

Kerberos Working Group                                            L. Zhu
Internet-Draft                                     Microsoft Corporation
Updates: 4120 (if approved)                                   S. Hartman
Intended status: Standards Track                       Painless Security
Expires: January 15, 2009                                  July 14, 2008


        A Generalized Framework for Kerberos Pre-Authentication
                 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-08

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Abstract

   Kerberos is a protocol for verifying the identity of principals
   (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open network.
   The Kerberos protocol provides a mechanism called pre-authentication
   for proving the identity of a principal and for better protecting the
   long-term secret of the principal.

   This document describes a model for Kerberos pre-authentication
   mechanisms.  The model describes what state in the Kerberos request a
   pre-authentication mechanism is likely to change.  It also describes
   how multiple pre-authentication mechanisms used in the same request
   will interact.



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   This document also provides common tools needed by multiple pre-
   authentication mechanisms.  One of these tools is a secure channel
   between the client and the KDC with a reply key delivery mechanism;
   this secure channel can be used to protect the authentication
   exchange thus eliminate offline dictionary attacks.  With these
   tools, it is relatively straightforward to chain multiple
   authentication mechanisms, utilize a different key management system,
   or support a new key agreement algorithm.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Conventions and Terminology Used in This Document  . . . . . .  5
   3.  Model for Pre-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Information Managed by the Pre-authentication Model  . . .  6
     3.2.  Initial Pre-authentication Required Error  . . . . . . . .  8
     3.3.  Client to KDC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.4.  KDC to Client  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Pre-Authentication Facilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  Client-authentication Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.2.  Strengthening-reply-key Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.3.  Replacing-reply-key Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.4.  KDC-authentication Facility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   5.  Requirements for Pre-Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Tools for Use in Pre-Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 15
     6.1.  Combining Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.2.  Protecting Requests/Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.3.  Managing States for the KDC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     6.4.  Pre-authentication Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.5.  Definition of Kerberos FAST Padata . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       6.5.1.  FAST Armors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       6.5.2.  FAST Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       6.5.3.  FAST Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       6.5.4.  Authenticated Kerberos Error Messages using
               Kerberos FAST  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
       6.5.5.  The Encrypted Challenge FAST Factor  . . . . . . . . . 31
     6.6.  Authentication Strength Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   Appendix A.  Change History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     A.1.  Changes since 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     A.2.  Changes since 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
   Appendix B.  ASN.1 module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35



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   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 40

















































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1.  Introduction

   The core Kerberos specification [RFC4120] treats pre-authentication
   data as an opaque typed hole in the messages to the KDC that may
   influence the reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply.  This
   generality has been useful: pre-authentication data is used for a
   variety of extensions to the protocol, many outside the expectations
   of the initial designers.  However, this generality makes designing
   more common types of pre-authentication mechanisms difficult.  Each
   mechanism needs to specify how it interacts with other mechanisms.
   Also, problems like combining a key with the long-term secret or
   proving the identity of the user are common to multiple mechanisms.
   Where there are generally well-accepted solutions to these problems,
   it is desirable to standardize one of these solutions so mechanisms
   can avoid duplication of work.  In other cases, a modular approach to
   these problems is appropriate.  The modular approach will allow new
   and better solutions to common pre-authentication problems to be used
   by existing mechanisms as they are developed.

   This document specifies a framework for Kerberos pre-authentication
   mechanisms.  It defines the common set of functions that pre-
   authentication mechanisms perform as well as how these functions
   affect the state of the request and reply.  In addition several
   common tools needed by pre-authentication mechanisms are provided.
   Unlike [RFC3961], this framework is not complete--it does not
   describe all the inputs and outputs for the pre-authentication
   mechanisms.  Pre-Authentication mechanism designers should try to be
   consistent with this framework because doing so will make their
   mechanisms easier to implement.  Kerberos implementations are likely
   to have plugin architectures for pre-authentication; such
   architectures are likely to support mechanisms that follow this
   framework plus commonly used extensions.

   One of these common tools is the flexible authentication secure
   tunneling (FAST) padata type.  FAST provides a protected channel
   between the client and the KDC, and it can optionally deliver a reply
   key within the protected channel.  Based on FAST, pre-authentication
   mechanisms can extend Kerberos with ease, to support, for example,
   password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols with zero
   knowledge password proof (ZKPP) [EKE] [IEEE1363.2].  Any pre-
   authentication mechanism can be encapsulated in the FAST messages as
   defined in Section 6.5.  A pre-authentication type carried within
   FAST is called a FAST factor.  Creating a FAST factor is the easiest
   path to create a new pre-authentication mechanism.  FAST factors are
   significantly easier to analyze from a security standpoint than other
   pre-authentication mechanisms.

   Mechanism designers should design FAST factors, instead of new pre-



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   authentication mechanisms outside of FAST.


2.  Conventions and Terminology Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The word padata is used as a shorthand for pre-authentication data.

   A conversation is the set of all authentication messages exchanged
   between the client and the KDCs in order to authenticate the client
   principal.  A conversation as defined here consists of all messages
   that are necessary to complete the authentication between the client
   and the KDC.

   Lastly, this document should be read only after reading the documents
   describing the Kerberos cryptography framework [RFC3961] and the core
   Kerberos protocol [RFC4120].  This document may freely use
   terminology and notation from these documents without reference or
   further explanation.


3.  Model for Pre-Authentication

   When a Kerberos client wishes to obtain a ticket using the
   authentication server, it sends an initial Authentication Service
   (AS) request.  If pre-authentication is required but not being used,
   then the KDC will respond with a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.
   Alternatively, if the client knows what pre-authentication to use, it
   MAY optimize away a round-trip and send an initial request with
   padata included in the initial request.  If the client includes the
   padata computed using the wrong pre-authentication mechanism or
   incorrect keys, the KDC MAY return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED with no
   indication of what padata should have been included.  In that case,
   the client MUST retry with no padata and examine the error data of
   the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.  If the KDC includes pre-
   authentication information in the accompanying error data of
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, the client SHOULD process the error data, and
   then retry.

   The conventional KDC maintains no state between two requests;
   subsequent requests may even be processed by a different KDC.  On the
   other hand, the client treats a series of exchanges with KDCs as a
   single conversation.  Each exchange accumulates state and hopefully
   brings the client closer to a successful authentication.




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   These models for state management are in apparent conflict.  For many
   of the simpler pre-authentication scenarios, the client uses one
   round trip to find out what mechanisms the KDC supports.  Then the
   next request contains sufficient pre-authentication for the KDC to be
   able to return a successful reply.  For these simple scenarios, the
   client only sends one request with pre-authentication data and so the
   conversation is trivial.  For more complex conversations, the KDC
   needs to provide the client with a cookie to include in future
   requests to capture the current state of the authentication session.
   Handling of multiple round-trip mechanisms is discussed in
   Section 6.3.

   This framework specifies the behavior of Kerberos pre-authentication
   mechanisms used to identify users or to modify the reply key used to
   encrypt the KDC reply.  The PA-DATA typed hole may be used to carry
   extensions to Kerberos that have nothing to do with proving the
   identity of the user or establishing a reply key.  Such extensions
   are outside the scope of this framework.  However mechanisms that do
   accomplish these goals should follow this framework.

   This framework specifies the minimum state that a Kerberos
   implementation needs to maintain while handling a request in order to
   process pre-authentication.  It also specifies how Kerberos
   implementations process the padata at each step of the AS request
   process.

3.1.  Information Managed by the Pre-authentication Model

   The following information is maintained by the client and KDC as each
   request is being processed:

   o  The reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply

   o  How strongly the identity of the client has been authenticated

   o  Whether the reply key has been used in this conversation

   o  Whether the reply key has been replaced in this conversation

   o  Whether the contents of the KDC reply can be verified by the
      client principal


   Conceptually, the reply key is initially the long-term key of the
   principal.  However, principals can have multiple long-term keys
   because of support for multiple encryption types, salts and
   string2key parameters.  As described in Section 5.2.7.5 of the
   Kerberos protocol [RFC4120], the KDC sends PA-ETYPE-INFO2 to notify



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   the client what types of keys are available.  Thus in full
   generality, the reply key in the pre-authentication model is actually
   a set of keys.  At the beginning of a request, it is initialized to
   the set of long-term keys advertised in the PA-ETYPE-INFO2 element on
   the KDC.  If multiple reply keys are available, the client chooses
   which one to use.  Thus the client does not need to treat the reply
   key as a set.  At the beginning of a request, the client picks a
   reply key to use.

