Nicolas Williams 6b45c3512e kadmin: LIST interrupt message needs no reply
The online LIST interrupt message is a NOP, but it's expected to not
have a reply (the server doesn't send one if it receives it before the
LIST finishes).

However, if the interrupt message arrives after the LIST finished, then
it does get a reply, and this causes the client to get out of step with
the server.

Fixes include:

1) flavor the interrupt NOP to make sure it never gets a reply,
2) introduce a new kadm_list_interrtupt message that is like a NOP that
   produces no reply
3) always consume -after the LIST ends- a reply to any list interrupt
   NOP on the client side.

This implements (1).
2022-03-22 17:07:34 -05:00

1175 lines
37 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 1997 - 2005 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "kadmin_locl.h"
#include <krb5-private.h>
static kadm5_ret_t check_aliases(kadm5_server_context *,
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *,
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *);
/*
* All the iter_cb stuff is about online listing of principals via
* kadm5_iter_principals(). Search for "LIST" to see more commentary.
*/
struct iter_cb_data {
krb5_context context;
krb5_auth_context ac;
krb5_storage *rsp;
kadm5_ret_t ret;
size_t n;
size_t i;
int fd;
unsigned int initial:1;
unsigned int stop:1;
};
/*
* This function sends the current chunk of principal listing and checks if the
* client requested that the listing stop.
*/
static int
iter_cb_send_now(struct iter_cb_data *d)
{
struct timeval tv;
krb5_data out;
krb5_data_zero(&out);
if (!d->stop) {
fd_set fds;
int nfds;
/*
* The client can send us one message to interrupt the iteration.
*
* TODO: Maybe we should have the client send a message every N chunks
* so we can clock the listing and have a chance to receive any
* interrupt message from the client?
*/
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(d->fd, &fds);
tv.tv_sec = 0;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
nfds = select(d->fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
if (nfds == -1) {
d->ret = errno;
} else if (nfds > 0) {
/*
* And it did. We'll throw this message away. It should be a NOP
* call, which we'd throw away anyways. If the client's stop
* message arrives after we're done anyways, well, it will be
* processed as a NOP and thrown away.
*/
d->stop = 1;
d->ret = krb5_read_priv_message(d->context, d->ac, &d->fd, &out);
krb5_data_free(&out);
if (d->ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF)
exit(0);
}
}
d->i = 0;
d->ret = krb5_storage_to_data(d->rsp, &out);
if (d->ret == 0)
d->ret = krb5_write_priv_message(d->context, d->ac, &d->fd, &out);
krb5_data_free(&out);
krb5_storage_free(d->rsp);
if ((d->rsp = krb5_storage_emem()) == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(d->context);
return d->ret;
}
static int
iter_cb(void *cbdata, const char *p)
{
struct iter_cb_data *d = cbdata;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
size_t n = d->n;
/* Convince the compiler that `-(int)d->n' is defined */
if (n == 0 || n > INT_MAX)
return ERANGE;
if (d->rsp == NULL && (d->rsp = krb5_storage_emem()) == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(d->context);
if (d->i == 0) {
/* Every chunk starts with a result code */
ret = krb5_store_int32(d->rsp, d->ret);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (d->ret)
return ret;
}
if (d->initial) {
/*
* We'll send up to `d->n' entries per-write. We send a negative
* number to indicate we accepted the client's proposal that we speak
* the online LIST protocol.
*
* Note that if we're here then we've already placed a result code in
* this reply (see above).
*/
d->initial = 0;
ret = krb5_store_int32(d->rsp, -(int)n); /* Princs per-chunk */
if (ret == 0)
ret = iter_cb_send_now(d);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Now that we've sent the acceptance reply, put a result code as the
* first thing in the next reply, which will have the first chunk of
* the listing.
*/
ret = krb5_store_int32(d->rsp, d->ret);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (d->ret)
return ret;
}
if (p) {
ret = krb5_store_string(d->rsp, p);
d->i++;
} else {
/*
* We get called with `p == NULL' when the listing is done. This
* forces us to iter_cb_send_now(d) below, but also forces us to have a
* properly formed reply (i.e., that we have a result code as the first
* item), even if the chunk is otherwise empty (`d->i == 0').
