
initial (9),
pre-authent (10),
hw-authent (11),
transited-policy-checked (12),
ok-as-delegate (13),
anonymous (14),
cksummed-ticket (15)
}
--
-- *** KDC protocol
--
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AS-REQ ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ-1510
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (10),
-- AS-REQ must include client name
req-body (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., cname PRESENT })
}),
ext [APPLICATION 6] Signed {
-- APPLICATION tag goes inside Signed{} as well as outside,
-- to prevent possible substitution attacks.
[APPLICATION 6] KDC-REQ-EXT,
-- not sure this is correct key to use; do we even want
-- to sign AS-REQ?
{ key-client },
{ ku-ASReq-cksum }
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (6),
-- AS-REQ must include client name
req-body (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., cname PRESENT })
})
}
TGS-REQ ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ-1510
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (12),
-- client name optional in TGS-REQ
req-body (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., cname ABSENT })
}),
ext [APPLICATION 8] Signed {
-- APPLICATION tag goes inside Signed{} as well as outside,
-- to prevent possible substitution attacks.
[APPLICATION 8] KDC-REQ-EXT,
{ key-session }, { ku-TGSReq-cksum }
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (8),
-- client name optional in TGS-REQ
req-body (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., cname ABSENT })
})
}
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KDC-REQ-COMMON ::= SEQUENCE {
-- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0]
pvno [1] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [2] INTEGER (10 -- AS-REQ.rfc1510 --
| 12 -- TGS-REQ.rfc1510 --
| 6 -- AS-REQ.ext --
| 8 -- TGS-REQ.ext -- ),
padata [3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL
-- NOTE: not empty
}
KDC-REQ-1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
COMPONENTS OF KDC-REQ-COMMON,
req-body [4] KDC-REQ-BODY-1510
} (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (10 | 12) })
-- APPLICATION tag goes inside Signed{} as well as outside,
-- to prevent possible substitution attacks.
KDC-REQ-EXT ::= SEQUENCE {
COMPONENTS OF KDC-REQ-COMMON,
req-body [4] KDC-REQ-BODY-EXT,
lang-tags [5] SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF LangTag OPTIONAL,
...
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (6 | 8),
padata (SIZE (1..MAX))
})
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KDC-REQ-BODY-COMMON ::= SEQUENCE {
kdc-options [0] KDCOptions,
cname [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL
-- Used only in AS-REQ --,
realm [2] Realm
-- Server's realm; also client's in AS-REQ --,
sname [3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
from [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
till [5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL
-- was required in rfc1510;
-- still required for compat versions
-- of messages --,
rtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
nonce [7] Nonce,
etype [8] SEQUENCE OF EType
-- in preference order --,
addresses [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
enc-authorization-data [10] EncryptedData {
AuthorizationData, { key-session | key-subsession },
{ ku-TGSReqAuthData-subkey |
ku-TGSReqAuthData-sesskey }
} OPTIONAL,
additional-tickets [11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL
-- NOTE: not empty --,
...
}
KDC-REQ-BODY-1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF KDC-REQ-BODY-COMMON
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }))
}),
realm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }),
sname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }))
}),
till PRESENT
})
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KDC-REQ-BODY-EXT ::= KDC-REQ-BODY-COMMON
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
}),
realm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }),
sname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
}),
addresses (SIZE (1..MAX)),
enc-authorization-data (EncryptedData {
AuthorizationData (SIZE (1..MAX)),
{ key-session | key-subsession },
{ ku-TGSReqAuthData-subkey |
ku-TGSReqAuthData-sesskey }
}),
additional-tickets (SIZE (1..MAX))
})
KDCOptions ::= KerberosFlags { KDCOptionsBits }
KDCOptionsBits ::= BIT STRING {
reserved (0),
forwardable (1),
forwarded (2),
proxiable (3),
proxy (4),
allow-postdate (5),
postdated (6),
unused7 (7),
renewable (8),
unused9 (9),
unused10 (10),
unused11 (11),
unused12 (12),
unused13 (13),
requestanonymous (14),
canonicalize (15),
disable-transited-check (26),
renewable-ok (27),
enc-tkt-in-skey (28),
renew (30),
validate (31)
-- XXX need "need ticket1" flag?