   KDC implementations MAY choose to offer only one key in the PA-ETYPE-
   INFO2 element.  Since the KDC already knows the client's list of
   supported enctypes from the request, no interoperability problems are
   created by choosing a single possible reply key.  This way, the KDC
   implementation avoids the complexity of treating the reply key as a
   set.

   When the padata in the request is verified by the KDC, then the
   client is known to have that key, therefore the KDC SHOULD pick the
   same key as the reply key.

   At the beginning of handling a message on both the client and the
   KDC, the client's identity is not authenticated.  A mechanism may
   indicate that it has successfully authenticated the client's
   identity.  This information is useful to keep track of on the client
   in order to know what pre-authentication mechanisms should be used.
   The KDC needs to keep track of whether the client is authenticated
   because the primary purpose of pre-authentication is to authenticate
   the client identity before issuing a ticket.  The handling of
   authentication strength using various authentication mechanisms is
   discussed in Section 6.6.

   Initially the reply key has not been used.  A pre-authentication
   mechanism that uses the reply key to encrypt or checksum some data in
   the generation of new keys MUST indicate that the reply key is used.
   This state is maintained by the client and the KDC to enforce the
   security requirement stated in Section 4.3 that the reply key cannot
   be replaced after it is used.

   Initially the reply key has not been replaced.  If a mechanism
   implements the Replace Reply Key facility discussed in Section 4.3,
   then the state MUST be updated to indicate that the reply key has
   been replaced.  Once the reply key has been replaced, knowledge of
   the reply key is insufficient to authenticate the client.  The reply
   key is marked replaced in exactly the same situations as the KDC
   reply is marked as not being verified to the client principal.
   However, while mechanisms can verify the KDC reply to the client,
   once the reply key is replaced, then the reply key remains replaced
   for the remainder of the conversation.



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   Without pre-authentication, the client knows that the KDC reply is
   authentic and has not been modified because it is encrypted in a
   long-term key of the client.  Only the KDC and the client know that
   key.  So at the start of a conversation, the KDC reply is presumed to
   be verified using the client principal's long-term key.  Any pre-
   authentication mechanism that sets a new reply key not based on the
   principal's long-term secret MUST either verify the KDC reply some
   other way or indicate that the reply is not verified.  If a mechanism
   indicates that the reply is not verified then the client
   implementation MUST return an error unless a subsequent mechanism
   verifies the reply.  The KDC needs to track this state so it can
   avoid generating a reply that is not verified.

   The typical Kerberos request does not provide a way for the client
   machine to know that it is talking to the correct KDC.  Someone who
   can inject packets into the network between the client machine and
   the KDC and who knows the password that the user will give to the
   client machine can generate a KDC reply that will decrypt properly.
   So, if the client machine needs to authenticate that the user is in
   fact the named principal, then the client machine needs to do a TGS
   request for itself as a service.  Some pre-authentication mechanisms
   may provide a way for the client to authenticate the KDC.  Examples
   of this include signing the reply that can be verified using a well-
   known public key or providing a ticket for the client machine as a
   service.

3.2.  Initial Pre-authentication Required Error

   Typically a client starts a conversation by sending an initial
   request with no pre-authentication.  If the KDC requires pre-
   authentication, then it returns a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message.
   After the first reply with the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error code,
   the KDC returns the error code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED
   (defined in Section 6.3) for pre-authentication configurations that
   use multi-round-trip mechanisms; see Section 3.4 for details of that
   case.

   The KDC needs to choose which mechanisms to offer the client.  The
   client needs to be able to choose what mechanisms to use from the
   first message.  For example consider the KDC that will accept
   mechanism A followed by mechanism B or alternatively the single
   mechanism C. A client that supports A and C needs to know that it
   should not bother trying A.

   Mechanisms can either be sufficient on their own or can be part of an
   authentication set--a group of mechanisms that all need to
   successfully complete in order to authenticate a client.  Some
   mechanisms may only be useful in authentication sets; others may be



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   useful alone or in authentication sets.  For the second group of
   mechanisms, KDC policy dictates whether the mechanism will be part of
   an authentication set or offered alone.  For each mechanism that is
   offered alone, the KDC includes the pre-authentication type ID of the
   mechanism in the padata sequence returned in the
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.

   The KDC SHOULD NOT send data that is encrypted in the long-term
   password-based key of the principal.  Doing so has the same security
   exposures as the Kerberos protocol without pre-authentication.  There
   are few situations where pre-authentication is desirable and where
   the KDC needs to expose cipher text encrypted in a weak key before
   the client has proven knowledge of that key.

3.3.  Client to KDC

   This description assumes that a client has already received a
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED from the KDC.  If the client performs
   optimistic pre-authentication then the client needs to optimistically
   guess values for the information it would normally receive from that
   error response.

   The client starts by initializing the pre-authentication state as
   specified.  It then processes the padata in the
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED.

   When processing the response to the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, the
   client MAY ignore any padata it chooses unless doing so violates a
   specification to which the client conforms.  Clients conforming to
   this specification MUST NOT ignore the padata defined in Section 6.3.
   Clients SHOULD process padata unrelated to this framework or other
   means of authenticating the user.  Clients SHOULD choose one
   authentication set or mechanism that could lead to authenticating the
   user and ignore the rest.  Since the list of mechanisms offered by
   the KDC is in the decreasing preference order, clients typically
   choose the first mechanism or authentication set that the client can
   usefully perform.  If a client chooses to ignore a padata it MUST NOT
   process the padata, allow the padata to affect the pre-authentication
   state, nor respond to the padata.

   For each padata the client chooses to process, the client processes
   the padata and modifies the pre-authentication state as required by
   that mechanism.  Padata are processed in the order received from the
   KDC.

   After processing the padata in the KDC error, the client generates a
   new request.  It processes the pre-authentication mechanisms in the
   order in which they will appear in the next request, updating the



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   state as appropriate.  The request is sent when it is complete.

3.4.  KDC to Client

   When a KDC receives an AS request from a client, it needs to
   determine whether it will respond with an error or an AS reply.
   There are many causes for an error to be generated that have nothing
   to do with pre-authentication; they are discussed in the core
   Kerberos specification.

   From the standpoint of evaluating the pre-authentication, the KDC
   first starts by initializing the pre-authentication state.  It then
   processes the padata in the request.  As mentioned in Section 3.3,
   the KDC MAY ignore padata that is inappropriate for the configuration
   and MUST ignore padata of an unknown type.  The KDC MUST NOT ignore
   padata of types used in previous messages.  For example, if a KDC
   issues a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error including padata of type x,
   then the KDC cannot ignore padata of type x received in an AS-REQ
   message from the client.

   At this point the KDC decides whether it will issue an error or a
   reply.  Typically a KDC will issue a reply if the client's identity
   has been authenticated to a sufficient degree.

   In the case of a KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED error, the KDC
   first starts by initializing the pre-authentication state.  Then it
   processes any padata in the client's request in the order provided by
   the client.  Mechanisms that are not understood by the KDC are
   ignored.  Next, it generates padata for the error response, modifying
   the pre-authentication state appropriately as each mechanism is
   processed.  The KDC chooses the order in which it will generate
   padata (and thus the order of padata in the response), but it needs
   to modify the pre-authentication state consistently with the choice
   of order.  For example, if some mechanism establishes an
   authenticated client identity, then the subsequent mechanisms in the
   generated response receive this state as input.  After the padata is
   generated, the error response is sent.  Typically the errors with the
   code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED in a converstation will include
   KDC state as discussed in Section 6.3.

   To generate a final reply, the KDC generates the padata modifying the
   pre-authentication state as necessary.  Then it generates the final
   response, encrypting it in the current pre-authentication reply key.


4.  Pre-Authentication Facilities

   Pre-Authentication mechanisms can be thought of as providing various



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   conceptual facilities.  This serves two useful purposes.  First,
   mechanism authors can choose only to solve one specific small
   problem.  It is often useful for a mechanism designed to offer key
   management not to directly provide client authentication but instead
   to allow one or more other mechanisms to handle this need.  Secondly,
   thinking about the abstract services that a mechanism provides yields
   a minimum set of security requirements that all mechanisms providing
   that facility must meet.  These security requirements are not
   complete; mechanisms will have additional security requirements based
   on the specific protocol they employ.