*/
d->i = n;
}
if (ret == 0 && d->i == n)
ret = iter_cb_send_now(d); /* Chunk finished; send it */
if (d->stop)
return EINTR;
return ret;
}
static kadm5_ret_t
kadmind_dispatch(void *kadm_handlep, krb5_boolean initial,
krb5_data *in, krb5_auth_context ac, int fd,
krb5_data *out, int readonly)
{
kadm5_ret_t ret = 0;
kadm5_ret_t ret_sp = 0;
int32_t cmd, mask, kvno, tmp;
kadm5_server_context *contextp = kadm_handlep;
char client[128], name[128], name2[128];
const char *op = "";
krb5_principal princ = NULL, princ2 = NULL;
kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, ent_prev;
char *password = NULL, *expression;
krb5_keyblock *new_keys;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple = NULL;
int keepold = FALSE;
int n_ks_tuple = 0;
int n_keys;
char **princs;
int n_princs;
int keys_ok = 0;
krb5_storage *rsp; /* response goes here */
krb5_storage *sp;
int len;
memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent));
memset(&ent_prev, 0, sizeof(ent_prev));
krb5_data_zero(out);
rsp = krb5_storage_emem();
if (rsp == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
sp = krb5_storage_from_data(in);
if (sp == NULL) {
krb5_storage_free(rsp);
return krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, contextp->caller,
client, sizeof(client));
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &cmd);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
switch(cmd){
case kadm_nop:{
/*
* In the future we could use this for versioning.
*
* We used to respond to NOPs with KADM5_FAILURE. Now we respond with
* zero. In the future we could send back a protocol version number
* and use NOPs for protocol version negotiation.
*
* In the meantime, this gets called only if a client wants to
* interrupt a long-running LIST operation.
*/
op = "NOP";
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp);
if (ret == 0 && tmp == 0) {
/*
* Reply not wanted. This would be a LIST interrupt request.
*/
krb5_storage_free(rsp);
krb5_storage_free(sp);
return 0;
}
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = 0);
break;
}
case kadm_get:{
op = "GET";
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_UNK_PRINC);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL;
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
/* If the caller doesn't have KADM5_PRIV_GET, we're done. */
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_GET, princ);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
goto fail;
}
/* Then check to see if it is ok to return keys */
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) != 0) {
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_GET_KEYS,
princ);
if (ret == 0) {
keys_ok = 1;
} else if ((mask == (KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KEY_DATA)) ||
(mask == (KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KVNO|KADM5_KEY_DATA))) {
/*
* Requests for keys will get bogus keys, which is useful if
* the client just wants to see what (kvno, enctype)s the
* principal has keys for, but terrible if the client wants to
* write the keys into a keytab or modify the principal and
* write the bogus keys back to the server.
*
* We use a heuristic to detect which case we're handling here.
* If the client only asks for the flags in the above
* condition, then it's very likely a kadmin ext_keytab,
* add_enctype, or other request that should not see bogus
* keys. We deny them.
*
* The kadmin get command can be coaxed into making a request
* with the same mask. But the default long and terse output
* modes request other things too, so in all likelihood this
* heuristic will not hurt any kadmin get uses.
*/
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
goto fail;
}
}
ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, &ent, mask);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
if (ret == 0) {
if (ret_sp == 0 && keys_ok)
ret_sp = kadm5_store_principal_ent(rsp, &ent);
else if (ret_sp == 0)
ret_sp = kadm5_store_principal_ent_nokeys(rsp, &ent);
}
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
break;
}
case kadm_delete:{
op = "DELETE";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
if (ret == 0) {
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_DELETE, princ);
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s (%s)", client, op, name,
ret == 0 ? "granted" : "denied");
}
/*
* There's no need to check that the caller has permission to
* delete the victim principal's aliases.
