

Kerberos Working Group                                            L. Zhu
Internet-Draft                                     Microsoft Corporation
Updates: 4120 (if approved)                                   S. Hartman
Intended status: Standards Track                                     MIT
Expires: September 6, 2007                                 March 5, 2007


        A Generalized Framework for Kerberos Pre-Authentication
                 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-05

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2007.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   Kerberos is a protocol for verifying the identity of principals
   (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open network.
   The Kerberos protocol provides a mechanism called pre-authentication
   for proving the identity of a principal and for better protecting the
   long-term secret of the principal.

   This document describes a model for Kerberos pre-authentication



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 1]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   mechanisms.  The model describes what state in the Kerberos request a
   pre-authentication mechanism is likely to change.  It also describes
   how multiple pre-authentication mechanisms used in the same request
   will interact.

   This document also provides common tools needed by multiple pre-
   authentication mechanisms.  One of these tools is a secure channel
   between the client and the KDC with a reply key delivery mechanism;
   this secure channel can be used to protect the authentication
   exchange thus eliminate offline dictionary attacks.  With these
   tools, it is straightforward to chain multiple authentication
   mechanisms, utilize a different key management system, or support a
   new key agreement algorithm.






































Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 2]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Conventions and Terminologies Used in This Document  . . . . .  5
   3.  Model for Pre-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Information Managed by the Pre-authentication Model  . . .  6
     3.2.  Initial Pre-authentication Required Error  . . . . . . . .  8
     3.3.  Client to KDC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.4.  KDC to Client  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Pre-Authentication Facilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  Client-authentication Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.2.  Strengthening-reply-key Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.3.  Replacing-reply-key Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.4.  KDC-authentication Facility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   5.  Requirements for Pre-Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Tools for Use in Pre-Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 15
     6.1.  Combining Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.2.  Protecting Requests/Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.3.  Managing States for the KDC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     6.4.  Pre-authentication Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.5.  Definition of Kerberos FAST Padata . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       6.5.1.  FAST and Encrypted Time Stamp  . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       6.5.2.  FAST Armors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       6.5.3.  FAST Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       6.5.4.  FAST Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       6.5.5.  Error Messages used with Kerberos FAST . . . . . . . . 28
     6.6.  Authentication Strength Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 34















Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 3]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


1.  Introduction

   The core Kerberos specification [RFC4120] treats pre-authentication
   data as an opaque typed hole in the messages to the KDC that may
   influence the reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply.  This
   generality has been useful: pre-authentication data is used for a
   variety of extensions to the protocol, many outside the expectations
   of the initial designers.  However, this generality makes designing
   more common types of pre-authentication mechanisms difficult.  Each
   mechanism needs to specify how it interacts with other mechanisms.
   Also, problems like combining a key with the long-term secret or
   proving the identity of the user are common to multiple mechanisms.
   Where there are generally well-accepted solutions to these problems,
   it is desirable to standardize one of these solutions so mechanisms
   can avoid duplication of work.  In other cases, a modular approach to
   these problems is appropriate.  The modular approach will allow new
   and better solutions to common pre-authentication problems to be used
   by existing mechanisms as they are developed.

   This document specifies a framework for Kerberos pre-authentication
   mechanisms.  It defines the common set of functions that pre-
   authentication mechanisms perform as well as how these functions
   affect the state of the request and reply.  In addition several
   common tools needed by pre-authentication mechanisms are provided.
   Unlike [RFC3961], this framework is not complete--it does not
   describe all the inputs and outputs for the pre-authentication
   mechanisms.  Pre-Authentication mechanism designers should try to be
   consistent with this framework because doing so will make their
   mechanisms easier to implement.  Kerberos implementations are likely
   to have plugin architectures for pre-authentication; such
   architectures are likely to support mechanisms that follow this
   framework plus commonly used extensions.

   One of these common tools is the flexible authentication secure
   tunneling (FAST) padata.  FAST provides a protected channel between
   the client and the KDC, and it also delivers a reply key within the
   protected channel.  Based on FAST, pre-authentication mechanisms can
   extend Kerberos with ease, to support, for example, password
   authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols with zero knowledge
   password proof (ZKPP) [EKE] [IEEE1363.2].  Any pre-authentication
   mechanism can be encapsulated in the FAST messages as defined in
   Section 6.5.  A pre-authentication type carried within FAST is called
   a FAST factor.  Creating a FAST factor is the easiest path to create
   a new pre-authentication mechanism.  FAST factors are significantly
   easier to analyze from a security standpoint than other pre-
   authentication mechanisms.

   Mechanism designers should design FAST factors, instead of new pre-



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 4]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   authentication mechanisms outside of FAST.

   This document should be read only after reading the documents
   describing the Kerberos cryptography framework [RFC3961] and the core
   Kerberos protocol [RFC4120].  This document freely uses terminology
   and notation from these documents without reference or further
   explanation.


2.  Conventions and Terminologies Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The word padata is used as the shorthand of pre-authentication data.

   A conversation is used to refer to all authentication messages
   exchanged between the client and the KDCs in order to authenticate
   the client principal.  A conversation as defined here consists of all
   messages that are necessary to complete the authentication between
   the client and the KDC.  It is the smallest logic unit for messages
   exchanged between the client and the KDC.


3.  Model for Pre-Authentication

   When a Kerberos client wishes to obtain a ticket using the
   authentication server, it sends an initial Authentication Service
   (AS) request.  If pre-authentication is required but not being used,
   then the KDC will respond with a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.
   Alternatively, if the client knows what pre-authentication to use, it
   MAY optimize away a round-trip and send an initial request with
   padata included in the initial request.  If the client includes the
   wrong padata, the KDC MAY return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED with no
   indication of what padata should have been included.  In that case,
   the client MUST retry with no padata and examine the error data of
   the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.  If the KDC includes pre-
   authentication information in the accompanying error data of
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, the client SHOULD process the error data, and
   then retry.

   The conventional KDC maintains no state between two requests;
   subsequent requests may even be processed by a different KDC.  On the
   other hand, the client treats a series of exchanges with KDCs as a
   single conversation.  Each exchange accumulates state and hopefully
   brings the client closer to a successful authentication.




Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 5]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   These models for state management are in apparent conflict.  For many
   of the simpler pre-authentication scenarios, the client uses one
   round trip to find out what mechanisms the KDC supports.  Then the
   next request contains sufficient pre-authentication for the KDC to be
   able to return a successful reply.  For these simple scenarios, the
   client only sends one request with pre-authentication data and so the
   conversation is trivial.  For more complex conversations, the KDC
   needs to provide the client with a cookie to include in future
   requests to capture the current state of the authentication session.
   Handling of multiple round-trip mechanisms is discussed in
   Section 6.3.

   This framework specifies the behavior of Kerberos pre-authentication
   mechanisms used to identify users or to modify the reply key used to
   encrypt the KDC reply.  The PA-DATA typed hole may be used to carry
   extensions to Kerberos that have nothing to do with proving the
   identity of the user or establishing a reply key.  Such extensions
   are outside the scope of this framework.  However mechanisms that do
   accomplish these goals should follow this framework.

   This framework specifies the minimum state that a Kerberos
   implementation needs to maintain while handling a request in order to
   process pre-authentication.  It also specifies how Kerberos
   implementations process the padata at each step of the AS request
   process.

