Files
heimdal/lib/hcrypto/rand-fortuna.c
Simon Wilkinson 887993e8b3 Add mutex protection for the fortuna PRNG
The fortuna PRNG has an statically held internal state. Prevent
concurrent access to this internal state by adding mutexes around
all of the access classes.

Signed-off-by: Love Hornquist Astrand <lha@h5l.org>
2010-04-19 14:26:53 +02:00

656 lines
14 KiB
C

/*
* fortuna.c
* Fortuna-like PRNG.
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c,v 1.8 2006/10/04 00:29:46 momjian Exp $
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <rand.h>
#include <heim_threads.h>
#ifdef KRB5
#include <krb5-types.h>
#endif
#include <roken.h>
#include "randi.h"
#include "aes.h"
#include "sha.h"
/*
* Why Fortuna-like: There does not seem to be any definitive reference
* on Fortuna in the net. Instead this implementation is based on
* following references:
*
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fortuna_(PRNG)
* - Wikipedia article
* http://jlcooke.ca/random/
* - Jean-Luc Cooke Fortuna-based /dev/random driver for Linux.
*/
/*
* There is some confusion about whether and how to carry forward
* the state of the pools. Seems like original Fortuna does not
* do it, resetting hash after each request. I guess expecting
* feeding to happen more often that requesting. This is absolutely
* unsuitable for pgcrypto, as nothing asynchronous happens here.
*
* J.L. Cooke fixed this by feeding previous hash to new re-initialized
* hash context.
*
* Fortuna predecessor Yarrow requires ability to query intermediate
* 'final result' from hash, without affecting it.
*
* This implementation uses the Yarrow method - asking intermediate
* results, but continuing with old state.
*/
/*
* Algorithm parameters
*/
#define NUM_POOLS 32
/* in microseconds */
#define RESEED_INTERVAL 100000 /* 0.1 sec */
/* for one big request, reseed after this many bytes */
#define RESEED_BYTES (1024*1024)
/*
* Skip reseed if pool 0 has less than this many
* bytes added since last reseed.
*/
#define POOL0_FILL (256/8)
/*
* Algorithm constants
*/
/* Both cipher key size and hash result size */
#define BLOCK 32
/* cipher block size */
#define CIPH_BLOCK 16
/* for internal wrappers */
#define MD_CTX SHA256_CTX
#define CIPH_CTX AES_KEY
struct fortuna_state
{
unsigned char counter[CIPH_BLOCK];
unsigned char result[CIPH_BLOCK];
unsigned char key[BLOCK];
MD_CTX pool[NUM_POOLS];
CIPH_CTX ciph;
unsigned reseed_count;
struct timeval last_reseed_time;
unsigned pool0_bytes;
unsigned rnd_pos;
int tricks_done;
pid_t pid;
};
typedef struct fortuna_state FState;
/*
* Use our own wrappers here.
* - Need to get intermediate result from digest, without affecting it.
* - Need re-set key on a cipher context.
* - Algorithms are guaranteed to exist.
* - No memory allocations.
*/
static void
ciph_init(CIPH_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *key, int klen)
{
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, klen * 8, ctx);
}
static void
ciph_encrypt(CIPH_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
AES_encrypt(in, out, ctx);
}
static void
md_init(MD_CTX * ctx)
{
SHA256_Init(ctx);
}
static void
md_update(MD_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *data, int len)
{
SHA256_Update(ctx, data, len);
}
static void
md_result(MD_CTX * ctx, unsigned char *dst)
{
SHA256_CTX tmp;
memcpy(&tmp, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
SHA256_Final(dst, &tmp);
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
}
/*
* initialize state
*/
static void
init_state(FState * st)
{
int i;
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
for (i = 0; i < NUM_POOLS; i++)
md_init(&st->pool[i]);
st->pid = getpid();
}
/*
* Endianess does not matter.
* It just needs to change without repeating.
*/
static void
inc_counter(FState * st)
{
uint32_t *val = (uint32_t *) st->counter;
if (++val[0])
return;
if (++val[1])
return;
if (++val[2])
return;
++val[3];
}
/*
* This is called 'cipher in counter mode'.
*/
static void
encrypt_counter(FState * st, unsigned char *dst)
{
ciph_encrypt(&st->ciph, st->counter, dst);
inc_counter(st);
}
/*
* The time between reseed must be at least RESEED_INTERVAL
* microseconds.
