diff --git a/kdc/digest-service.c b/kdc/digest-service.c index 4d339a2dd..575850c29 100644 --- a/kdc/digest-service.c +++ b/kdc/digest-service.c @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ typedef struct pk_client_params pk_client_params; struct DigestREQ; struct Kx509Request; +typedef struct kdc_request_desc *kdc_request_t; + #include krb5_kdc_configuration *config; diff --git a/kdc/headers.h b/kdc/headers.h index aced5ce61..9e7af82e9 100644 --- a/kdc/headers.h +++ b/kdc/headers.h @@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ #include #include +#include + #undef ALLOC #define ALLOC(X) ((X) = calloc(1, sizeof(*(X)))) #undef ALLOC_SEQ diff --git a/kdc/kdc_locl.h b/kdc/kdc_locl.h index 36d694dae..40dcae16b 100644 --- a/kdc/kdc_locl.h +++ b/kdc/kdc_locl.h @@ -43,8 +43,51 @@ typedef struct pk_client_params pk_client_params; struct DigestREQ; struct Kx509Request; +typedef struct kdc_request_desc *kdc_request_t; + #include +struct kdc_request_desc { + krb5_context context; + krb5_kdc_configuration *config; + + /* */ + + krb5_data request; + KDC_REQ req; + METHOD_DATA *padata; + + /* out */ + + METHOD_DATA outpadata; + + KDC_REP rep; + EncTicketPart et; + EncKDCRepPart ek; + + /* PA methods can affect both the reply key and the session key (pkinit) */ + krb5_keyblock sessionetype; + krb5_keyblock reply_key; + krb5_keyblock session_key; + + const char *e_text; + + /* state */ + krb5_principal client_princ; + char *client_name; + hdb_entry_ex *client; + HDB *clientdb; + + krb5_principal server_princ; + char *server_name; + hdb_entry_ex *server; + + krb5_crypto armor_crypto; + + heim_dict_t pastate; +}; + + extern sig_atomic_t exit_flag; extern size_t max_request_udp; extern size_t max_request_tcp; diff --git a/kdc/kerberos5.c b/kdc/kerberos5.c index 532c29e6b..db1494208 100644 --- a/kdc/kerberos5.c +++ b/kdc/kerberos5.c @@ -271,24 +271,366 @@ _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context, type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str); } +static krb5_error_code +make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md, + krb5_crypto crypto) +{ + PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + EncryptedData encdata; + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t usec; + int usec2; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec); + usec2 = usec; + p.pausec = &usec2; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC, + buf, + len, + 0, + &encdata); + free(buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret); + free_EncryptedData(&encdata); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(buf_size != len) + krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); + + ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len); + if (ret) + free(buf); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa) +{ + krb5_data pepper1, pepper2, ts_data; + KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body; + EncryptedData enc_data; + krb5_enctype aenctype; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct Key *k; + size_t size; + int i; + + heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST"); + + if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon"); + return ret; + } + + ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data, + pa->padata_value.length, + &enc_data, + &size); + if (ret) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s", + r->client_name); + return ret; + } + + pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor"; + pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data); + pepper2.data = "challengelongterm"; + pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data); + + krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype); + + for (i = 0; i < r->client->entry.keys.len; i++) { + krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto; + krb5_keyblock challangekey; + PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; + + k = &r->client->entry.keys.val[i]; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto); + if (ret) + continue; + + ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto, + &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype, + &challangekey); + krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto); + if (ret) + continue; + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challangekey, 0, + &challangecrypto); + if (ret) + continue; + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r->context, challangecrypto, + KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT, + &enc_data, + &ts_data); + if (ret) + continue; + + ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data, + ts_data.length, + &p, + &size); + krb5_data_free(&ts_data); + if(ret){ + krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, + 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s", + r->client_name); + continue; + } + + if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) { + char client_time[100]; + + krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto); + + krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp, + client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE); + + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, + "Too large time skew, " + "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s", + client_time, + (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp), + r->context->max_skew, + r->client_name); + + free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); + goto out; + } + + free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); + + ret = make_pa_enc_challange(r->context, &r->outpadata, + challangecrypto); + krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challangecrypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + + set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, k->salt); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key); + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key); + ret = 0; + break; + } + if (i < r->client->entry.keys.len) + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + out: + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa) +{ + EncryptedData enc_data; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_data ts_data; + PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; + size_t len; + Key *pa_key; + char *str; + + if (r->req.req_body.kdc_options.request_anonymous) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + r->e_text = "ENC-TS doesn't suport anon"; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon"); + goto out; + } + + ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data, + pa->padata_value.length, + &enc_data, + &len); + if (ret) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s", + r->client_name); + goto out; + } + + ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, + enc_data.etype, &pa_key); + if(ret){ + char *estr; + r->e_text = "No key matching entype"; + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr)) + estr = NULL; + if(estr == NULL) + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 5, + "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s", + enc_data.etype, r->client_name); + else + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 5, + "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s", + estr, r->client_name); + free(estr); + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + goto out; + } + + try_next_key: + ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret); + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg); + krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg); + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, + &enc_data, + &ts_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto); + /* + * Since the user might have several keys with the same + * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all + * the keys with the same enctype. + */ + if(ret){ + krb5_error_code ret2; + const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret); + + ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, + pa_key->key.keytype, &str); + if (ret2) + str = NULL; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 5, + "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s " + "(enctype %s) error %s", + r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg); + krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg); + free(str); + + if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, &r->client->entry, + enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0) + goto try_next_key; + + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + + if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) + r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client, + HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD); + + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + goto out; + } + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data, + ts_data.length, + &p, + &len); + krb5_data_free(&ts_data); + if(ret){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, + 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s", + r->client_name); + goto out; + } + if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) { + char client_time[100]; + + krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp, + client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE); + + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0, + "Too large time skew, " + "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s", + client_time, + (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp), + r->context->max_skew, + r->client_name); + + /* + * The following is needed to make windows clients to + * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if + * there is a e_text, they become unhappy. + */ + r->e_text = NULL; + free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); + goto out; + } + free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); + + set_salt_padata(&r->outpadata, pa_key->salt); + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str); + if (ret) + str = NULL; + kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 2, + "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s", + r->client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype"); + free(str); + + ret = 0; + + out: + + return ret; +} + struct kdc_patypes { int type; char *name; unsigned int flags; #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1 -#ifdef PKINIT -#define PA_ANNOUNCE_PKINIT PA_ANNOUNCE -#else -#define PA_ANNOUNCE_PKINIT 0 -#endif +#define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */ + krb5_error_code (*validate)(kdc_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa); }; static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = { - { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE_PKINIT }, - { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE_PKINIT }, +#ifdef PKINIT + { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE }, + { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE }, +#else + { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0 }, + { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0 }, +#endif { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0 }, - { KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS", PA_ANNOUNCE }, - { KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL", PA_ANNOUNCE }, + { + KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS", + PA_ANNOUNCE, + pa_enc_ts_validate + }, + { + KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL", + PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REQ_FAST, + pa_enc_chal_validate + }, { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0 }, { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE }, { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0 }, @@ -1063,53 +1405,6 @@ _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal) return 1; } -static krb5_error_code -make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context, METHOD_DATA *md, - krb5_crypto crypto) -{ - PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; - unsigned char *buf; - size_t buf_size; - size_t len; - EncryptedData encdata; - krb5_error_code ret; - int32_t usec; - int usec2; - - krb5_us_timeofday (context, &p.patimestamp, &usec); - usec2 = usec; - p.pausec = &usec2; - - ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC, buf, buf_size, &p, &len, ret); - if (ret) - return ret; - if(buf_size != len) - krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); - - ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, - crypto, - KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC, - buf, - len, - 0, - &encdata); - free(buf); - if (ret) - return