3.1.  Information Managed by the Pre-authentication Model

   The following information is maintained by the client and KDC as each
   request is being processed:

   o  The reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply

   o  How strongly the identity of the client has been authenticated

   o  Whether the reply key has been used in this conversation

   o  Whether the reply key has been replaced in this conversation

   o  Whether the contents of the KDC reply can be verified by the
      client principal


   Conceptually, the reply key is initially the long-term key of the
   principal.  However, principals can have multiple long-term keys
   because of support for multiple encryption types, salts and
   string2key parameters.  As described in Section 5.2.7.5 of the
   Kerberos protocol [RFC4120], the KDC sends PA-ETYPE-INFO2 to notify



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 6]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   the client what types of keys are available.  Thus in full
   generality, the reply key in the pre-authentication model is actually
   a set of keys.  At the beginning of a request, it is initialized to
   the set of long-term keys advertised in the PA-ETYPE-INFO2 element on
   the KDC.  If multiple reply keys are available, the client chooses
   which one to use.  Thus the client does not need to treat the reply
   key as a set.  At the beginning of a request, the client picks a
   reply key to use.

   KDC implementations MAY choose to offer only one key in the PA-ETYPE-
   INFO2 element.  Since the KDC already knows the client's list of
   supported enctypes from the request, no interoperability problems are
   created by choosing a single possible reply key.  This way, the KDC
   implementation avoids the complexity of treating the reply key as a
   set.

   When the padata in the request is verified by the KDC, then the
   client is known to have that key, therefore the KDC SHOULD pick the
   same key as the reply key.

   At the beginning of handling a message on both the client and the
   KDC, the client's identity is not authenticated.  A mechanism may
   indicate that it has successfully authenticated the client's
   identity.  This information is useful to keep track of on the client
   in order to know what pre-authentication mechanisms should be used.
   The KDC needs to keep track of whether the client is authenticated
   because the primary purpose of pre-authentication is to authenticate
   the client identity before issuing a ticket.  The handling of
   authentication strength using various authentication mechanisms is
   discussed in Section 6.6.

   Initially the reply key has not been used.  A pre-authentication
   mechanism that uses the reply key to encrypt or checksum some data in
   the generation of new keys MUST indicate that the reply key is used.
   This state is maintained by the client and the KDC to enforce the
   security requirement stated in Section 4.3 that the reply key cannot
   be replaced after it is used.

   Initially the reply key has not been replaced.  If a mechanism
   implements the Replace Reply Key facility discussed in Section 4.3,
   then the state MUST be updated to indicate that the reply key has
   been replaced.  Once the reply key has been replaced, knowledge of
   the reply key is insufficient to authenticate the client.  The reply
   key is marked replaced in exactly the same situations as the KDC
   reply is marked as not being verified to the client principal.
   However, while mechanisms can verify the KDC reply to the client,
   once the reply key is replaced, then the reply key remains replaced
   for the remainder of the conversation.



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 7]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   Without pre-authentication, the client knows that the KDC reply is
   authentic and has not been modified because it is encrypted in a
   long-term key of the client.  Only the KDC and the client know that
   key.  So at the start of handling any message the KDC reply is
   presumed to be verified using the client principal's long-term key.
   Any pre-authentication mechanism that sets a new reply key not based
   on the principal's long-term secret MUST either verify the KDC reply
   some other way or indicate that the reply is not verified.  If a
   mechanism indicates that the reply is not verified then the client
   implementation MUST return an error unless a subsequent mechanism
   verifies the reply.  The KDC needs to track this state so it can
   avoid generating a reply that is not verified.

   The typical Kerberos request does not provide a way for the client
   machine to know that it is talking to the correct KDC.  Someone who
   can inject packets into the network between the client machine and
   the KDC and who knows the password that the user will give to the
   client machine can generate a KDC reply that will decrypt properly.
   So, if the client machine needs to authenticate that the user is in
   fact the named principal, then the client machine needs to do a TGS
   request for itself as a service.  Some pre-authentication mechanisms
   may provide a way for the client to authenticate the KDC.  Examples
   of this include signing the reply that can be verified using a well-
   known public key or providing a ticket for the client machine as a
   service.

3.2.  Initial Pre-authentication Required Error

   Typically a client starts a conversation by sending an initial
   request with no pre-authentication.  If the KDC requires pre-
   authentication, then it returns a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message.
   After the first reply with the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error code,
   the KDC returns the error code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED
   (defined in Section 6.3) for pre-authentication configurations that
   use multi-round-trip mechanisms; see Section 3.4 for details of that
   case. [[anchor3: Is it desirable to define a new error code for this?
   Probably but we need to call out to the WG.]]

   The KDC needs to choose which mechanisms to offer the client.  The
   client needs to be able to choose what mechanisms to use from the
   first message.  For example consider the KDC that will accept
   mechanism A followed by mechanism B or alternatively the single
   mechanism C. A client that supports A and C needs to know that it
   should not bother trying A.

   Mechanisms can either be sufficient on their own or can be part of an
   authentication set--a group of mechanisms that all need to
   successfully complete in order to authenticate a client.  Some



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 8]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   mechanisms may only be useful in authentication sets; others may be
   useful alone or in authentication sets.  For the second group of
   mechanisms, KDC policy dictates whether the mechanism will be part of
   an authentication set or offered alone.  For each mechanism that is
   offered alone, the KDC includes the pre-authentication type ID of the
   mechanism in the padata sequence returned in the
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.

   The KDC SHOULD NOT send data that is encrypted in the long-term
   password-based key of the principal.  Doing so has the same security
   exposures as the Kerberos protocol without pre-authentication.  There
   are few situations where pre-authentication is desirable and where
   the KDC needs to expose cipher text encrypted in a weak key before
   the client has proven knowledge of that key.

3.3.  Client to KDC

   This description assumes that a client has already received a
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED from the KDC.  If the client performs
   optimistic pre-authentication then the client needs to optimistically
   choose the information it would normally receive from that error
   response.

   The client starts by initializing the pre-authentication state as
   specified.  It then processes the padata in the
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED.

   When processing the response to the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, the
   client MAY ignore any padata it chooses unless doing so violates a
   specification to which the client conforms.  Clients conforming to
   this specification MUST NOT ignore the padata defined in Section 6.3.
   Clients SHOULD process padata unrelated to this framework or other
   means of authenticating the user.  Clients SHOULD choose one
   authentication set or mechanism that could lead to authenticating the
   user and ignore the rest.  Since the list of mechanisms offered by
   the KDC is in the decreasing preference order, clients typically
   choose the first mechanism or authentication set that the client can
   usefully perform.  If a client chooses to ignore a padata it MUST NOT
   process the padata, allow the padata to affect the pre-authentication
   state, nor respond to the padata.

   For each padata the client chooses to process, the client processes
   the padata and modifies the pre-authentication state as required by
   that mechanism.  Padata are processed in the order received from the
   KDC.

   After processing the padata in the KDC error, the client generates a
   new request.  It processes the pre-authentication mechanisms in the



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007               [Page 9]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   order in which they will appear in the next request, updating the
   state as appropriate.  The request is sent when it is complete.

