kdc: Fix code spelling
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Jeffrey Altman

parent
05602c2286
commit
560c9da844
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ pa_enc_ts_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
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krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
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/*
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* Since the user might have several keys with the same
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* enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
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* enctype but with different salting, we need to try all
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* the keys with the same enctype.
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*/
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if(ret){
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@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
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}
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/*
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* Return 0 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
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* Return 0 if the client has only older enctypes, this is for
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* determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
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*/
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@@ -2511,7 +2511,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
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_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
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t = *b->till;
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/* be careful not overflowing */
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/* be careful not to overflow */
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/*
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* Pre-auth can override r->client->max_life if configured.
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@@ -2640,7 +2640,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
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}
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/*
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* Check and session and reply keys
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* Check session and reply keys
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*/
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if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
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@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Check if message too large
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* Check if message is too large
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*/
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if (r->datagram_reply && r->reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
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krb5_data_free(r->reply);
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10
kdc/pkinit.c
10
kdc/pkinit.c
@@ -527,8 +527,8 @@ _kdc_pk_rd_padata(astgs_request_t priv,
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}
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/*
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* If the client sent more then 10 EDI, don't bother
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* looking more then 10 of performance reasons.
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* If the client sent more than 10 EDIs, don't bother
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* looking at more than 10 for performance reasons.
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*/
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maxedi = edi->len;
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if (maxedi > 10)
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@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ pk_mk_pa_reply_enckey(krb5_context context,
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*kdc_cert = NULL;
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/*
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* If the message client is a win2k-type but it send pa data
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* If the message client is a win2k-type but it sends pa data
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* 09-binding it expects a IETF (checksum) reply so there can be
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* no replay attacks.
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*/
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@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(astgs_request_t r, pk_client_params *cp)
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krb5_data_free(&ocsp.data);
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ocsp.expire = 0;
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} else if (ocsp.expire > 180) {
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ocsp.expire -= 180; /* refetch the ocsp before it expire */
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ocsp.expire -= 180; /* refetch the ocsp before it expires */
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ocsp.next_update = ocsp.expire;
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} else {
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ocsp.next_update = kdc_time;
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@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ _kdc_pk_check_client(astgs_request_t r,
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if (strcmp(*subject_name, acl->val[0].subject) != 0)
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continue;
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/* Don't support isser and anchor checking right now */
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/* Don't support issuer and anchor checking right now */
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if (acl->val[0].issuer)
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continue;
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if (acl->val[0].anchor)
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