ret; - - ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData, buf, buf_size, &encdata, &len, ret); - free_EncryptedData(&encdata); - if (ret) - return ret; - if(buf_size != len) - krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder"); - - ret = krb5_padata_add(context, md, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE, buf, len); - if (ret) - free(buf); - return ret; -} - static krb5_error_code unwrap_fast(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_configuration *config, @@ -1344,41 +1639,33 @@ unwrap_fast(krb5_context context, */ krb5_error_code -_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, - krb5_kdc_configuration *config, - KDC_REQ *req, - const krb5_data *req_buffer, +_kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r, krb5_data *reply, const char *from, struct sockaddr *from_addr, int datagram_reply) { + krb5_context context = r->context; + krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config; + KDC_REQ *req = &r->req; + const krb5_data *req_buffer = &r->request; KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL; AS_REP rep; KDCOptions f; - hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL; - HDB *clientdb; krb5_enctype setype, sessionetype; EncTicketPart et; EncKDCRepPart ek; - krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL; - char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL; krb5_error_code ret = 0; - const char *e_text = NULL; - krb5_crypto crypto; Key *ckey, *skey; - EncryptionKey *reply_key = NULL, session_key; int flags = 0; #ifdef PKINIT pk_client_params *pkp = NULL; #endif METHOD_DATA error_method; - krb5_crypto armor_crypto = NULL; memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et)); memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek)); - memset(&session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); error_method.len = 0; error_method.val = NULL; @@ -1389,7 +1676,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, /* * Look for FAST armor and unwrap */ - ret = unwrap_fast(context, config, req, &armor_crypto); + ret = unwrap_fast(context, config, req, &r->armor_crypto); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1401,14 +1688,14 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, if(b->sname == NULL){ ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - e_text = "No server in request"; + r->e_text = "No server in request"; } else{ ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context, - &server_princ, + &r->server_princ, *(b->sname), b->realm); if (ret == 0) - ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name); + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name); } if (ret) { kdc_log(context, config, 0, @@ -1417,16 +1704,16 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, } if(b->cname == NULL){ ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; - e_text = "No client in request"; + r->e_text = "No client in request"; } else { ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context, - &client_princ, + &r->client_princ, *(b->cname), b->realm); if (ret) goto out; - ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name); + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name); } if (ret) { kdc_log(context, config, 0, @@ -1435,13 +1722,13 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, } kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s", - client_name, from, server_name); + r->client_name, from, r->server_name); /* * */ - if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) { + if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) { if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) { kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag"); ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; @@ -1450,7 +1737,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) { kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Request for a anonymous ticket with non " - "anonymous client name: %s", client_name); + "anonymous client name: %s", r->client_name); ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; goto out; } @@ -1459,28 +1746,30 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, * */ - ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ, + ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL, - &clientdb, &client); + &r->clientdb, &r->client); if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) { - kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", client_name); + kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", + r->client_name); goto out; } else if(ret){ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret); - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name, msg); + kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg); krb5_free_error_message(context, msg); ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; goto out; } - ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ, + ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ, HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags, - NULL, NULL, &server); + NULL, NULL, &r->server); if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) { - kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", server_name); + kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", + r->server_name); goto out; } else if(ret){ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret); - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name, msg); + kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg); krb5_free_error_message(context, msg); ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; goto out; @@ -1509,153 +1798,51 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, client_name, from); goto out; } - /* - * But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "not - * the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from - * the client list and hope that that will work for any other - * KDCs. - */ /* * Pre-auth processing */ if(req->padata){ - int i; const PA_DATA *pa; int found_pa = 0; + unsigned int n; + int i; log_patypes(context, config, req->padata); - kdc_log(context, config, 5, - "Looking for ENCRYPTED-CHALLANGE pa-data -- %s", client_name); + /* Check if preauth matching */ - e_text = "No FAST ENCRYPTED CHALLANGE found"; - - i = 0; - pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE); - if (pa && armor_crypto) { - krb5_data ts_data; - struct Key *k; - size_t size; - - if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) { - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon"); - goto out; - } - - EncryptedData enc_data; - - ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data, - pa->padata_value.length, - &enc_data, - &size); - if (ret) { - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s", - client_name); - goto out; - } - - krb5_data pepper1, pepper2; - - pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor"; - pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data); - pepper2.data = "challengelongterm"; - pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data); - - krb5_enctype aenctype; - krb5_crypto_getenctype(context, armor_crypto, &aenctype); - - for (i = 0; i < client->entry.keys.len; i++) { - krb5_crypto challangecrypto, longtermcrypto; - krb5_keyblock challangekey; - PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; - - k = &client->entry.keys.val[i]; - - ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto); - if (ret) - continue; - - ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(context, armor_crypto, longtermcrypto, - &pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype, - &challangekey); - krb5_crypto_destroy(context, longtermcrypto); - if (ret) - continue; - - ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &challangekey, 0, - &challangecrypto); - if (ret) - continue; - - ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, challangecrypto, - KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT, - &enc_data, - &ts_data); - if (ret) - continue; - - ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data, - ts_data.length, - &p, - &size); - krb5_data_free(&ts_data); - if(ret){ - krb5_crypto_destroy(context, challangecrypto); - e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC"; - ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; - kdc_log(context, config, - 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s", - client_name); - continue; - } - - if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) { - char client_time[100]; - - krb5_crypto_destroy(context, challangecrypto); - - krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp, - client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE); - - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) { + if (pat[n].validate == NULL) + continue; + if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST)) + continue; + kdc_log(context, config, 5, + "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name); + i = 0; + pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type); + if (pa) { + ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa); + if (ret == 0) { kdc_log(context, config, 0, - "Too large time skew, " - "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s", - client_time, - (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp), - context->max_skew, - client_name); - - free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); - goto out; + "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s", + pat[n].name, r->client_name); + found_pa = 1; } - - free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); - et.flags.pre_authent = 1; - - ret = make_pa_enc_challange(context, rep.padata, - challangecrypto); - krb5_crypto_destroy(context, challangecrypto); - if (ret) - goto out; - - set_salt_padata(rep.padata, k->salt); - reply_key = &k->key; - - goto preauth_done; } - free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + } + + if (found_pa) { + et.flags.pre_authent = 1; + goto preauth_done; } #ifdef PKINIT kdc_log(context, config, 5, - "Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name); + "Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", r->client_name); - e_text = "No PKINIT PA found"; + r->e_text = "No PKINIT PA found"; i = 0; pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ); @@ -1666,29 +1853,29 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, if (pa) { char *client_cert = NULL; - ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, client, &pkp); + ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, r->client, &pkp); if (ret) { ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s", - client_name); - goto ts_enc; + r->client_name); + goto out; } if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL) - goto ts_enc; + goto out; ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context, config, - clientdb, - client, + r->clientdb, + r->client, pkp, &client_cert); if (ret) { - e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to " + r->e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to " "impersonate principal"; _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp); - - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text); + + kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", r->e_text); pkp = NULL; goto out; } @@ -1697,172 +1884,9 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, et.flags.pre_authent = 1; kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s", - client_name, client_cert); + r->client_name, client_cert); free(client_cert); - if (pkp) - goto preauth_done; } - ts_enc: -#endif - kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s", - client_name); - - i = 0; - e_text = "No ENC-TS found"; - while((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){ - krb5_data ts_data; - PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; - size_t len; - EncryptedData enc_data; - Key *pa_key; - char *str; - - found_pa = 1; - - if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) { - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon"); - goto out; - } - - ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data, - pa->padata_value.length, - &enc_data, - &len); - if (ret) { - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; - kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s", - client_name); - goto out; - } - - ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry, - enc_data.etype, &pa_key); - if(ret){ - char *estr; - e_text = "No key matches pa-data"; - ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; - if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr)) - estr = NULL; - if(estr == NULL) - kdc_log(context, config, 