3.4.  KDC to Client

   When a KDC receives an AS request from a client, it needs to
   determine whether it will respond with an error or an AS reply.
   There are many causes for an error to be generated that have nothing
   to do with pre-authentication; they are discussed in the core
   Kerberos specification.

   From the standpoint of evaluating the pre-authentication, the KDC
   first starts by initializing the pre-authentication state.  It then
   processes the padata in the request.  As mentioned in Section 3.3,
   the KDC MAY ignore padata that is inappropriate for the configuration
   and MUST ignore padata of an unknown type.

   At this point the KDC decides whether it will issue a pre-
   authentication required error or a reply.  Typically a KDC will issue
   a reply if the client's identity has been authenticated to a
   sufficient degree.

   In the case of a KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED error, the KDC
   first starts by initializing the pre-authentication state.  Then it
   processes any padata in the client's request in the order provided by
   the client.  Mechanisms that are not understood by the KDC are
   ignored.  Mechanisms that are inappropriate for the client principal
   or the request SHOULD also be ignored.  Next, it generates padata for
   the error response, modifying the pre-authentication state
   appropriately as each mechanism is processed.  The KDC chooses the
   order in which it will generate padata (and thus the order of padata
   in the response), but it needs to modify the pre-authentication state
   consistently with the choice of order.  For example, if some
   mechanism establishes an authenticated client identity, then the
   subsequent mechanisms in the generated response receive this state as
   input.  After the padata is generated, the error response is sent.
   Typically the errors with the code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED
   in a converstation will include KDC state as discussed in
   Section 6.3.

   To generate a final reply, the KDC generates the padata modifying the
   pre-authentication state as necessary.  Then it generates the final
   response, encrypting it in the current pre-authentication reply key.


4.  Pre-Authentication Facilities

   Pre-Authentication mechanisms can be thought of as providing various



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 10]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   conceptual facilities.  This serves two useful purposes.  First,
   mechanism authors can choose only to solve one specific small
   problem.  It is often useful for a mechanism designed to offer key
   management not to directly provide client authentication but instead
   to allow one or more other mechanisms to handle this need.  Secondly,
   thinking about the abstract services that a mechanism provides yields
   a minimum set of security requirements that all mechanisms providing
   that facility must meet.  These security requirements are not
   complete; mechanisms will have additional security requirements based
   on the specific protocol they employ.

   A mechanism is not constrained to only offering one of these
   facilities.  While such mechanisms can be designed and are sometimes
   useful, many pre-authentication mechanisms implement several
   facilities.  By combining multiple facilities in a single mechanism,
   it is often easier to construct a secure, simple solution than by
   solving the problem in full generality.  Even when mechanisms provide
   multiple facilities, they need to meet the security requirements for
   all the facilities they provide.  If the FAST factor approach is
   used, it is likely that one or a small number of facilities can be
   provided by a single mechanism without complicating the security
   analysis.

   According to Kerberos extensibility rules (Section 1.5 of the
   Kerberos specification [RFC4120]), an extension MUST NOT change the
   semantics of a message unless a recipient is known to understand that
   extension.  Because a client does not know that the KDC supports a
   particular pre-authentication mechanism when it sends an initial
   request, a pre-authentication mechanism MUST NOT change the semantics
   of the request in a way that will break a KDC that does not
   understand that mechanism.  Similarly, KDCs MUST NOT send messages to
   clients that affect the core semantics unless the client has
   indicated support for the message.

   The only state in this model that would break the interpretation of a
   message is changing the expected reply key.  If one mechanism changed
   the reply key and a later mechanism used that reply key, then a KDC
   that interpreted the second mechanism but not the first would fail to
   interpret the request correctly.  In order to avoid this problem,
   extensions that change core semantics are typically divided into two
   parts.  The first part proposes a change to the core semantic--for
   example proposes a new reply key.  The second part acknowledges that
   the extension is understood and that the change takes effect.
   Section 4.2 discusses how to design mechanisms that modify the reply
   key to be split into a proposal and acceptance without requiring
   additional round trips to use the new reply key in subsequent pre-
   authentication.  Other changes in the state described in Section 3.1
   can safely be ignored by a KDC that does not understand a mechanism.



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 11]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   Mechanisms that modify the behavior of the request outside the scope
   of this framework need to carefully consider the Kerberos
   extensibility rules to avoid similar problems.

4.1.  Client-authentication Facility

   The client authentication facility proves the identity of a user to
   the KDC before a ticket is issued.  Examples of mechanisms
   implementing this facility include the encrypted timestamp facility
   defined in Section 5.2.7.2 of the Kerberos specification [RFC4120].
   Mechanisms that provide this facility are expected to mark the client
   as authenticated.

   Mechanisms implementing this facility SHOULD require the client to
   prove knowledge of the reply key before transmitting a successful KDC
   reply.  Otherwise, an attacker can intercept the pre-authentication
   exchange and get a reply to attack.  One way of proving the client
   knows the reply key is to implement the Replace Reply Key facility
   along with this facility.  The PKINIT mechanism [RFC4556] implements
   Client Authentication alongside Replace Reply Key.

   If the reply key has been replaced, then mechanisms such as
   encrypted-timestamp that rely on knowledge of the reply key to
   authenticate the client MUST NOT be used.

4.2.  Strengthening-reply-key Facility

   Particularly, when dealing with keys based on passwords, it is
   desirable to increase the strength of the key by adding additional
   secrets to it.  Examples of sources of additional secrets include the
   results of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or key bits from the output
   of a smart card [KRB-WG.SAM].  Typically these additional secrets can
   be first combined with the existing reply key and then converted to a
   protocol key using tools defined in Section 6.1.

   If a mechanism implementing this facility wishes to modify the reply
   key before knowing that the other party in the exchange supports the
   mechanism, it proposes modifying the reply key.  The other party then
   includes a message indicating that the proposal is accepted if it is
   understood and meets policy.  In many cases it is desirable to use
   the new reply key for client authentication and for other facilities.
   Waiting for the other party to accept the proposal and actually
   modify the reply key state would add an additional round trip to the
   exchange.  Instead, mechanism designers are encouraged to include a
   typed hole for additional padata in the message that proposes the
   reply key change.  The padata included in the typed hole are
   generated assuming the new reply key.  If the other party accepts the
   proposal, then these padata are considered as an inner level.  As



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 12]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   with the outer level, one authentication set or mechanism is
   typically chosen for client authentication, along with auxiliary
   mechanisms such as KDC cookies, and other mechanisms are ignored.
   [[anchor6: Containers like this need more thought.  For example if
   you are constructing an authentication set do you expect to use a
   strengthen reply key mechanism in conjunction with something else, do
   you include the something else in the hint of the strengthen
   mechanism or as its own entry.  It's easier to configure and express
   the authentication set as its own entry.  However if you do that' the
   composition of the mechanisms looks in practice than it appears in
   the authentication set.]]  The party generating the proposal can
   determine whether the padata were processed based on whether the
   proposal for the reply key is accepted.

   The specific formats of the proposal message, including where padata
   are included is a matter for the mechanism specification.  Similarly,
   the format of the message accepting the proposal is mechanism-
   specific.

