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doc/ack.texi
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doc/ack.texi
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@node Acknowledgments, , Kerberos 4 issues, Top
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@comment node-name, next, previous, up
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@appendix Acknowledgments
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Eric Young wrote ``libdes''.
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The University of California at Berkeley initially wrote @code{telnet},
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and @code{telnetd}. The authentication and encryption code of
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@code{telnet} and @code{telnetd} was added by David Borman (then of Cray
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Research, Inc). The encryption code was removed when this was exported
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and then added back by Juha Eskelinen, @email{esc@@magic.fi}.
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The @code{popper} was also a Berkeley program initially.
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Some of the functions in @file{libroken} also come from Berkeley by way
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of NetBSD/FreeBSD.
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@code{editline} was written by Simmule Turner and Rich Salz.
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Bugfixes, documentation, encouragement, and code has been contributed by:
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@table @asis
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@item Derrick J Brashear
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@email{shadow@@dementia.org}
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@item Ken Hornstein
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@email{kenh@@cmf.nrl.navy.mil}
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@item Johan Ihr<68>n
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@email{johani@@pdc.kth.se}
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@item Love H<>rnquist-<2D>strand
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@email{e96_lho@@e.kth.se}
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@item Magnus Ahltorp
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@email{map@@stacken.kth.se}
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@item Marc Eichin
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@email{eichin@@cygnus.com}
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@item Marc Horowitz
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@email{marc@@cygnus.com}
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@item Luke Howard
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@email{lukeh@@xedoc.com.au}
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@item and we hope that those not mentioned here will forgive us.
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@end table
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All bugs were introduced by ourselves.
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@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@
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@syncodeindex pg cp
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@c %**end of header
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@dircategory Kerberos
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@ifinfo
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@dircategory Heimdal
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@direntry
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* Heimdal: (heimdal). The Kerberos 5 distribution from KTH
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@end direntry
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@end ifinfo
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@c title page
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@titlepage
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@@ -212,9 +214,11 @@ to the following restrictions:
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@menu
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* Introduction::
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* What is Kerberos?::
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* Building and Installing::
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* Setting up a realm::
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* Kerberos 4 issues::
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* Acknowledgments::
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--- The Detailed Node Listing ---
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@@ -229,9 +233,11 @@ Kerberos 4 issues
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@end menu
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@include intro.texi
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@include whatis.texi
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@include install.texi
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@include setup.texi
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@include kerberos4.texi
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@include ack.texi
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@c @shortcontents
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@contents
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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@node Building and Installing, Setting up a realm, Introduction, Top
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@node Building and Installing, Setting up a realm, What is Kerberos?, Top
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@comment node-name, next, previous, up
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@chapter Building and Installing
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@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ A compiler that supports a ``loose'' ANSI C mode, such as @code{gcc}.
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@item
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lex or flex
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@item
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awk
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@item
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yacc or bison
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@item
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a socket library
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@@ -44,6 +46,10 @@ Kerberos 4 support in the applications (telnet, rsh, popper, etc) and
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the KDC. If you keep libraries and headers in different places, you can
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instead give the path to each with the @kbd{--with-krb4-lib=@file{dir}},
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and @kbd{--with-krb4-include=@file{dir}} options.
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You will need a fairly recent version of our Kerberos 4 distribution for
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@code{rshd} and @code{popper} to support version 4 clients.
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@item @kbd{--enable-kaserver}
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Enables experimental kaserver support in the KDC. This is the protocol
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used by ``KDC'' in AFS. Requires Kerberos 4 support.
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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@node Introduction, Building and Installing, Top, Top
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@node Introduction, What is Kerberos?, Top, Top
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@c @node Introduction, What is Kerberos?, Top, Top
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@comment node-name, next, previous, up
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@chapter Introduction
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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@node Kerberos 4 issues, , Setting up a realm, Top
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@node Kerberos 4 issues, Acknowledgments, Setting up a realm, Top
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@comment node-name, next, previous, up
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@chapter Kerberos 4 issues
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@@ -3,14 +3,16 @@
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A
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@cindex realm
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realm is an administrative domain. Kerberos realms usually consists of
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an Internet domain name in uppercase. Call your realm the same as your
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Internet domain name if you do not have strong reasons for not doing so.
