kdc: update PAC hooks for Samba

Samba includes the user's long-term credentials (encrypted in the AS reply key)
to allow legacy authentication protocols such as NTLM to work even if the
pre-authentication mechanism replaced the reply key (as PKINIT does).

Samba also needs to know whether the client explicitly requested a PAC be
included (or excluded), in order to defer PAC exclusion until a service ticket
is issued (thereby avoiding a name binding attack if the user is renamed
between TGT and service ticket issuance).

References:

https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14561

Closes: #864

Original authors:
 - Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
 - Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
 - Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This commit is contained in:
Luke Howard
2021-12-14 12:40:31 +11:00
parent fcd8e33a98
commit 2087e07c1e
6 changed files with 77 additions and 27 deletions

View File

@@ -20,11 +20,20 @@ windc_fini(void *ctx)
static krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
pac_generate(void *ctx, krb5_context context,
struct hdb_entry_ex *client, krb5_pac *pac)
struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
struct hdb_entry_ex *server,
const krb5_keyblock *pk_replykey,
const krb5_boolean *pac_request,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data data;
if (pac_request != NULL && *pac_request == FALSE) {
*pac = NULL;
return 0;
}
krb5_warnx(context, "pac generate");
data.data = "\x00\x01";