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+
+
+Network Working Group                                        N. Williams
+Request for Comments: 4401                              Sun Microsystems
+Category: Standards Track                                  February 2006
+
+
+         A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) API Extension for the
+    Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
+
+Abstract
+
+   This document defines a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) extension to the
+   Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) for
+   keying application protocols given an established GSS-API security
+   context.  The primary intended use of this function is to key secure
+   session layers that do not or cannot use GSS-API per-message message
+   integrity check (MIC) and wrap tokens for session protection.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+   1. Introduction ....................................................2
+      1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................2
+   2. GSS_Pseudo_random() .............................................2
+      2.1. C-Bindings .................................................5
+   3. IANA Considerations .............................................5
+   4. Security Considerations .........................................5
+   5. References ......................................................7
+      5.1. Normative References .......................................7
+      5.2. Informative References .....................................7
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 1]
+
+RFC 4401            A PRF Extension for the GSS-API        February 2006
+
+
+1.  Introduction
+
+   A need has arisen for users of the GSS-API to key applications'
+   cryptographic protocols using established GSS-API security contexts.
+   Such applications can use the GSS-API [RFC2743] for authentication,
+   but not for transport security (for whatever reasons), and since the
+   GSS-API does not provide a method for obtaining keying material from
+   established security contexts, such applications cannot make
+   effective use of the GSS-API.
+
+   To address this need, we define a pseudo-random function (PRF)
+   extension to the GSS-API.
+
+   Though this document specifies an abstract API as an extension to the
+   GSS-API version 2, update 1, and though it specifies the bindings of
+   this extension for the C programming language, it does not specify a
+   revision of the GSS-API and so does not address the matter of how
+   portable applications detect support for and ensure access to this
+   extension.  We defer this matter to an expected, comprehensive update
+   to the GSS-API.
+
+1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document
+
+   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+2.  GSS_Pseudo_random()
+
+   Inputs:
+
+   o  context CONTEXT handle,
+
+   o  prf_key INTEGER,
+
+   o  prf_in OCTET STRING,
+
+   o  desired_output_len INTEGER
+
+
+   Outputs:
+
+   o  major_status INTEGER,
+
+   o  minor_status INTEGER,
+
+   o  prf_out OCTET STRING
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 2]
+
+RFC 4401            A PRF Extension for the GSS-API        February 2006
+
+
+   Return major_status codes:
+
+   o  GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
+
+   o  GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that a null context has been provided
+      as input.
+
+   o  GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that an expired context has been
+      provided as input.
+
+   o  GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the mechanism lacks support for
+      this function or, if the security context is not fully
+      established, that the context is not ready to compute the PRF with
+      the given prf_key, or that the given prf_key is not available.
+
+   o  GSS_S_FAILURE indicates general failure, possibly due to the given
+      input data being too large or of zero length, or due to the
+      desired_output_len being zero; the minor status code may provide
+      additional information.
+
+   This function applies the established context's mechanism's keyed
+   pseudo-random function (PRF) to the input data ('prf_in'), keyed with
+   key material associated with the given security context and
+   identified by 'prf_key', and outputs the resulting octet string
+   ('prf_out') of desired_output_len length.
+
+   The minimum input data length is one octet.
+
+   Mechanisms MUST be able to consume all the provided prf_in input data
+   that is 2^14 or fewer octets.
+
+   If a mechanism cannot consume as much input data as provided by the
+   caller, then GSS_Pseudo_random() MUST return GSS_S_FAILURE.
+
+   The minimum desired_output_len is one.
+
+   Mechanisms MUST be able to output at least up to 2^14 octets.
+
+   If the implementation cannot produce the desired output due to lack
+   of resources, then it MUST return GSS_S_FAILURE and MUST set a
+   suitable minor status code.
