
Format string fixes that fail in the Samba build on a 32-bit machine Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
968 lines
27 KiB
C
968 lines
27 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
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* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 2009 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "krb5_locl.h"
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/**
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* Free ticket and content
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*
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* @param context a Kerberos 5 context
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* @param ticket ticket to free
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*
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* @return Returns 0 to indicate success. Otherwise an kerberos et
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* error code is returned, see krb5_get_error_message().
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*
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* @ingroup krb5
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*/
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
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krb5_free_ticket(krb5_context context,
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krb5_ticket *ticket)
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{
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free_EncTicketPart(&ticket->ticket);
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krb5_free_principal(context, ticket->client);
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krb5_free_principal(context, ticket->server);
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free(ticket);
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Copy ticket and content
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*
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* @param context a Kerberos 5 context
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* @param from ticket to copy
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* @param to new copy of ticket, free with krb5_free_ticket()
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*
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* @return Returns 0 to indicate success. Otherwise an kerberos et
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* error code is returned, see krb5_get_error_message().
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*
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* @ingroup krb5
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*/
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
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krb5_copy_ticket(krb5_context context,
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const krb5_ticket *from,
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krb5_ticket **to)
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{
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krb5_error_code ret;
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krb5_ticket *tmp;
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*to = NULL;
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tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp));
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if (tmp == NULL)
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return krb5_enomem(context);
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if((ret = copy_EncTicketPart(&from->ticket, &tmp->ticket))){
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free(tmp);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, from->client, &tmp->client);
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if(ret){
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free_EncTicketPart(&tmp->ticket);
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free(tmp);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, from->server, &tmp->server);
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if(ret){
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krb5_free_principal(context, tmp->client);
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free_EncTicketPart(&tmp->ticket);
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free(tmp);
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return ret;
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}
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*to = tmp;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Return client principal in ticket
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*
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* @param context a Kerberos 5 context
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* @param ticket ticket to copy
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* @param client client principal, free with krb5_free_principal()
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*
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* @return Returns 0 to indicate success. Otherwise an kerberos et
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* error code is returned, see krb5_get_error_message().
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*
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* @ingroup krb5
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*/
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
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krb5_ticket_get_client(krb5_context context,
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const krb5_ticket *ticket,
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krb5_principal *client)
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{
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return krb5_copy_principal(context, ticket->client, client);
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}
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/**
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* Return server principal in ticket
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*
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* @param context a Kerberos 5 context
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* @param ticket ticket to copy
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* @param server server principal, free with krb5_free_principal()
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*
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* @return Returns 0 to indicate success. Otherwise an kerberos et
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* error code is returned, see krb5_get_error_message().
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*
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* @ingroup krb5
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*/
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
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krb5_ticket_get_server(krb5_context context,
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const krb5_ticket *ticket,
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krb5_principal *server)
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{
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return krb5_copy_principal(context, ticket->server, server);
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}
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/**
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* Return end time of a ticket
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*
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* @param context a Kerberos 5 context
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* @param ticket ticket to copy
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*
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* @return end time of ticket
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*
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* @ingroup krb5
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*/
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION time_t KRB5_LIB_CALL
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krb5_ticket_get_endtime(krb5_context context,
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const krb5_ticket *ticket)
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{
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return ticket->ticket.endtime;
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}
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/**
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* Return authentication, start, end, and renew limit times of a ticket
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*
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* @param context a Kerberos 5 context
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* @param ticket ticket to copy
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* @param t pointer to krb5_times structure
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*
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* @ingroup krb5
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*/
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION void KRB5_LIB_CALL
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krb5_ticket_get_times(krb5_context context,
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const krb5_ticket *ticket,
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krb5_times *t)
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{
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t->authtime = ticket->ticket.authtime;
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t->starttime = ticket->ticket.starttime ? *ticket->ticket.starttime :
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t->authtime;
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t->endtime = ticket->ticket.endtime;
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t->renew_till = ticket->ticket.renew_till ? *ticket->ticket.renew_till :
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t->endtime;
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}
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/**
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* Get the flags from the Kerberos ticket
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*
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* @param context Kerberos context
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* @param ticket Kerberos ticket
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*
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* @return ticket flags
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*
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* @ingroup krb5_ticket
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*/
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION unsigned long KRB5_LIB_CALL
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krb5_ticket_get_flags(krb5_context context,
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const krb5_ticket *ticket)
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{
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return TicketFlags2int(ticket->ticket.flags);
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}
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/*
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* Find an authz-data element in the given `ad'. If `failp', then validate any
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* containing AD-KDC-ISSUED's keyed checksum with the `sessionkey' (if given).
