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[HEIMDAL-533] KDC sends TGS-REP encrypted in session key not authenticator

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From RFC 4120, page 35

   In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-
   session key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be
   encrypted.  If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be
   taken to ensure the randomness of the selected sub-session key.

The client library alread handle this case.

Thanks to Sam Hartman to report this though Debian
This commit is contained in:
Love Hornquist Astrand
2009-10-11 08:46:53 -07:00
parent 8e08aa0a15
commit 678f9f9f07
2 changed files with 56 additions and 30 deletions
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5
kdc/kerberos5.c
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@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype etype,
int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
int rk_is_subkey,
const char **e_text,
krb5_data *reply)
{
@@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
} else {
krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
buf,
len,
ckvno,
@@ -1757,7 +1758,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
&rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
&skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
reply_key, &e_text, reply);
reply_key, 0, &e_text, reply);
free_EncTicketPart(&et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
if (ret)