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This Internet-Draft has expired and is no longer available.
Unrevised documents placed in the Internet-Drafts directories have a
maximum life of six months. After that time, they must be updated, or
they will be deleted. This document was deleted on July 17, 2000.
CAT working group M. Swift
Internet Draft J. Brezak
Document: draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-02.txt Microsoft
Category: Informational November 2000
The Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos encryption type
tatus of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. Internet-Drafts are
working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are
draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be
updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It
is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to
cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
. Abstract
The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new
encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an
MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using
the existing DES based encryption types.
The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing
Windows NT environments, provide strong crypto (128-bit key
lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government
export restriction requirements) encryption.
The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos contains new encryption
and checksum types for two reasons: for export reasons early in the
development process, 56 bit DES encryption could not be exported,
and because upon upgrade from Windows NT 4.0 to Windows 2000,
accounts will not have the appropriate DES keying material to do the
standard DES encryption. Furthermore, 3DES is not available for
export, and there was a desire to use a single flavor of encryption
in the product for both US and international products.
As a result, there are two new encryption types and one new checksum
type introduced in Windows 2000.
. Conventions used in this document
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2].
. Key Generation
On upgrade from existing Windows NT domains, the user accounts would
not have a DES based key available to enable the use of DES base
encryption types specified in RFC 1510. The key used for RC4-HMAC is
the same as the existing Windows NT key (NT Password Hash) for
compatibility reasons. Once the account password is changed, the DES
based keys are created and maintained. Once the DES keys are
available DES based encryption types can be used with Kerberos.
The RC4-HMAC String to key function is defined as follow:
String2Key(password)
K = MD4(UNICODE(password))
The RC4-HMAC keys are generated by using the Windows UNICODE version
of the password. Each Windows UNICODE character is encoded in
little-endian format of 2 octets each. Then performing an MD4 [6]
hash operation on just the UNICODE characters of the password (not
including the terminating zero octets).
For an account with a password of "foo", this String2Key("foo") will
return:
0xac, 0x8e, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x83, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xbe,
0xea, 0x5d, 0x43, 0xbd, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x00, 0xcc
. Basic Operations
The MD5 HMAC function is defined in [3]. It is used in this
encryption type for checksum operations. Refer to [3] for details on
its operation. In this document this function is referred to as
HMAC(Key, Data) returning the checksum using the specified key on
the data.
The basic MD5 hash operation is used in this encryption type and
defined in [7]. In this document this function is referred to as
MD5(Data) returning the checksum of the data.
RC4 is a stream cipher licensed by RSA Data Security [RSADSI]. A
compatible cipher is described in [8]. In this document the function
is referred to as RC4(Key, Data) returning the encrypted data using
the specified key on the data.
These encryption types use key derivation as defined in [9] (RFC-
1510BIS) in Section titled "Key Derivation". With each message, the
message type (T) is used as a component of the keying material. This
summarizes the different key derivation values used in the various
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
operations. Note that these differ from the key derivations used in
other Kerberos encryption types.
T = 1 for TS-ENC-TS in the AS-Request
T = 8 for the AS-Reply
T = 7 for the Authenticator in the TGS-Request
T = 8 for the TGS-Reply
T = 2 for the Server Ticket in the AP-Request
T = 11 for the Authenticator in the AP-Request
T = 12 for the Server returned AP-Reply
T = 15 in the generation of checksum for the MIC token
T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the MIC token
T = 13 in the generation of checksum for the WRAP token
T = 0 in the generation of sequence number for the WRAP token
T = 0 in the generation of encrypted data for the WRAPPED token
All strings in this document are ASCII unless otherwise specified.
The lengths of ASCII encoded character strings include the trailing
terminator character (0).
The concat(a,b,c,...) function will return the logical concatenation
(left to right) of the values of the arguments.
The nonce(n) function returns a pseudo-random number of "n" octets.
. Checksum Types
There is one checksum type used in this encryption type. The
Kerberos constant for this type is:
#define KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5 (-138)
The function is defined as follows:
K - is the Key
T - the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer
CHKSUM(K, T, data)
Ksign = HMAC(K, "signaturekey") //includes zero octet at end
tmp = MD5(concat(T, data))
CHKSUM = HMAC(Ksign, tmp)
. Encryption Types
There are two encryption types used in these encryption types. The
Kerberos constants for these types are:
#define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC 23
#define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP 24
The basic encryption function is defined as follow:
T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer.