+
+   The prf_key can take on the following values: GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL,
+   GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, or mechanism-specific values, if any.  This
+   parameter is intended to distinguish between the best cryptographic
+   keys that may be available only after full security context
+   establishment and keys that may be available prior to full security
+   context establishment.  For some mechanisms, or contexts, those two
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 3]
+
+RFC 4401            A PRF Extension for the GSS-API        February 2006
+
+
+   prf_key values MAY refer to the same cryptographic keys; for
+   mechanisms like the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [RFC1964] where one
+   peer may assert a key that may be considered better than the others
+   they MAY be different keys.
+
+   GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL corresponds to a key that would have been used
+   while the security context was partially established, even if it is
+   fully established when GSS_Pseudo_random() is actually called.
+   Mechanism-specific prf_key values are intended to refer to any other
+   keys that may be available.
+
+   The GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL value corresponds to the best key available
+   for fully-established security contexts.
+
+   GSS_Pseudo_random() has the following properties:
+
+   o  its output string MUST be a pseudo-random function [GGM1] [GGM2]
+      of the input keyed with key material from the given security
+      context -- the chances of getting the same output given different
+      input parameters should be exponentially small.
+
+   o  when successfully applied to the same inputs by an initiator and
+      acceptor using the same security context, it MUST produce the
+      _same results_ for both, the initiator and acceptor, even if
+      called multiple times (as long as the security context is not
+      expired).
+
+   o  upon full establishment of a security context, all cryptographic
+      keys and/or negotiations used for computing the PRF with any
+      prf_key MUST be authenticated (mutually, if mutual authentication
+      is in effect for the given security context).
+
+   o  the outputs of the mechanism's GSS_Pseudo_random() (for different
+      inputs) and its per-message tokens for the given security context
+      MUST be "cryptographically separate"; in other words, it must not
+      be feasible to recover key material for one mechanism operation or
+      transform its tokens and PRF outputs from one to the other given
+      only said tokens and PRF outputs.  (This is a fancy way of saying
+      that key derivation and strong cryptographic operations and
+      constructions must be used.)
+
+   o  as implied by the above requirement, it MUST NOT be possible to
+      access any raw keys of a security context through
+      GSS_Pseudo_random(), no matter what inputs are given.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 4]
+
+RFC 4401            A PRF Extension for the GSS-API        February 2006
+
+
+2.1.  C-Bindings
+
+   #define GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL 0
+   #define GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL 1
+
+   OM_uint32 gss_pseudo_random(
+     OM_uint32                     *minor_status,
+     gss_ctx_id_t                  context,
+     int                           prf_key,
+     const gss_buffer_t            prf_in,
+     ssize_t                       desired_output_len,
+     gss_buffer_t                  prf_out
+   );
+
+   Additional major status codes for the C-bindings:
+
+   o  GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ
+
+   o  GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE
+
+   See [RFC2744].
+
+3.  IANA Considerations
+
+   This document has no IANA considerations currently.  If and when a
+   relevant IANA registry of GSS-API symbols is created, then the
+   generic and language-specific function names, constant names, and
+   constant values described above should be added to such a registry.
+
+4.  Security Considerations
+
+   Care should be taken in properly designing a mechanism's PRF
+   function.
+
+   GSS mechanisms' PRF functions should use a key derived from contexts'
+   authenticated session keys and should preserve the forward security
+   properties of the mechanisms' key exchanges.
+
+   Some mechanisms may support the GSS PRF function with security
+   contexts that are not fully established, but applications MUST assume
+   that authentication, mutual or otherwise, has not completed until the
+   security context is fully established.
+
+   Callers of GSS_Pseudo_random() should avoid accidentally calling it
+   with the same inputs.  One useful technique is to prepend to the
+   prf_in input string, by convention, a string indicating the intended
+   purpose of the PRF output in such a way that unique contexts in which
+   the function is called yield unique inputs to it.
