Annotate libkdc APIs with KDC_LIB_{CALL,FUNCTION} to ensure correct calling
convention and optimized DLL importing on Windows.
Ensure Windows and libtool export tables are consistent.
Now heim_audit_addkv() correctly supports multiple values, the other functions
that (by design) replace existing values with a single value should use the
heim_audit_setkv prefix.
A subsequent commit could add variants that support multiple values for
non-string types.
Rename the "windc" plugin API to the more general "kdc" plugin API, for two
reasons: the Heimdal KDC uses the Windows PAC even when not emulating a domain
controller, and the plugin API has accreted methods that are not specific to
emulating a domain controller (such as referral_policy and finalize_reply).
Allow the windc plugin to also implement an audit callback. As part of this
change, both the HDB and windc audit function signatures are changed to return
void.
Active Directory/Samba-specific referral policy should be implemented by a
windc plugin, not in the main KDC code. It looks like it probably isn't
necessary at all if Samba wishes to bypass Heimdal's referral handling.
This reverts commit 6f0cafa6cf.
Add a referral policy hook to the TGS as a more elegant way of resolving
referral detection for Samba). The hook can either rewrite the server_princ in
the request, or it can return an error to disable built-in referral processing.
The auth event details audit key (formerly, parameter to auth_status)
contained, variously, an encryption type name; a PKINIT client certificate
name; or, a GSS initiator name. Audit these instead using individual keys that
reflect the values' contents.
Preserve integer/boolean audit values as their native types; convert to strings
when logging only. This commit goes some way towards unifying the two auditing
APIs.
Make Samba-specific HDB auth status API a wrapper on the existing auditing API,
with a view towards unifying the two APIs in a future commit.
The term "auth status" is replaced with "auth event", and the HDB auth_status
method is replaced with a more general purpose audit method which has access to
the entire request structure.
Return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, not HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, if a client
principal could not be found during pre-authentication.
This fixes a regression introduced with synthetic principals in 00358252d3.
We're logging SUCCESS even when the KDC sends error replies. That's
because we're returning success to process_request() even when we send
errors to clients. The error we want to send to the client, and that we
succeed or fail to send it, are different statuses.
Also, further move things into `r` and out of function arguments.
Remove the outpadata field from astgs_request_t, because it's not something we
wish to expose publically (yet it is something that Samba needs in the
client_access plugin API, to add Windows error information).
Instead, allocate rep->padata at the start of AS/TGS request handling, and
ensure it is valid for the lifetime of the request until it is encoded (at
which point it will be freed and set to NULL if zero length, to avoid sending a
zero length METHOD-DATA to the client).
(The previous approach of setting rep->padata to point to &r->outpadata was
fragile, because it required clearing the pointer before freeing the KDC-REP.)
Make client_access plugin API take a single argument, astgs_request_t. Note: in
order to avoid making r->outpadata public (it's an internal buffer), but allow
Samba to modify the reply pa data, some pointer magic is required.
Add a helper function that returns TRUE if a PAC should be included in ticket
authorization data, that can be called from both AS and TGS paths.
Per [MS-KILE] 3.3.5.3, PACs are always included for TGTs; for service
tickets, policy is governed by whether the client explicitly requested
a PAC be omitted when requesting a TGT, or if the no-auth-data-reqd
flag is set on the service principal entry.
Remove the unwieldy pac_attributes_present field from the request structure.
Instead, if PAC attributes are not present in the TGT, the default is to assume
they were set to KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY.
Distinguish pre-authentication mechanisms that replace the reply key from those
that use the client's long-term key. In the general case, one is the inverse of
the other, however KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE replaces the reply-key with
one derived from the long-term key.
PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY indicates that the kvno should be set to zero in the
reply; the absence of PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY indicates that the client's
long-term key may be included in the PAC (PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO with Samba only).
Corrects e8984871.
Distinguish pre-authentication mechanisms that replace the reply key from those
that use the client's long-term key. In the general case, one is the inverse of
the other, however KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE replaces the reply-key with
one derived from the long-term key.
PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY indicates that the kvno should be set to zero in the
reply; the absence of PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY indicates that the client's
long-term key may be included in the PAC (PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO with Samba only).
PACs are included when issuing TGTs, if there is no PAC_ATTRIBUTES buffer
(legacy behavior) or if the attributes buffer indicates the AS client requested
one.
Only include the PAC_ATTRIBUTES PAC info buffer if we are issuing a TGT, as its
contents are not relevant to application services. (The buffer contains a bit
indicating whether the client explicitly or implicitly requested a PAC.)
In the altsecid GSS pre-authentication authorizer plugin, don't add the
REQUESTOR_SID PAC info buffer unless the client requested a TGT. It is not
relevant to application services.