*/
static int
enough_time_passed(FState * st)
{
int ok;
struct timeval tv;
struct timeval *last = &st->last_reseed_time;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
/* check how much time has passed */
ok = 0;
if (tv.tv_sec > last->tv_sec + 1)
ok = 1;
else if (tv.tv_sec == last->tv_sec + 1)
{
if (1000000 + tv.tv_usec - last->tv_usec >= RESEED_INTERVAL)
ok = 1;
}
else if (tv.tv_usec - last->tv_usec >= RESEED_INTERVAL)
ok = 1;
/* reseed will happen, update last_reseed_time */
if (ok)
memcpy(last, &tv, sizeof(tv));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(tv));
return ok;
}
/*
* generate new key from all the pools
*/
static void
reseed(FState * st)
{
unsigned k;
unsigned n;
MD_CTX key_md;
unsigned char buf[BLOCK];
/* set pool as empty */
st->pool0_bytes = 0;
/*
* Both #0 and #1 reseed would use only pool 0. Just skip #0 then.
*/
n = ++st->reseed_count;
/*
* The goal: use k-th pool only 1/(2^k) of the time.
*/
md_init(&key_md);
for (k = 0; k < NUM_POOLS; k++)
{
md_result(&st->pool[k], buf);
md_update(&key_md, buf, BLOCK);
if (n & 1 || !n)
break;
n >>= 1;
}
/* add old key into mix too */
md_update(&key_md, st->key, BLOCK);
/* add pid to make output diverse after fork() */
md_update(&key_md, (const unsigned char *)&st->pid, sizeof(st->pid));
/* now we have new key */
md_result(&key_md, st->key);
/* use new key */
ciph_init(&st->ciph, st->key, BLOCK);
memset(&key_md, 0, sizeof(key_md));
memset(buf, 0, BLOCK);
}
/*
* Pick a random pool. This uses key bytes as random source.
*/
static unsigned
get_rand_pool(FState * st)
{
unsigned rnd;
/*
* This slightly prefers lower pools - thats OK.
*/
rnd = st->key[st->rnd_pos] % NUM_POOLS;
st->rnd_pos++;
if (st->rnd_pos >= BLOCK)
st->rnd_pos = 0;
return rnd;
}
/*
* update pools
*/
static void
add_entropy(FState * st, const unsigned char *data, unsigned len)
{
unsigned pos;
unsigned char hash[BLOCK];
MD_CTX md;
/* hash given data */
md_init(&md);
md_update(&md, data, len);
md_result(&md, hash);
/*
* Make sure the pool 0 is initialized, then update randomly.
*/
if (st->reseed_count == 0)
pos = 0;
else
pos = get_rand_pool(st);
md_update(&st->pool[pos], hash, BLOCK);
if (pos == 0)
st->pool0_bytes += len;
memset(hash, 0, BLOCK);
memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
}
/*
* Just take 2 next blocks as new key
*/
static void
rekey(FState * st)
{
encrypt_counter(st, st->key);
encrypt_counter(st, st->key + CIPH_BLOCK);
ciph_init(&st->ciph, st->key, BLOCK);
}
/*
* Hide public constants. (counter, pools > 0)
*
* This can also be viewed as spreading the startup
* entropy over all of the components.
*/
static void
startup_tricks(FState * st)
{
int i;
unsigned char buf[BLOCK];
/* Use next block as counter. */
encrypt_counter(st, st->counter);
/* Now shuffle pools, excluding #0 */
for (i = 1; i < NUM_POOLS; i++)
{
encrypt_counter(st, buf);
encrypt_counter(st, buf + CIPH_BLOCK);
md_update(&st->pool[i], buf, BLOCK);
}
memset(buf, 0, BLOCK);
/* Hide the key. */
rekey(st);
/* This can be done only once. */
st->tricks_done = 1;
}
static void
extract_data(FState * st, unsigned count, unsigned char *dst)
{
unsigned n;
unsigned block_nr = 0;
pid_t pid = getpid();
/* Should we reseed? */
if (st->pool0_bytes >= POOL0_FILL || st->reseed_count == 0)
if (enough_time_passed(st))
reseed(st);
/* Do some randomization on first call */
if (!st->tricks_done)
startup_tricks(st);
/* If we forked, force a reseed again */
if (pid != st->pid) {
st->pid = pid;
reseed(st);
}
while (count > 0)
{
/* produce bytes */
encrypt_counter(st, st->result);
/* copy result */
if (count > CIPH_BLOCK)
n = CIPH_BLOCK;
else
n = count;
memcpy(dst, st->result, n);
dst += n;
count -= n;
/* must not give out too many bytes with one key */
block_nr++;
if (block_nr > (RESEED_BYTES / CIPH_BLOCK))
{
rekey(st);
block_nr = 0;
}
}
/* Set new key for next request. */
rekey(st);
}
/*
* public interface
*/
static FState main_state;
static int init_done;
static int have_entropy;
#define FORTUNA_RESEED_BYTE 10000
static unsigned resend_bytes;
/*
* This mutex protects all of the above static elements from concurrent
* access by multiple threads
*/
static HEIMDAL_MUTEX fortuna_mutex = HEIMDAL_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
/*
* Try our best to do an inital seed
*/
#define INIT_BYTES 128
/*
* fortuna_mutex must be held across calls to this function
*/
static int
fortuna_reseed(void)
{
int entropy_p = 0;
if (!init_done)
abort();
#ifndef NO_RAND_UNIX_METHOD
{
unsigned char buf[INIT_BYTES];
if ((*hc_rand_unix_method.bytes)(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 1) {
add_entropy(&main_state, buf, sizeof(buf));
entropy_p = 1;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
}
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
{
uint32_t buf[INIT_BYTES / sizeof(uint32_t)];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0]); i++)
buf[i] = arc4random();
add_entropy(&main_state, (void *)buf, sizeof(buf));
entropy_p = 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef NO_RAND_EGD_METHOD
/*
* Only to get egd entropy if /dev/random or arc4rand failed since
* it can be horribly slow to generate new bits.