   A mechanism is not constrained to only offering one of these
   facilities.  While such mechanisms can be designed and are sometimes
   useful, many pre-authentication mechanisms implement several
   facilities.  By combining multiple facilities in a single mechanism,
   it is often easier to construct a secure, simple solution than by
   solving the problem in full generality.  Even when mechanisms provide
   multiple facilities, they need to meet the security requirements for
   all the facilities they provide.  If the FAST factor approach is
   used, it is likely that one or a small number of facilities can be
   provided by a single mechanism without complicating the security
   analysis.

   According to Kerberos extensibility rules (Section 1.5 of the
   Kerberos specification [RFC4120]), an extension MUST NOT change the
   semantics of a message unless a recipient is known to understand that
   extension.  Because a client does not know that the KDC supports a
   particular pre-authentication mechanism when it sends an initial
   request, a pre-authentication mechanism MUST NOT change the semantics
   of the request in a way that will break a KDC that does not
   understand that mechanism.  Similarly, KDCs MUST NOT send messages to
   clients that affect the core semantics unless the client has
   indicated support for the message.

   The only state in this model that would break the interpretation of a
   message is changing the expected reply key.  If one mechanism changed
   the reply key and a later mechanism used that reply key, then a KDC
   that interpreted the second mechanism but not the first would fail to
   interpret the request correctly.  In order to avoid this problem,
   extensions that change core semantics are typically divided into two
   parts.  The first part proposes a change to the core semantic--for
   example proposes a new reply key.  The second part acknowledges that
   the extension is understood and that the change takes effect.
   Section 4.2 discusses how to design mechanisms that modify the reply
   key to be split into a proposal and acceptance without requiring
   additional round trips to use the new reply key in subsequent pre-
   authentication.  Other changes in the state described in Section 3.1
   can safely be ignored by a KDC that does not understand a mechanism.



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   Mechanisms that modify the behavior of the request outside the scope
   of this framework need to carefully consider the Kerberos
   extensibility rules to avoid similar problems.

4.1.  Client-authentication Facility

   The client authentication facility proves the identity of a user to
   the KDC before a ticket is issued.  Examples of mechanisms
   implementing this facility include the encrypted timestamp facility
   defined in Section 5.2.7.2 of the Kerberos specification [RFC4120].
   Mechanisms that provide this facility are expected to mark the client
   as authenticated.

   Mechanisms implementing this facility SHOULD require the client to
   prove knowledge of the reply key before transmitting a successful KDC
   reply.  Otherwise, an attacker can intercept the pre-authentication
   exchange and get a reply to attack.  One way of proving the client
   knows the reply key is to implement the Replace Reply Key facility
   along with this facility.  The PKINIT mechanism [RFC4556] implements
   Client Authentication alongside Replace Reply Key.

   If the reply key has been replaced, then mechanisms such as
   encrypted-timestamp that rely on knowledge of the reply key to
   authenticate the client MUST NOT be used.

4.2.  Strengthening-reply-key Facility

   Particularly, when dealing with keys based on passwords, it is
   desirable to increase the strength of the key by adding additional
   secrets to it.  Examples of sources of additional secrets include the
   results of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or key bits from the output
   of a smart card [KRB-WG.SAM].  Typically these additional secrets can
   be first combined with the existing reply key and then converted to a
   protocol key using tools defined in Section 6.1.

   Typically a mechanism implementing this facility will know that the
   other side of the exchange supports the facility before the reply key
   is changed.  For example, a mechanism might need to learn the
   certificate for a KDC before encrypting a new key in the public key
   belonging to that certificate.  However, if a mechanism implementing
   this facility wishes to modify the reply key before knowing that the
   other party in the exchange supports the mechanism, it proposes
   modifying the reply key.  The other party then includes a message
   indicating that the proposal is accepted if it is understood and
   meets policy.  In many cases it is desirable to use the new reply key
   for client authentication and for other facilities.  Waiting for the
   other party to accept the proposal and actually modify the reply key
   state would add an additional round trip to the exchange.  Instead,



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   mechanism designers are encouraged to include a typed hole for
   additional padata in the message that proposes the reply key change.
   The padata included in the typed hole are generated assuming the new
   reply key.  If the other party accepts the proposal, then these
   padata are considered as an inner level.  As with the outer level,
   one authentication set or mechanism is typically chosen for client
   authentication, along with auxiliary mechanisms such as KDC cookies,
   and other mechanisms are ignored.  When mechanisms include such a
   container, the hint provided for use in authentication sets MUST
   contain a sequence of inner mechanisms along with hints for those
   mechanisms.  The party generating the proposal can determine whether
   the padata were processed based on whether the proposal for the reply
   key is accepted.

   The specific formats of the proposal message, including where padata
   are included is a matter for the mechanism specification.  Similarly,
   the format of the message accepting the proposal is mechanism-
   specific.

   Mechanisms implementing this facility and including a typed hole for
   additional padata MUST checksum that padata using a keyed checksum or
   encrypt the padata.  This requirement protects against modification
   of the contents of the typed hole.  By modifying these contents an
   attacker might be able to choose which mechanism is used to
   authenticate the client, or to convince a party to provide text
   encrypted in a key that the attacker had manipulated.  It is
   important that mechanisms strengthen the reply key enough that using
   it to checksum padata is appropriate.

4.3.  Replacing-reply-key Facility

   The Replace Reply Key facility replaces the key in which a successful
   AS reply will be encrypted.  This facility can only be used in cases
   where knowledge of the reply key is not used to authenticate the
   client.  The new reply key MUST be communicated to the client and the
   KDC in a secure manner.  Mechanisms implementing this facility MUST
   mark the reply key as replaced in the pre-authentication state.
   Mechanisms implementing this facility MUST either provide a mechanism
   to verify the KDC reply to the client or mark the reply as unverified
   in the pre-authentication state.  Mechanisms implementing this
   facility SHOULD NOT be used if a previous mechanism has used the
   reply key.

   As with the strengthening-reply-key facility, Kerberos extensibility
   rules require that the reply key not be changed unless both sides of
   the exchange understand the extension.  In the case of this facility
   it will likely be the case for both sides to know that the facility
   is available by the time that the new key is available to be used.



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   However, mechanism designers can use a container for padata in a
   proposal message as discussed in Section 4.2 if appropriate.

4.4.  KDC-authentication Facility

   This facility verifies that the reply comes from the expected KDC.
   In traditional Kerberos, the KDC and the client share a key, so if
   the KDC reply can be decrypted then the client knows that a trusted
   KDC responded.  Note that the client machine cannot trust the client
   unless the machine is presented with a service ticket for it
   (typically the machine can retrieve this ticket by itself).  However,
   if the reply key is replaced, some mechanism is required to verify
   the KDC.  Pre-authentication mechanisms providing this facility allow
   a client to determine that the expected KDC has responded even after
   the reply key is replaced.  They mark the pre-authentication state as
   having been verified.


5.  Requirements for Pre-Authentication Mechanisms

   This section lists requirements for specifications of pre-
   authentication mechanisms.

   For each message in the pre-authentication mechanism, the
   specification describes the pa-type value to be used and the contents
   of the message.  The processing of the message by the sender and
   recipient is also specified.  This specification needs to include all
   modifications to the pre-authentication state.

   Generally mechanisms have a message that can be sent in the error
   data of the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error message or in an
   authentication set.  If the client needs information such as trusted
   certificate authorities in order to determine if it can use the
   mechanism, then this information should be in that message.  In
   addition, such mechanisms should also define a pa-hint to be included
   in authentication sets.  Often, the same information included in the
   padata-value is appropriate to include in the pa-hint (as defined in
   Section 6.4).

   In order to ease security analysis the mechanism specification should
   describe what facilities from this document are offered by the
   mechanism.  For each facility, the security consideration section of
   the mechanism specification should show that the security
   requirements of that facility are met.  This requirement is
   applicable to any FAST factor that provides authentication
   information.

   Significant problems have resulted in the specification of Kerberos



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   protocols because much of the KDC exchange is not protected against
   authentication.  The security considerations section should discuss
   unauthenticated plaintext attacks.  It should either show that
   plaintext is protected or discuss what harm an attacker could do by
   modifying the plaintext.  It is generally acceptable for an attacker
   to be able to cause the protocol negotiation to fail by modifying
   plaintext.  More significant attacks should be evaluated carefully.

