
Remove hdb_entry_ex and revert to the original design of hdb_entry (except with an additional context member in hdb_entry which is managed by the free_entry method in HDB).
583 lines
17 KiB
C
583 lines
17 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1997-2008 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
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* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "kdc_locl.h"
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/*
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* [MS-SFU] Kerberos Protocol Extensions:
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* Service for User (S4U2Self) and Constrained Delegation Protocol (S4U2Proxy)
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* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/
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*/
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/*
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* Determine if constrained delegation is allowed from this client to this server
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*/
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static krb5_error_code
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check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context,
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krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
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HDB *clientdb,
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hdb_entry *client,
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hdb_entry *server,
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krb5_const_principal target)
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{
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const HDB_Ext_Constrained_delegation_acl *acl;
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krb5_error_code ret;
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size_t i;
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/*
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* constrained delegation (S4U2Proxy) only works within
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* the same realm. We use the already canonicalized version
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* of the principals here, while "target" is the principal
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* provided by the client.
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*/
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if (!krb5_realm_compare(context, client->principal, server->principal)) {
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ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
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kdc_log(context, config, 4,
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"Bad request for constrained delegation");
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return ret;
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}
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if (clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation) {
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ret = clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation(context, clientdb, client, target);
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if (ret == 0)
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return 0;
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} else {
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/* if client delegates to itself, that ok */
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if (krb5_principal_compare(context, client->principal, server->principal) == TRUE)
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return 0;
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ret = hdb_entry_get_ConstrainedDelegACL(client, &acl);
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if (ret) {
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krb5_clear_error_message(context);
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return ret;
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}
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if (acl) {
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for (i = 0; i < acl->len; i++) {
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if (krb5_principal_compare(context, target, &acl->val[i]) == TRUE)
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return 0;
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}
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}
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ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
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}
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kdc_log(context, config, 4,
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"Bad request for constrained delegation");
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return ret;
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}
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static void
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update_client_names(astgs_request_t r,
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char **s4ucname,
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krb5_principal *s4u_client_name,
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HDB **s4u_clientdb,
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hdb_entry **s4u_client,
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krb5_principal *s4u_canon_client_name,
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krb5_pac *s4u_pac)
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{
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krb5_xfree(r->cname);
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r->cname = *s4ucname;
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*s4ucname = NULL;
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r->client_princ = *s4u_client_name;
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*s4u_client_name = NULL;
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_kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client);
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r->client = *s4u_client;
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*s4u_client = NULL;
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r->clientdb = *s4u_clientdb;
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*s4u_clientdb = NULL;
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krb5_free_principal(r->context, r->canon_client_princ);
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r->canon_client_princ = *s4u_canon_client_name;
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*s4u_canon_client_name = NULL;
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krb5_pac_free(r->context, r->pac);
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r->pac = *s4u_pac;
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*s4u_pac = NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Validate a protocol transition (S4U2Self) request. If present and
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* successfully validated then the client in the request structure
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* will be replaced with the impersonated client.
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*/
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static krb5_error_code
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validate_protocol_transition(astgs_request_t r)
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{
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krb5_error_code ret;
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KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
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EncTicketPart *ticket = &r->ticket->ticket;
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hdb_entry *s4u_client = NULL;
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HDB *s4u_clientdb;
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int flags = HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ;
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krb5_principal s4u_client_name = NULL, s4u_canon_client_name = NULL;
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krb5_pac s4u_pac = NULL;
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const PA_DATA *sdata;
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char *s4ucname = NULL;
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int i = 0;
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krb5_crypto crypto;
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krb5_data datack;
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PA_S4U2Self self;
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const char *str;
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if (r->client == NULL)
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return 0;
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sdata = _kdc_find_padata(&r->req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
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if (sdata == NULL)
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return 0;
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memset(&self, 0, sizeof(self));
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if (b->kdc_options.canonicalize)
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flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
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ret = decode_PA_S4U2Self(sdata->padata_value.data,
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sdata->padata_value.length,
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&self, NULL);
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if (ret) {
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_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
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"Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
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goto out;
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}
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if (!krb5_checksum_is_keyed(r->context, self.cksum.cksumtype)) {
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_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
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"PA-S4U2Self with unkeyed checksum");
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "Reject PA-S4U2Self with unkeyed checksum");
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ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
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goto out;
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}
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ret = _krb5_s4u2self_to_checksumdata(r->context, &self, &datack);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &ticket->key, 0, &crypto);
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if (ret) {
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const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
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krb5_data_free(&datack);
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
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krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
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goto out;
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}
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/* Allow HMAC_MD5 checksum with any key type */
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if (self.cksum.cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) {
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struct krb5_crypto_iov iov;
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unsigned char csdata[16];
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Checksum cs;
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cs.checksum.length = sizeof(csdata);
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cs.checksum.data = &csdata;
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iov.data.data = datack.data;
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iov.data.length = datack.length;
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iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
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ret = _krb5_HMAC_MD5_checksum(r->context, NULL, &crypto->key,
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KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM, &iov, 1,
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&cs);
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if (ret == 0 &&
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krb5_data_ct_cmp(&cs.checksum, &self.cksum.checksum) != 0)
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ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
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} else {
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ret = _kdc_verify_checksum(r->context,
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crypto,
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KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
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&datack,
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&self.cksum);
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}
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krb5_data_free(&datack);
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krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
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if (ret) {
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const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
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_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
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"S4U2Self checksum failed");
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4,
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"krb5_verify_checksum failed for S4U2Self: %s", msg);
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krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
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goto out;
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}
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ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context,
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&s4u_client_name,
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self.name,
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self.realm);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, s4u_client_name, &s4ucname);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Note no HDB_F_SYNTHETIC_OK -- impersonating non-existent clients
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* is probably not desirable!
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*/
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ret = _kdc_db_fetch(r->context, r->config, s4u_client_name,
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HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
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&s4u_clientdb, &s4u_client);
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if (ret) {
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const char *msg;
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/*
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* If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
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* should exist in the local database.
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*
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*/
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if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
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ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
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msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
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_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
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"S4U2Self principal to impersonate not found");
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 2,
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"S4U2Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s",
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s4ucname, msg);
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krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Ignore require_pwchange and pw_end attributes (as Windows does),
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* since S4U2Self is not password authentication.
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*/
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s4u_client->flags.require_pwchange = FALSE;
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free(s4u_client->pw_end);
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s4u_client->pw_end = NULL;
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ret = kdc_check_flags(r, FALSE, s4u_client, r->server);
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if (ret)
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goto out; /* kdc_check_flags() calls _kdc_audit_addreason() */
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ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r->context,
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r->config,
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s4u_client,
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r->server,
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NULL,
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KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY,
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&s4u_pac);
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if (ret) {
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "PAC generation failed for -- %s", s4ucname);
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Check that service doing the impersonating is
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* requesting a ticket to it-self.
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*/
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ret = _kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(r->context,
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r->config,
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r->clientdb,
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r->client,
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r->server,
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r->server_princ);
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if (ret) {
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "S4U2Self: %s is not allowed "
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"to impersonate to service "
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"(tried for user %s to service %s)",
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r->cname, s4ucname, r->sname);
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goto out;
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}
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(r->context, s4u_client->principal,
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&s4u_canon_client_name);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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|
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/*
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* If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
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* delegation or if the impersonate client is disallowed
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* forwardable, remove the forwardable flag.
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*/
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if (r->client->flags.trusted_for_delegation &&
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s4u_client->flags.forwardable) {
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str = "[forwardable]";
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} else {
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b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
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str = "";
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}
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kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "s4u2self %s impersonating %s to "
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"service %s %s", r->cname, s4ucname, r->sname, str);
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/*
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* Replace all client information in the request with the
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* impersonated client. (The audit entry containing the original
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* client name will have been created before this point.)
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*/
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update_client_names(r, &s4ucname, &s4u_client_name,
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&s4u_clientdb, &s4u_client,
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&s4u_canon_client_name, &s4u_pac);
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out:
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if (s4u_client)
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_kdc_free_ent(r->context, s4u_clientdb, s4u_client);
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krb5_free_principal(r->context, s4u_client_name);
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krb5_xfree(s4ucname);
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krb5_free_principal(r->context, s4u_canon_client_name);
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krb5_pac_free(r->context, s4u_pac);
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|
|
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free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
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|
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return ret;
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}
|
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|
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/*