   Mechanisms implementing this facility and including a typed hole for
   additional padata MUST checksum that padata using a keyed checksum or
   encrypt the padata. [[anchor7: Why?  I suspect there's an obvious
   attack here but I need to work through it and add detail.  In
   particular, it seems that a checksum at the end should be
   sufficient.]]Typically the reply key is used to protect the padata.
   If you are only minimally increasing the strength of the reply key,
   this may give the attacker access to something too close to the
   original reply key.  However, binding the padata to the new reply key
   seems potentially important from a security standpoint.  There may
   also be objections to this from a double encryption standpoint
   because we also recommend client authentication facilities be tied to
   the reply key.

4.3.  Replacing-reply-key Facility

   The Replace Reply Key facility replaces the key in which a successful
   AS reply will be encrypted.  This facility can only be used in cases
   where knowledge of the reply key is not used to authenticate the
   client.  The new reply key MUST be communicated to the client and the
   KDC in a secure manner.  Mechanisms implementing this facility MUST
   mark the reply key as replaced in the pre-authentication state.
   Mechanisms implementing this facility MUST either provide a mechanism
   to verify the KDC reply to the client or mark the reply as unverified
   in the pre-authentication state.  Mechanisms implementing this
   facility SHOULD NOT be used if a previous mechanism has used the
   reply key.

   As with the strengthening-reply-key facility, Kerberos extensibility



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 13]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   rules require that the reply key not be changed unless both sides of
   the exchange understand the extension.  In the case of this facility
   it will likely be more common for both sides to know that the
   facility is available by the time that the new key is available to be
   used.  However, mechanism designers can use a container for padata in
   a proposal message as discussed in Section 4.2 if appropriate.

4.4.  KDC-authentication Facility

   This facility verifies that the reply comes from the expected KDC.
   In traditional Kerberos, the KDC and the client share a key, so if
   the KDC reply can be decrypted then the client knows that a trusted
   KDC responded.  Note that the client machine cannot trust the client
   unless the machine is presented with a service ticket for it
   (typically the machine can retrieve this ticket by itself).  However,
   if the reply key is replaced, some mechanism is required to verify
   the KDC.  Pre-authentication mechanisms providing this facility allow
   a client to determine that the expected KDC has responded even after
   the reply key is replaced.  They mark the pre-authentication state as
   having been verified.


5.  Requirements for Pre-Authentication Mechanisms

   This section lists requirements for specifications of pre-
   authentication mechanisms.

   For each message in the pre-authentication mechanism, the
   specification describes the pa-type value to be used and the contents
   of the message.  The processing of the message by the sender and
   recipient is also specified.  This specification needs to include all
   modifications to the pre-authentication state.

   Generally mechanisms have a message that can be sent in the error
   data of the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error message or in an
   authentication set.  If the client needs information such as trusted
   certificate authorities in order to determine if it can use the
   mechanism, then this information should be in that message.  In
   addition, such mechanisms should also define a pa-hint to be included
   in authentication sets.  Often, the same information included in the
   padata-value is appropriate to include in the pa-hint (as defined in
   Section 6.4).

   In order to ease security analysis the mechanism specification should
   describe what facilities from this document are offered by the
   mechanism.  For each facility, the security consideration section of
   the mechanism specification should show that the security
   requirements of that facility are met.  This requirement is



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 14]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   applicable to any FAST factor that provides authentication
   information.

   Significant problems have resulted in the specification of Kerberos
   protocols because much of the KDC exchange is not protected against
   authentication.  The security considerations section should discuss
   unauthenticated plaintext attacks.  It should either show that
   plaintext is protected or discuss what harm an attacker could do by
   modifying the plaintext.  It is generally acceptable for an attacker
   to be able to cause the protocol negotiation to fail by modifying
   plaintext.  More significant attacks should be evaluated carefully.

   As discussed in Section 6.3, there is no guarantee that a client will
   use the same KDCs for all messages in a conversation.  The mechanism
   specification needs to show why the mechanism is secure in this
   situation.  The hardest problem to deal with, especially for
   challenge/response mechanisms is to make sure that the same response
   cannot be replayed against two KDCs while allowing the client to talk
   to any KDC.


6.  Tools for Use in Pre-Authentication Mechanisms

   This section describes common tools needed by multiple pre-
   authentication mechanisms.  By using these tools mechanism designers
   can use a modular approach to specify mechanism details and ease
   security analysis.

6.1.  Combining Keys

   Frequently a weak key need to be combined with a stronger key before
   use.  For example, passwords are typically limited in size and
   insufficiently random, therefore it is desirable to increase the
   strength of the keys based on passwords by adding additional secrets.
   Additional source of secrecy may come from hardware tokens.

   This section provides standard ways to combine two keys into one.

   KRB-FX-CF1() is defined to combine two pass-phrases.

       KRB-FX-CF1(UTF-8 string, UTF-8 string) -> (UTF-8 string)
       KRB-FX-CF1(x, y) -> x || y

   Where || denotes concatenation.  The strength of the final key is
   roughly the total strength of the individual keys being combined
   assuming that the string_to_key() function [RFC3961] uses all its
   input evenly.




Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 15]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   An example usage of KRB-FX-CF1() is when a device provides random but
   short passwords, the password is often combined with a personal
   identification number (PIN).  The password and the PIN can be
   combined using KRB-FX-CF1().

   KRB-FX-CF2() combines two protocol keys based on the pseudo-random()
   function defined in [RFC3961].

   Given two input keys, K1 and K2, where K1 and K2 can be of two
   different enctypes, the output key of KRB-FX-CF2(), K3, is derived as
   follows:

       KRB-FX-CF2(protocol key, protocol key, octet string,
                 octet string)  ->  (protocol key)

       PRF+(K1, pepper1) -> octet-string-1
       PRF+(K2, pepper2) -> octet-string-2
       KRB-FX-CF2(K1, K2, pepper1, pepper2) ->
              random-to-key(octet-string-1 ^ octet-string-2)

   Where ^ denotes the exclusive-OR operation.  PRF+() is defined as
   follows:

    PRF+(protocol key, octet string) -> (octet string)

    PRF+(key, shared-info) -> pseudo-random( key,  1 || shared-info ) ||
                  pseudo-random( key, 2 || shared-info ) ||
                  pseudo-random( key, 3 || shared-info ) || ...

   Here the counter value 1, 2, 3 and so on are encoded as a one-octet
   integer.  The pseudo-random() operation is specified by the enctype
   of the protocol key.  PRF+() uses the counter to generate enough bits
   as needed by the random-to-key() [RFC3961] function for the
   encryption type specified for the resulting key; unneeded bits are
   removed from the tail.

   Mechanism designers MUST specify the pepper values when combining two
   keys using KRB-FX-CF2().  The pepper1 and pepper2 MUST be distinct so
   that if the two keys being combined are the same, the resulting key
   is not a trivial key.

6.2.  Protecting Requests/Responses

   Mechanism designers SHOULD protect clear text portions of pre-
   authentication data.  Various denial of service attacks and downgrade
   attacks against Kerberos are possible unless plaintexts are somehow
   protected against modification.  An early design goal of Kerberos
   Version 5 [RFC4120] was to avoid encrypting more of the



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 16]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   authentication exchange that was required.  (Version 4 doubly-
   encrypted the encrypted part of a ticket in a KDC reply, for
   example.)  This minimization of encryption reduces the load on the
   KDC and busy servers.  Also, during the initial design of Version 5,
   the existence of legal restrictions on the export of cryptography
   made it desirable to minimize of the number of uses of encryption in
   the protocol.  Unfortunately, performing this minimization created
   numerous instances of unauthenticated security-relevant plaintext
   fields.