   As discussed in Section 6.3, there is no guarantee that a client will
   use the same KDCs for all messages in a conversation.  The mechanism
   specification needs to show why the mechanism is secure in this
   situation.  The hardest problem to deal with, especially for
   challenge/response mechanisms is to make sure that the same response
   cannot be replayed against two KDCs while allowing the client to talk
   to any KDC.


6.  Tools for Use in Pre-Authentication Mechanisms

   This section describes common tools needed by multiple pre-
   authentication mechanisms.  By using these tools mechanism designers
   can use a modular approach to specify mechanism details and ease
   security analysis.

6.1.  Combining Keys

   Frequently a weak key needs to be combined with a stronger key before
   use.  For example, passwords are typically limited in size and
   insufficiently random, therefore it is desirable to increase the
   strength of the keys based on passwords by adding additional secrets.
   Additional source of secrecy may come from hardware tokens.

   This section provides standard ways to combine two keys into one.

   KRB-FX-CF1() is defined to combine two pass-phrases.

       KRB-FX-CF1(UTF-8 string, UTF-8 string) -> (UTF-8 string)
       KRB-FX-CF1(x, y) -> x || y

   Where || denotes concatenation.  The strength of the final key is
   roughly the total strength of the individual keys being combined
   assuming that the string_to_key() function [RFC3961] uses all its
   input evenly.

   An example usage of KRB-FX-CF1() is when a device provides random but
   short passwords, the password is often combined with a personal
   identification number (PIN).  The password and the PIN can be
   combined using KRB-FX-CF1().



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   KRB-FX-CF2() combines two protocol keys based on the pseudo-random()
   function defined in [RFC3961].

   Given two input keys, K1 and K2, where K1 and K2 can be of two
   different enctypes, the output key of KRB-FX-CF2(), K3, is derived as
   follows:

       KRB-FX-CF2(protocol key, protocol key, octet string,
                 octet string)  ->  (protocol key)

       PRF+(K1, pepper1) -> octet-string-1
       PRF+(K2, pepper2) -> octet-string-2
       KRB-FX-CF2(K1, K2, pepper1, pepper2) ->
              random-to-key(octet-string-1 ^ octet-string-2)

   Where ^ denotes the exclusive-OR operation.  PRF+() is defined as
   follows:

    PRF+(protocol key, octet string) -> (octet string)

    PRF+(key, shared-info) -> pseudo-random( key,  1 || shared-info ) ||
                  pseudo-random( key, 2 || shared-info ) ||
                  pseudo-random( key, 3 || shared-info ) || ...

   Here the counter value 1, 2, 3 and so on are encoded as a one-octet
   integer.  The pseudo-random() operation is specified by the enctype
   of the protocol key.  PRF+() uses the counter to generate enough bits
   as needed by the random-to-key() [RFC3961] function for the
   encryption type specified for the resulting key; unneeded bits are
   removed from the tail.

   Mechanism designers MUST specify the values for the input parameter
   pepper1 and pepper2 when combining two keys using KRB-FX-CF2().  The
   pepper1 and pepper2 MUST be distinct so that if the two keys being
   combined are the same, the resulting key is not a trivial key.

6.2.  Protecting Requests/Responses

   Mechanism designers SHOULD protect clear text portions of pre-
   authentication data.  Various denial of service attacks and downgrade
   attacks against Kerberos are possible unless plaintexts are somehow
   protected against modification.  An early design goal of Kerberos
   Version 5 [RFC4120] was to avoid encrypting more of the
   authentication exchange that was required.  (Version 4 doubly-
   encrypted the encrypted part of a ticket in a KDC reply, for
   example.)  This minimization of encryption reduces the load on the
   KDC and busy servers.  Also, during the initial design of Version 5,
   the existence of legal restrictions on the export of cryptography



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   made it desirable to minimize of the number of uses of encryption in
   the protocol.  Unfortunately, performing this minimization created
   numerous instances of unauthenticated security-relevant plaintext
   fields.

   If there is more than one roundtrip for an authentication exchange,
   mechanism designers need to allow either the client or the KDC to
   provide a checksum of all the messages exchanged on the wire in the
   conversation, and the checksum is then verified by the receiver.

   New mechanisms MUST NOT be hard-wired to use a specific algorithm.

   Primitives defined in [RFC3961] are RECOMMENDED for integrity
   protection and confidentiality.  Mechanisms based on these primitives
   are crypto-agile as the result of using [RFC3961] along with
   [RFC4120].  The advantage afforded by crypto-agility is the ability
   to avoid a multi-year standardization and deployment cycle to fix a
   problem that is specific to a particular algorithm, when real attacks
   do arise against that algorithm.

   Note that data used by FAST factors (defined in Section 6.5) is
   encrypted in a protected channel, thus they do not share the un-
   authenticated-text issues with mechanisms designed as full-blown pre-
   authentication mechanisms.

6.3.  Managing States for the KDC

   Kerberos KDCs are stateless.  There is no requirement that clients
   will choose the same KDC for the second request in a conversation.
   Proxies or other intermediate nodes may also influence KDC selection.
   So, each request from a client to a KDC must include sufficient
   information that the KDC can regenerate any needed state.  This is
   accomplished by giving the client a potentially long opaque cookie in
   responses to include in future requests in the same conversation.
   The KDC MAY respond that a conversation is too old and needs to
   restart by responding with a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED error.

       KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED            TBA

   When a client receives this error, the client SHOULD abort the
   existing conversation, and restart a new one.

   An example, where more than one message from the client is needed, is
   when the client is authenticated based on a challenge-response
   scheme.  In that case, the KDC needs to keep track of the challenge
   issued for a client authentication request.

   The PA-FX-COOKIE pdata type is defined in this section to facilitate



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   state management.  This padata is sent by the KDC when the KDC
   requires state for a future transaction.  The client includes this
   opaque token in the next message in the conversation.  The token may
   be relatively large; clients MUST be prepared for tokens somewhat
   larger than the size of all messages in a conversation.

       PA_FX_COOKIE                       TBA
           -- Stateless cookie that is not tied to a specific KDC.

   The corresponding padata-value field [RFC4120] contains the
   Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X60] [X690] encoding of the
   following Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) type PA-FX-COOKIE:

      PA-FX-COOKIE ::= SEQUENCE {
          conversationId  [0] OCTET STRING,
             -- Contains the identifier of this conversation. This field
             -- must contain the same value for all the messages
             -- within the same conversation.
          enc-binding-key [1] EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
                          -- EncryptionKey --
             -- This field is present when and only when a FAST
             -- padata as defined in Section 6.5 is included.
             -- The encrypted data, when decrypted, contains an
             -- EncryptionKey structure.
             -- This encryption key is encrypted using the armor key
             -- (defined in Section 6.5.1), and the key usage for the
             -- encryption is KEY_USAGE_FAST_BINDING_KEY.
             -- Present only once in a converstation.
          cookie          [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
             -- Opaque data, for use to associate all the messages in
             -- a single conversation between the client and the KDC.
             -- This is generated by the KDC and the client MUST copy
             -- the exact cookie encapsulated in a PA_FX_COOKIE data
             -- element into the next message of the same conversation.
          ...
      }
      KEY_USAGE_FAST_BINDING_KEY         TBA

   The conversationId field contains a sufficiently-long rand number
   that uniquely identifies the conversation.  If a PA_FX_COOKIE padata
   is present in one message, a PA_FX_COOKIE structure MUST be present
   in all subsequent messages of the same converstation between the
   client and the KDC, with the same conversationId value.

   The enc-binding-key field is present when and only when a FAST padata
   (defined in Section 6.5) is included.  The enc-binding-key field is
   present only once in a conversation.  It MUST be ignored if it is
   present in a subsequent message of the same conversation.  The



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   encrypted data, when decrypted, contains an EncryptionKey structure
   that is called the binding key.  The binding key is encrypted using
   the armor key (defined in Section 6.5.1), and the key usage for the
   encryption is KEY_USAGE_FAST_BINDING_KEY.

   If a Kerberos FAST padata as defined in Section 6.5 is included in
   one message, it MUST be included in all subsequent messages of the
   same conversation.

   When FAST padata as defined Section 6.5 is included, the PA-FX-COOKIE
   padata MUST be included.