5, - "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s", - enc_data.etype, client_name); - else - kdc_log(context, config, 5, - "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s", - estr, client_name); - free(estr); - free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); - - continue; - } - - try_next_key: - ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto); - if (ret) { - const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret); - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg); - krb5_free_error_message(context, msg); - free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); - continue; - } - - ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, - crypto, - KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, - &enc_data, - &ts_data); - krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); - /* - * Since the user might have several keys with the same - * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all - * the keys with the same enctype. - */ - if(ret){ - krb5_error_code ret2; - const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret); - - ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, - pa_key->key.keytype, &str); - if (ret2) - str = NULL; - kdc_log(context, config, 5, - "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s " - "(enctype %s) error %s", - client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg); - krb5_free_error_message(context, msg); - free(str); - - if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry, - enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0) - goto try_next_key; - e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA"; - - free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); - - if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status) - (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client, HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD); - - ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; - continue; - } - free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); - ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data, - ts_data.length, - &p, - &len); - krb5_data_free(&ts_data); - if(ret){ - e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC"; - ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; - kdc_log(context, config, - 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s", - client_name); - continue; - } - if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) { - char client_time[100]; - - krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp, - client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE); - - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; - kdc_log(context, config, 0, - "Too large time skew, " - "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s", - client_time, - (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp), - context->max_skew, - client_name); - - /* - * The following is needed to make windows clients to - * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if - * there is a e_text, they become unhappy. - */ - e_text = NULL; - free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); - goto out; - } - free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); - et.flags.pre_authent = 1; - - set_salt_padata(rep.padata, pa_key->salt); - - reply_key = &pa_key->key; - - ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str); - if (ret) - str = NULL; - - kdc_log(context, config, 2, - "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s", - client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype"); - free(str); - break; - } -#ifdef PKINIT preauth_done: #endif if(found_pa == 0 && config->require_preauth) @@ -1870,14 +1894,14 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, /* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there was some problem with it, other than too large skew */ if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){ - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name); - e_text = NULL; + kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", r->e_text, r->client_name); + r->e_text = NULL; goto out; } }else if (config->require_preauth || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */ - || client->entry.flags.require_preauth - || server->entry.flags.require_preauth) { + || r->client->entry.flags.require_preauth + || r->server->entry.flags.require_preauth) { size_t n; use_pa: for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) { @@ -1922,25 +1946,25 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, } ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; - e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ", + r->e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ", kdc_log(context, config, 0, "No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s", - client_name); + r->client_name); goto out; } - if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status) - (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client, - HDB_AUTH_SUCCESS); + if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) + r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client, + HDB_AUTH_SUCCESS); /* * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity * with in a preauth mech. */ - ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, client, client_name, - server, server_name, + ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name, + r->server, r->server_name, req, &error_method); if(ret) goto out; @@ -1951,7 +1975,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, */ ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config, - server, server_name, + r->server, r->server_name, &setype, &skey); if(ret) goto out; @@ -1959,25 +1983,25 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey || (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) { ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; - e_text = "Bad KDC options"; - kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name); + r->e_text = "Bad KDC options"; + kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", r->client_name); goto out; } rep.pvno = 5; rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep; - ret = copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm); + ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm); if (ret) goto out; - ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, client->entry.principal); + ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal); if (ret) goto out; rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5; - copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm); + copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm); _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, - server->entry.principal); + r->server->entry.principal); /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that * uncomplicated name-types. */ #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t) @@ -1986,40 +2010,40 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, #undef CNT et.flags.initial = 1; - if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable) + if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable) et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable; else if (f.forwardable) { - e_text = "Ticket may not be forwardable"; + r->e_text = "Ticket may not be forwardable"; ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; kdc_log(context, config, 0, - "Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name); + "Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", r->client_name); goto out; } - if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable) + if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable) et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable; else if (f.proxiable) { - e_text = "Ticket may not be proxiable"; + r->e_text = "Ticket may not be proxiable"; ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; kdc_log(context, config, 0, - "Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name); + "Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", r->client_name); goto out; } - if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate) + if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate) et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate; else if (f.allow_postdate){ - e_text = "Ticket may not be postdate"; + r->e_text = "Ticket may not be postdate"; ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; kdc_log(context, config, 0, - "Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name); + "Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", r->client_name); goto out; } /* check for valid set of addresses */ if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) { - e_text = "Bad address list in requested"; + r->e_text = "Bad address list in requested"; ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; kdc_log(context, config, 0, - "Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name); + "Bad address list requested -- %s", r->client_name); goto out; } @@ -2047,10 +2071,10 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, /* be careful not overflowing */ - if(client->entry.max_life) - t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_life); - if(server->entry.max_life) - t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_life); + if(r->client->entry.max_life) + t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life); + if(r->server->entry.max_life) + t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life); #if 0 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life); #endif @@ -2068,10 +2092,10 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, t = *b->rtime; if(t == 0) t = MAX_TIME; - if(client->entry.max_renew) - t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_renew); - if(server->entry.max_renew) - t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_renew); + if(r->client->entry.max_renew) + t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew); + if(r->server->entry.max_renew) + t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew); #if 0 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew); #endif @@ -2107,16 +2131,16 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, goto out; } ek.last_req.len = 0; - if (client->entry.pw_end + if (r->client->entry.pw_end && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0 - || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *client->entry.pw_end)) { + || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) { ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME; - ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.pw_end; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end; ++ek.last_req.len; } - if (client->entry.valid_end) { + if (r->client->entry.valid_end) { ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME; - ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.valid_end; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end; ++ek.last_req.len; } if (ek.last_req.len == 0) { @@ -2125,16 +2149,16 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, ++ek.last_req.len; } ek.nonce = b->nonce; - if (client->entry.valid_end || client->entry.pw_end) { + if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) { ALLOC(ek.key_expiration); - if (client->entry.valid_end) { - if (client->entry.pw_end) - *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end, - *client->entry.pw_end); + if (r->client->entry.valid_end) { + if (r->client->entry.pw_end) + *ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end, + *r->client->entry.pw_end); else - *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end; + *ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end; } else - *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.pw_end; + *ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end; } else ek.key_expiration = NULL; ek.flags = et.flags; @@ -2157,10 +2181,10 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, #if PKINIT if (pkp) { - e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply"; - ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client, + r->e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply"; + ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, r->client, sessionetype, req, req_buffer, - &reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata); + &r->reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata); if (ret) goto out; ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context, @@ -2178,8 +2202,8 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, goto out; } - if (reply_key == NULL) { - e_text = "Client have no reply