   If there are more than one roundtrip for an authentication exchange,
   mechanism designers need to allow either the client or the KDC to
   provide a checksum of all the messages exchanged on the wire in the
   conversation, and the checksum is then verified by the receiver.

   Primitives defined in [RFC3961] are RECOMMENDED for integrity
   protection and confidentiality.  Mechanisms based on these primitives
   have the benefit of crypto-agility provided by [RFC3961].

   The advantage afforded by crypto-agility is the ability to avoid a
   multi-year standardization and deployment cycle to fix a problem that
   is specific to a particular algorithm, when real attacks do arise
   against that algorithm.

   New mechanisms MUST NOT be hard-wired to use a specific algorithm.

   Note that data used by FAST factors (defined in Section 6.5) are
   encrypted in a protected channel, in most cases, therefore no un-
   authenticated-text issue is associated with these mechanisms.
   However mechanism designers MUST consider the case carefully when the
   KDC authentication is not provided by Kerberos FAST.

6.3.  Managing States for the KDC

   [[anchor11: Kerberos is stateless today.  We can either maintain that
   and store all the state in a cookie or change that and require
   clients go to the same KDC for future requests.  Consider how this
   interacts with proxies.  The rest of this section assumes we maintain
   the current model.]]  Kerberos KDCs are stateless.  There is no
   requirement that clients will choose the same KDC for the second
   request in a conversation.  Proxies or other intermediate nodes may
   also influence KDC selection.  So, each request from a client to a
   KDC must include sufficient information that the KDC can regenerate
   any needed state.  This is accomplished by giving the client a
   potentially long opaque cookie in responses to include in future
   requests in the same conversation.  The KDC MAY respond that a
   conversation is too old and needs to restart by responding with a
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED error.



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 17]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


       KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED            TBA

   When a client receives this error, the client MUST abort the existing
   conversation, and restart a new one.

   An example, where more than one message from the client is needed, is
   when the client is authenticated based on a challenge-response
   scheme.  In that case, the KDC needs to keep track of the challenge
   issued for a client authentication request.

   The PA-FX-COOKIE pdata type is defined in this section to facilitate
   state management.  This padata is sent by the KDC when the KDC
   requires state for a future transaction.  The client includes this
   opaque token in the next message in the conversation.  The token may
   be relatively large; clients MUST be prepared for tokens somewhat
   larger than the size of all messages in a conversation.

       PA_FX_COOKIE                       TBA
           -- Stateless cookie that is not tied to a specific KDC.

   The corresponding padata-value field [RFC4120] contains the
   Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X60] [X690] encoding of the
   following Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) type PA-FX-COOKIE:

     PA-FX-COOKIE ::= SEQUENCE {
         Cookie            [1] OCTET STRING,
             -- Opaque data, for use to associate all the messages in a
             -- single conversation between the client and the KDC.
             -- This can be generated by either the client or the KDC.
             -- The receiver MUST copy the exact Cookie encapsulated in
             -- a PA_FX_COOKIE data element into the next message of the
             -- same conversation.
         ...
     }

   The content of the PA_FX_COOKIE padata is a local matter of the KDC.
   However the KDC MUST construct the token in such a manner that a
   malicious client cannot subvert the authentication process by
   manipulating the token.  The KDC implementation needs to consider
   expiration of tokens, key rollover and other security issues in token
   design.  The content of the Cookie field is likely specific to the
   pre-authentication mechanisms used to authenticate the client.  In
   order to compute the finished field in the KrbFastRespons structure
   as defined in Section 6.5.4, all the previous messages in the
   conversation MUST be included in the Cookie.  If a client
   authentication response can be replayed to multiple KDCs via the
   PA_FX_COOKIE mechanism, an expiration in the Cookie is RECOMMENDED to
   prevent the response being presented indefinitely.



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 18]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   If at least one more message for a mechanism or a mechanism set is
   expected by the KDC, the KDC returns a
   KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED error with a PA_FX_COOKIE to
   identify the conversation with the client.

       KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED   TBA

6.4.  Pre-authentication Set

   If all mechanisms in a group need to successfully complete in order
   to authenticate a client, the client and the KDC SHOULD use the
   PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET padata element.

   A PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET padata element contains the ASN.1 DER
   encoding of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET structure:

       PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM

       PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
           pa-type           [1] Int32,
               -- same as padata-type.
           pa-hint           [2] OCTET STRING,
               -- hint data.
           ...
       }

   The pa-type field of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM structure
   contains the corresponding value of padata-type in PA-DATA [RFC4120].
   Associated with the pa-type is a pa-hint, which is an octet-string
   specified by the pre-authentication mechanism.  This hint may provide
   information for the client which helps it determine whether the
   mechanism can be used.  For example a public-key mechanism might
   include the certificate authorities it trusts in the hint info.  Most
   mechanisms today do not specify hint info; if a mechanism does not
   specify hint info the KDC MUST NOT send a hint for that mechanism.
   To allow future revisions of mechanism specifications to add hint
   info, clients MUST ignore hint info received for mechanisms that the
   client believes do not support hint info. [[anchor12: What if you
   have a padata type as the first member of a set that requires a
   challenge.  For example SAM assumes that the KDC sends a challenge to
   the client initially.  That's not a pa-hint; that's a pa-value.  How
   do you convey that data with this?]] [[anchor13: The PA-SET appears
   only in the first message from the KDC to the client?  In particular,
   the client should not be prepared for the future authentication
   mechanisms to change as the conversation progresses.  I think this is
   correct; we should discuss and if the WG agrees the text should
   reflect this.]]




Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 19]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   When indicating which sets of padata are supported, the KDC includes
   a PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element for each authentication set.

   The client sends the padata-value for the first mechanism it picks in
   the authentication set, when the first mechanism completes, the
   client and the KDC will proceed with the second mechanism, and so on
   until all mechanisms complete successfully.  The PA_FX_COOKIE as
   defined in Section 6.3 MUST be sent by the KDC along with the first
   message that contains a PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET, in order to keep track
   of KDC states.

   [[anchor14: It's much easier to design UIs if you can determine ahead
   of time what all the elements of your dialogue will need to be.  If
   we mandate that the pa-hints need to be sufficient that you can
   determine what information you will require from a user ahead of time
   we can simplify the UI for login.  I propose that we make this
   requirement.  WG agreement required.]]

6.5.  Definition of Kerberos FAST Padata

   The cipher text exposure when using the encrypted timestamp pre-
   authentication data is a security concern for Kerberos.  Attackers
   can launch offline dictionary attack using the cipher text.  The FAST
   pre-authentication padata is a tool to mitigate this threat.  FAST
   also provides solutions to common problems for pre-authentication
   mechanisms such as binding of the request and the reply, freshness
   guarantee of the authentication.  FAST itself, however, does not
   authenticate the client or the KDC, instead, it provides a typed hole
   to allow pre-authentication data be tunneled.  A pre-authentication
   data element used within FAST is called a FAST factor.  A FAST factor
   captures the minimal work required for extending Kerberos to support
   a new authentication scheme.