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*
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* All AD-KDC-ISSUED will be validated (if requested) even when `type' is
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* `KRB5_AUTHDATA_KDC_ISSUED'.
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*
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* Only the first matching element will be output (via `data').
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*
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* Note that all AD-KDC-ISSUEDs found while traversing the authz-data will be
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* validated, though only the first one will be returned.
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*
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* XXX We really need a better interface though. First, forget AD-AND-OR --
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* just remove it. Second, probably forget AD-KDC-ISSUED, but still, between
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* that, the PAC, and the CAMMAC, we need an interface that can:
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*
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* a) take the derived keys instead of the service key or the session key,
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* b) can indicate whether the element was marked critical,
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* c) can indicate whether the element was authenticated to the KDC,
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* d) can iterate over all the instances found (if more than one is found).
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*
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* Also, we need to know here if the authz-data is from a Ticket or from an
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* Authenticator -- if the latter then we must refuse to find AD-KDC-ISSUED /
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* PAC / CAMMAC or anything of the sort, ever.
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*/
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static int
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find_type_in_ad(krb5_context context,
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int type,
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krb5_data *data, /* optional */
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krb5_boolean *found,
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krb5_boolean failp, /* validate AD-KDC-ISSUED */
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krb5_keyblock *sessionkey, /* ticket session key */
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const AuthorizationData *ad,
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int level)
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{
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krb5_error_code ret = 0;
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size_t i;
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if (level > 9) {
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ret = ENOENT; /* XXX */
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
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N_("Authorization data nested deeper "
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"then %d levels, stop searching", ""),
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level);
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Only copy out the element the first time we get to it, we need
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* to run over the whole authorization data fields to check if
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* there are any container clases we need to care about.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < ad->len; i++) {
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if (!*found && ad->val[i].ad_type == type) {
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if (data) {
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ret = der_copy_octet_string(&ad->val[i].ad_data, data);
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if (ret) {
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
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N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
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goto out;
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}
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}
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*found = TRUE;
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if (type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_KDC_ISSUED ||
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!failp || !sessionkey || !sessionkey->keyvalue.length)
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continue;
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/* else go on to validate the AD-KDC-ISSUED's keyed checksum */
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}
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switch (ad->val[i].ad_type) {
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case KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT: {
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AuthorizationData child;
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ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[i].ad_data.data,
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ad->val[i].ad_data.length,
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&child,
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NULL);
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if (ret) {
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
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N_("Failed to decode "
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"IF_RELEVANT with %d", ""),
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(int)ret);
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goto out;