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
BYTE L40[14] = "fortybits";
BYTE SK = "signaturekey";
ENCRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, data, data_len, edata, edata_len)
{
if (fRC4_EXP){
*((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T;
HMAC (K, L40, 10 + 4, K1);
}else{
HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1);
}
memcpy (K2, K1, 16);
if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9);
add_8_random_bytes(data, data_len, conf_plus_data);
HMAC (K2, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, checksum);
HMAC (K1, checksum, 16, K3);
RC4(K3, conf_plus_data, 8 + data_len, edata + 16);
memcpy (edata, checksum, 16);
edata_len = 16 + 8 + data_len;
}
DECRYPT (K, fRC4_EXP, T, edata, edata_len, data, data_len)
{
if (fRC4_EXP){
*((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T;
HMAC (K, L40, 14, K1);
}else{
HMAC (K, &T, 4, K1);
}
memcpy (K2, K1, 16);
if (fRC4_EXP) memset (K1+7, 0xAB, 9);
HMAC (K1, edata, 16, K3); // checksum is at edata
RC4(K3, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, edata + 16);
data_len = edata_len - 16 - 8;
memcpy (data, edata + 16 + 8, data_len);
// verify generated and received checksums
HMAC (K2, edata + 16, edata_len - 16, checksum);
if (memcmp(edata, checksum, 16) != 0)
printf("CHECKSUM ERROR !!!!!!\n");
}
The header field on the encrypted data in KDC messages is:
typedef struct _RC4_MDx_HEADER {
UCHAR Checksum[16];
UCHAR Confounder[8];
} RC4_MDx_HEADER, *PRC4_MDx_HEADER;
The KDC message is encrypted using the ENCRYPT function not
including the Checksum in the RC4_MDx_HEADER.
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40-
bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States.
It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable"
length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits.
. Key Strength Negotiation
A Kerberos client and server can negotiate over key length if they
are using mutual authentication. If the client is unable to perform
full strength encryption, it may propose a key in the "subkey" field
of the authenticator, using a weaker encryption type. The server
must then either return the same key or suggest its own key in the
subkey field of the AP reply message. The key used to encrypt data
is derived from the key returned by the server. If the client is
able to perform strong encryption but the server is not, it may
propose a subkey in the AP reply without first being sent a subkey
in the authenticator.
. GSSAPI Kerberos V5 Mechanism Type
.1 Mechanism Specific Changes
The GSSAPI per-message tokens also require new checksum and
encryption types. The GSS-API per-message tokens must be changed to
support these new encryption types (See [5] Section 1.2.2). The
sealing algorithm identifier (SEAL_ALG) for an RC4 based encryption
is:
Byte 4..5 SEAL_ALG 0x10 0x00 - RC4
The signing algorithm identifier (SGN_ALG) for MD5 HMAC is:
Byte 2..3 SGN ALG 0x11 0x00 - HMAC
The only support quality of protection is:
#define GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0x0
In addition, when using an RC4 based encryption type, the sequence
number is sent in big-endian rather than little-endian order.
The Windows 2000 implementation also defines new GSSAPI flags in the
initial token passed when initializing a security context. These
flags are passed in the checksum field of the authenticator (See [5]
Section 1.1.1).
GSS_C_DCE_STYLE - This flag was added for use with Microsoft<66>s
implementation of DCE RPC, which initially expected three legs of
authentication. Setting this flag causes an extra AP reply to be
sent from the client back to the server after receiving the server<65>s
AP reply. In addition, the context negotiation tokens do not have
GSSAPI framing - they are raw AP message and do not include object
identifiers.
#define GSS_C_DCE_STYLE 0x1000
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG - This flag allows the client to indicate to the
server that it should only allow the server application to identify
the client by name and ID, but not to impersonate the client.
#define GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG 0x2000
GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG - Setting this flag indicates that the
client wants to be informed of extended error information. In
particular, Windows 2000 status codes may be returned in the data
field of a Kerberos error message. This allows the client to
understand a server failure more precisely. In addition, the server
may return errors to the client that are normally handled at the
application layer in the server, in order to let the client try to
recover. After receiving an error message, the client may attempt to
resubmit an AP request.
#define GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG 0x4000
These flags are only used if a client is aware of these conventions
when using the SSPI on the Windows platform, they are not generally
used by default.
When NetBIOS addresses are used in the GSSAPI, they are identified
by the GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS value. This value is defined as:
#define GSS_C_AF_NETBIOS 0x14
NetBios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to th 15 characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16
octet of 0x0.
.2 GSSAPI Checksum Type
The GSSAPI checksum type and algorithm is defined in Section 5. Only
the first 8 octets of the checksum are used. The resulting checksum
is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field (See [5] Section 1.2) for
GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(conf_flag=FALSE).