   The cookie token is generated by the KDC and the client MUST copy the
   exact cookie encapsulated in a PA_FX_COOKIE data element into the
   next message of the same conversation.  The content of the cookie
   field is a local matter of the KDC.  However the KDC MUST construct
   the cookie token in such a manner that a malicious client cannot
   subvert the authentication process by manipulating the token.  The
   KDC implementation needs to consider expiration of tokens, key
   rollover and other security issues in token design.  The content of
   the cookie field is likely specific to the pre-authentication
   mechanisms used to authenticate the client.  If a client
   authentication response can be replayed to multiple KDCs via the
   PA_FX_COOKIE mechanism, an expiration in the cookie is RECOMMENDED to
   prevent the response being presented indefinitely.

   If at least one more message for a mechanism or a mechanism set is
   expected by the KDC, the KDC returns a
   KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED error with a PA_FX_COOKIE to
   identify the conversation with the client according to Section 6.5.4.

        KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED   TBA

6.4.  Pre-authentication Set

   If all mechanisms in a group need to successfully complete in order
   to authenticate a client, the client and the KDC SHOULD use the
   PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET padata element.

   A PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET padata element contains the ASN.1 DER
   encoding of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET structure:










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        PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM

        PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
            pa-type      [0] Int32,
                -- same as padata-type.
            pa-hint      [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
            pa-value  [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
            ...
        }

   The pa-type field of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM structure
   contains the corresponding value of padata-type in PA-DATA [RFC4120].
   Associated with the pa-type is a pa-hint, which is an octet-string
   specified by the pre-authentication mechanism.  This hint may provide
   information for the client which helps it determine whether the
   mechanism can be used.  For example a public-key mechanism might
   include the certificate authorities it trusts in the hint info.  Most
   mechanisms today do not specify hint info; if a mechanism does not
   specify hint info the KDC MUST NOT send a hint for that mechanism.
   To allow future revisions of mechanism specifications to add hint
   info, clients MUST ignore hint info received for mechanisms that the
   client believes do not support hint info.  The pa-value element of
   the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM sequence is included to carry the
   first padata-value from the KDC to the client.  If the client chooses
   this authentication set then the client MUST process this pa-value.
   The pa-value element MUST be absent for all but the first entry in
   the authentication set.  Clients MUST ignore pa-value for the second
   and following entries in the authentication set.

   If the client chooses an authentication set, then its AS-REQ message
   MUST contain a PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_SELECTED padata element.  This
   element contains the encoding of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET sequence
   received from the KDC corresponding to the authentication set that is
   chosen.  The client MUST use the same octet values received from the
   KDC; it cannot re-encode the sequence.  This allows KDCs to use bit-
   wise comparison to identify the selected authentication set.  The
   PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_SELECTED padata element MUST come before any
   padata elements from the authentication set in the padata sequence in
   the AS-REQ message.  The client MAY cache authentication sets from
   prior messages and use them to construct an optimistic initial AS-
   REQ.  If the KDC receives a PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_SELECTED padata
   element that does not correspond to an authentication set that it
   would offer, then the KDC returns the
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET error.  The edata in this
   error contains a sequence of padata just as for the
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.





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      PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_SELECTED         TBA
      KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET TBA

   The PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET appears only in the first message from the
   KDC to the client.  In particular, the client MAY fail if the
   authentication mechanism sets change as the conversation progresses.
   Clients MAY assume that the hints provided in the authentication set
   contain enough information that the client knows what user interface
   elements need to be displayed during the entire authentication
   conversation.  Exceptional circumstances such as expired passwords or
   expired accounts may require that additional user interface be
   displayed.  Mechanism designers need to carefully consider the design
   of their hints so that the client has this information.  This way,
   clients can construct necessary dialogue boxes or wizards based on
   the authentication set and can present a coherent user interface.
   Current standards for user interface do not provide an acceptable
   experience when the client has to ask additional questions later in
   the conversation.

   When indicating which sets of pre-authentication mechanisms are
   supported, the KDC includes a PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element
   for each pre-authentication mechanism set.

   The client sends the padata-value for the first mechanism it picks in
   the pre-authentication set, when the first mechanism completes, the
   client and the KDC will proceed with the second mechanism, and so on
   until all mechanisms complete successfully.  The PA_FX_COOKIE as
   defined in Section 6.3 MUST be sent by the KDC along with the first
   message that contains a PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET, in order to keep track
   of KDC states.

   Before the authentication succeeds and a ticket is returned, the
   message that the client sends is an AS_REQ and the message that the
   KDC sends is a KRB-ERROR message.  The error code in the KRB-ERROR
   message from the KDC is KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED as defined
   in Section 6.3 and the accompanying e-data contains the DER encoding
   of ASN.1 type METHOD-DATA.  The KDC includes the padata elements in
   the METHOD-DATA.  If there is no padata, the e-data field is absent
   in the KRB-ERROR message.

   If the client sends the last message for a given mechanism, then the
   KDC sends the first message for the next mechanism.  If the next
   mechanism does not start with a KDC-side challenge, then the KDC
   includes a padata item with the appropriate pa-type and an empty pa-
   data.

   If the KDC sends the last message for a particular mechanism, the KDC
   also includes the first padata for the next mechanism.



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6.5.  Definition of Kerberos FAST Padata

   As described in [RFC4120], Kerberos is vulnerable to offline
   dictionary attacks.  An attacker can request an AS-REP and try
   various passwords to see if they can decrypt the resulting ticket.
   RFC 4120 provides the entrypted timestap pre-authentication method
   that ameliorates the situation somewhat by requiring that an attacker
   observe a successful authentication.  However stronger security is
   desired in many environments.  The Kerberos FAST pre-authentication
   padata defined in this section provides a tool to significantly
   reduce vulnerability to offline dictionary attack.  When combined
   with encrypted timestamp, FAST requires an attacker to mount a
   successful man-in-the-middle attack to observe ciphertext.  When
   combined with host keys, FAST can even protect against active
   attacks.  FAST also provides solutions to common problems for pre-
   authentication mechanisms such as binding of the request and the
   reply, freshness guarantee of the authentication.  FAST itself,
   however, does not authenticate the client or the KDC, instead, it
   provides a typed hole to allow pre-authentication data be tunneled.
   A pre-authentication data element used within FAST is called a FAST
   factor.  A FAST factor captures the minimal work required for
   extending Kerberos to support a new pre-authentication scheme.

   A FAST factor MUST NOT be used outside of FAST unless its
   specification explicitly allows so.  The typed holes in FAST messages
   can also be used as generic holes for other padata that are not
   intended to prove the client's identity, or establish the reply key.

   New pre-authentication mechanisms SHOULD be designed as FAST factors,
   instead of full-blown pre-authentication mechanisms.

   FAST factors that are pre-authentication mechanisms MUST meet the
   requirements in Section 5.

   FAST employs an armoring scheme.  The armor can be a Ticket Granting
   Ticket (TGT) obtained by the client's machine using the host keys to
   pre-authenticate with the KDC, or an anonymous TGT obtained based on
   anonymous PKINIT [KRB-ANON] [RFC4556].

   The rest of this section describes the types of armors and the syntax
   of the messages used by FAST.  Conforming implementations MUST
   support Kerberos FAST padata.

   Any FAST armor scheme MUST provide a fresh armor key for each
   conversation.  Clients and KDCs can assume that if a message is
   encrypted and integrity protected with a given armor key then it is
   part of the conversation using that armor key.




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6.5.1.  FAST Armors

   An armor key is used to encrypt pre-authentication data in the FAST
   request and the response.  The KrbFastArmor structure is defined to
   identify the armor key.  This structure contains the following two
   fields: the armor-type identifies the type of armors, and the armor-
   value as an OCTET STRING contains the description of the armor scheme
   and the armor key.

        KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
            armor-type   [0] Int32,
                -- Type of the armor.
            armor-value  [1] OCTET STRING,
                -- Value of the armor.
            ...
        }

   The value of the armor key is a matter of the armor type
   specification.  Only one armor type is defined in this document.

        FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST           TBA

   The FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor is based on Kerberos tickets.

   Conforming implementations MUST implement the
   FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor type.

6.5.1.1.  Ticket-based Armors

   This is a ticket-based armoring scheme.  The armor-type is
   FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST, the armor-value contains an ASN.1 DER
   encoded AP-REQ.  The ticket in the AP-REQ is called an armor ticket
   or an armor TGT.  The subkey field in the AP-REQ MUST be present.
   The armor key is the subkey in the AP-REQ authenticator.