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It will make life easier for you and everyone else.
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realm is an administrative domain. The name of a Kerberos realm is
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usually the Internet domain name in uppercase. Call your realm the same
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as your Internet domain name if you do not have strong reasons for not
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doing so. It will make life easier for you and everyone else.
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@section Configuration file
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To setup a realm you will first have to create a configuration file:
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@file{/etc/krb5.conf}. The @file{krb5.conf} file can contain many
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configuration options, some which are described here.
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configuration options, some of which are described here.
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There is a sample @file{krb5.conf} supplied with the distribution.
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@@ -70,6 +72,8 @@ with contents similar to the following.
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If you use a realm name equal to your domain name, you can omit the
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@samp{libdefaults}, and @samp{domain_realm}, sections.
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@section Creating the database
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The database library will look for the database in @file{/var/heimdal},
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so you should probably create that directory.
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@@ -96,6 +100,7 @@ Default renewable ticket life: [7 days]
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kdb_edit> ank me
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Max ticket life [1 day]:
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Max renewable ticket [7 days]:
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Flags [client, server, postdate, renewable, proxiable, forwardable]:
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Password:
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Verifying password - Password:
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@end example
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@@ -113,3 +118,28 @@ Credentials cache: /tmp/krb5cc_3008
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Issued Expires Principal
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Aug 25 07:25:55 Aug 25 17:25:55 krbtgt/MY.REALM@@MY.REALM
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@end example
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@section keytabs
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To extract a service ticket from the database and put it in a keytab you
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need to first create the principal in the database with @samp{ank}
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(entering @kbd{random} and then extract it with @samp{ext_keytab}.
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@example
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# kdb_edit
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kdb_edit> ank host/my.host.name
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Max ticket life [1 day]:
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Max renewable life [1 week]:
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Flags [client, server, postdate, renewable, proxiable, forwardable]:
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Password:
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Verifying password - Password:
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kdb_edit> ext host/my.host.name
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# ktutil list
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Version Type Principal
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0 1 host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM
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@end example
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@section Testing clients and servers
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Now you should be able to run all the clients and servers. Refer to the
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appropriate man pages for information on how to use them.
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142
doc/whatis.texi
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doc/whatis.texi
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@node What is Kerberos?, Building and Installing, Introduction, Top
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@chapter What is Kerberos?
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@quotation
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@flushleft
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Now this Cerberus had three heads of dogs,
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the tail of a dragon, and on his back the
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heads of all sorts of snakes.
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--- Pseudo-Apollodorus Library 2.5.12
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@end flushleft
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@end quotation
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Kerberos is a system for authenticating users and services on a network.
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It is built upon the assumption that the network is ``unsafe''. For
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example, data sent over the network can be eavesdropped and altered, and
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addresses can also be faked. Therefore they cannot be used for
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authentication purposes.
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@cindex authentication
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Kerberos is a trusted third-party service. That means that there is a
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third party (the kerberos server) that is trusted by all the entities on
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the network (users and services, usually called @dfn{principals}). All
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principals share a secret password (or key) with the kerberos server and
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this enables principals to verify that the messages from the kerberos
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server are authentic. Thus trusting the kerberos server, users and
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services can authenticate each other.
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@section Basic mechanism
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@ifinfo
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THIS IS INFO
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@end ifinfo
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@ifinfo
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@macro sub{arg}
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<\arg\>
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@end macro
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@end ifinfo
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@tex
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@def@xsub#1{$_{#1}$}
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@global@let@sub=@xsub
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@end tex
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In Kerberos, principals use @dfn{tickets} to prove that they are who
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they claim to be. In the following example, @var{A} is the initiator of
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the authentication exchange, usually a user, and @var{B} is the service
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that @var{A} wishes to use.
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To obtain a ticket for a specific service, @var{A} sends a ticket
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request to the kerberos server. The request basically contains @var{A}'s
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and @var{B}'s names. The kerberos server checks that both @var{A} and
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@var{B} are valid principals.