key"; + if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) { + r->e_text = "Client have no reply key"; ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET; goto out; } @@ -2199,7 +2223,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon)); canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname; - canon.names.mapped_name = client->entry.principal->name; + canon.names.mapped_name = r->client->entry.principal->name; ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length, &canon.names, &len, ret); @@ -2250,22 +2274,22 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p = NULL; krb5_data data; - ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p); + ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, r->client, &p); if (ret) { kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s", - client_name); + r->client_name); goto out; } if (p != NULL) { ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime, - client->entry.principal, + r->client->entry.principal, &skey->key, /* Server key */ &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */ &data); krb5_pac_free(context, p); if (ret) { kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s", - client_name); + r->client_name); goto out; } @@ -2284,19 +2308,19 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */ ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context, config, - server, + r->server, setype, - client->entry.principal, + r->client->entry.principal, NULL, NULL, &et); if (ret) goto out; - log_as_req(context, config, reply_key->keytype, setype, b); + log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b); { - PA_DATA *pa; + const PA_DATA *pa; int i = 0; pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP); @@ -2305,10 +2329,10 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, } ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config, req_buffer, - armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce, - &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno, - &skey->key, client->entry.kvno, - reply_key, 0, &e_text, reply); + r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce, + &rep, &et, &ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno, + &skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno, + &r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply); if (ret) goto out; @@ -2316,7 +2340,7 @@ _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context, if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) { krb5_data_free(reply); ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG; - e_text = "Reply packet too large"; + r->e_text = "Reply packet too large"; } out: @@ -2329,10 +2353,10 @@ out: kdc_log(context, config, 10, "as-req: sending error: %d to client", ret); ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, &error_method, - armor_crypto, + r->armor_crypto, &req->req_body, - ret, e_text, - client_princ, server_princ, + ret, r->e_text, + r->client_princ, r->server_princ, NULL, NULL, reply); if (ret) @@ -2348,18 +2372,34 @@ out2: if (error_method.len) free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method); - if (client_princ) - krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ); - free(client_name); - if (server_princ) - krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ); - free(server_name); - if(client) - _kdc_free_ent(context, client); - if(server) - _kdc_free_ent(context, server); - if (armor_crypto) - krb5_crypto_destroy(context, armor_crypto); + if (r->outpadata.len) + free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata); + if (r->client_princ) { + krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ); + r->client_princ = NULL; + } + if (r->client_name) { + free(r->client_name); + r->client_name = NULL; + } + if (r->server_princ){ + krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ); + r->server_princ = NULL; + } + if (r->server_name) { + free(r->server_name); + r->server_name = NULL; + } + if (r->client) + _kdc_free_ent(context, r->client); + if (r->server) + _kdc_free_ent(context, r->server); + if (r->armor_crypto) { + krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto); + r->armor_crypto = NULL; + } + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key); return ret; } diff --git a/kdc/pkinit.c b/kdc/pkinit.c index d85b15650..7d81829b7 100644 --- a/kdc/pkinit.c +++ b/kdc/pkinit.c @@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@ _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype sessionetype, const KDC_REQ *req, const krb5_data *req_buffer, - krb5_keyblock **reply_key, + krb5_keyblock *reply_key, krb5_keyblock *sessionkey, METHOD_DATA *md) { @@ -1563,7 +1563,7 @@ out: hx509_cert_free(kdc_cert); if (ret == 0) - *reply_key = &cp->reply_key; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, &cp->reply_key, reply_key); return ret; } diff --git a/kdc/process.c b/kdc/process.c index 6f3691580..c6535bb22 100644 --- a/kdc/process.c +++ b/kdc/process.c @@ -57,19 +57,25 @@ kdc_as_req(krb5_context context, int datagram_reply, int *claim) { + struct kdc_request_desc r; krb5_error_code ret; - KDC_REQ req; size_t len; - ret = decode_AS_REQ(req_buffer->data, req_buffer->length, &req, &len); + memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r)); + + ret = decode_AS_REQ(req_buffer->data, req_buffer->length, &r.req, &len); if (ret) return ret; + r.context = context; + r.config = config; + r.request.data = req_buffer->data; + r.request.length = req_buffer->length; + *claim = 1; - ret = _kdc_as_rep(context, config, &req, req_buffer, - reply, from, addr, datagram_reply); - free_AS_REQ(&req); + ret = _kdc_as_rep(&r, reply, from, addr, datagram_reply); + free_AS_REQ(&r.req); return ret; } diff --git a/tests/kdc/check-fast.in b/tests/kdc/check-fast.in index c565f25db..15321bb90 100644 --- a/tests/kdc/check-fast.in +++ b/tests/kdc/check-fast.in @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ export KRB5_CONFIG testfailed="echo test failed; cat messages.log; exit 1" # If there is no useful db support compile in, disable test -${have_db} || exit 77 +#${have_db} || exit 77 R=TEST.H5L.SE @@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ if [ -f ${mit}/kinit ] ; then echo "Checking for FAST avail" ${klist} --hidden | grep fast_avail > /dev/null || { exit 1; } + echo "Getting service ticket" + ${mit}/kvno -c ${cache} ${server}@${R} || { exit 1; } + fi