   The server name field of the armor ticket MUST identify the TGS of
   the target realm.  Here are three ways in the decreasing preference
   order how an armor TGT SHOULD be obtained:

   1.  If the client is authenticating from a host machine whose
       Kerberos realm has a trust path to the client's realm, the host
       machine obtains a TGT by pre-authenticating intitialy the realm
       of the host machine using the host keys.  If the client's realm
       is different than the realm of the local host, the machine then
       obtains a cross-realm TGT to the client's realm as the armor
       ticket.  Otherwise, the host's primary TGT is the armor ticket.





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   2.  If the client's host machine cannot obtain a host ticket strictly
       based on RFC4120, but the KDC has an asymmetric signing key that
       the client can verify the binding between the public key of the
       signing key and the expected KDC, the client can use anonymous
       PKINIT [KRB-ANON] [RFC4556] to authenticate the KDC and obtain an
       anonymous TGT as the armor ticket.  The armor key can be a cross-
       team TGT obtained based on the initial primary TGT obtained using
       anonymous PKINIT with KDC authentication.

   3.  Otherwise, the client uses anonymous PKINIT to get an anonymous
       TGT without KDC authentication and that TGT is the armor ticket.
       Note that this mode of operation is vulnerable to man-in-the-
       middle attacks at the time of obtaining the initial anonymous
       armor TGT.  The armor key can be a cross-team TGT obtained based
       on the initial primary TGT obtained using anonymous PKINIT
       without KDC authentication.

   Because the KDC does not know if the client is able to trust the
   ticket it has, the KDC MUST initialize the pre-authentication state
   to an unverified KDC.

6.5.2.  FAST Request

   A padata type PA_FX_FAST is defined for the Kerberos FAST pre-
   authentication padata.  The corresponding padata-value field
   [RFC4120] contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-FAST-
   REQUEST.
























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       PA_FX_FAST                         TBA
           -- Padata type for Kerberos FAST

       PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
           armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
           ...
       }

       KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
           armor        [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
               -- Contains the armor that identifies the armor key.
               -- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
               -- MUST be absent in TGS-REQ.
           req-checksum [1] Checksum,
               -- Checksum performed over the type KDC-REQ-BODY for
               -- the req-body field of the KDC-REQ structure defined in
               -- [RFC4120]
               -- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
               -- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
               -- the armor key, and the key usage number is
               -- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REA_CHKSUM.
           enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
               -- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
               -- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
           ...
       }

       KEY_USAGE_FAST_REA_CHKSUM          TBA
       KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC                 TBA

   The PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST structure contains a KrbFastArmoredReq type.
   The KrbFastArmoredReq encapsulates the encrypted padata.

   The enc-fast-req field contains an encrypted KrbFastReq structure.
   The armor key is used to encrypt the KrbFastReq structure, and the
   key usage number for that encryption is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ARMOR.

        KEY_USAGE_FAST_ARMOR               TBA

   The armor key is selected as follows:

   o  In an AS request, the armor field in the KrbFastArmoredReq
      structure MUST be present and the armor key is identified
      according to the specification of the armor type.

   o  In a TGS request, the armor field in the KrbFastArmoredReq
      structure MUST NOT be present and the subkey in the AP-REQ
      authenticator in the PA-TGS-REQ PA-DATA MUST be present.  In this



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      case, the armor key is that subkey in the AP-REQ authenticator.

   The req-checksum field contains a checksum that is performed over the
   type KDC-REQ-BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ [RFC4120]
   structure of the containing message.  The checksum key is the armor
   key, and the checksum type is the required checksum type for the
   enctype of the armor key per [RFC3961].  This checksum is included in
   order to bind the FAST data to the outer request.  A KDC that
   implements FAST will ignore the outer request, but including a
   checksum is relatively cheap and may prevent confusing behavior.

   The KrbFastReq structure contains the following information:

        KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
            fast-options [0] FastOptions,
                -- Additional options.
            padata       [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
                -- padata typed holes.
            req-body     [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
                -- Contains the KDC request body as defined in Section
                -- 5.4.1 of [RFC4120].
                -- This req-body field is preferred over the outer field
                -- in the KDC request.
             ...
        }

   The fast-options field indicates various options that are to modify
   the behavior of the KDC.  The following options are defined:

        FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
            -- reserved(0),
            -- anonymous(1),
            -- kdc-referrals(16)


      Bits    Name          Description
     -----------------------------------------------------------------
      0     RESERVED        Reserved for future expansion of this field.
      1     anonymous       Requesting the KDC to hide client names in
                            the KDC response, as described next in this
                            section.
      16    kdc-referrals   Requesting the KDC to follow referrals, as
                            described next in this section.

   Bits 1 through 15 (with bit 2 and bit 15 included) are critical
   options.  If the KDC does not support a critical option, it MUST fail
   the request with KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS (there is no
   accompanying e-data defined in this document for this error code).



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   Bit 16 and onward (with bit 16 included) are non-critical options.
   KDCs conforming to this specification ignores unknown non-critical
   options.

        KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_FAST_OPTIONS       TBA

   The anonymous Option

      The Kerberos response defined in [RFC4120] contains the client
      identity in clear text, This makes traffic analysis
      straightforward.  The anonymous option is designed to complicate
      traffic analysis.  If the anonymous option is set, the KDC
      implementing PA_FX_FAST MUST identify the client as the anonymous
      principal [KRB-ANON] in the KDC reply and the error response.
      Hence this option is set by the client if it wishes to conceal the
      client identity in the KDC response.  A conforming KD ignores the
      client principal name in the outer KDC-REQ-BODY field, and
      identifies the client using the cname and crealm fields in the
      req-body field of the KrbFastReq structure.

   The kdc-referrals Option

      The Kerberos client described in [RFC4120] has to request referral
      TGTs along the authentication path in order to get a service
      ticket for the target service.  The Kerberos client described in
      the [REFERRALS] need to contact the AS specified in the error
      response in order to complete client referrals.  The kdc-referrals
      option is designed to minimize the number of messages that need to
      be processed by the client.  This option is useful when, for
      example, the client may contact the KDC via a satellite link that
      has high network latency, or the client has limited computational
      capabilities.  If the kdc-referrals option is set, the KDC that
      honors this option acts as the client to follow AS referrals and
      TGS referrals [REFERRALS], and return the service ticket to the
      named server principal in the client request using the reply key
      expected by the client.  The kdc-referrals option can be
      implemented when the KDC knows the reply key.  The KDC can ignore
      kdc-referrals option when it does not understand it or it does not
      allow this option based on local policy.  The client SHOULD be
      able to process the KDC responses when this option is not honored
      by the KDC.

   The padata field contains a list of PA-DATA structures as described
   in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC4120].  These PA-DATA structures can contain
   FAST factors.  They can also be used as generic typed-holes to
   contain data not intended for proving the client's identity or
   establishing a reply key, but for protocol extensibility.




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   The KDC-REQ-BODY in the FAST structure is used in preference to the
   KDC-REQ-BODY outside of the FAST pre-authentication.  The outer KDC-
   REQ-BODY structure SHOULD be filled in for backwards compatibility
   with KDCs that do not support FAST.  A conforming KDC ignores the
   outer KDC-REQ-BODY field in the KDC request.

6.5.3.  FAST Response

   The KDC that supports the PA_FX_FAST padata MUST include a PA_FX_FAST
   padata element in the KDC reply.  In the case of an error, the
   PA_FX_FAST padata is included in the KDC responses according to
   Section 6.5.4.

   The corresponding padata-value field [RFC4120] for the PA_FX_FAST in
   the KDC response contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-
   FAST-REPLY.

      PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
          armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
          ...
      }

      KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
          enc-fast-rep      [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
              -- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
              -- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
          ...
      }
      KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP                 TBA

   The PA-FX-FAST-REPLY structure contains a KrbFastArmoredRep
   structure.  The KrbFastArmoredRep structure encapsulates the padata
   in the KDC reply in the encrypted form.  The KrbFastResponse is
   encrypted with the armor key used in the corresponding request, and
   the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.

   The Kerberos client who does not receive a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY in the
   KDC response MUST support a local policy that rejects the response.
   Clients MAY also support policies that fall back to other mechanisms
   or that do not use pre-authentication when FAST is unavailable.  It
   is important to consider the potential downgrade attacks when
   deploying such a policy.