*/
if (ret == 0)
ret = kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handlep, princ);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
break;
}
case kadm_create:{
op = "CREATE";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent);
if(ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask);
if(ret){
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password);
if(ret){
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
goto fail;
}
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, ent.principal,
name, sizeof(name));
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_ADD,
ent.principal);
if(ret){
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
goto fail;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_TL_DATA)) {
/*
* Also check that the caller can create the aliases, if the
* new principal has any.
*/
ret = check_aliases(contextp, &ent, NULL);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
goto fail;
}
}
ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handlep, &ent,
mask, password);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
break;
}
case kadm_modify:{
op = "MODIFY";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent);
if(ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask);
if(ret){
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
goto fail;
}
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, ent.principal,
name, sizeof(name));
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY,
ent.principal);
if(ret){
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
goto fail;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_TL_DATA)) {
/*
* Also check that the caller can create aliases that are in
* the new entry but not the old one. There's no need to
* check that the caller can delete aliases it wants to
* drop. See also handling of rename.
*/
ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handlep, ent.principal, &ent_prev, mask);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
goto fail;
}
ret = check_aliases(contextp, &ent, &ent_prev);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent_prev);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent);
goto fail;
}
}
ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handlep, &ent, mask);
kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
break;
}
case kadm_prune:{
op = "PRUNE";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &kvno);
if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) {
kvno = 0;
} else if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
goto fail;
}
ret = kadm5_prune_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, kvno);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
break;
}
case kadm_rename:{
op = "RENAME";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ2);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ2,
name2, sizeof(name2));
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s -> %s",
client, op, name, name2);
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp,
KADM5_PRIV_ADD,
princ2);
if (ret == 0) {
/*
* Also require modify for the principal. For backwards
* compatibility, allow delete permission on the old name to
* cure lack of modify permission on the old name.
*/
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp,
KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY,
princ);
if (ret) {
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp,
KADM5_PRIV_DELETE,
princ);
}
}
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
goto fail;
}
ret = kadm5_rename_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, princ2);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
break;
}
case kadm_chpass:{
krb5_boolean is_self_cpw, allow_self_cpw;
op = "CHPASS";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold);
if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF)
ret = 0;
if (ret == 0) {
ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
if (ret == 0)
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
}
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
/*
* Change password requests are subject to ACLs unless the principal is
* changing their own password and the initial ticket flag is set, and
* the allow_self_change_password configuration option is TRUE.
*/
is_self_cpw =
krb5_principal_compare(contextp->context, contextp->caller, princ);
allow_self_cpw =
krb5_config_get_bool_default(contextp->context, NULL, TRUE,
"kadmin", "allow_self_change_password", NULL);
if (!(is_self_cpw && initial && allow_self_cpw)) {
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
goto fail;
}
}
ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold, 0, NULL,
password);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
break;
}
case kadm_chpass_with_key:{
int i;
krb5_key_data *key_data;
int n_key_data;
op = "CHPASS_WITH_KEY";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &n_key_data);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold);
if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF)
ret = 0;
}
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
/* n_key_data will be squeezed into an int16_t below. */
if (n_key_data < 0 || n_key_data >= 1 << 16 ||
(size_t)n_key_data > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*key_data)) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
ret = ERANGE;
goto fail;
}
key_data = malloc (n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data));
if (key_data == NULL && n_key_data != 0) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; ++i) {
ret = kadm5_ret_key_data (sp, &key_data[i]);
if (ret) {
int16_t dummy = i;
kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data);
free (key_data);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
}
/*
* The change is only allowed if the user is on the CPW ACL,
* this it to force password quality check on the user.
*/
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
ret_sp = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
if (ret_sp == 0)
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s (%s)", client, op, name,
ret ? "denied" : "granted");
if(ret) {
int16_t dummy = n_key_data;
kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data);
free (key_data);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold,
n_key_data, key_data);
{
int16_t dummy = n_key_data;
kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data);
}
free (key_data);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
break;
}
case kadm_randkey:{
size_t i;
op = "RANDKEY";
if (readonly) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name));
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name);
/*
* The change is allowed if at least one of:
* a) it's for the principal him/herself and this was an initial ticket
* b) the user is on the CPW ACL.