   A FAST factor MUST NOT be used outside of FAST unless its
   specification explicitly allows so.  The typed holes in FAST messages
   can also be used as generic holes for other padata that are not
   intended to prove the client's identity, or establish the reply key.

   New pre-authentication mechanisms SHOULD be designed as FAST factors,
   instead of full-blown pre-authentication mechanisms.

   FAST factors that are pre-authentication mechanisms MUST meet the
   requirements in Section 5.

   FAST employs an armoring scheme.  The armor can be a host Ticket
   Granting Ticket (TGT), or an anonymous TGT obtained based on
   anonymous PKINIT [KRB-ANON], or a pre-shared long term key such as a
   host key.  The armoring TGT can be a cross-realm TGT.  The rest of



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 20]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   this section describes the types of armors and the messages used by
   FAST.

6.5.1.  FAST and Encrypted Time Stamp

   FAST provides new behavior for encrypted time stamp [RFC4120].  When
   used as a FAST factor, this mechanism provides stronger security
   guarantees.

   Implementations of the pre-authentication framework SHOULD use
   encrypted timestamp pre-authentication, if that is the mechanism to
   authenticate the client, as a FAST factor to avoid security exposure.

   The encrypted timestamp FAST factor MUST fill out the encrypted rep-
   key-package field as described in Section 6.5.4.  It provides the
   following facilities: client-authentication, replacing-reply-key,
   KDC-authentication.  It does not provide the strengthening-reply-key
   facility.  The security considerations section of this document
   provides an explanation why the security requirements are met.

6.5.2.  FAST Armors

   An armor key is used to encrypt pre-authentication data in the FAST
   request and the response.  The ArmorData structure is used to
   identify the armor key.  It contains the following two fields: the
   armor-type identifies the type of armor data, and the armor-value as
   an OCTET STRING contains the data.

       KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
           armor-type        [1] Int32,
               -- Type of the armor.
           armor-value       [2] OCTET STRING,
               -- Value of the armor.
           ...
       }

   The value of the armor key is a matter of the armor type
   specification.  The following armor types are currently defined :


       FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST  1
       FX_FAST_ARMOR_KEY_ID      2

   Conforming implementations MUST implement the
   FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor type.






Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 21]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


6.5.2.1.  Ticket-based Armors

   The FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor type is based on a Kerberos TGT.
   The armor-value field of an FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor contains
   an AP-REQ encoded in DER.  The subkey field in the AP-REQ MUST be
   present.  The armor key is the subkey in the AP-REQ authenticator.

   The ticket in the AP-REQ MUST be for the TGT service of the target
   KDC.  Here are 3 ways in the decreasing preference order how an armor
   TGT SHOULD be obtained:

   1.  If the client is authenticating from a host machine whose
       Kerberos realm has a trust path to the client's realm, the host
       machine obtains a TGT to the client's realm, and this ticket is
       the armor ticket.

   2.  Otherwise, the client's host machine cannot obtain a host ticket
       strictly based on RFC4120, but the KDC has a signing asymmetric
       key that the client can verify its binding with the expected KDC,
       the client then can use anonymous PKINIT to obtain a anonymous
       TGT, and use that TGT to as the armor ticket.

   3.  Otherwise, the client uses anonymous PKINIT to get an anonymous
       TGT without KDC authentication.  Note that this mode of operation
       is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks at the time of
       obtaining the initial anonymous TGT.

   Because the KDC does not know if the client is able to trust the
   ticket it has, the KDC and client MUST initialize the pre-
   authentication state to an unverified KDC.

6.5.2.2.  Key-based Armors

   The FX_FAST_ARMOR_KEY_ID armor type is used to carry an identifier of
   a key that is shared between the client host and the KDC.  The
   content and the encoding of the armor-data field of this armor type
   is a local matter of the communicating client and the expected KDC.
   The FX_FAST_ARMOR_KEY_ID armor is useful when the client host and the
   KDC does have a shared key and it is beneficial to minimize the
   number of messages exchanged between the client and the KDC, namely
   by eliminating the messages for obtaining a host ticket based on the
   host key. [[anchor19: Do we believe this has sufficient value to
   specify or do we want to assume all armor comes from tickets?]]

6.5.3.  FAST Request

   A padata type PA_FX_FAST is defined for the Kerberos FAST pre-
   authentication padata.  The corresponding padata-value field



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 22]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   [RFC4120] contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-FAST-
   REQUEST.

       PA_FX_FAST                         TBA
           -- Padata type for Kerberos FAST

       PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
           armored-data      [1] KrbFastAmoredReq,
           ...
       }

       KrbFastAmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
           armor             [1] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
               -- Contains the armor that determines the armor key.
               -- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
               -- MUST be absent in TGS-REQ.
           req-checksum      [2] Checksum,
               -- Checksum performed over the type KDC-REQ-BODY.
               -- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
               -- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
               -- the armor key, and the key usage number is
               -- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REA_CHKSUM.
           enc-fast-req      [3] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
               -- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
               -- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
           ...
       }

       KEY_USAGE_FAST_REA_CHKSUM          TBA
       KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC                 TBA

   The PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST contains a KrbFastAmoredReq structure.  The
   KrbFastAmoredReq encapsulates the encrypted padata.

   The armor key is used to encrypt the KrbFastReq structure, and the
   key usage number for that encryption is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ARMOR.

       KEY_USAGE_FAST_ARMOR               TBA

   The armor key is identified as follows:

   o  When a KrbFastAmoredReq is included in an AS request, the armor
      field MUST be present in the initial AS-REQ in a conversation,
      specifying the armor key being used.  The armor field MUST be
      absent in any subsequent AS-REQ of the same conversation.  In
      other words, the armor key is specified explicitly in the initial
      AS-REQ in a conversation, and implicitly thereafter.




Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 23]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   o  When a KrbFastAmoredReq is included in a TGS request, the armor
      field MUST be absent.  In which case, the subkey in the AP-REQ
      authenticator in the PA-TGS-REQ PA-DATA MUST be present, and the
      armor key is implicitly that subkey.

   The req-checksum field contains a checksum that is performed over the
   type KDC-REQ-BODY of the containing message.  The checksum key is the
   armor key, and the checksum type is the required checksum type for
   the enctype of the armor key.

   The enc-fast-req field contains an encrypted KrbFastReq structure.
   The KrbFastReq structure contains the following information:

       KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
           fast-options      [0] FastOptions,
               -- Additional options.
           padata            [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
               -- padata typed holes.
           crealm            [2] Realm OPTIONAL,
           cname             [3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
               -- Contains the client realm and the client name.
               -- If present, the client name and realm in the
               -- AS_REQ KDC-REQ-BODY [RFC4120] MUST be ignored.
           ...
       }

   The fast-options field indicates various options that are to modify
   the behavior of the KDC.  The meanings of the options are as follows:

      FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
          -- reserved(0),
          -- anonymous(1),
          -- kdc-referrals(16)


      Bits    Name          Description
     -----------------------------------------------------------------
      0     RESERVED        Reserved for future expansion of this field.
      1     anonymous       Requesting the KDC to hide client names in
                            the KDC response, as described next in this
                            section.
      16    kdc-referrals   Requesting the KDC to follow referrals, as
                            described next in this section.