}
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AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP-1510 { EncASRepPart }
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (11) }),
ext [APPLICATION 7] Signed {
[APPLICATION 7] KDC-REP-EXT { EncASRepPart },
{ key-reply }, { ku-ASRep-cksum }
} (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (7) })
}
TGS-REP ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP-1510 { EncTGSRepPart }
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (13) }),
ext [APPLICATION 9] Signed {
[APPLICATION 9] KDC-REP-EXT { EncTGSRepPart },
{ key-reply }, { ku-TGSRep-cksum }
} (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (9) })
}
KDC-REP-COMMON { EncPart } ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (11 -- AS-REP.rfc1510 -- |
13 -- TGS.rfc1510 -- |
7 -- AS-REP.ext -- |
9 -- TGS-REP.ext -- ),
padata [2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL,
crealm [3] Realm,
cname [4] PrincipalName,
ticket [5] Ticket,
enc-part [6] EncryptedData {
EncPart,
{ key-reply },
-- maybe reach into EncryptedData in AS-REP/TGS-REP definitions
-- to apply constraints on key usages?
{ ku-EncASRepPart -- if AS-REP -- |
ku-EncTGSRepPart-subkey -- if TGS-REP and using --
-- Authenticator session key -- |
ku-EncTGSRepPart-sesskey -- if TGS-REP and using --
-- subsession key -- }
},
-- In extensible version, KDC signs original request
-- to avoid replay attacks agaginst client.
req-cksum [7] ChecksumOf { CHOICE {
as-req AS-REQ,
tgs-req TGS-REQ
}, { key-reply }, { ku-KDCRep-cksum }} OPTIONAL,
lang-tag [8] LangTag OPTIONAL,
...
}
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KDC-REP-1510 { EncPart } ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF KDC-REP-COMMON { EncPart }
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (11 | 13),
crealm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT}),
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 PRESENT }))
}),
req-cksum ABSENT,
lang-tag ABSENT
})
KDC-REP-EXT { EncPart } ::= KDC-REP-COMMON { EncPart }
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (7 | 9),
crealm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }),
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
})
})
EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart
EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart
EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE {
key [0] EncryptionKey,
last-req [1] LastReq,
nonce [2] Nonce,
key-expiration [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
flags [4] TicketFlags,
authtime [5] KerberosTime,
starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime [7] KerberosTime,
renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm [9] Realm,
sname [10] PrincipalName,
caddr [11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
... -- ASN.1 extensions must be excluded
-- when sending to rfc1510 implementation
}
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-- convert to use object class?
LRType ::= Int32
LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
lr-type [0] LRType,
lr-value [1] KerberosTime
}
--
-- *** preauth
--
PaDataType ::= Int32
-- TYPEDHOLE class that uses PaDataType as its unique ID type.
PADATA-OBJ ::= TYPEDHOLE { PaDataType }
PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
-- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0]
padata-type [1] CHOICE {
-- example of possible use of RELATIVE-OIDs
int PADATA-OBJ.&id-int ({PaDataSet}),
oid PADATA-OBJ.&id-oid ({PaDataSet}{@int})
},
padata-value [2] OCTET STRING (PADATA-OBJ.&Type)
({PaDataSet}{@padata-type.int})
}
PaDataSet PADATA-OBJ ::= {
pa-tgs-req |
pa-enc-timestamp |
pa-etype-info |
pa-etype-info2 |
pa-pw-salt |
pa-as-req ,
...
}
pa-tgs-req PADATA-OBJ ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { AP-REQ }
IDENTIFIED BY 1
DESCRIPTION
"AP-REQ authenticating a TGS-REQ"
}
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pa-enc-timestamp PADATA-OBJ ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP }
IDENTIFIED BY 2
DESCRIPTION
"Encrypted timestamp preauth;
Encryption key used is client's long-term key."
}
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP ::= EncryptedData {
PA-ENC-TS-ENC, { key-client }, { ku-pa-enc-ts }
}
PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
patimestamp [0] KerberosTime -- client's time --,
pausec [1] Microseconds OPTIONAL
}
pa-etype-info PADATA-OBJ ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { ETYPE-INFO }
IDENTIFIED BY 11
DESCRIPTION
"Hints returned in AS-REP or KRB-ERROR to help client
choose a password-derived key, either for preauthentication or
for decryption of the reply."