*/
if (initial
&& krb5_principal_compare (contextp->context, contextp->caller,
princ))
ret = 0;
else
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
goto fail;
}
/*
* See comments in kadm5_c_randkey_principal() regarding the
* protocol.
*/
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold);
if (ret != 0 && ret != HEIM_ERR_EOF) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &n_ks_tuple);
if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) {
const char *enctypes;
size_t n;
enctypes = krb5_config_get_string(contextp->context, NULL,
"realms",
krb5_principal_get_realm(contextp->context,
princ),
"supported_enctypes", NULL);
if (enctypes == NULL || enctypes[0] == '\0')
enctypes = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96";
ret = krb5_string_to_keysalts2(contextp->context, enctypes,
&n, &ks_tuple);
n_ks_tuple = n;
}
if (ret != 0) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE); /* XXX */
goto fail;
}
if (n_ks_tuple < 0) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE); /* XXX */
ret = EOVERFLOW;
goto fail;
}
free(ks_tuple);
if ((ks_tuple = calloc(n_ks_tuple, sizeof (*ks_tuple))) == NULL) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
ret = errno;
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < n_ks_tuple; i++) {
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ks_tuple[i].ks_enctype);
if (ret != 0) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
free(ks_tuple);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ks_tuple[i].ks_salttype);
if (ret != 0) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
free(ks_tuple);
goto fail;
}
}
ret = kadm5_randkey_principal_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold,
n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &new_keys,
&n_keys);
free(ks_tuple);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
if (ret == 0 && ret_sp == 0){
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, n_keys);
for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++){
if (ret_sp == 0)
ret_sp = krb5_store_keyblock(rsp, new_keys[i]);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(contextp->context, &new_keys[i]);
}
free(new_keys);
}
break;
}
case kadm_get_privs:{
uint32_t privs;
ret = kadm5_get_privs(kadm_handlep, &privs);
if (ret == 0)
ret_sp = krb5_store_uint32(rsp, privs);
break;
}
case kadm_get_princs:{
op = "LIST";
ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
/* See kadm5_c_iter_principals() */
if (tmp == 0x55555555) {
/* Want online iteration */
ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &expression);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
if (expression[0] == '\0') {
free(expression);
expression = NULL;
}
} else if (tmp) {
ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &expression);
if (ret) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
goto fail;
}
}else
expression = NULL;
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op,
expression ? expression : "*");
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_LIST, NULL);
if(ret){
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
free(expression);
goto fail;
}
if (fd > -1 && tmp == 0x55555555) {
struct iter_cb_data iter_cbdata;
int n;
/*
* The client proposes that we speak the online variation of LIST
* by sending a magic value in the int32 that is meant to be a
* boolean for "an expression follows". The client must send an
* expression in this case because the server might be an old one,
* so even if the caller to kadm5_get/iter_principals() passed NULL
* for the expression, the client must send something ("*").
*
* The list of principals will be streamed in multiple replies.
*
* The first reply will have just a return code and a negative
* count of maximum number of names per-subsequent reply. See
* `iter_cb()'.
*
* The second reply, third, .., nth replies will have a return code
* followed by 50 names, except the last reply must have fewer than
* 50 names -zero if need be- so the client can deterministically
* notice the end of the stream.
*/
n = list_chunk_size;
if (n < 0)
n = krb5_config_get_int_default(contextp->context, NULL, -1,
"kadmin", "list_chunk_size", NULL);
if (n < 0)
n = 50;
if (n > 500)
n = 500;
if ((iter_cbdata.rsp = krb5_storage_emem()) == NULL) {
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context);
goto fail;
}
iter_cbdata.context = contextp->context;
iter_cbdata.initial = 1;
iter_cbdata.stop = 0;
iter_cbdata.ret = 0;
iter_cbdata.ac = ac;
iter_cbdata.fd = fd;
iter_cbdata.n = n;
iter_cbdata.i = 0;
/*
* All sending of replies will happen in iter_cb, except for the
* final chunk with the final result code.