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 5]
+
+RFC 4401            A PRF Extension for the GSS-API        February 2006
+
+
+   Pseudo-random functions are, by their nature, capable of producing
+   only limited amounts of cryptographically secure output.  The exact
+   amount of output that one can safely use, unfortunately, varies from
+   one PRF to another (which prevents us from recommending specific
+   numbers).  Because of this, we recommend that unless you really know
+   what you are doing (i.e., you are a cryptographer and are qualified
+   to pass judgement on cryptographic functions in areas of period,
+   presence of short cycles, etc.), you limit the amount of the PRF
+   output used to the necessary minimum.  See [RFC4086] for more
+   information about "Randomness Requirements for Security".
+
+   For some mechanisms, the computational cost of computing
+   GSS_Pseudo_random() may increase significantly as the length of the
+   prf_in data and/or the desired_output_length increase.  This means
+   that if an application can be tricked into providing very large input
+   octet strings and requesting very long output octet strings, then
+   that may constitute a denial of service attack on the application;
+   therefore, applications SHOULD place appropriate limits on the size
+   of any input octet strings received from their peers without
+   integrity protection.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 6]
+
+RFC 4401            A PRF Extension for the GSS-API        February 2006
+
+
+5.  References
+
+5.1.  Normative References
+
+   [GGM1]     Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., and S. Micali, "How to
+              Construct Random Functions", Journal of the ACM, October
+              1986.
+
+   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+   [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
+              Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
+
+   [RFC2744]  Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
+              C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000.
+
+5.2.  Informative References
+
+   [GGM2]     Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., and S. Micali, "On the
+              Cryptographic Applications of Random Functions",
+              Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology, 1985.
+
+   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
+              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
+              June 2005.
+
+   [RFC1964]  Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC
+              1964, June 1996.
+
+Author's Address
+
+   Nicolas Williams
+   Sun Microsystems
+   5300 Riata Trace Ct
+   Austin, TX  78727
+   US
+
+   EMail: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 7]
+
+RFC 4401            A PRF Extension for the GSS-API        February 2006
+
+
+Full Copyright Statement
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
+
+   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
+   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
+   retain all their rights.
+
+   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
+   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
+   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
+   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
+   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
+   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
+   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Intellectual Property
+
+   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
+   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
+   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
+   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
+   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
+   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
+   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
+   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
+
+   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
+   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
+   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
+   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
+   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
+   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
+
+   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
+   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
+   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
+   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
+   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
+   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 8]
+
diff --git a/doc/standardisation/rfc4402.txt b/doc/standardisation/rfc4402.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c6f1d871c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/standardisation/rfc4402.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Network Working Group                                        N. Williams
+Request for Comments: 4402                                           Sun
+Category: Standards Track                                  February 2006
+
+
+   A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the Kerberos V Generic Security
+       Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
+
+Abstract
+
+   This document defines the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the
+   Kerberos V mechanism for the Generic Security Service Application
+   Program Interface (GSS-API), based on the PRF defined for the
+   Kerberos V cryptographic framework, for keying application protocols
+   given an established Kerberos V GSS-API security context.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+   1. Introduction ....................................................2
+      1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................2
+   2. Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF ....................................2
+   3. IANA Considerations .............................................3
+   4. Security Considerations .........................................3
+   5. Normative References ............................................4
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 1]
+
+RFC 4402           A PRF for the Kerberos V Mechanism      February 2006
+
+
+1.  Introduction
+
+   This document specifies the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism's [RFC4121]
+   pseudo-random function corresponding to [RFC4401].  The function is a
+   "PRF+" style construction.  For more information see [RFC4401],
+   [RFC2743], [RFC2744], and [RFC4121].
+
+1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document
+
+   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+2.  Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF
+
+   The GSS-API PRF [RFC4401] function for the Kerberos V mechanism
+   [RFC4121] shall be the output of a PRF+ function based on the
+   encryption type's PRF function keyed with the negotiated session key
+   of the security context corresponding to the 'prf_key' input
+   parameter of GSS_Pseudo_random().