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}
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ret = find_type_in_ad(context, type, data, found, FALSE,
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sessionkey, &child, level + 1);
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free_AuthorizationData(&child);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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break;
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}
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case KRB5_AUTHDATA_KDC_ISSUED: {
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AD_KDCIssued child;
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ret = decode_AD_KDCIssued(ad->val[i].ad_data.data,
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ad->val[i].ad_data.length,
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&child,
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NULL);
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if (ret) {
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
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N_("Failed to decode "
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"AD_KDCIssued with %d", ""),
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ret);
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goto out;
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}
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if (failp && sessionkey && sessionkey->keyvalue.length) {
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krb5_boolean valid;
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krb5_data buf;
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size_t len;
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ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData, buf.data, buf.length,
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&child.elements, &len, ret);
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if (ret) {
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free_AD_KDCIssued(&child);
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krb5_clear_error_message(context);
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goto out;
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}
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if(buf.length != len)
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krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
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ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, sessionkey, 19, &buf,
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&child.ad_checksum, &valid);
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krb5_data_free(&buf);
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if (ret) {
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free_AD_KDCIssued(&child);
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goto out;
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}
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if (!valid) {
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krb5_clear_error_message(context);
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ret = ENOENT;
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free_AD_KDCIssued(&child);
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goto out;
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}
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} else if (failp) {
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krb5_clear_error_message(context);
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ret = ENOENT;
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free_AD_KDCIssued(&child);
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goto out;
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}
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ret = find_type_in_ad(context, type, data, found, failp, sessionkey,
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&child.elements, level + 1);
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free_AD_KDCIssued(&child);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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break;
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}
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case KRB5_AUTHDATA_AND_OR:
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if (!failp)
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break;
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ret = ENOENT; /* XXX */
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
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N_("Authorization data contains "
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"AND-OR element that is unknown to the "
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"application", ""));
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goto out;
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default:
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if (!failp)
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break;
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ret = ENOENT; /* XXX */
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
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N_("Authorization data contains "
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"unknown type (%d) ", ""),
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ad->val[i].ad_type);
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goto out;
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}
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}
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out:
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if (ret) {
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if (*found) {
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if (data)
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krb5_data_free(data);
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*found = 0;