*/
iter_cbdata.ret = kadm5_iter_principals(kadm_handlep, expression,
iter_cb, &iter_cbdata);
/* Send terminating chunk */
iter_cb(&iter_cbdata, NULL);
/* Final result */
ret = krb5_store_int32(rsp, iter_cbdata.ret);
krb5_storage_free(iter_cbdata.rsp);
} else {
ret = kadm5_get_principals(kadm_handlep, expression, &princs, &n_princs);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret);
if (ret == 0 && ret_sp == 0) {
int i;
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, n_princs);
for (i = 0; ret_sp == 0 && i < n_princs; i++)
ret_sp = krb5_store_string(rsp, princs[i]);
kadm5_free_name_list(kadm_handlep, princs, &n_princs);
}
}
free(expression);
break;
}
default:
krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: UNKNOWN OP %d", client, cmd);
ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, KADM5_FAILURE);
break;
}
fail:
if (password != NULL) {
len = strlen(password);
memset_s(password, len, 0, len);
free(password);
}
krb5_storage_to_data(rsp, out);
krb5_storage_free(rsp);
krb5_storage_free(sp);
krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ);
krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ2);
if (ret)
krb5_warn(contextp->context, ret, "%s", op);
if (out->length == 0)
krb5_warn(contextp->context, ret, "%s: reply failed", op);
else if (ret_sp)
krb5_warn(contextp->context, ret, "%s: reply incomplete", op);
if (ret_sp)
return ret_sp;
return 0;
}
struct iter_aliases_ctx {
HDB_Ext_Aliases aliases;
krb5_tl_data *tl;
int alias_idx;
int done;
};
static kadm5_ret_t
iter_aliases(kadm5_principal_ent_rec *from,
struct iter_aliases_ctx *ctx,
krb5_principal *out)
{
HDB_extension ext;
kadm5_ret_t ret;
size_t size;
*out = NULL;
if (ctx->done > 0)
return 0;
if (from == NULL) {
ctx->done = 1;
return 0;
}
if (ctx->done == 0) {
if (ctx->alias_idx < ctx->aliases.aliases.len) {
*out = &ctx->aliases.aliases.val[ctx->alias_idx++];
return 0;
}
/* Out of aliases in this TL, step to next TL */
ctx->tl = ctx->tl->tl_data_next;
} else if (ctx->done < 0) {
/* Setup iteration context */
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->done = 0;
ctx->aliases.aliases.val = NULL;
ctx->aliases.aliases.len = 0;
ctx->tl = from->tl_data;
}
free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&ctx->aliases);
ctx->alias_idx = 0;
/* Find TL with aliases */
for (; ctx->tl != NULL; ctx->tl = ctx->tl->tl_data_next) {
if (ctx->tl->tl_data_type != KRB5_TL_EXTENSION)
continue;
ret = decode_HDB_extension(ctx->tl->tl_data_contents,
ctx->tl->tl_data_length,
&ext, &size);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (ext.data.element == choice_HDB_extension_data_aliases &&
ext.data.u.aliases.aliases.len > 0) {
ctx->aliases = ext.data.u.aliases;
break;
}
free_HDB_extension(&ext);
}
if (ctx->tl != NULL && ctx->aliases.aliases.len > 0) {
*out = &ctx->aliases.aliases.val[ctx->alias_idx++];
return 0;
}
ctx->done = 1;
return 0;
}
static kadm5_ret_t
check_aliases(kadm5_server_context *contextp,
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *add_princ,
kadm5_principal_ent_rec *del_princ)
{
kadm5_ret_t ret;
struct iter_aliases_ctx iter;
struct iter_aliases_ctx iter_del;
krb5_principal new_name, old_name;
int match;
/*
* Yeah, this is O(N^2). Gathering and sorting all the aliases
* would be a bit of a pain; if we ever have principals with enough
* aliases for this to be a problem, we can fix it then.