   Bits 1 through 15 (with bit 2 and bit 15 included) are critical
   options.  If the KDC does not understand a critical option, it MUST
   fail the request.  Bit 16 and onward (with bit 16 included) are non-
   critical options.  KDCs conforming to this specification ignores



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 24]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   unknown non-critical options.

   The anonymous Option

      The Kerberos response defined in [RFC4120] contains the client
      identity in clear text, This makes traffic analysis
      straightforward.  The anonymous option is designed to complicate
      traffic analysis performed over the messages exchanged between the
      client and the KDC.  If the anonymous option is set, the KDC
      implementing PA_FX_FAST MUST identify the client as the anonymous
      principal in the KDC reply and the error response.  Hence this
      option is set by the client if it wishes to conceal the client
      identity in the KDC response.

   The kdc-referrals Option

      The Kerberos client described in [RFC4120] has to request referral
      TGTs along the authentication path in order to get a service
      ticket for the target service.  The Kerberos client described in
      the [REFERRALS] need to contact the AS specified in the error
      response in order to complete client referrals.  The kdc-referrals
      option is designed to minimize the number of messages that need to
      be processed by the client.  This option is useful when, for
      example, the client may contact the KDC via a satellite link that
      has high latency, or the client has limited computational
      capabilities.  If the kdc-referrals option is set, the KDC that
      honors this option acts as the client to follow AS referrals and
      TGS referrals [REFERRALS], and return the ticket thus-obtained
      using the reply key expected by the client.  The kdc-referrals
      option can be implemented when the KDC knows the reply key.  The
      KDC can ignore kdc-referrals option when it does not understand it
      or it does not allow this option based on local policy.  The
      client MUST be able to process the KDC responses when this option
      is not honored by the KDC, unless otherwise specified.

   The padata field contains a list of PA-DATA structures as described
   in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC4120].  These PA-DATA structures can contain
   FAST factors.  They can also be used as generic typed-holes to
   contain data not intended for proving the client's identity or
   establishing a reply key, but for protocol extensibility.

   The crealm field and the cname field identify the client principal in
   the ticket request.  If either the crealm field or the cname field is
   present, the corresponding crealm or cname field in the KDC-REQ-BODY
   [RFC4120] of an AS-REQ MUST be ignored.  The client can fill in these
   fields in the KrbFastReq structure and leaves the cname field and the
   crealm field KDC-REQ-BODY absent, thus conceals its identity in the
   AS-REQ.



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 25]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


6.5.4.  FAST Response

   The KDC that supports the PA_FX_FAST padata MUST include a PA_FX_FAST
   padata element in the KDC reply and/or the error response, when the
   client and the KDC agreed upon the armor key.  The corresponding
   padata-value field [RFC4120] in the KDC response is the DER encoding
   of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-FAST-REPLY.

      PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
          armored-data      [1] KrbFastArmoredRep,
          ...
      }

      KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
          enc-fast-rep      [1] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
              -- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
              -- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
          ...
      }
      KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP                 TBA

   The PA-FX-FAST-REPLY structure contains a KrbFastArmoredRep
   structure.  The KrbFastArmoredRep structure encapsulates the padata
   in the KDC reply in the encrypted form.  The KrbFastResponse is
   encrypted with the armor key used in the corresponding request, and
   the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.

   The Kerberos client who does not receive a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY in the
   KDC response MUST support a local policy that rejects the request.
   Clients MAY also support policies that fall back to other mechanisms
   or that do not use pre-authentication when FAST is unavailable.  It
   is important to consider the potential downgrade attacks when
   deploying such a policy.  The Kerberos client MAY process an error
   message without a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY, if that is only intended to
   return better error information to the application, typically for
   trouble-shooing purposes.

   The KrbFastResponse structure contains the following information:

      KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
          padata            [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
              -- padata typed holes.
          finished          [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
              -- MUST be present if the client is authenticated,
              -- absent otherwise.
              -- Typically this is present if and only if the containing
              -- message is the last one in a conversation.
          ...



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 26]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


      }

   The padata field in the KrbFastResponse structure contains a list of
   PA-DATA structures as described in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC4120].  These
   PA-DATA structures are used to carry data advancing the exchange
   specific for the FAST factors.  They can also be used as generic
   typed-holes for protocol extensibility.

   The finished field contains a KrbFastFinished structure.  It is
   filled by the KDC in the final message in the conversation; it MUST
   be absent otherwise.  Consequently this field can only be present in
   an AS-REP or a TGS-REP when a ticket is returned.

   The KrbFastFinished structure contains the following information:

     KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
         timestamp         [1] KerberosTime,
         usec              [2] Microseconds,
             -- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
             -- the reply was generated.
         rep-key-package   [3]  EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
                       -- EncryptionKey --
             -- This, if present, replaces the reply key for AS and TGS.
             -- The encryption key is the client key, unless otherwise
             -- specified. The key usage number is
             -- KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED.
         crealm            [4] Realm,
         cname             [5] PrincipalName,
             -- Contains the client realm and the client name.
         checksum          [6] Checksum,
             -- Checksum performed over all the messages in the
             -- conversation, except the containing message.
             -- The checksum key is the ticket session key of the reply
             -- ticket, and the checksum type is the required checksum
             -- type of that key.
         ...
     }
     KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP_KEY             TBA
     KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED            TBA

   The timestamp and usec fields represent the time on the KDC when the
   reply ticket was generated, these fields have the same semantics as
   the corresponding-identically-named fields in Section 5.6.1 of
   [RFC4120].  The client MUST use the KDC's time in these fields
   thereafter when using the returned ticket.  Note that the KDC's time
   in AS-REP may not match the authtime in the reply ticket if the kdc-
   referrals option is requested and honored by the KDC.




Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 27]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   The rep-key-package field, if present, contains the reply key
   encrypted using the client key unless otherwise specified.  The key
   usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP_KEY.

   When the encrypted timestamp FAST factor is used in the request, the
   rep-key-package field MUST be present and the client key is used to
   encrypt the reply key enclosed in the KrbFastArmoredRep.

   The cname and crealm fields identify the authenticated client.

   The checksum field contains a checksum of all the messages in the
   conversation prior to the containing message (the containing message
   is excluded).  The checksum key is the ticket session key of the
   reply ticket, the checksum type is the required checksum type of the
   enctype of that key, and the key usage number is
   KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED.

6.5.5.  Error Messages used with Kerberos FAST

   If the Kerberos FAST padata was included in the request, unless
   otherwise specified, the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message
   [RFC4120] contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the type METHOD-DATA
   [RFC4120], where a PA_FX_FAST padata element is included and it
   contains the DER encoding of the type PA-FX-FAST-REPLY.  If the
   e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message contains the DER encoding of a
   TYPED-DATA, a typed data element TD_FX_FAST SHOULD be included in the
   e-data if the Kerberos FAST padata is included in the request, and
   the corresponding data-value field [RFC4120] contains the ASN.1 DER
   encoding of the type PA-FX-FAST-REPLY.  In other words, the typed
   data element type TD_FX_FAST is allocated to encapsulate the FAST
   reply message in the error responses.  If a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY is not
   included in the error reply, it is a matter of the local policy on
   the client to accept the information in the error message without
   integrity protection. [[anchor21: Why do we want padata in arbitrary
   error responses?  What if the KDC cannot generate a fast reply
   because for example no armor nor state cookie was included in a
   request?  Also, we need to confirm that the WG is OK with a pre-
   authentication specification changing error returns for unrelated
   errors.]]