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Having verified the validity of the principals, it creates a packet
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containing @var{A}'s and @var{B}'s names, @var{A}'s network address
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(@var{A@sub{addr}}), the current time (@var{t@sub{issue}}), the lifetime
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of the ticket (@var{life}), and a secret @dfn{session key}
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@cindex session key
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(@var{K@sub{AB}}). This packet is encrypted with @var{B}'s secret key
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(@var{K@sub{B}}). The actual ticket (@var{T@sub{AB}}) looks like this:
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(@{@var{A}, @var{B}, @var{A@sub{addr}}, @var{t@sub{issue}}, @var{life},
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@var{K@sub{AB}}@}@var{K@sub{B}}).
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The reply to @var{A} consists of the ticket (@var{T@sub{AB}}), @var{B}'s
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name, the current time, the lifetime of the ticket, and the session key, all
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encrypted in @var{A}'s secret key (@{@var{B}, @var{t@sub{issue}},
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@var{life}, @var{K@sub{AB}}, @var{T@sub{AB}}@}@var{K@sub{A}}). @var{A}
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decrypts the reply and retains it for later use.
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@sp 1
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Before sending a message to @var{B}, @var{A} creates an authenticator
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consisting of @var{A}'s name, @var{A}'s address, the current time, and a
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``checksum'' chosen by @var{A}, all encrypted with the secret session
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key (@{@var{A}, @var{A@sub{addr}}, @var{t@sub{current}},
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@var{checksum}@}@var{K@sub{AB}}). This is sent together with the ticket
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received from the kerberos server to @var{B}. Upon reception, @var{B}
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decrypts the ticket using @var{B}'s secret key. Since the ticket
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contains the session key that the authenticator was encrypted with,
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@var{B} can now also decrypt the authenticator. To verify that @var{A}
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really is @var{A}, @var{B} now has to compare the contents of the ticket
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with that of the authenticator. If everything matches, @var{B} now
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considers @var{A} as properly authenticated.
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@c (here we should have some more explanations)
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@section Different attacks
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@subheading Impersonating A
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An impostor, @var{C} could steal the authenticator and the ticket as it
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is transmitted across the network, and use them to impersonate
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@var{A}. The address in the ticket and the authenticator was added to
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make it more difficult to perform this attack. To succeed @var{C} will
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have to either use the same machine as @var{A} or fake the source
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addresses of the packets. By including the time stamp in the
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authenticator, @var{C} does not have much time in which to mount the
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attack.
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@subheading Impersonating B
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@var{C} can hijack @var{B}'s network address, and when @var{A} sends
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her credentials, @var{C} just pretend to verify them. @var{C} can't
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be sure that she is talking to @var{A}.
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@section Defense strategies
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It would be possible to add a @dfn{replay cache}
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@cindex replay cache
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to the server side. The idea is to save the authenticators sent during
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the last few minutes, so that @var{B} can detect when someone is trying
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to retransmit an already used message. This is somewhat impractical
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(mostly regarding efficiency), and is not part of Kerberos 4; MIT
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Kerberos 5 contains it.
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To authenticate @var{B}, @var{A} might request that @var{B} sends
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something back that proves that @var{B} has access to the session
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key. An example of this is the checksum that @var{A} sent as part of the
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authenticator. One typical procedure is to add one to the checksum,
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encrypt it with the session key and send it back to @var{A}. This is
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called @dfn{mutual authentication}.
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The session key can also be used to add cryptographic checksums to the
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messages sent between @var{A} and @var{B} (known as @dfn{message
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integrity}). Encryption can also be added (@dfn{message
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confidentiality}). This is probably the best approach in all cases.
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@cindex integrity
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@cindex confidentiality
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@section Further reading
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The original paper on Kerberos from 1988 is @cite{Kerberos: An
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Authentication Service for Open Network Systems}, by Jennifer Steiner,
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Clifford Neuman and Jeffrey I. Schiller.
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A less technical description can be found in @cite{Designing an
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Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes} by Bill Bryant, also
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from 1988.
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These and several other documents can be found on our web-page at
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@url{http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-krb/}.
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