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* Validate a constrained delegation (S4U2Proxy) request. If present
|
|
* and successfully validated then the client in the request structure
|
|
* will be replaced with the client from the evidence ticket.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code
|
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validate_constrained_delegation(astgs_request_t r)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
|
|
int flags = HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ;
|
|
krb5_principal s4u_client_name = NULL, s4u_server_name = NULL;
|
|
krb5_principal s4u_canon_client_name = NULL;
|
|
krb5_pac s4u_pac = NULL;
|
|
uint64_t s4u_pac_attributes;
|
|
char *s4ucname = NULL, *s4usname = NULL;
|
|
EncTicketPart evidence_tkt;
|
|
HDB *s4u_clientdb;
|
|
hdb_entry *s4u_client = NULL;
|
|
krb5_boolean ad_kdc_issued = FALSE;
|
|
Key *clientkey;
|
|
Ticket *t;
|
|
krb5_const_realm local_realm;
|
|
|
|
if (r->client == NULL
|
|
|| b->additional_tickets == NULL
|
|
|| b->additional_tickets->len == 0
|
|
|| b->kdc_options.cname_in_addl_tkt == 0
|
|
|| b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(&evidence_tkt, 0, sizeof(evidence_tkt));
|
|
local_realm =
|
|
krb5_principal_get_comp_string(r->context, r->krbtgt->principal, 1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We require that the service's TGT has a PAC; this will have been
|
|
* validated prior to this function being called.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (r->pac == NULL) {
|
|
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
|
_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Missing PAC");
|
|
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4,
|
|
"Constrained delegation without PAC, %s/%s",
|
|
r->cname, r->sname);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
|
|
|
|
ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, r->client,
|
|
hdb_kvno2keys(r->context, r->client,
|
|
t->enc_part.kvno ? * t->enc_part.kvno : 0),
|
|
t->enc_part.etype, &clientkey);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(r->context, t, &clientkey->key, &evidence_tkt, 0);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
|
|
"Failed to decrypt constrained delegation ticket");
|
|
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4,
|
|
"failed to decrypt ticket for "
|
|
"constrained delegation from %s to %s ", r->cname, r->sname);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context,
|
|
&s4u_client_name,
|
|
evidence_tkt.cname,
|
|
evidence_tkt.crealm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, s4u_client_name, &s4ucname);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
_kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, "impersonatee", "%s", s4ucname);
|
|
|
|
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context,
|
|
&s4u_server_name,
|
|
t->sname,
|
|
t->realm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, s4u_server_name, &s4usname);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* check that ticket is valid */
|
|
if (evidence_tkt.flags.forwardable == 0) {
|
|
_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
|
|
"Missing forwardable flag on ticket for constrained delegation");
|
|
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4,
|
|
"Missing forwardable flag on ticket for "
|
|
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s ",
|
|
r->cname, s4usname, s4ucname, r->sname);
|
|
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = check_constrained_delegation(r->context, r->config, r->clientdb,
|
|
r->client, r->server, r->server_princ);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
|
|
"Constrained delegation not allowed");
|
|
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4,
|
|
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s not allowed",
|
|
r->cname, s4usname, s4ucname, r->sname);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = _kdc_verify_flags(r->context, r->config, &evidence_tkt, s4ucname);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
|
|
"Constrained delegation ticket expired or invalid");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try lookup the delegated client in DB */
|
|
ret = _kdc_db_fetch_client(r->context, r->config, flags,
|
|
s4u_client_name, s4ucname, local_realm,
|
|
&s4u_clientdb, &s4u_client);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if (s4u_client != NULL) {
|
|
ret = kdc_check_flags(r, FALSE, s4u_client, r->server);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO: pass in t->sname and t->realm and build
|
|
* a S4U_DELEGATION_INFO blob to the PAC.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = _kdc_check_pac(r->context, r->config, s4u_client_name, s4u_server_name,
|
|
s4u_client, r->server, r->krbtgt, r->client,
|
|
&clientkey->key, &r->ticket_key->key, &evidence_tkt,
|
|
&ad_kdc_issued, &s4u_pac,
|
|
&s4u_canon_client_name, &s4u_pac_attributes);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
|
|
_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
|
|
"Constrained delegation ticket PAC check failed");
|
|
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4,
|
|
"Verify delegated PAC failed to %s for client"
|
|
"%s (%s) as %s from %s with %s",
|
|
r->sname, r->cname, s4usname, s4ucname, r->from, msg);
|
|
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s4u_pac == NULL || !ad_kdc_issued) {
|
|
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
|
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4,
|
|
"Ticket not signed with PAC; service %s failed for "
|
|
"for delegation to %s for client %s (%s) from %s; (%s).",
|
|
r->sname, s4ucname, s4usname, r->cname, r->from,
|
|
s4u_pac ? "Ticket unsigned" : "No PAC");
|
|
_kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
|
|
"Constrained delegation ticket not signed");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the evidence ticket PAC didn't include PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO with
|
|
* the canonical client name, but the user is local to our KDC, we
|
|
* can insert the canonical client name ourselves.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s4u_canon_client_name == NULL && s4u_client != NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_copy_principal(r->context, s4u_client->principal,
|
|
&s4u_canon_client_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "constrained delegation for %s "
|
|
"from %s (%s) to %s", s4ucname, r->cname, s4usname, r->sname);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Replace all client information in the request with the
|
|
* impersonated client. (The audit entry containing the original
|
|
* client name will have been created before this point.)
|
|
*/
|
|
update_client_names(r, &s4ucname, &s4u_client_name,
|
|
&s4u_clientdb, &s4u_client,
|
|
&s4u_canon_client_name, &s4u_pac);
|
|
r->pac_attributes = s4u_pac_attributes;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (s4u_client)
|
|
_kdc_free_ent(r->context, s4u_clientdb, s4u_client);
|
|
krb5_free_principal(r->context, s4u_client_name);
|
|
krb5_xfree(s4ucname);
|
|
krb5_free_principal(r->context, s4u_server_name);
|
|
krb5_xfree(s4usname);
|
|
krb5_free_principal(r->context, s4u_canon_client_name);
|
|
krb5_pac_free(r->context, s4u_pac);
|
|
|
|
free_EncTicketPart(&evidence_tkt);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
krb5_error_code
|
|
_kdc_validate_services_for_user(astgs_request_t r)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = validate_protocol_transition(r);
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
ret = validate_constrained_delegation(r);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|