       TD_FX_FAST                         TBA
           -- Typed data element type for Kerberos FAST

6.6.  Authentication Strength Indication

   Implementations that have pre-authentication mechanisms offering
   significantly different strengths of client authentication MAY choose
   to keep track of the strength of the authentication used as an input



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 28]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


   into policy decisions.  For example, some principals might require
   strong pre-authentication, while less sensitive principals can use
   relatively weak forms of pre-authentication like encrypted timestamp.

   An AuthorizationData data type AD-Authentication-Strength is defined
   for this purpose.

       AD-authentication-strength         TBA

   The corresponding ad-data field contains the DER encoding of the pre-
   authentication data set as defined in Section 6.4.  This set contains
   all the pre-authentication mechanisms that were used to authenticate
   the client.  If only one pre-authentication mechanism was used to
   authenticate the client, the pre-authentication set contains one
   element.

   The AD-authentication-strength element MUST be included in the AD-IF-
   RELEVANT, thus it can be ignored if it is unknown to the receiver.


7.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines FAST factors, these are mini- and light-
   weighted- pre-authentication mechanisms.  A new IANA registry should
   be setup for registering FAST factor IDs.  The evaluation policy is
   "Specification Required".


8.  Security Considerations

   The kdc-referrals option in the Kerberos FAST padata requests the KDC
   to act as the client to follow referrals.  This can overload the KDC.
   To limit the damages of denied of service using this option, KDCs MAY
   restrict the number of simultaneous active requests with this option
   for any given client principal.

   Because the client secrets are known only to the client and the KDC,
   the verification of the encrypted timestamp proves the client's
   identity, the verification of the encrypted rep-key-package in the
   KDC reply proves that the expected KDC responded.  The encrypted
   reply key is contained in the rep-key-package in the PA-FX-FAST-
   REPLY.  Therefore, the encrypted timestamp FAST factor as a pre-
   authentication mechanism offers the following facilities: client-
   authentication, replacing-reply-key, KDC-authentication.  There is no
   un-authenticated clear text introduced by the encrypted timestamp
   FAST factor.





Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 29]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


9.  Acknowledgements

   Several suggestions from Jeffery Hutzman based on early revisions of
   this documents led to significant improvements of this document.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [KRB-ANON] Zhu, L., Leach, P. and Jaganathan, K., "Kerberos Anonymity 
              Support", draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon, work in progress.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
              Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [REFERALS] Raeburn, K. et al, "Generating KDC Referrals to Locate 
              Kerberos Realms", draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals, 
              work in progress.

   [SHA2]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure 
              Hash Standard (SHS)", Federal Information Processing 
              Standards Publication 180-2, August 2002.  

   [X680]     ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002,
              Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
              (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.
   
   [X690]     ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
              Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER).

10.2.  Informative References

   [EKE]      Bellovin, S. M. and M. Merritt. "Augmented 
              Encrypted Key Exchange: A Password-Based Protocol Secure 
              Against Dictionary Attacks and Password File Compromise". 
              Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and 
              Communications Security, ACM Press, November 1993.
   
   [HKDF]     Dang, Q. and P. Polk, draft-dang-nistkdf, work in 
              progress.

   [IEEE1363.2] 
              IEEE P1363.2: Password-Based Public-Key Cryptography, 
              2004.

   [KRB-WG.SAM]
              Hornstein, K., Renard, K., Neuman, C., and G. Zorn,
              "Integrating Single-use Authentication Mechanisms with
              Kerberos", draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-sam-02.txt (work in
              progress), October 2003.

   [RFC4556]  Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
              Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556, June 2006.


Appendix A.  ASN.1 module

     KerberosPreauthFramework {
            iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
            security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) preauth-framework(3)
     } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

     IMPORTS
           KerberosTime, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum,
           Int32, EncryptedData, PA-DATA
                FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
                  dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
                  modules(4) krb5spec2(2) };
                  -- as defined in RFC 4120.

     PA-FX-COOKIE ::= SEQUENCE {



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 30]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


         Cookie            [1] OCTET STRING,
             -- Opaque data, for use to associate all the messages in a
             -- single conversation between the client and the KDC.
             -- This can be generated by either the client or the KDC.
             -- The receiver MUST copy the exact Cookie encapsulated in
             -- a PA_FX_COOKIE data element into the next message of the
             -- same conversation.
         ...
     }

     PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM

     PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
         pa-type           [1] Int32,
             -- same as padata-type.
         pa-hint           [2] OCTET STRING,
             -- hint data.
         ...
     }

     PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
         armored-data      [1] KrbFastAmoredReq,
         ...
     }

     KrbFastAmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
         armor             [1] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
             -- Contains the armor that determines the armor key.
             -- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
             -- MUST be absent in TGS-REQ.
         req-checksum      [2] Checksum,
             -- Checksum performed over the type KDC-REQ-BODY.
             -- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
             -- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
             -- the armor key, and the key usage number is
             -- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REA_CHKSUM.
         enc-fast-req      [3] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
             -- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
             -- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
         ...
     }

     KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
         armor-type        [1] Int32,
             -- Type of the armor.
         armor-value       [2] OCTET STRING,
             -- Value of the armor.
         ...



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 31]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


     }

     KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
         fast-options      [0] FastOptions,
             -- Additional options.
         padata            [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
             -- padata typed holes.
         crealm            [2] Realm OPTIONAL,
         cname             [3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
             -- Contains the client realm and the client name.
             -- If present, the client name and realm in the
             -- AS_REQ KDC-REQ-BODY [RFC4120] MUST be ignored.
         ...
     }

     FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
         -- reserved(0),
         -- anonymous(1),
         -- kdc-referrals(16)

     PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
         armored-data      [1] KrbFastArmoredRep,
         ...
     }

     KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
         enc-fast-rep      [1] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
             -- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
             -- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
         ...
     }

     KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
         padata            [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
             -- padata typed holes.
         finished          [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
             -- MUST be present if the client is authenticated,
             -- absent otherwise.
             -- Typically this is present if and only if the containing
             -- message is the last one in a conversation.
         ...
     }

     KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
         timestamp         [1] KerberosTime,
         usec              [2] Microseconds,
             -- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
             -- the reply was generated.



Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 32]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


         rep-key-package   [3]  EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
                       -- EncryptionKey --
             -- This, if present, replaces the reply key for AS and TGS.
             -- The encryption key is the client key, unless otherwise
             -- specified. The key usage number is
             -- KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED.
         crealm            [4] Realm,
         cname             [5] PrincipalName,
             -- Contains the client realm and the client name.
         checksum          [6] Checksum,
             -- Checksum performed over all the messages in the
             -- conversation, except the containing message.
             -- The checksum key is the ticket session key of the reply
             -- ticket, and the checksum type is the required checksum
             -- type of that key.
         ...
     }
     END


Authors' Addresses

   Larry Zhu
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Email: lzhu@microsoft.com


   Sam hartman
   MIT

   Email: hartmans@mit.edu
















Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 33]

Internet-Draft         Kerberos Preauth Framework             March 2007


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.


Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





Zhu & Hartman           Expires September 6, 2007              [Page 34]