*/
if (!entropy_p) {
unsigned char buf[INIT_BYTES];
if ((*hc_rand_egd_method.bytes)(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 1) {
add_entropy(&main_state, buf, sizeof(buf));
entropy_p = 1;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
}
}
#endif
/*
* Fall back to gattering data from timer and secret files, this
* is really the last resort.
*/
if (!entropy_p) {
/* to save stackspace */
union {
unsigned char buf[INIT_BYTES];
unsigned char shad[1001];
} u;
int fd;
/* add timer info */
if ((*hc_rand_timer_method.bytes)(u.buf, sizeof(u.buf)) == 1)
add_entropy(&main_state, u.buf, sizeof(u.buf));
/* add /etc/shadow */
fd = open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd >= 0) {
ssize_t n;
rk_cloexec(fd);
/* add_entropy will hash the buf */
while ((n = read(fd, (char *)u.shad, sizeof(u.shad))) > 0)
add_entropy(&main_state, u.shad, sizeof(u.shad));
close(fd);
}
memset(&u, 0, sizeof(u));
entropy_p = 1; /* sure about this ? */
}
{
pid_t pid = getpid();
add_entropy(&main_state, (void *)&pid, sizeof(pid));
}
{
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
add_entropy(&main_state, (void *)&tv, sizeof(tv));
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETUID
{
uid_t u = getuid();
add_entropy(&main_state, (void *)&u, sizeof(u));
}
#endif
return entropy_p;
}
/*
* fortuna_mutex must be held by callers of this function
*/
static int
fortuna_init(void)
{
if (!init_done)
{
init_state(&main_state);
init_done = 1;
}
if (!have_entropy)
have_entropy = fortuna_reseed();
return (init_done && have_entropy);
}
static void
fortuna_seed(const void *indata, int size)
{
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&fortuna_mutex);
fortuna_init();
add_entropy(&main_state, indata, size);
if (size >= INIT_BYTES)
have_entropy = 1;
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&fortuna_mutex);
}
static int
fortuna_bytes(unsigned char *outdata, int size)
{
int ret = 0;
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&fortuna_mutex);
if (!fortuna_init())
goto out;
resend_bytes += size;
if (resend_bytes > FORTUNA_RESEED_BYTE || resend_bytes < size) {
resend_bytes = 0;
fortuna_reseed();
}
extract_data(&main_state, size, outdata);
ret = 1;
out:
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&fortuna_mutex);
return ret;
}
static void
fortuna_cleanup(void)
{
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&fortuna_mutex);
init_done = 0;
have_entropy = 0;
memset(&main_state, 0, sizeof(main_state));
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&fortuna_mutex);
}
static void
fortuna_add(const void *indata, int size, double entropi)
{
fortuna_seed(indata, size);
}
static int
fortuna_pseudorand(unsigned char *outdata, int size)
{
return fortuna_bytes(outdata, size);
}
static int
fortuna_status(void)
{
int result;
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&fortuna_mutex);
result = fortuna_init();
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&fortuna_mutex);
return result ? 1 : 0;
}
const RAND_METHOD hc_rand_fortuna_method = {
fortuna_seed,
fortuna_bytes,
fortuna_cleanup,
fortuna_add,
fortuna_pseudorand,
fortuna_status
};
const RAND_METHOD *
RAND_fortuna_method(void)
{
return &hc_rand_fortuna_method;
}