}
ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY
ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
etype [0] EType,
salt [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
pa-etype-info2 PADATA-OBJ ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { ETYPE-INFO2 }
IDENTIFIED BY 19
DESCRIPTION
"Similar to etype-info, but with parameters provided for
the string-to-key function."
}
ETYPE-INFO2 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX))
OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY
ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
etype [0] EType,
salt [1] KerberosString OPTIONAL,
s2kparams [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
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pa-pw-salt PADATA-OBJ ::= {
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
-- Must consist of the salt string to be used by the
-- client, in an unspecified character encoding. -- })
IDENTIFIED BY 3
DESCRIPTION
"Obsolescent. Salt for client's long-term key.
Its character encoding is unspecified."
}
pa-as-req PADATA-OBJ ::= {
SYNTAX OctetstringHole { AS-REQ
(WITH COMPONENTS {
ext }) }
IDENTIFIED BY 42 -- provisional
DESCRIPTION
"An extensible AS-REQ may be sent as a padata in a
non-extensible AS-REQ to allow for backwards compatibility."
}
--
-- *** Application session setup
--
AP-REQ ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 14] AP-REQ-1510,
ext [APPLICATION 18] Signed {
AP-REQ-EXT, { key-session }, { ku-APReq-cksum }
}
}
AP-REQ-COMMON ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (14 | 18),
ap-options [2] APOptions,
ticket [3] Ticket,
authenticator [4] EncryptedData {
Authenticator,
{ key-session },
{ ku-APReq-authenticator |
ku-pa-TGSReq-authenticator }
},
extensions [5] ApReqExtensions OPTIONAL,
...
}
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AP-REQ-1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF AP-REQ-COMMON
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (14),
extensions ABSENT
})
AP-REQ-EXT ::= AP-REQ-COMMON
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (18),
-- The following constraints on Authenticator assume that
-- we want to restrict the use of AP-REQ-EXT with TicketExt only,
-- since that is the only way we can enforce UTF-8.
authenticator (EncryptedData {
Authenticator (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
crealm (WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }),
cname (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
name-string (WITH COMPONENT
(WITH COMPONENTS { ia5 ABSENT }))
}),
authorization-data (SIZE (1..MAX))
}), { key-session }, { ku-APReq-authenticator }})
})
ApReqExtType ::= Int32
ApReqExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF SEQUENCE {
apReqExt-Type [0] ApReqExtType,
apReqExt-Data [1] OCTET STRING
}
APOptions ::= KerberosFlags { APOptionsBits }
APOptionsBits ::= BIT STRING {
reserved (0),
use-session-key (1),
mutual-required (2)
}
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-- plaintext of authenticator
Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE {
authenticator-vno [0] INTEGER (5),
crealm [1] Realm,
cname [2] PrincipalName,
cksum [3] Checksum {{ key-session },
{ ku-Authenticator-cksum |
ku-pa-TGSReq-cksum }} OPTIONAL,
cusec [4] Microseconds,
ctime [5] KerberosTime,
subkey [6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number [7] SeqNum OPTIONAL,
authorization-data [8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
AP-REP ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 15] AP-REP-1510,
ext [APPLICATION 19] Signed {
AP-REP-EXT,
{ key-session | key-subsession }, { ku-APRep-cksum }}
}
AP-REP-COMMON { EncPart } ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (15 | 19),
enc-part [2] EncryptedData {
EncPart,
{ key-session | key-subsession }, { ku-EncAPRepPart }},
extensions [3] ApRepExtensions OPTIONAL,
...
}
AP-REP-1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF AP-REP-COMMON { EncAPRepPart1510 }
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (15),
extensions ABSENT
})
AP-REP-EXT ::= [APPLICATION 19] AP-REP-COMMON {
EncAPRepPartExt }
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (19) })
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ApRepExtType ::= Int32
-- convert to use object class?
ApRepExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF SEQUENCE {
apRepExt-Type [0] ApRepExtType,
apRepExt-Data [1] OCTET STRING
}
EncAPRepPart ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 27] EncAPRepPart1510,
ext [APPLICATION 31] EncAPRepPartExt
}
EncAPRepPart1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
COMPONENTS OF ENCAPRepPartCom
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
authorization-data ABSENT
})
EncAPRepPartExt ::= EncAPRepPartCom
EncAPRepPartCom ::= SEQUENCE {
ctime [0] KerberosTime,
cusec [1] Microseconds,
subkey [2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number [3] SeqNum OPTIONAL,
authorization-data [4] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL,
...
}
--
-- *** Application messages
--
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-- Do we chew up another tag for KRB-SAFE-EXT? That would allow us to
-- make safe-body optional, allowing for a GSS-MIC sort of message.
KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (20),
safe-body [2] KRB-SAFE-BODY,
cksum [3] ChecksumOf {
KRB-SAFE-BODY,
{ key-session | key-subsession }, { ku-KrbSafe-cksum }},
... -- ASN.1 extensions must be excluded
-- when sending to rfc1510 implementations
}
KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
user-data [0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
seq-number [3] SeqNum OPTIONAL,
s-address [4] HostAddress,
r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
... -- ASN.1 extensions must be excluded
-- when sending to rfc1510 implementations
}
KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (21),
enc-part [3] EncryptedData {
EncKrbPrivPart,
{ key-session | key-subsession }, { ku-EncKrbPrivPart }},
...
}
EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE {
user-data [0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
seq-number [3] SeqNum OPTIONAL,
s-address [4] HostAddress -- sender's addr --,
r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr --,
... -- ASN.1 extensions must be excluded
-- when sending to rfc1510 implementations
}
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KRB-CRED ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 22] KRB-CRED-1510,
ext [APPLICATION 24] Signed {
KRB-CRED-EXT,
{ key-session | key-subsession }, { ku-KrbCred-cksum }}
}
KRB-CRED-COMMON ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (22 | 24),
tickets [2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket,
enc-part [3] EncryptedData {
EncKrbCredPart,
{ key-session | key-subsession }, { ku-EncKrbCredPart }},
...
}
KRB-CRED-1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF KRB-CRED-COMMON
} (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (22) })
KRB-CRED-EXT ::= [APPLICATION 24] KRB-CRED-COMMON
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (24) })
EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE {
ticket-info [0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo,
nonce [1] Nonce OPTIONAL,
timestamp [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
s-address [4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
}
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KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
key [0] EncryptionKey,
prealm [1] Realm OPTIONAL,
pname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
flags [3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL,
authtime [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
starttime [5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
renew-till [7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm [8] Realm OPTIONAL,
sname [9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
caddr [10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL
}
TGT-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 16] SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (16),
sname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
srealm [3] Realm OPTIONAL,
...
}
--
-- *** Error messages
--
ErrCode ::= Int32
KRB-ERROR ::= CHOICE {
rfc1510 [APPLICATION 30] KRB-ERROR-1510,
ext [APPLICATION 23] Signed {
KRB-ERROR-EXT, { ku-KrbError-cksum } }
}
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KRB-ERROR-COMMON ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
msg-type [1] INTEGER (30 | 23),
ctime [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
cusec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
stime [4] KerberosTime,
susec [5] Microseconds,
error-code [6] ErrCode,
crealm [7] Realm OPTIONAL,
cname [8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
realm [9] Realm -- Correct realm --,
sname [10] PrincipalName -- Correct name --,
e-text [11] KerberosString OPTIONAL,
e-data [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
typed-data [13] TYPED-DATA OPTIONAL,
nonce [14] Nonce OPTIONAL,
lang-tag [15] LangTag OPTIONAL,
...
}
KRB-ERROR-1510 ::= SEQUENCE {
-- effectively drops the extension marker
COMPONENTS OF KRB-ERROR-COMMON
} (WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
msg-type (30),
typed-data ABSENT,
nonce ABSENT,
lang-tag ABSENT
})
KRB-ERROR-EXT ::= [APPLICATION 23] KRB-ERROR-COMMON
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., msg-type (23) })
TDType ::= Int32
-- convert to information object class later
TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
data-type [0] TDType,
data-value [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
END
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B. Kerberos and Character Encodings (Informative)
[adapted from KCLAR 5.2.1]
The original specification of the Kerberos protocol in RFC 1510 uses
GeneralString in numerous places for human-readable string data.