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
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_krb5_get_ad(krb5_context context,
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const AuthorizationData *ad,
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krb5_keyblock *sessionkey,
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int type,
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krb5_data *data)
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{
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krb5_boolean found = FALSE;
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krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
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if (data)
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krb5_data_zero(data);
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|
|
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if (ad == NULL) {
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT,
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N_("No authorization data", ""));
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return ENOENT; /* XXX */
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}
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|
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ret = find_type_in_ad(context, type, data, &found, TRUE, sessionkey, ad, 0);
|
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if (ret)
|
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return ret;
|
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if (!found) {
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT,
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N_("Have no authorization data of type %d", ""),
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type);
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return ENOENT; /* XXX */
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}
|
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return 0;
|
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}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
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* Extract the authorization data type of type from the ticket. Store
|
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* the field in data. This function is to use for kerberos
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* applications.
|
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*
|
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* @param context a Kerberos 5 context
|
|
* @param ticket Kerberos ticket
|
|
* @param type type to fetch
|
|
* @param data returned data, free with krb5_data_free()
|
|
*
|
|
* @ingroup krb5
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
|
|
krb5_ticket_get_authorization_data_type(krb5_context context,
|
|
krb5_ticket *ticket,
|
|
int type,
|
|
krb5_data *data)
|
|
{
|
|
AuthorizationData *ad;
|
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krb5_error_code ret;
|
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krb5_boolean found = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (data)
|
|
krb5_data_zero(data);
|
|
|
|
ad = ticket->ticket.authorization_data;
|
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if (ticket->ticket.authorization_data == NULL) {
|
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT,
|
|
N_("Ticket has no authorization data", ""));
|
|
return ENOENT; /* XXX */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = find_type_in_ad(context, type, data, &found, TRUE,
|
|
&ticket->ticket.key, ad, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (!found) {
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT,
|
|
N_("Ticket has no "
|
|
"authorization data of type %d", ""),
|
|
type);
|
|
return ENOENT; /* XXX */
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code
|
|
check_server_referral(krb5_context context,
|
|
krb5_kdc_rep *rep,
|
|
unsigned flags,
|
|
krb5_const_principal requested,
|
|
krb5_const_principal returned,
|
|
krb5_keyblock * key)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
PA_ServerReferralData ref;
|
|
krb5_crypto session;
|
|
EncryptedData ed;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
krb5_data data;
|
|
PA_DATA *pa;
|
|
int i = 0, cmp;
|
|
|
|
if (rep->kdc_rep.padata == NULL)
|
|
goto noreferral;
|
|
|
|
pa = krb5_find_padata(rep->kdc_rep.padata->val,
|
|
rep->kdc_rep.padata->len,
|
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KRB5_PADATA_SERVER_REFERRAL, &i);
|
|
if (pa == NULL)
|
|
goto noreferral;
|
|
|
|
memset(&ed, 0, sizeof(ed));
|
|
memset(&ref, 0, sizeof(ref));
|
|
|
|
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
|
|
pa->padata_value.length,
|
|
&ed, &len);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (len != pa->padata_value.length) {
|
|
free_EncryptedData(&ed);
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("Referral EncryptedData wrong for realm %s",
|
|
"realm"), requested->realm);
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &session);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
free_EncryptedData(&ed);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, session,
|
|
KRB5_KU_PA_SERVER_REFERRAL,
|
|
&ed, &data);
|
|
free_EncryptedData(&ed);
|
|
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, session);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = decode_PA_ServerReferralData(data.data, data.length, &ref, &len);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_data_free(&data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_data_free(&data);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(requested->realm, returned->realm) != 0) {
|
|
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("server ref realm mismatch, "
|
|
"requested realm %s got back %s", ""),
|
|
requested->realm, returned->realm);
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, returned)) {
|
|
const char *realm = returned->name.name_string.val[1];
|
|
|
|
if (ref.referred_realm == NULL
|
|
|| strcmp(*ref.referred_realm, realm) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("tgt returned with wrong ref", ""));
