Revert "krb5: zero nonce before encoding for GSS preauth"
This reverts commit 34b374b5e4
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We are revising the GSS-API pre-authentication draft to include the nonce from
the first request in the GSS channel bindings, to avoid re-encoding issues that
may surface with Kerberos implementations that do not correctly implement DER.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1211,7 +1211,6 @@ gss_pa_step(krb5_context context,
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krb5_data req_body;
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PA_DATA *pa;
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krb5_data *input_token;
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KDC_REQ_BODY kdc_req_body;
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krb5_data_zero(&req_body);
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krb5_data_zero(output_token);
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@@ -1239,16 +1238,8 @@ gss_pa_step(krb5_context context,
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Zero the nonce before encoding, as the nonce may change between
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* AS-REQs and we don't know which step the GSS mechanism will
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* honor the channel binding data.
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*/
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kdc_req_body = ctx->as_req.req_body;
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kdc_req_body.nonce = 0;
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ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KDC_REQ_BODY, req_body.data, req_body.length,
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&kdc_req_body, &len, ret);
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&ctx->as_req.req_body, &len, ret);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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heim_assert(req_body.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
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