*/
for (iter.done = -1; iter.done != 1;) {
match = 0;
ret = iter_aliases(add_princ, &iter, &new_name);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (iter.done == 1)
break;
for (iter_del.done = -1; iter_del.done != 1;) {
ret = iter_aliases(del_princ, &iter_del, &old_name);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (iter_del.done == 1)
break;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(contextp->context, new_name, old_name))
continue;
free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&iter_del.aliases);
match = 1;
break;
}
if (match)
continue;
ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_ADD, new_name);
if (ret) {
free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&iter.aliases);
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
static void
v5_loop (krb5_context contextp,
krb5_auth_context ac,
krb5_boolean initial,
void *kadm_handlep,
krb5_socket_t fd,
int readonly)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data in, out;
for (;;) {
doing_useful_work = 0;
if(term_flag)
exit(0);
ret = krb5_read_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, &in);
if(ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF)
exit(0);
if(ret)
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message");
doing_useful_work = 1;
ret = kadmind_dispatch(kadm_handlep, initial, &in, ac, fd, &out,
readonly);
if (ret)
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "kadmind_dispatch");
krb5_data_free(&in);
if (out.length)
ret = krb5_write_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, &out);
krb5_data_free(&out);
if(ret)
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message");
}
}
static krb5_boolean
match_appl_version(const void *data, const char *appl_version)
{
unsigned minor;
if(sscanf(appl_version, "KADM0.%u", &minor) != 1)
return 0;
/*XXX*/
*(unsigned*)(intptr_t)data = minor;
return 1;
}
static void
handle_v5(krb5_context contextp,
krb5_keytab keytab,
krb5_socket_t fd,
int readonly)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ticket *ticket;
char *server_name;
char *client;
void *kadm_handlep;
krb5_boolean initial;
krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
unsigned kadm_version = 1;
kadm5_config_params realm_params;
ret = krb5_recvauth_match_version(contextp, &ac, &fd,
match_appl_version, &kadm_version,
NULL, KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION,
keytab, &ticket);
if (ret) {
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth");
return;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(contextp, ticket->server, &server_name);
if (ret) {
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket);
return;
}
if (strncmp(server_name, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE,
strlen(KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE)) != 0) {
krb5_errx(contextp, 1, "ticket for strange principal (%s)", server_name);
krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket);
free(server_name);
return;
}
free(server_name);
memset(&realm_params, 0, sizeof(realm_params));
if(kadm_version == 1) {
krb5_data params;
ret = krb5_read_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, &params);
if (ret) {
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message");
krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket);
return;
}
ret = _kadm5_unmarshal_params(contextp, &params, &realm_params);
if (ret) {
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret,
"Could not read or parse kadm5 parameters");
krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket);
return;
}
}
initial = ticket->ticket.flags.initial;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(contextp, ticket->client, &client);
krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket);
if (ret) {
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
return;
}
ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(contextp,
client,
NULL,
KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE,
&realm_params,
0, 0,
&kadm_handlep);
if (ret) {
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx");
return;
}
v5_loop(contextp, ac, initial, kadm_handlep, fd, readonly);
}
krb5_error_code
kadmind_loop(krb5_context contextp,
krb5_keytab keytab,
krb5_socket_t sock,
int readonly)
{
u_char buf[sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION) + 4];
ssize_t n;
unsigned long len;
n = krb5_net_read(contextp, &sock, buf, 4);
if(n == 0)
exit(0);
if(n < 0)
krb5_err(contextp, 1, errno, "read");
_krb5_get_int(buf, &len, 4);
if (len == sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)) {
n = krb5_net_read(contextp, &sock, buf + 4, len);
if (n < 0)
krb5_err (contextp, 1, errno, "reading sendauth version");
if (n == 0)
krb5_errx (contextp, 1, "EOF reading sendauth version");
if(memcmp(buf + 4, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) == 0) {
handle_v5(contextp, keytab, sock, readonly);
return 0;
}
len += 4;
} else
len = 4;
handle_mit(contextp, buf, len, sock, readonly);
return 0;
}