+
+   This PRF+ MUST be keyed with the key indicated by the 'prf_key' input
+   parameter as follows:
+
+   o  GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the
+      acceptor, if any, or the sub-session asserted by the initiator, if
+      any, or the Ticket's session key
+
+   o  GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the
+      initiator, if any, or the Ticket's session key
+
+   The PRF+ function is a simple counter-based extension of the Kerberos
+   V pseudo-random function [RFC3961] for the encryption type of the
+   security context's keys:
+
+         PRF+(K, L, S) = truncate(L, T1 || T2 || .. || Tn)
+
+         Tn = pseudo-random(K, n || S)
+
+   where '||' is the concatenation operator, 'n' is encoded as a network
+   byte order 32-bit unsigned binary number, truncate(L, S) truncates
+   the input octet string S to length L, and pseudo-random() is the
+   Kerberos V pseudo-random function [RFC3961].
+
+   The maximum output size of the Kerberos V mechanism's GSS-API PRF
+   then is, necessarily, 2^32 times the output size of the pseudo-
+   random() function for the encryption type of the given key.
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 2]
+
+RFC 4402           A PRF for the Kerberos V Mechanism      February 2006
+
+
+   When the input size is longer than 2^14 octets as per [RFC4401] and
+   exceeds an implementation's resources, then the mechanism MUST return
+   GSS_S_FAILURE and GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG as the minor status
+   code.
+
+3.  IANA Considerations
+
+   This document has no IANA considerations currently.  If and when a
+   relevant IANA registry of GSS-API symbols and constants is created,
+   then the GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG minor status code should be
+   added to such a registry.
+
+4.  Security Considerations
+
+   Kerberos V encryption types' PRF functions use a key derived from
+   contexts' session keys and should preserve the forward security
+   properties of the mechanisms' key exchanges.
+
+   Legacy Kerberos V encryption types may be weak, particularly the
+   single-DES encryption types.
+
+   See also [RFC4401] for generic security considerations of
+   GSS_Pseudo_random().
+
+   See also [RFC3961] for generic security considerations of the
+   Kerberos V cryptographic framework.
+
+   Use of Ticket session keys, rather than sub-session keys, when
+   initiators and acceptors fail to assert sub-session keys, is
+   dangerous as ticket reuse can lead to key reuse; therefore,
+   initiators should assert sub-session keys always, and acceptors
+   should assert sub-session keys at least when initiators fail to do
+   so.
+
+   The computational cost of computing this PRF+ may vary depending on
+   the Kerberos V encryption types being used, but generally the
+   computation of this PRF+ gets more expensive as the input and output
+   octet string lengths grow (note that the use of a counter in the PRF+
+   construction allows for parallelization).  This means that if an
+   application can be tricked into providing very large input octet
+   strings and requesting very long output octet strings, then that may
+   constitute a denial of service attack on the application; therefore,
+   applications SHOULD place appropriate limits on the size of any input
+   octet strings received from their peers without integrity protection.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 3]
+
+RFC 4402           A PRF for the Kerberos V Mechanism      February 2006
+
+
+5.  Normative References
+
+   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+   [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
+              Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
+
+   [RFC2744]  Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
+              C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000.
+
+   [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
+              Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
+
+   [RFC4121]  Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
+              Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
+              Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
+              July 2005.
+
+   [RFC4401]  Williams, N., "A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) API
+              Extension for the Generic Security Service Application
+              Program Interface (GSS-API)", RFC 4401, February 2006.
+
+Author's Address
+
+   Nicolas Williams
+   Sun Microsystems
+   5300 Riata Trace Ct
+   Austin, TX  78727
+   US
+
+   EMail: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 4]
+
+RFC 4402           A PRF for the Kerberos V Mechanism      February 2006
+
+
+Full Copyright Statement
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
+
+   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
+   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
+   retain all their rights.
+
+   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
+   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
+   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
+   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
+   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
+   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
+   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Intellectual Property
+
+   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
+   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
+   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
+   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
+   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
+   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
+   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
+   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
+
+   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
+   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
+   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
+   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
+   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
+   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
+
+   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
+   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
+   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
+   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
+   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
+   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Williams                    Standards Track                     [Page 5]
+