MIC (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, MIC_hdr, msg, msg_len,
MIC_seq, MIC_checksum)
{
HMAC (K, SK, 13, K4);
T = 15;
memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 00, &T, 4);
memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 04, MIC_hdr, 8);
// 0101 1100 FFFFFFFF
memcpy (T_plus_hdr_plus_msg + 12, msg, msg_len);
MD5 (T_hdr_msg, 4 + 8 + msg_len, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg);
HMAC (K4, MD5_of_T_hdr_msg, CHKSUM);
memcpy (MIC_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8 bytes
T = 0;
if (fRC4_EXP){
*((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T;
HMAC (K, L40, 14, K5);
}else{
HMAC (K, &T, 4, K5);
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
}
if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K5+7, 0xAB, 9);
HMAC(K5, MIT_checksum, 8, K6);
copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction);
//0x12345678
copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction +
4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF
RC4(K6, seq_plus_direction, 8, MIC_seq);
}
.3 GSSAPI Encryption Types
There are two encryption types for GSSAPI message tokens, one that
is 128 bits in strength, and one that is 56 bits in strength as
defined in Section 6.
All padding is rounded up to 1 byte. One byte is needed to say that
there is 1 byte of padding. The DES based mechanism type uses 8 byte
padding. See [5] Section 1.2.2.3.
The encryption mechanism used for GSS wrap based messages is as
follow:
WRAP (K, fRC4_EXP, seq_num, WRAP_hdr, msg, msg_len,
WRAP_seq, WRAP_checksum, edata, edata_len)
{
HMAC (K, SK, 13, K7);
T = 13;
PAD = 1;
memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 00, &T, 4);
memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 04, WRAP_hdr, 8); // 0101 1100
FFFFFFFF
memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12, msg, msg_len);
memcpy (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 12 + msg_len, &PAD, 1);
MD5 (T_hdr_conf_msg_pad,
4 + 8 + 8 + msg_len + 1,
MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad);
HMAC (K7, MD5_of_T_hdr_conf_msg_pad, CHKSUM);
memcpy (WRAP_checksum, CHKSUM, 8); // use only first 8
bytes
T = 0;
if (fRC4_EXP){
*((DWORD *)(L40+10)) = T;
HMAC (K, L40, 14, K8);
}else{
HMAC (K, &T, 4, K8);
}
if (fRC4_EXP) memset(K8+7, 0xAB, 9);
HMAC(K8, WRAP_checksum, 8, K9);
copy_seq_num_in_big_endian(seq_num, seq_plus_direction);
//0x12345678
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
copy_direction_flag (direction_flag, seq_plus_direction +
4); //0x12345678FFFFFFFF
RC4(K9, seq_plus_direction, 8, WRAP_seq);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) K10 [i] ^= 0xF0; // XOR each byte
of key with 0xF0
T = 0;
if (fRC4_EXP){
*(DWORD *)(L40+10) = T;
HMAC(K10, L40, 14, K11);
memset(K11+7, 0xAB, 9);
}else{
HMAC(K10, &T, 4, K11);
}
HMAC(K11, seq_num, 4, K12);
RC4(K12, T_hdr_conf_msg_pad + 4 + 8, 8 + msg_len + 1,
edata); /* skip T & hdr */
edata_len = 8 + msg_len + 1; // conf + msg_len + pad
}
The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40-
bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States.
It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable"
length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits.
. Security Considerations
Care must be taken in implementing this encryption type because it
uses a stream cipher. If a different IV isn<73>t used in each direction
when using a session key, the encryption is weak. By using the
sequence number as an IV, this is avoided.
0. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Salil Dangi for the valuable input in
refining the descriptions of the functions and review input.
1. References
1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
3 Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.,"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997
4 Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication
Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type June 2000
5 Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC-1964,
June 1996
6 R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1320, April
1992
7 R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1321, April
1992
8 Thayer, R. and K. Kaukonen, "A Stream Cipher Encryption
Algorithm", Work in Progress.
9 RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under license
from RSA Data Security Inc. For licensing information, contact:
RSA Data Security, Inc.
100 Marine Parkway
Redwood City, CA 94065-1031
10 Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network
Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-
04.txt, June 25, 1999
2. Author's Addresses
Mike Swift
Dept. of Computer Science
Sieg Hall
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98105
Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu
John Brezak
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, Washington
Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com
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Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999
3. Full Copyright Statement
"Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and
furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or
otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be
prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in
part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above
copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such
copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may
not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright
notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet
organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing
Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights
defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or
as required to translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will
not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or
assigns.
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