SPNEGO uses the callback function initiator_approved() in order to determine
mechanism availability. Prior to this commit, is not passed in the initiator
credential, so it always uses a default credential. This breaks SPNEGO if a
non-default credential (such as one acquired with
gss_acquire_cred_with_password()) is used. This commit addresses this.
gss_krb5_set_allowable_enctypes() was declared with an array of int32_t types
representing the enctype list, but the definition had an array of krb5_enctype.
Whilst these are likely the same size, they may not be. On the receiving end,
allocate an array of krb5_enctype.
* check `ctx->gc_ctx` in `gss_inquire_context()`
* check `gm_inquire_cred != NULL` in `gss_inquire_context()`
* check `min_lifetime` in `gss_inquire_cred()`
* check `gm_inquire_cred_by_mech != NULL` in `gss_inquire_cred_by_mech()`
* set mech error in `gss_inquire_cred_by_oid()`
* don't clobber error in `gss_inquire_cred_by_oid()`
* don't pass NULL minor_status to `gss_krb5_free_lucid_sec_context()`
* allow NULL ccache in `gss_krb5_ccache_name()`
* NULL names OK in `_gss_find_mn()`
* allow empty names in `gss_import_name()` (removes `input_name_buffer` length
check). to support ANONYMOUS. in `gss_import_name()`, ignore mech name
import failure as long as it's possible to import the name in some other
mechanism
* better argument validation in `gss_export_sec_context()`
* in `gss_compare_name()`, check `mn2 != NULL`
* check `gss_add_oid_set_member()` return code in `gss_indicate_mechs()`
* in `gss_destroy_cred()`, set output cred handle to `GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL`
* cast size_t to OM_uint32 where required
In the case that one name has no MNs and the second name only has an MN, then
the order in which the two names are passed in matters, but it shouldn't. Run
the comparison both ways.
If a memory allocation failure occurs, return an error instead of
triggering a segmentation fault.
Change-Id: I38f5e88ca2f1ba7411b05a35b925168015261eb4
For compatibility with MIT Kerberos, support automatic acquisition of initiator
credentials if a client keytab is available. The default path on non-Windows is
/var/heimdal/user/%{euid}/client.keytab, but can be overriden with the
KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME environment variable or the default_client_keytab_name
configuration option. If a client keytab does not exist, or exists but does not
contain the principal for which initiator credentials are being acquired, the
system keytab is tried.
It turns out gss_add_cred() really needed a complete rewrite. It's much
better to first have a gss_duplicate_cred() (which has been needed for
other reasons anyways), and use that when the input_cred_handle is not
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL and output_cred_handle is not NULL, then mutate that
duplicate credential handle (or the input_cred_handle if
output_cred_handle is NULL).
Zero out the DES_cblock structure instead of the (not yet used at this point
in the function) key schedule. The contents could potentially be left
on the stack in the case of an error return from _gssapi_verify_pad().
We generally clear out the cryptographic key and key schedule from
local variables before relinquishing control flow, but this case was
missed. Reported by jhb@FreeBSD.org.
The iovec encryption code doesn't handle 0 length iovecs correctly.
Instead of just skipping them, _krb5_evp_encrypt_iov_cts() will spin
on the 0 length iovec.
Modify the _krb5_evp_iov_cursor_expand helper so that iovec expansion
simply skips 0 length iovecs, and make _krb5_evp_iov_cursor_nextcrypt
do the same.
Original bug report and tests from Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Treat principals of type NT-UNKNOWN as NT-SRV-HST if the first component
of the principal name is "host".
Change-Id: I28fb619379daac827436040e701d4ab7b279852b
gsskrb5_acceptor_start() was making a copy of the global pointer
_gsskrb5_keytab to use later. This invites a race condition where
another thread could call gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity()
(thus invalidating the target of the copied pointer) before it is
used by gsskrb5_acceptor_start().
So instead, clone the keytab to a new one while protected by the
mutex lock (similar to get_keytab() in acquire_cred.c).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
This adds a new backend for libhcrypto: the OpenSSL backend.
Now libhcrypto has these backends:
- hcrypto itself (i.e., the algorithms coded in lib/hcrypto)
- Common Crypto (OS X)
- PKCS#11 (specifically for Solaris, but not Solaris-specific)
- Windows CNG (Windows)
- OpenSSL (generic)
The ./configure --with-openssl=... option no longer disables the use of
hcrypto. Instead it enables the use of OpenSSL as a (and the default)
backend in libhcrypto. The libhcrypto framework is now always used.
OpenSSL should no longer be used directly within Heimdal, except in the
OpenSSL hcrypto backend itself, and files where elliptic curve (EC)
crypto is needed.
Because libhcrypto's EC support is incomplete, we can only use OpenSSL
for EC. Currently that means separating all EC-using code so that it
does not use hcrypto, thus the libhx509/hxtool and PKINIT EC code has
been moved out of the files it used to be in.
