kdc: Fix code spelling

Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Sutton
2023-06-26 16:53:21 +12:00
committed by Jeffrey Altman
parent 05602c2286
commit 560c9da844
2 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ pa_enc_ts_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
/*
* Since the user might have several keys with the same
* enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
* enctype but with different salting, we need to try all
* the keys with the same enctype.
*/
if(ret){
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
}
/*
* Return 0 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
* Return 0 if the client has only older enctypes, this is for
* determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
*/
@@ -2511,7 +2511,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
t = *b->till;
/* be careful not overflowing */
/* be careful not to overflow */
/*
* Pre-auth can override r->client->max_life if configured.
@@ -2640,7 +2640,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
}
/*
* Check and session and reply keys
* Check session and reply keys
*/
if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
goto out;
/*
* Check if message too large
* Check if message is too large
*/
if (r->datagram_reply && r->reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
krb5_data_free(r->reply);

View File

@@ -527,8 +527,8 @@ _kdc_pk_rd_padata(astgs_request_t priv,
}
/*
* If the client sent more then 10 EDI, don't bother
* looking more then 10 of performance reasons.
* If the client sent more than 10 EDIs, don't bother
* looking at more than 10 for performance reasons.
*/
maxedi = edi->len;
if (maxedi > 10)
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ pk_mk_pa_reply_enckey(krb5_context context,
*kdc_cert = NULL;
/*
* If the message client is a win2k-type but it send pa data
* If the message client is a win2k-type but it sends pa data
* 09-binding it expects a IETF (checksum) reply so there can be
* no replay attacks.
*/
@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(astgs_request_t r, pk_client_params *cp)
krb5_data_free(&ocsp.data);
ocsp.expire = 0;
} else if (ocsp.expire > 180) {
ocsp.expire -= 180; /* refetch the ocsp before it expire */
ocsp.expire -= 180; /* refetch the ocsp before it expires */
ocsp.next_update = ocsp.expire;
} else {
ocsp.next_update = kdc_time;
@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ _kdc_pk_check_client(astgs_request_t r,
if (strcmp(*subject_name, acl->val[0].subject) != 0)
continue;
/* Don't support isser and anchor checking right now */
/* Don't support issuer and anchor checking right now */
if (acl->val[0].issuer)
continue;
if (acl->val[0].anchor)