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git-svn-id: svn://svn.h5l.se/heimdal/trunk/heimdal@4045 ec53bebd-3082-4978-b11e-865c3cabbd6b
This commit is contained in:
@@ -14,11 +14,13 @@
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.ad l
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.ad l
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.in 0
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.ta \n(.luR
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.ta \n(.luR
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.nf
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Network Working Group Assar Westerlund
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Network Working Group Assar Westerlund
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<draft-ietf-cat-krb5-tcp.txt> SICS
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<draft-ietf-cat-krb5-tcp.txt> SICS
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Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson
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Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson
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October, 1997 PDC, KTH
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November, 1997 PDC, KTH
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Expire in six months
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Expire in six months
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.fi
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.ce
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.ce
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Kerberos over TCP
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Kerberos over TCP
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@@ -58,25 +60,24 @@ protocol.
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.ti 0
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.ti 0
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Specification
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Specification
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A Kerberos server MAY accepts requests on port 88 (decimal).
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This draft specifies an extension to section 8.2.1 of RFC1510.
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A Kerberos server MAY accept requests on TCP port 88 (decimal).
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The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes
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The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes
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containting the length Kerberos request in network byte order and then
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containing the length, in network byte order, of the Kerberos request,
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the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The reply from the KDC should
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followed by the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The reply from
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consist of the length of the reply packet in network byte order
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the KDC should consist of the length of the reply packet (4 bytes,
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followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR).
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network byte order) followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, TGS-REP, or
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KRB-ERROR).
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C->S: Open connection to port 88 at the server
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.nf
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.br
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C->S: Open connection to TCP port 88 at the server
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C->S: length of request [as 4 bytes in network byte order ]
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C->S: length of request
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.br
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C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ
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C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ
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.br
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S->C: length of reply
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S->C: length of reply [as 4 bytes in network byte order ]
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.br
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S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR
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S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR
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.br
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.fi
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: connection is closed
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.ti 0
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.ti 0
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Discussion
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Discussion
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@@ -90,12 +91,11 @@ than UDP.
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In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that
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In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that
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information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos
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information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos
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packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to
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packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to
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decode the ASN1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read.
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decode the ASN.1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read.
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Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be
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Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be
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to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the
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to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the reply.
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reply. This does not work well with all kind of firewalls so the
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This does not work well with all kinds of firewalls.
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simpler and more robust solution of explicit length fields.
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.ti 0
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.ti 0
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Security considerations
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Security considerations
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@@ -14,11 +14,13 @@
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.ad l
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.ad l
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.in 0
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.in 0
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.ta \n(.luR
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.ta \n(.luR
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.nf
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Network Working Group Assar Westerlund
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Network Working Group Assar Westerlund
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<draft-ietf-cat-krb5-tcp.txt> SICS
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<draft-ietf-cat-krb5-tcp.txt> SICS
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Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson
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Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson
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October, 1997 PDC, KTH
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November, 1997 PDC, KTH
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Expire in six months
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Expire in six months
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.fi
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|
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.ce
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.ce
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Kerberos over TCP
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Kerberos over TCP
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@@ -58,25 +60,24 @@ protocol.
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.ti 0
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.ti 0
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Specification
|
Specification
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|
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A Kerberos server MAY accepts requests on port 88 (decimal).
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This draft specifies an extension to section 8.2.1 of RFC1510.
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|
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A Kerberos server MAY accept requests on TCP port 88 (decimal).
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|
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The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes
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The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes
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containting the length Kerberos request in network byte order and then
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containing the length, in network byte order, of the Kerberos request,
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the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The reply from the KDC should
|
followed by the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The reply from
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consist of the length of the reply packet in network byte order
|
the KDC should consist of the length of the reply packet (4 bytes,
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followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR).
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network byte order) followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, TGS-REP, or
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KRB-ERROR).
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|
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C->S: Open connection to port 88 at the server
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.nf
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.br
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C->S: Open connection to TCP port 88 at the server
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C->S: length of request [as 4 bytes in network byte order ]
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C->S: length of request
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.br
|
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C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ
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C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ
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.br
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S->C: length of reply
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S->C: length of reply [as 4 bytes in network byte order ]
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.br
|
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S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR
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S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR
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.br
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.fi
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: connection is closed
|
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|
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.ti 0
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.ti 0
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||||||
Discussion
|
Discussion
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||||||
@@ -90,12 +91,11 @@ than UDP.
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In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that
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In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that
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information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos
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information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos
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packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to
|
packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to
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decode the ASN1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read.
|
decode the ASN.1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read.
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||||||
|
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Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be
|
Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be
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||||||
to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the
|
to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the reply.
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||||||
reply. This does not work well with all kind of firewalls so the
|
This does not work well with all kinds of firewalls.
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simpler and more robust solution of explicit length fields.
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|
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.ti 0
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.ti 0
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||||||
Security considerations
|
Security considerations
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||||||
|
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