Added a disting get-keys authorization for kadmind.

This commit is contained in:
Nicolas Williams
2011-07-14 15:39:20 -05:00
committed by Nicolas Williams
parent 3d0019d3ce
commit 45294a93a7
3 changed files with 52 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static struct units acl_units[] = {
{ "modify", KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY },
{ "add", KADM5_PRIV_ADD },
{ "get", KADM5_PRIV_GET },
{ "get-keys", KADM5_PRIV_GET_KEYS },
{ NULL, 0 }
};
@@ -177,6 +178,8 @@ check_flags (unsigned op,
if(res & KADM5_PRIV_GET)
return KADM5_AUTH_GET;
if(res & KADM5_PRIV_GET_KEYS)
return KADM5_AUTH_GET;
if(res & KADM5_PRIV_ADD)
return KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
if(res & KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY)

View File

@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ typedef struct _kadm5_policy_ent_t {
#define KADM5_PRIV_DELETE (1 << 3)
#define KADM5_PRIV_LIST (1 << 4)
#define KADM5_PRIV_CPW (1 << 5)
#define KADM5_PRIV_GET_KEYS (1 << 6)
#define KADM5_PRIV_ALL (KADM5_PRIV_GET | KADM5_PRIV_ADD | KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY | KADM5_PRIV_DELETE | KADM5_PRIV_LIST | KADM5_PRIV_CPW)
typedef struct _kadm5_config_params {

View File

@@ -53,6 +53,38 @@ kadm5_store_key_data(krb5_storage *sp,
return 0;
}
kadm5_ret_t
kadm5_store_fake_key_data(krb5_storage *sp,
krb5_key_data *key)
{
char buf[4] = {0};
krb5_data c;
krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_ver);
krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_kvno);
krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[0]);
/*
* This is the key contents. We want it to be obvious to the client
* (if it really did want the keys) that the key won't work.
* 32-bit keys are no good for any enctype, so that should do.
* Clients that didn't need keys will ignore this, and clients that
* did want keys will either fail or they'll, say, create bogus
* keytab entries that will subsequently fail to be useful.
*/
c.length = sizeof (buf);
c.data = buf;
memset(buf, 0xdeadcee5, sizeof (buf)); /* bad bad hexspeak for deadkeys */
krb5_store_data(sp, c);
/* This is the salt -- no need to send garbage */
krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[1]);
c.length = key->key_data_length[1];
c.data = key->key_data_contents[1];
krb5_store_data(sp, c);
return 0;
}
kadm5_ret_t
kadm5_ret_key_data(krb5_storage *sp,
krb5_key_data *key)
@@ -105,7 +137,7 @@ kadm5_ret_tl_data(krb5_storage *sp,
static kadm5_ret_t
store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp,
kadm5_principal_ent_t princ,
uint32_t mask)
uint32_t mask, int wkeys)
{
int i;
@@ -149,8 +181,12 @@ store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp,
krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->fail_auth_count);
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->n_key_data);
for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++)
for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++) {
if (wkeys)
kadm5_store_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]);
else
kadm5_store_fake_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]);
}
}
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
krb5_tl_data *tp;
@@ -167,7 +203,14 @@ kadm5_ret_t
kadm5_store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp,
kadm5_principal_ent_t princ)
{
return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0);
return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0, 1);
}
kadm5_ret_t
kadm5_store_principal_ent_nokeys(krb5_storage *sp,
kadm5_principal_ent_t princ)
{
return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0, 0);
}
kadm5_ret_t
@@ -176,7 +219,7 @@ kadm5_store_principal_ent_mask(krb5_storage *sp,
uint32_t mask)
{
krb5_store_int32(sp, mask);
return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, mask);
return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, mask, 1);
}
static kadm5_ret_t