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (krb5_principal_compare(context, returned, requested) == 0) {
|
|
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("req princ no same as returned", ""));
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ref.requested_principal_name) {
|
|
cmp = _krb5_principal_compare_PrincipalName(context,
|
|
requested,
|
|
ref.requested_principal_name);
|
|
if (!cmp) {
|
|
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("referred principal not same "
|
|
"as requested", ""));
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (flags & EXTRACT_TICKET_AS_REQ) {
|
|
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("Requested principal missing on AS-REQ", ""));
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
noreferral:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Expect excact match or that we got a krbtgt
|
|
*/
|
|
if (krb5_principal_compare(context, requested, returned) != TRUE &&
|
|
(krb5_realm_compare(context, requested, returned) != TRUE &&
|
|
krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, returned) != TRUE))
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("Not same server principal returned "
|
|
"as requested", ""));
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify KDC supported anonymous if requested
|
|
*/
|
|
static krb5_error_code
|
|
check_client_anonymous(krb5_context context,
|
|
krb5_kdc_rep *rep,
|
|
krb5_const_principal requested,
|
|
krb5_const_principal mapped,
|
|
krb5_boolean is_tgs_rep)
|
|
{
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
if (!rep->enc_part.flags.anonymous)
|
|
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Here we must validate that the AS returned a ticket of the expected type
|
|
* for either a fully anonymous request, or authenticated request for an
|
|
* anonymous ticket. If this is a TGS request, we're done. Then if the
|
|
* 'requested' principal was anonymous, we'll check the 'mapped' principal
|
|
* accordingly (without enforcing the name type and perhaps the realm).
|
|
* Finally, if the 'requested' principal was not anonymous, well check
|
|
* that the 'mapped' principal has an anonymous name and type, in a
|
|
* non-anonymous realm. (Should we also be checking for a realm match
|
|
* between the request and the mapped name in this case?)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_tgs_rep)
|
|
flags = KRB5_ANON_MATCH_ANY_NONT;
|
|
else if (krb5_principal_is_anonymous(context, requested,
|
|
KRB5_ANON_MATCH_ANY_NONT))
|
|
flags = KRB5_ANON_MATCH_UNAUTHENTICATED | KRB5_ANON_IGNORE_NAME_TYPE;
|
|
else
|
|
flags = KRB5_ANON_MATCH_AUTHENTICATED;
|
|
|
|
if (!krb5_principal_is_anonymous(context, mapped, flags))
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify returned client principal name in anonymous/referral case
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code
|
|
check_client_mismatch(krb5_context context,
|
|
krb5_kdc_rep *rep,
|
|
krb5_const_principal requested,
|
|
krb5_const_principal mapped,
|
|
krb5_keyblock const * key)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rep->enc_part.flags.anonymous) {
|
|
if (!krb5_principal_is_anonymous(context, mapped,
|
|
KRB5_ANON_MATCH_ANY_NONT)) {
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("Anonymous ticket does not contain anonymous "
|
|
"principal", ""));
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (krb5_principal_compare(context, requested, mapped) == FALSE &&
|
|
!rep->enc_part.flags.enc_pa_rep) {
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
|
|
N_("Not same client principal returned "
|
|
"as requested", ""));
|
|
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
|
|
decrypt_tkt (krb5_context context,
|
|
krb5_keyblock *key,
|
|
krb5_key_usage usage,
|
|
krb5_const_pointer decrypt_arg,
|
|
krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
krb5_data data;
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
krb5_crypto crypto;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
|
|
crypto,
|
|
usage,
|
|
&dec_rep->kdc_rep.enc_part,
|
|
&data);
|
|
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = decode_EncASRepPart(data.data,
|
|
data.length,
|
|
&dec_rep->enc_part,
|
|
&size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
ret = decode_EncTGSRepPart(data.data,
|
|
data.length,
|
|
&dec_rep->enc_part,
|
|
&size);
|
|
krb5_data_free (&data);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
|
|
N_("Failed to decode encpart in ticket", ""));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION int KRB5_LIB_CALL
|
|
_krb5_extract_ticket(krb5_context context,
|
|
krb5_kdc_rep *rep,
|
|
krb5_creds *creds,
|
|
krb5_keyblock *key,
|
|
krb5_const_pointer keyseed,
|
|
krb5_key_usage key_usage,
|
|
krb5_addresses *addrs,
|
|
unsigned nonce,
|
|
unsigned flags,
|
|
krb5_data *request,
|
|
krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc,
|
|
krb5_const_pointer decryptarg)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
krb5_principal tmp_principal;
|
|
size_t len = 0;
|
|
time_t tmp_time;
|
|
krb5_timestamp sec_now;
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt */
|
|
|
|
if (decrypt_proc == NULL)
|
|
decrypt_proc = decrypt_tkt;
|
|
|
|
ret = (*decrypt_proc)(context, key, key_usage, decryptarg, rep);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if (rep->enc_part.flags.enc_pa_rep && request) {
|
|
krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
|
|
Checksum cksum;
|
|
PA_DATA *pa = NULL;
|
|
int idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "processing enc-ap-rep");
|
|
|
|
if (rep->enc_part.encrypted_pa_data == NULL ||
|
|
(pa = krb5_find_padata(rep->enc_part.encrypted_pa_data->val,
|
|
rep->enc_part.encrypted_pa_data->len,
|
|
KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP,
|
|
&idx)) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP missing");
|
|
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ret = decode_Checksum(pa->padata_value.data,
|
|
pa->padata_value.length,
|
|
&cksum, NULL);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto,
|
|
KRB5_KU_AS_REQ,