Historical implementations of Kerberos cannot utilize the full power
of GeneralString. This ASN.1 type requires the use of designation
and invocation escape sequences as specified in ISO-2022/ECMA-35
[ISO-2022/ECMA-35] to switch character sets, and the default
character set that is designated as G0 is the ISO-646/ECMA-6
[ISO-646,ECMA-6] International Reference Version (IRV) (aka U.S.
ASCII), which mostly works.
ISO-2022/ECMA-35 defines four character-set code elements (G0..G3)
and two Control-function code elements (C0..C1). DER previously
prohibited the designation of character sets as any but the G0 and C0
sets. This had the side effect of prohibiting the use of ISO-8859
(ISO Latin) [ISO-8859] character-sets or any other character-sets
that utilize a 96-character set, since it is prohibited by
ISO-2022/ECMA-35 to designate them as the G0 code element. Recent
revisions to the ASN.1 standards resolve this contradiction.
In practice, many implementations treat RFC 1510 GeneralStrings as if
they were 8-bit strings of whichever character set the implementation
defaults to, without regard for correct usage of character-set
designation escape sequences. The default character set is often
determined by the current user's operating system dependent locale.
At least one major implementation places unescaped UTF-8 encoded
Unicode characters in the GeneralString. This failure to conform to
the GeneralString specifications results in interoperability issues
when conflicting character encodings are utilized by the Kerberos
clients, services, and KDC.
This unfortunate situation is the result of improper documentation of
the restrictions of the ASN.1 GeneralString type in prior Kerberos
specifications.
[the following should probably be rewritten and moved into the
principal name section]
For compatibility, implementations MAY choose to accept GeneralString
values that contain characters other than those permitted by
IA5String, but they should be aware that character set designation
codes will likely be absent, and that the encoding should probably be
treated as locale-specific in almost every way. Implementations MAY
also choose to emit GeneralString values that are beyond those
permitted by IA5String, but should be aware that doing so is
extraordinarily risky from an interoperability perspective.
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Some existing implementations use GeneralString to encode unescaped
locale-specific characters. This is a violation of the ASN.1
standard. Most of these implementations encode US-ASCII in the left-
hand half, so as long the implementation transmits only US-ASCII, the
ASN.1 standard is not violated in this regard. As soon as such an
implementation encodes unescaped locale-specific characters with the
high bit set, it violates the ASN.1 standard.
Other implementations have been known to use GeneralString to contain
a UTF-8 encoding. This also violates the ASN.1 standard, since UTF-8
is a different encoding, not a 94 or 96 character "G" set as defined
by ISO 2022. It is believed that these implementations do not even
use the ISO 2022 escape sequence to change the character encoding.
Even if implementations were to announce the change of encoding by
using that escape sequence, the ASN.1 standard prohibits the use of
any escape sequences other than those used to designate/invoke "G" or
"C" sets allowed by GeneralString.
C. Kerberos History (Informative)
[Adapted from KCLAR "BACKGROUND"]
The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's
trusted third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on
modifications suggested by Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original
design and implementation of Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the
work of two former Project Athena staff members, Steve Miller of
Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman (now at the
Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern
California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project
Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other
members of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on
Kerberos.
Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has
evolved from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for
features not available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the
Kerberos protocol was led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much
input from the community. The development of the MIT reference
implementation was led at MIT by John Kohl and Theodore Ts'o, with
help and contributed code from many others. Since RFC1510 was issued,
extensions and revisions to the protocol have been proposed by many
individuals. Some of these proposals are reflected in this document.
Where such changes involved significant effort, the document cites
the contribution of the proposer.
Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos
are publicly available and commercial implementations have been
developed and are widely used. Details on the differences between
Kerberos Versions 4 and 5 can be found in [KNT94].
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Normative References
[KCRYPTO]
[RFC2119]
[X680]
[X681]
[X682]
[X683]
[X690]
Informative References
[DS81]
[KCLAR]
[KNT94]
[NS78]
[RFC1510]
[RFC1964]
[ISO8859]
Acknowledgments
Some stuff lifted from draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-04.
Author's Address
Tom Yu
77 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02139
USA
tlyu@mit.edu
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
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and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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