Added a disting get-keys authorization for kadmind.
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Nicolas Williams

parent
3d0019d3ce
commit
45294a93a7
@@ -53,6 +53,38 @@ kadm5_store_key_data(krb5_storage *sp,
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return 0;
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}
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kadm5_ret_t
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kadm5_store_fake_key_data(krb5_storage *sp,
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krb5_key_data *key)
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{
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char buf[4] = {0};
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krb5_data c;
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krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_ver);
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krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_kvno);
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krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[0]);
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/*
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* This is the key contents. We want it to be obvious to the client
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* (if it really did want the keys) that the key won't work.
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* 32-bit keys are no good for any enctype, so that should do.
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* Clients that didn't need keys will ignore this, and clients that
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* did want keys will either fail or they'll, say, create bogus
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* keytab entries that will subsequently fail to be useful.
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*/
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c.length = sizeof (buf);
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c.data = buf;
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memset(buf, 0xdeadcee5, sizeof (buf)); /* bad bad hexspeak for deadkeys */
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krb5_store_data(sp, c);
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/* This is the salt -- no need to send garbage */
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krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[1]);
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c.length = key->key_data_length[1];
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c.data = key->key_data_contents[1];
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krb5_store_data(sp, c);
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return 0;
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}
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kadm5_ret_t
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kadm5_ret_key_data(krb5_storage *sp,
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krb5_key_data *key)
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@@ -105,7 +137,7 @@ kadm5_ret_tl_data(krb5_storage *sp,
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static kadm5_ret_t
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store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp,
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kadm5_principal_ent_t princ,
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uint32_t mask)
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uint32_t mask, int wkeys)
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{
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int i;
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@@ -149,8 +181,12 @@ store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp,
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krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->fail_auth_count);
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if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
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krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->n_key_data);
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for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++)
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kadm5_store_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]);
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for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++) {
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if (wkeys)
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kadm5_store_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]);
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else
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kadm5_store_fake_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]);
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}
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}
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if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
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krb5_tl_data *tp;
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@@ -167,7 +203,14 @@ kadm5_ret_t
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kadm5_store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp,
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kadm5_principal_ent_t princ)
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{
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return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0);
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return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0, 1);
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}
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kadm5_ret_t
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kadm5_store_principal_ent_nokeys(krb5_storage *sp,
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kadm5_principal_ent_t princ)
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{
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return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0, 0);
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}
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kadm5_ret_t
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@@ -176,7 +219,7 @@ kadm5_store_principal_ent_mask(krb5_storage *sp,
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uint32_t mask)
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{
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krb5_store_int32(sp, mask);
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return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, mask);
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return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, mask, 1);
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}
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static kadm5_ret_t
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