   The KrbFastResponse structure contains the following information:







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     KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
         padata      [0] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
             -- padata typed holes.
         rep-key     [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
             -- This, if present, replaces the reply key for AS and TGS.
             -- MUST be absent in KRB-ERROR.
         finished    [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
             -- MUST be present if the client is authenticated,
             -- absent otherwise.
             -- Typically this is present if and only if the containing
             -- message is the last one in a conversation.
         ...
     }

   The padata field in the KrbFastResponse structure contains a list of
   PA-DATA structures as described in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC4120].  These
   PA-DATA structures are used to carry data advancing the exchange
   specific for the FAST factors.  They can also be used as generic
   typed-holes for protocol extensibility.

   The rep-key field, if present, contains the reply key that is used to
   encrypted the KDC reply.  The rep-key field MUST be absent in the
   case where an error occurs.  The enctype of the rep-key is the
   strongest mutually supported by the KDC and the client.

   The finished field contains a KrbFastFinished structure.  It is
   filled by the KDC in the final message in the conversation; it MUST
   be absent otherwise.  In other words, this field can only be present
   in an AS-REP or a TGS-REP when a ticket is returned.

   The KrbFastFinished structure contains the following information:

        KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
            timestamp   [0] KerberosTime,
            usec        [1] Microseconds,
                -- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
                -- the reply was generated.
            crealm      [2] Realm,
            cname       [3] PrincipalName,
                -- Contains the client realm and the client name.
            checksum    [4] Checksum,
                -- Checksum performed over all the messages in the
                -- conversation, except the containing message.
                -- The checksum key is the binding key as defined in
                -- Section 6.3, and the checksum type is the required
                -- checksum type of the binding key.
            ...
        }



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        KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED            TBA

   The timestamp and usec fields represent the time on the KDC when the
   reply ticket was generated, these fields have the same semantics as
   the corresponding-identically-named fields in Section 5.6.1 of
   [RFC4120].  The client MUST use the KDC's time in these fields
   thereafter when using the returned ticket.  Note that the KDC's time
   in AS-REP may not match the authtime in the reply ticket if the kdc-
   referrals option is requested and honored by the KDC.

   The cname and crealm fields identify the authenticated client.

   The checksum field contains a checksum of all the messages in the
   conversation prior to the containing message (the containing message
   is excluded).  The checksum key is the binding key as defined in
   Section 6.3, and the checksum type is the required checksum type of
   the enctype of that key, and the key usage number is
   KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED. [[anchor9: Examples would be good here; what
   all goes into the checksum?]]

   When FAST padata is included, the PA-FX-COOKIE padata as defined in
   Section 6.3 MUST also be included if the KDC expects at least one
   more message from the client in order to complete the authentication.

6.5.4.  Authenticated Kerberos Error Messages using Kerberos FAST

   If the Kerberos FAST padata was included in the request, unless
   otherwise specified, the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message
   [RFC4120] contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the type METHOD-DATA
   [RFC4120] and a PA_FX_FAST is included in the METHOD-DATA.  The KDC
   MUST include all the padata elements such as PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and
   padata elments that indicate acceptable pre-authentication mechanisms
   [RFC4120] and in the KrbFastResponse structure.

   If the Kerberos FAST padata is included in the request but not
   included in the error reply, it is a matter of the local policy on
   the client to accept the information in the error message without
   integrity protection.  The Kerberos client MAY process an error
   message without a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY, if that is only intended to
   return better error information to the application, typically for
   trouble-shooting purposes.

   In the cases where the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message is
   expected to carry a TYPED-DATA [RFC4120] element, the
   PA_FX_TYPED_DATA padata is included in the KrbFastResponse structure
   to encapsulate the TYPED-DATA [RFC4120] elements.  For example, the
   TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS structure is expected to be in the KRB-ERROR
   message when the error code is KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE



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   [RFC4556].

        PA_FX_TYPED_DATA                   TBA
            -- This is the padata element that encapsulates a TYPED-DATA
            -- structure.

   The corresponding padata-value for the PA_FX_TYPED_DATA padata type
   contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type TYPED-DATA [RFC4120].

6.5.5.  The Encrypted Challenge FAST Factor

   The encrypted challenge FAST factor authenticates a client using the
   client's long-term key.  This factor works similarly to the encrypted
   time stamp pre-authentication option described in [RFC4120].  The
   client encrypts a structure containing a timestamp in the challenge
   key.  The challenge key is KRB-FX-CF2(long_term_key, armor_key,
   "challengelongterm", "challengearmor").  Because the armor key is
   fresh and random, the challenge key is fresh and random.  The only
   purpose of the timestamp is to limit the validity of the
   authentication so that a request cannot be replayed.  A client MAY
   base the timestamp based on the KDC time in a KDC error and need not
   maintain accurate time synchronization itself.  If a client bases its
   time on an untrusted source, an attacker may trick the client into
   producing an authentication request that is valid at some future
   time.  The attacker may be able to use this authentication request to
   make it appear that a client has authenticated at that future time.
   If ticket-based armor is used, then the lifetime of the ticket will
   limit the window in which an attacker can make the client appear to
   have authenticated.  For many situations, the ability of an attacker
   to cause a client to appear to have authenticated is not a
   significant concern; the ability to avoid requiring time
   synchronization on clients is more valuable.

   The client sends a padata of type PA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE the
   corresponding padata-value contains the DER encoding of ASN.1 type
   EncryptedChallenge.

      EncryptedChallenge ::= EncryptedData
              -- Encrypted PA-ENC-TS-ENC, encrypted in the challenge key
              -- using key usage KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT for the
              --  client and KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC for the KDC.

      PA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE          TBA
      KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT  TBA
      KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC     TBA

   The client includes some time stamp reasonably close to the KDC's
   current time and encrypts it in the challenge key.  Clients MAY use



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   the current time; doing so prevents the exposure where an attacker
   can cause a client to appear to authenticate in the future.  The
   client sends the request including this factor.

   On receiving an AS-REQ containing the PA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE fast
   factor, the KDC decrypts the timestamp.  If the decryption fails the
   KDC SHOULD return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, including etype-info2 in
   the error [[anchor11: Or should this be KRB_APP_ERR_MODIFIED?]].  The
   KDC confirms that the timestamp falls within its current clock skew
   returning KRB_APP_ERR_SKEW if not.  The KDC then SHOULD check to see
   if the encrypted challenge is a replay.  The KDC MUST NOT consider
   two encrypted challenges replays simply because the time stamps are
   the same; to be a replay, the ciphertext MUST be identical.  It is
   not clear that RFC 3961 prevents encryption systems for which an
   attacker can transform one ciphertext into a different ciphertext
   yielding an identical plaintext.  So, it may not be safe to base
   replay detection on the ciphertext in the general case.  However the
   FAST tunnel provides integrity protection so requiring ciphertext be
   identical is secure in this instance.  Allowing clients to re-use
   time stamps avoids requiring that clients maintain state about which
   time stamps have been used.

   If the KDC accepts the encrypted challenge, it MUST include a padata
   element of type PA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE.  The KDC encrypts its current
   time in the challenge key.  The KDC MUST replace the reply key before
   issuing a ticket. [[anchor12: I'd like to say that the KDC replaces
   its reply key by this point.  However we need to decide at what
   points the FAST mechanism for replacing the reply key can be used and
   how that interacts with this.]]The client MUST check that the
   timestamp decrypts properly.  The client MAY check that the timestamp
   is in some reasonable skew of the current time.  The client MUST NOT
   require that the timestamp be identical to the timestamp in the
   issued credentials or the returned message.

   The encrypted challenge FAST factor provides the following
   facilities: client-authentication, KDC authentication.  It does not
   provide the strengthening-reply-key facility.  The security
   considerations section of this document provides an explanation why
   the security requirements are met.

   Conforming implementations MUST support the encrypted challenge FAST
   factor.

6.6.  Authentication Strength Indication

   Implementations that have pre-authentication mechanisms offering
   significantly different strengths of client authentication MAY choose
   to keep track of the strength of the authentication used as an input



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   into policy decisions.  For example, some principals might require
   strong pre-authentication, while less sensitive principals can use
   relatively weak forms of pre-authentication like encrypted timestamp.

   An AuthorizationData data type AD-Authentication-Strength is defined
   for this purpose.

        AD-authentication-strength         TBA

   The corresponding ad-data field contains the DER encoding of the pre-
   authentication data set as defined in Section 6.4.  This set contains
   all the pre-authentication mechanisms that were used to authenticate
   the client.  If only one pre-authentication mechanism was used to
   authenticate the client, the pre-authentication set contains one
   element.

   The AD-authentication-strength element MUST be included in the AD-IF-
   RELEVANT, thus it can be ignored if it is unknown to the receiver.


