‘r->error_code’ might have been set earlier, and we don’t want to
overwrite it with a successful error code.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
If ‘r->error_code’ was zero, we would turn it into an ERR_GENERIC error
and return that to the client. Now we return the actual error code
instead.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Honor the return code of _kdc_audit_request(), propagating if non-zero. Note
that this is principally intended to allow the audit plugin to return
HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE, which influences whether the KDC sends an error reply
or not. If the audit plugin also wishes to rewrite r->error_code, it must do so
separately.
Closes: #964
_kdc_fast_check_armor_pac() already checks the PAC of the armor,
but it should also remember it if it's an TGS-REQ with explicit armor.
This will allow the kdc pac hooks to generate a compound identity PAC
with PAC_TYPE_DEVICE_INFO.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Closes: #967
As we move more and more state into astgs_request_t we need to be
careful not to leave locals and function arguments aliasing objects from
the astgs_request_t.
Remove hdb_entry_ex and revert to the original design of hdb_entry (except with
an additional context member in hdb_entry which is managed by the free_entry
method in HDB).
Decorate HDB_entry with context and move free_entry callback into HDB structure
itself. Requires updating hdb_free_entry() signature to include HDB parameter.
A follow-up commit will consolidate hdb_entry_ex (which has a single hdb_entry
member) into hdb_entry.
Move the Services for User (SFU/S4U) implementation -- protocol transition and
constrained delegation -- into its own compilation unit, with an interface that
only takes an astgs_request_t, so it can be easily factored out into a plugin
module in the future.
This refactoring is also careful to update all client names in the request
structure after the SFU/S4U validation has successfully completed.
Now heim_audit_addkv() correctly supports multiple values, the other functions
that (by design) replace existing values with a single value should use the
heim_audit_setkv prefix.
A subsequent commit could add variants that support multiple values for
non-string types.
Allow the windc plugin to also implement an audit callback. As part of this
change, both the HDB and windc audit function signatures are changed to return
void.
Active Directory/Samba-specific referral policy should be implemented by a
windc plugin, not in the main KDC code. It looks like it probably isn't
necessary at all if Samba wishes to bypass Heimdal's referral handling.
This reverts commit 6f0cafa6cf.
Add a referral policy hook to the TGS as a more elegant way of resolving
referral detection for Samba). The hook can either rewrite the server_princ in
the request, or it can return an error to disable built-in referral processing.
Preserve integer/boolean audit values as their native types; convert to strings
when logging only. This commit goes some way towards unifying the two auditing
APIs.
We're logging SUCCESS even when the KDC sends error replies. That's
because we're returning success to process_request() even when we send
errors to clients. The error we want to send to the client, and that we
succeed or fail to send it, are different statuses.
Also, further move things into `r` and out of function arguments.
Remove the outpadata field from astgs_request_t, because it's not something we
wish to expose publically (yet it is something that Samba needs in the
client_access plugin API, to add Windows error information).
Instead, allocate rep->padata at the start of AS/TGS request handling, and
ensure it is valid for the lifetime of the request until it is encoded (at
which point it will be freed and set to NULL if zero length, to avoid sending a
zero length METHOD-DATA to the client).
(The previous approach of setting rep->padata to point to &r->outpadata was
fragile, because it required clearing the pointer before freeing the KDC-REP.)
Make client_access plugin API take a single argument, astgs_request_t. Note: in
order to avoid making r->outpadata public (it's an internal buffer), but allow
Samba to modify the reply pa data, some pointer magic is required.
Add a helper function that returns TRUE if a PAC should be included in ticket
authorization data, that can be called from both AS and TGS paths.
Per [MS-KILE] 3.3.5.3, PACs are always included for TGTs; for service
tickets, policy is governed by whether the client explicitly requested
a PAC be omitted when requesting a TGT, or if the no-auth-data-reqd
flag is set on the service principal entry.
Remove the unwieldy pac_attributes_present field from the request structure.
Instead, if PAC attributes are not present in the TGT, the default is to assume
they were set to KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY.
PACs are included when issuing TGTs, if there is no PAC_ATTRIBUTES buffer
(legacy behavior) or if the attributes buffer indicates the AS client requested
one.
Only include the PAC_ATTRIBUTES PAC info buffer if we are issuing a TGT, as its
contents are not relevant to application services. (The buffer contains a bit
indicating whether the client explicitly or implicitly requested a PAC.)
Add PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO to the PAC. This info buffer indicates whether the user
explicitly requested a PAC be present or absent.
Note: this changes the windc plugin ABI.
Use the UPN_DNS_INFO buffer of the PAC to include the canonical principal name.
Arguably we should use AD-LOGIN-ALIAS as defined in RFC6806, but we may not
always know all the principal's aliases, and this approach allows us to share
application service logic with Windows.
08e0305b introduced a patch to validate armor ticket PACs, but required that
the armor client principal was in the local realm (as it did not allow
_kdc_db_fetch() to fail).
Allow cross-realm FAST armor clients by using the same logic to look up the
client principal as the TGS itself does, i.e. use db_fetch_client() which
handles the case where the client is not local to the KDC.
Note: the armor PAC is only required to be validated when issuing a final,
non-referral service ticket, as this is the only point upon which device claims
should be inserted (according to my understanding).
Closes: #901
Add a new authorization data type to indicate a synthetic principal was used,
to allow synthetic clients acquired outside of PKINIT (e.g. with GSS-API
pre-authentication) to use the TGS.
Note: we continue to honor KRB5_AUTHDATA_INITIAL_VERIFIED_CAS to indicate that
it is OK for the client to be synthetic, even though it is only an indication
that the client *may* have been synthetic.
This reverts commit 6f81e4c93b.
This patch may have originated in Samba from before force_canonicalize was
supported. Because the server_principal argument to tgs_make_reply() is
canonicalized prior to calling (if the server entry has force_canonicalize
set), honoring it again in tgs_make_reply() is superfluous.
This allows Samba to have a behaviour where
even if canonicalize flag is not set, the canonical realm
is returned, allowing a HDB module to require behaviour
that is the same as Windows.
Regression (for a HDB module wanting AD behaviour) was
introduced by commit:
378f34b4be
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
[abartlet@samba.org Similar to Samba commit a9e6119ca0c2a78ef314c3162122539ee834aa04
but made conditional on server->entry.flags.force_canonicalize to
allow upstream submission]
