gssapi: Allow a NULL authenticator
Some non-GSSAPI implementations that instead try to create compatible packets by wrapping krb5_mk_req() can trigger a NULL authenticator here. Assume this to be equvilent to specifying an all-zero channel bindings and some reasonable (fixed) flags. Original patch by Andrew Bartlett, restructured by Douglas Bagnall Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
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committed by
Douglas Bagnall

parent
be63a2914a
commit
8508294940
@@ -511,13 +511,8 @@ gsskrb5_acceptor_start(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
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return ret;
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}
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if (authenticator->cksum == NULL) {
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krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
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*minor_status = 0;
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return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
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}
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if (authenticator->cksum->cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI) {
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if (authenticator->cksum != NULL
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&& authenticator->cksum->cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI) {
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ret = _gsskrb5_verify_8003_checksum(minor_status,
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input_chan_bindings,
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authenticator->cksum,
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@@ -529,44 +524,48 @@ gsskrb5_acceptor_start(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
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return ret;
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}
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} else {
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krb5_crypto crypto;
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if (authenticator->cksum != NULL) {
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krb5_crypto crypto;
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kret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
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ctx->auth_context->keyblock,
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0, &crypto);
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if(kret) {
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kret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
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ctx->auth_context->keyblock,
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0, &crypto);
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if(kret) {
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krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
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ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
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*minor_status = kret;
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Windows accepts Samba3's use of a kerberos, rather than
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* GSSAPI checksum here
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*/
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kret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
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crypto, KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, NULL, 0,
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authenticator->cksum);
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krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
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krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
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ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
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*minor_status = kret;
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return ret;
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if(kret) {
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ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
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*minor_status = kret;
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return ret;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Windows accepts Samba3's use of a kerberos, rather than
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* GSSAPI checksum here
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* If there is no checksum or a kerberos checksum (which Windows
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* and Samba accept), we use the ap_options to guess the mutual
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* flag.
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*/
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kret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
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crypto, KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, NULL, 0,
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authenticator->cksum);
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krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
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krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
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if(kret) {
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ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
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*minor_status = kret;
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Samba style get some flags (but not DCE-STYLE), use
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* ap_options to guess the mutual flag.
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*/
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ctx->flags = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
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ctx->flags = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
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if (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)
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ctx->flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
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}
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}
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}
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if(ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) {
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