gsskrb5: Check dst-TGT pokicy at store time
Our initiator supports configuration-driven delegation of destination TGTs. This commit adds acceptor-side handling of destination TGT policy to reject storing of non-destination TGTs when destination TGTs are desired. Currently we use the same appdefault for this. Background: A root TGT is one of the form krbtgt/REALM@SAME-REALM. A destination TGT is a root TGT for the same realm as the acceptor service's realm. Normally clients delegate a root TGT for the client's realm. In some deployments clients may want to delegate destination TGTs as a form of constrained delegation: so that the destination service cannot use the delegated credential to impersonate the client principal to services in its home realm (due to KDC lineage/transit checks). In those deployments there may not even be a route back to the KDCs of the client's realm, and attempting to use a non-destination TGT might even lead to timeouts.
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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV _gsskrb5_duplicate_cred (
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dup = calloc(1, sizeof(*dup));
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if (dup == NULL) {
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*minor_status = ENOMEM;
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*minor_status = krb5_enomem(context);
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return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
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}
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@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV _gsskrb5_duplicate_cred (
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cred = (gsskrb5_cred)input_cred_handle;
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HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&cred->cred_id_mutex);
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dup->destination_realm = NULL;
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if (cred->destination_realm &&
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(dup->destination_realm = strdup(cred->destination_realm)) == NULL) {
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*minor_status = krb5_enomem(context);
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free(dup);
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return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
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}
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dup->usage = cred->usage;
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dup->endtime = cred->endtime;
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dup->principal = NULL;
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