oysteikt/heimdal
0
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 5 Pull Requests Releases Activity

*** empty log message ***

Browse Source 
git-svn-id: svn://svn.h5l.se/heimdal/trunk/heimdal@4055 ec53bebd-3082-4978-b11e-865c3cabbd6b
This commit is contained in:
Assar Westerlund
1997-11-21 21:54:55 +00:00
parent ae7d687956
commit 47f70cc8d6
2 changed files with 454 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

227
doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
Network Working Group Assar Westerlund
<draft-ietf-cat-krb5-firewalls.txt> SICS
Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson
November, 1997 PDC, KTH
Expire in six months
Kerberos vs firewalls
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the
"1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe),
munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the
<cat-ietf@mit.edu> mailing list.
Abstract
Introduction
Kerberos[RFC1510] is a protocol for authenticating parties
communicating over insecure networks.
Firewalling is a technique for achieving an illusion of security by
putting restrictions on what kinds of packets and how these are sent
between the internal (so called "secure") network and the global (or
"insecure") Internet.
Definitions
client: the user, process, and host acquiring tickets from the KDC
and authenticating itself to the kerberised server.
KDC: the Kerberos Key Distribution Center
Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 1]
Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997
Kerberised server: the server using Kerberos to authenticate the
client, for example telnetd.
Firewalls
A firewall is usually placed between the "inside" and the "outside"
networks, and is supposed to protect the inside from the evils on the
outside. There are different kinds of firewalls. The main
differences are in the way they forward packets.
o+ The most straight forward type is the one that just imposes
restrictions on incoming packets. Such a firewall could be
described as a router that filters packets that match some
criteria.
o+ They may also "hide" some or all addresses on the inside of the
firewall, replacing the addresses in the outgoing packets with the
address of the firewall (aka network address translation, or NAT).
NAT can also be used without any packet filtering, for instance
when you have more than one host sharing a single address (for
example, with a dialed-in PPP connection).
There are also firewalls that does NAT both on the inside and the
outside (a server on the inside will see this as a connection from
the firewall).
o+ A third type is the proxy type firewall, that parses the contents
of the packets, basically acting as a server to the client, and as
a client to the server (man-in-the-middle). If Kerberos is to be
used with this kind of firewall, a protocol module that handles
KDC requests has to be written.
This type of firewall might also cause extra trouble when used with
kerberised versions of protocols that the proxy understands, in
addition to the ones mentioned below. This is the case with the FTP
Security Extensions [RFC2228], that adds a new set of commands to the
FTP protocol [RFC959], for integrity, confidentiality, and privacy
protecting commands. When transferring data, the FTP protocol uses a
separate data channel, and an FTP proxy will have to look out for
commands that start a data transfer. If all commands are encrypted,
this is impossible. A protocol that doesn't suffer from this is the
Telnet Authentication Option [RFC1416] that does all authentication
and encryption in-bound.
Scenarios
Here the different scenarios we have considered are described, the
problems they introduce and the proposed ways of solving them.
Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 2]
Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997
Combinations of these can also occur.
Client behind firewall
This is the most typical and common scenario. First of all the
client needs some way of communicating with the KDC. This can be
done with whatever means and is usually much simpler when the KDC is
able to communicate over TCP.
Apart from that, the client needs to be sure that the ticket it will
acquire from the KDC can be used to authenticate to a server outside
its firewall. For this, it needs to add the address(es) of potential
firewalls between itself and the KDC/server, to the list of its own
addresses when requesting the ticket. We are not aware of any
protocol for determining this set of addresses, thus this will have
to be manually configured in the client.
The client could also request a ticket with no addresses, but some
KDCs and servers might not accept such a ticket.
With the ticket in possession, communication with the kerberised
server will not need to be any different from communicating between a
non-kerberised client and server.
Kerberised server behind firewall
The kerberised server does not talk to the KDC at all so nothing
beyond normal firewall-traversal techniques for reaching the server
itself needs to be applied.
The kerberised server needs to be able to retrieve the original
address (before its firewall) that the request was sent for. If this
is done via some out-of-band mechanism or it's directly able to see
it doesn't matter.
KDC behind firewall
The same restrictions applies for a KDC as for any other server.
Specification
Security considerations
This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in
addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510].
References
Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 3]
Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997
[RFC959] Postel, J. and Reynolds, J., "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)",
RFC 969, October 1985
[RFC1416] Borman, D., "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 1416,
February 1993.
[RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network
Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993.
[RFC2228] Horowitz, M. and Lunt, S., "FTP Security Extensions",
RFC2228, October 1997.
Authors' Addresses
Assar Westerlund
Swedish Institute of Computer Science
Box 1263
S-164 29 KISTA
Sweden
Phone: +46-8-7521526
Fax: +46-8-7517230
EMail: assar@sics.se
Johan Danielsson
PDC, KTH
S-100 44 STOCKHOLM
Sweden
Phone: +46-8-7907885
Fax: +46-8-247784
EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se
Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 4]