|
|
request->data, request->length,
|
|
&cksum);
|
|
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
|
|
free_Checksum(&cksum);
|
|
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "enc-ap-rep: %svalid", (ret == 0) ? "" : "in");
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* save session key */
|
|
|
|
creds->session.keyvalue.length = 0;
|
|
creds->session.keyvalue.data = NULL;
|
|
creds->session.keytype = rep->enc_part.key.keytype;
|
|
ret = krb5_data_copy (&creds->session.keyvalue,
|
|
rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.data,
|
|
rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.length);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compare client and save */
|
|
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
|
|
&tmp_principal,
|
|
rep->kdc_rep.cname,
|
|
rep->kdc_rep.crealm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* check KDC supported anonymous if it was requested */
|
|
if (flags & EXTRACT_TICKET_MATCH_ANON) {
|
|
ret = check_client_anonymous(context,rep,
|
|
creds->client,
|
|
tmp_principal,
|
|
request == NULL); /* is TGS */
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_principal);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check client referral and save principal */
|
|
if((flags & EXTRACT_TICKET_ALLOW_CNAME_MISMATCH) == 0) {
|
|
ret = check_client_mismatch(context, rep,
|
|
creds->client,
|
|
tmp_principal,
|
|
&creds->session);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_free_principal (context, tmp_principal);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_free_principal (context, creds->client);
|
|
creds->client = tmp_principal;
|
|
|
|
/* check server referral and save principal */
|
|
ret = _krb5_kdcrep2krb5_principal(context, &tmp_principal, &rep->enc_part);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
tmp_principal->nameattrs->peer_realm =
|
|
calloc(1, sizeof(tmp_principal->nameattrs->peer_realm[0]));
|
|
if (tmp_principal->nameattrs->peer_realm == NULL) {
|
|
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = copy_Realm(&creds->client->realm, tmp_principal->nameattrs->peer_realm);
|
|
if (ret) goto out;
|
|
|
|
if((flags & EXTRACT_TICKET_ALLOW_SERVER_MISMATCH) == 0){
|
|
ret = check_server_referral(context,
|
|
rep,
|
|
flags,
|
|
creds->server,
|
|
tmp_principal,
|
|
&creds->session);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_free_principal (context, tmp_principal);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_free_principal(context, creds->server);
|
|
creds->server = tmp_principal;
|
|
|
|
/* verify names */
|
|
if(flags & EXTRACT_TICKET_MATCH_REALM){
|
|
const char *srealm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, creds->server);
|
|
const char *crealm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, creds->client);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(rep->enc_part.srealm, srealm) != 0 ||
|
|
strcmp(rep->enc_part.srealm, crealm) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compare nonces */
|
|
|
|
if (nonce != (unsigned)rep->enc_part.nonce) {
|
|
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* set kdc-offset */
|
|
|
|
krb5_timeofday (context, &sec_now);
|
|
if (rep->enc_part.flags.initial
|
|
&& (flags & EXTRACT_TICKET_TIMESYNC)
|
|
&& context->kdc_sec_offset == 0
|
|
&& krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL,
|
|
"libdefaults",
|
|
"kdc_timesync",
|
|
NULL)) {
|
|
context->kdc_sec_offset = rep->enc_part.authtime - sec_now;
|
|
krb5_timeofday (context, &sec_now);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check all times */
|
|
|
|
if (rep->enc_part.starttime) {
|
|
tmp_time = *rep->enc_part.starttime;
|
|
} else
|
|
tmp_time = rep->enc_part.authtime;
|
|
|
|
if (creds->times.starttime == 0
|
|
&& krb5_time_abs(tmp_time, sec_now) > context->max_skew) {
|
|
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message (context, ret,
|
|
N_("time skew (%ld) larger than max (%ld)", ""),
|
|
(long)krb5_time_abs(tmp_time, sec_now),
|
|
(long)context->max_skew);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (creds->times.starttime != 0
|
|
&& tmp_time != creds->times.starttime) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message (context);
|
|
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creds->times.starttime = tmp_time;
|
|
|
|
if (rep->enc_part.renew_till) {
|
|
tmp_time = *rep->enc_part.renew_till;
|
|
} else
|
|
tmp_time = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (creds->times.renew_till != 0
|
|
&& tmp_time > creds->times.renew_till) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message (context);
|
|
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creds->times.renew_till = tmp_time;
|
|
|
|
creds->times.authtime = rep->enc_part.authtime;
|
|
|
|
if (creds->times.endtime != 0
|
|
&& rep->enc_part.endtime > creds->times.endtime) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message (context);
|
|
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creds->times.endtime = rep->enc_part.endtime;
|
|
|
|
if(rep->enc_part.caddr)
|
|
krb5_copy_addresses (context, rep->enc_part.caddr, &creds->addresses);
|
|
else if(addrs)
|
|
krb5_copy_addresses (context, addrs, &creds->addresses);
|
|
else {
|
|
creds->addresses.len = 0;
|
|
creds->addresses.val = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
creds->flags.b = rep->enc_part.flags;
|
|
|
|
creds->authdata.len = 0;
|
|
creds->authdata.val = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* extract ticket */
|
|
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, creds->ticket.data, creds->ticket.length,
|
|
&rep->kdc_rep.ticket, &len, ret);
|
|
if(ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (creds->ticket.length != len)
|
|
krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
|
|
creds->second_ticket.length = 0;
|
|
creds->second_ticket.data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
memset (rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.data, 0,
|
|
rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.length);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|