7.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines several new pa-data types, key usages and error
   codes.  In addition it would be good to track which pa-data items are
   only to be used as FAST factors.


8.  Security Considerations

   The kdc-referrals option in the Kerberos FAST padata requests the KDC
   to act as the client to follow referrals.  This can overload the KDC.
   To limit the damages of denied of service using this option, KDCs MAY
   restrict the number of simultaneous active requests with this option
   for any given client principal.

   Because the client secrets are known only to the client and the KDC,
   the verification of the authenticated timestamp proves the client's
   identity, the verification of the authenticated timestamp in the KDC
   reply proves that the expected KDC responded.  The encrypted reply
   key is contained in the rep-key in the PA-FX-FAST-REPLY.  Therefore,
   the authenticated timestamp FAST factor as a pre-authentication
   mechanism offers the following facilities: client-authentication,
   replacing-reply-key, KDC-authentication.  There is no un-
   authenticated clear text introduced by the authenticated timestamp
   FAST factor.






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9.  Acknowledgements

   Sam Hartman would like to thank the MIT Kerberos Consortium for its
   funding of his time on this project prior to April 2008.

   Several suggestions from Jeffery Hutzman based on early revisions of
   this documents led to significant improvements of this document.

   The proposal to ask one KDC to chase down the referrals and return
   the final ticket is based on requirements in [ID.CROSS].

   Joel Webber had a proposal for a mechanism similar to FAST that
   created a protected tunnel for Kerberos pre-authentication.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [KRB-ANON]
              Zhu, L. and P. Leach, "Kerberos Anonymity Support",
              draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-04.txt (work in progress), 2007.

   [REFERRALS]
              Raeburn, K. and L. Zhu, "Generating KDC Referrals to
              Locate Kerberos Realms",
              draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-10.txt (work in
              progress), 2007.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
              Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC4556]  Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
              Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556, June 2006.


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   [SHA2]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure 
              Hash Standard (SHS)", Federal Information Processing 
              Standards Publication 180-2, August 2002.  

   [X680]     ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002,
              Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
              (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.
   
   [X690]     ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
              Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER).              

10.2.  Informative References

   [EKE]      Bellovin, S. M. and M. Merritt. "Augmented 
              Encrypted Key Exchange: A Password-Based Protocol Secure 
              Against Dictionary Attacks and Password File Compromise". 
              Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and 
              Communications Security, ACM Press, November 1993.
   
   [HKDF]     Dang, Q. and P. Polk, draft-dang-nistkdf, work in 
              progress.

   [IEEE1363.2] 
              IEEE P1363.2: Password-Based Public-Key Cryptography, 
              2004.

   [ID.CROSS]
              Sakane, S., Zrelli, S., and M. Ishiyama , "Problem
              Statement on the Operation of Kerberos in a Specific
              System", draft-sakane-krb-cross-problem-statement-02.txt
              (work in progress), April 2007.

   [KRB-WG.SAM]

              Hornstein, K., Renard, K., Neuman, C., and G. Zorn,
              "Integrating Single-use Authentication Mechanisms with
              Kerberos", draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-sam-02.txt (work in
              progress), October 2003.


Appendix A.  Change History

   RFC editor, please remove this section before publication.

A.1.  Changes since 07

      Propose replacement of authenticated timestamp with encrypted
      challenge.  The desire to avoid clients needing time
      synchronization and to simply the factor.
      Add a requirement that any FAST armor scheme must provide a fresh
      key for each conversation.  This allows us to assume that anything
      encrypted/integrity protected in the right key is fresh and not
      subject to cross-conversation cut&paste.
      Removed heartbeat padata.  The KDC will double up messages if it
      needs to; the client simply sends its message and waits for the
      next response.
      Define PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_SELECTED
      Clarify a KDC cannot ignore padata is has clamed to support

A.2.  Changes since 06

      Note that even for replace reply key it is likely that the side
      using the mechanism will know that the other side supports it.
      Since it is reasonablly unlikely we'll need a container mechanism
      other than FAST itself, we don't need to optimize for that case.
      So, we want to optimize for implementation simplicity.  Thus if
      you do have such a container mechanism interacting with
      authentication sets we'll assume that the hint need to describe
      hints for all contained mechanisms.  This closes out a long-
      standing issue.
      Write up what Sam believes is the consensus on UI and prompts in
      the authentication set: clients MAY assume that they have all the
      UI information they need.


Appendix B.  ASN.1 module

     KerberosPreauthFramework {
           iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)



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           security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) preauth-framework(3)
     } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

     IMPORTS
          KerberosTime, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum,
          Int32, EncryptedData, PA-ENC-TS-ENC, PA-DATA, KDC-REQ-BODY,
          Microseconds, KerberosFlags
               FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
                 dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
                 modules(4) krb5spec2(2) };
                 -- as defined in RFC 4120.

     PA-FX-COOKIE ::= SEQUENCE {
         conversationId  [0] OCTET STRING,
            -- Contains the identifier of this conversation. This field
            -- must contain the same value for all the messages
            -- within the same conversation.
         enc-binding-key [1] EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
                         -- EncryptionKey --
            -- This field is present when and only when a FAST
            -- padata as defined in Section 6.5 is included.
            -- The encrypted data, when decrypted, contains an
            -- EncryptionKey structure.
            -- This encryption key is encrypted using the armor key
            -- (defined in Section 6.5.1), and the key usage for the
            -- encryption is KEY_USAGE_FAST_BINDING_KEY.
            -- Present only once in a converstation.
         cookie          [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
            -- Opaque data, for use to associate all the messages in
            -- a single conversation between the client and the KDC.
            -- This is generated by the KDC and the client MUST copy
            -- the exact cookie encapsulated in a PA_FX_COOKIE data
            -- element into the next message of the same conversation.
         ...
     }

     PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM

     PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
         pa-type      [0] Int32,
             -- same as padata-type.
         pa-hint      [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
         pa-value  [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
         ...
     }

     KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
         armor-type   [0] Int32,



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             -- Type of the armor.
         armor-value  [1] OCTET STRING,
             -- Value of the armor.
         ...
     }

     PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
         armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
         ...
     }

     KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
         armor        [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
             -- Contains the armor that identifies the armor key.
             -- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
             -- MUST be absent in TGS-REQ.
         req-checksum [1] Checksum,
             -- Checksum performed over the type KDC-REQ-BODY for
             -- the req-body field of the KDC-REQ structure defined in
             -- [RFC4120]
             -- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
             -- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
             -- the armor key, and the key usage number is
             -- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REA_CHKSUM.
         enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
             -- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
             -- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
         ...
     }

     KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
         fast-options [0] FastOptions,
             -- Additional options.
         padata       [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
             -- padata typed holes.
         req-body     [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
             -- Contains the KDC request body as defined in Section
             -- 5.4.1 of [RFC4120].
             -- This req-body field is preferred over the outer field
             -- in the KDC request.
          ...
     }

     FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
         -- reserved(0),
         -- anonymous(1),
         -- kdc-referrals(16)




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     PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
         armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
         ...
     }

     KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
         enc-fast-rep      [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
             -- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
             -- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
         ...
     }

     KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
         padata      [0] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
             -- padata typed holes.
         rep-key     [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
             -- This, if present, replaces the reply key for AS and TGS.
             -- MUST be absent in KRB-ERROR.
         finished    [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
             -- MUST be present if the client is authenticated,
             -- absent otherwise.
             -- Typically this is present if and only if the containing
             -- message is the last one in a conversation.
         ...
     }

     KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
         timestamp   [0] KerberosTime,
         usec        [1] Microseconds,
             -- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
             -- the reply was generated.
         crealm      [2] Realm,
         cname       [3] PrincipalName,
             -- Contains the client realm and the client name.
         checksum    [4] Checksum,
             -- Checksum performed over all the messages in the
             -- conversation, except the containing message.
             -- The checksum key is the binding key as defined in
             -- Section 6.3, and the checksum type is the required
             -- checksum type of the binding key.
         ...
     }

     EncryptedChallenge ::= EncryptedData
             -- Encrypted PA-ENC-TS-ENC, encrypted in the challenge key
             -- using key usage KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT for the
             --  client and KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC for the KDC.
     END



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Authors' Addresses

   Larry Zhu
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Email: lzhu@microsoft.com


   Sam hartman
   Painless Security

   Email: hartmans-ietf@mit.edu




































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Full Copyright Statement

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